RECENT CARIBBEAN MIGRATIONS:
NEGIGIBLE OR NEGLCETED FACTOR

by Jean Pierre GUENGANT

Demographer - ORSTOM
"Office de la Recherche Scientifique
et Technique Outre-Mer"
Centre de la Guadeloupe.

Member of the
"Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Cara"
beennes"
Université des Antilles et de la Guyane

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Virtually every demographic analysis of the Caribbean region made during the past thirty years has predicted that emigration would be negligible. But net emigration increased during the 1960's and the decrease predicted for the 1970's did not take place. In fact, net emigration from some countries increased during the seventies.

The main explanation of this gap between prediction and reality is the prevailing misconception of emigration from the Caribbean. Traditionally, researchers have assumed that the volume of emigration depends on available outlets rather than on local conditions. But Caribbean emigration is more complex than this and its ability to adapt to changing conditions has proved greater than expected. The recent development of return migration, as well as the incidence of illegal migration, are examples of these adaptations.

The belief that emigration has been negligible is reinforced by the generally low estimates of annual net emigration, that is excess emigration over immigration, derived from entry-departure statistics. Although, historically, this source has grossly underestimated the annual net emigration flows, it has been used consistently for yearly population estimates. Furthermore, the difficulties encountered in assessing migration trends, together with their assumed dependence on available outlets, has been used to justify the fact that little consideration is given to migration in population projections. As a result, current population estimates and population forecasts, both important tools for national planning, have been particularly inaccurate for several countries.

But the most important consequence of the belief that emigration was, or would be, negligible has been the lack of attention given to the impact of migration on society. Economically, emigration has been considered

1 In this paper the Caribbean or the Caribbean region refers, unless otherwise specified, to all the islands of the Caribbean plus the four mainland countries: Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana and Belize, generally associated with the Caribbean Islands.
mainly as an escape valve. In the Caribbean context of large labour surpluses, its effects have been deemed positive, and its negative effects are rarely considered. Concerning the human aspects, emigration has been controlled by the existing regulations in the receiving countries. These regulations have not been questioned and illegal migration has been treated as a criminal matter.

For all these reasons, emigration should no longer be seen just as a factor to balance demographic equations. Rather, the migration variable must be integrated into the national development plans. The past attitudes of "laissez faire" must be abandoned. This paper hopes to contribute to a better consideration of migration in the varying contexts of each Caribbean country, especially the CARICOM countries. It will analyze the changing patterns of migration movements after World War II; examine ways to assess migration trends and consequences more accurately; and it will present an overview of the economic and human aspects of migration movements.

THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF MIGRATION MOVEMENTS AFTER WORLD WAR II

With hindsight, criticism is, of course, easy. However, it may be valuable to underline some of the factors, not taken into account in the 1950's, which explain the massive unpredicted emigration to the metropoles during the past thirty years. It was assumed that emigration levels would depend on free movement to neighbouring countries, and would be determined by available outlets. Thus, it was assumed that emigration would be limited. This assumption has proved to be completely wrong for several countries in the 1970's.

A Negligible Factor

Although the Caribbean countries experienced quite significant migration movements for almost a century after Emancipation (until the 1930's), the general feeling after World War II was that prospects for new emigration were limited. The previous movements (intra-territorial migration to Trinidad and Guyana, inter-Caribbean migration to Panama, Central American Republics, Venezuela, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, as well as emigration to the United States) had come to an end by the 1930's. A decline in the need for immigrant labour and the deteriorating economic conditions in the host countries led not only to the end of the former movements, but also to the repatriation of large numbers of West Indian workers [Marshall, 1982]. In addition, most host countries adopted restrictive immigration policies or attitudes that often discriminated against potential West Indian immigrants. For example, in 1936 Venezuela passed a law excluding all non-white immigrants, while in 1937 thousands (5,000 to 25,000 depending on the sources) of Haitian workers were massacred in the Dominican Republic [Veraz, 1983]. Although some significant migration occurred during World War II, to Trinidad and to the United States, it was believed that these movements were temporary.

In this context, the population projections for the British Caribbean made for the 1946-1961 period assumed that no migration would take place during the 1950's [Roberts, 1950]. This assumption was cautiously justified in the following terms:

"In so far as there are now fewer avenues of free migration open to West Indians outside these territories (the former receiving Caribbean countries), such an assumption (of no migration) may not be unrealistic though the assumption that no inter Caribbean movements would take place may be less plausible".

This view was shared in the French West Indies even though there was a possibility of migration to French Guiana. Puerto Rico was the only case where emigration was envisaged, to the United States, because it was a free movement to a relatively close metropole.

Despite these predictions, the 1950's witnessed the beginning of massive emigration movements to the metropoles whereas inter-territorial migration remained comparatively small. Nevertheless, the assumption that emigration to the metropoles would not be important in the 1950's was not unfounded. Only Puerto Rico, the British islands with the exception of Trinidad, and Aruba registered high net emigration during the 1950's - all directed mainly at their respective colonial metropoles (see Appendix 1). Thus, of the 800,000 people who left the region during this decade, 470,000 or nearly 60 per cent, were from Puerto Rico, and 260,000, about 30 per cent, were from the British islands.

Because of the idiosyncrasies of these movements, the assumption that emigration would remain negligible was not seriously questioned in the 1960's. The sharp decrease in Puerto Rican net out migration in the 1960's,
as a result of return migration, as well as the low levels of emigration from the French islands, reinforced this assumption. In 1962 the French Government, which wanted to promote the emigration of Guadeloupeans and Martinicans to France, even set up a state office that covered the travel expenses of the emigrants and facilitated their settling in France.

In 1962, the Commonwealth Immigration Act restricted considerably the possibilities of Commonwealth citizens settling in the United Kingdom. A drastic reduction of emigration from the British Caribbean was therefore predicted. Consequently, prevailing ideas about future emigration levels changed. The decisive factor underlying Caribbean emigration was no longer thought to be the existence of outlets to which movement was free but, rather, the availability of outlets to which movement was controlled.

Emigration Levels and Possible Outlets

The migration movements from, and within, the Caribbean were much more important in the 1960's than in the 1950's. According to census results, in the 1960's the region lost about 1.7 million people - twice as many as during the 1950's. Of this total, the CARICOM countries accounted for about 600,000 (35 per cent), while the three largest and oldest independent nations (Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic) accounted for an estimated 850,000 (50 per cent). (Appendix 1).

Thus the dramatic increase in net emigration during the 1960's was mainly due to increased emigration from countries faced with restricted outlets. The relaxation of immigration policies in the United States and Canada has been given as the major reason for this phenomenon. In fact this reason was only valid in the late 1960's since the new American regulations, although passed in 1965, were not fully operational until 1968, while the new Canadian regulations were introduced in 1967. Therefore, the continuation of emigration to the United Kingdom for family reunification purposes, as allowed by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, also contributed significantly to the high emigration levels from the CARICOM countries in the 1960's. But the 1960's also witnessed the revival of inter-island movements, especially to the Bahamas and to the US Virgin Islands, where the rapidly growing tourist industry needed imported manpower. In addition, Haitian workers were once again required by the sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic. Although numerically important, these movements remained smaller than the movements to the metropoles. Moreover, they were believed to be temporary.

In the early 1970's, since all restricted outlets seemed to be known, most demographers became more cautious. They assumed that in the case of countries faced with restricted outlets, the emigration levels observed in the 1960's were too high for the 1970's (Mintz, 1968; Segal, 1975; Massiah, 1976). In the mid-seventies, this belief was reinforced because the host countries, affected adversely by the world economic crisis, initiated more restrictive immigration policies or measures. In 1976, the United States set an annual quota of 20,000 immigrants for every independent country - but only 600 for the non-independent countries - and in 1977, Canada adopted stricter immigration regulations. Moreover, at the end of the 1970's the Bahamian government ordered the departure of all Haitians of illegal status - estimated to be between 50,000 and 60,000 [United Nations, 1983]. Finally, the Chaguaramas treaty, which established CARICOM in 1973, restricted labour mobility to counteract the expected outflow of skilled and unskilled workers from the less developed member countries to the more developed member countries.

Despite all these reasons for reduced emigration in the 1970's, the results of the censuses held in the early 1980's, some of them provisional, suggest that regional net emigration has been at least as high in the 1970's as it was in the 1960's: about 1.7 million. It would be even higher if emigration estimates for Haiti and the Dominican Republic had been less conservative. How can these surprising results be explained?

More Complex Patterns and Local Conditions

In contrast to what was observed in the 1950's, and the 1960's when free and/or legal emigration were the main types of movements, the 1970's witnessed a growing complexity in the migration process. First of all, return migration occurred in several countries. Secondly, illegal migration developed both to the metropolitan countries and within the region. Therefore, the migration balances of the censuses of the 1970's must be analysed in the light of these new migration patterns.

The CARICOM countries accounted once more for about 600,000 out of a regional net emigration of 1.7 million, while Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic accounted for an estimated 860,000 (see Appendix 1). Although the results for Haiti and the Dominican Republic must be treated cautiously, it is clear that at least 80 per cent of the regional net emigration was from countries faced with restricted outlets. Moreover, net emigration from the CARICOM countries has, on the whole, been as high in the 1970's as in the 1960's.
As expected, the Bahamas and the U.S. Virgin Islands no longer registered high net immigration in the 1970's, although an important Haitian movement to French Guiana began in the mid 1970's. But, curiously, the results obtained for the countries with unrestricted outlets showed an absolute decrease in net emigration - about 250,000 in the 1970's compared to 300,000 in the 1960's. However, the situation varies from country to country. Puerto Rico registered a very low net emigration because of continuing return migration, although the expected excess of returns over departures did not materialize. Curacao and Aruba also seem to have experienced reduced net emigration. In contrast, Suriname, Guadeloupe and Martinique registered higher net emigration. Suriname, which achieved independence in 1975, registered massive emigration in the late 1970's as a result of domestic problems as well as the immigration privileges granted by the Netherlands after independence. These privileges ended in 1980.

For Guadeloupe and Martinique, the high net emigration occurred mainly in the early 1970's. But net emigration decreased sharply during the 1974-1982 intercensal period. Interestingly, this decrease was the result of two conflicting trends: emigration to France remained high, but it was balanced both by return migration and by immigration from France as well as from Dominica, Haiti and, to a lesser extent, St. Lucia. This new inter-Caribbean migration, which also included French Guiana, contained a large proportion of illegal immigrants. According to the 1982 censuses, which give a conservative estimate of this movement, the number of Caribbean nationals enumerated in Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana was approximately 30,000 people.

In the case of the CARICOM countries the results also vary from country to country. The net emigration decline expected in the 1970's apparently did occur in several countries. Ranked according to the size of the decrease, these countries are Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, Barbados, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. In contrast, all the other countries experienced increased net emigration: again ranked according to the size of the increase, these countries are Belize, Guyana, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia. As no complete censuses have been taken in Antigua either in 1970 or in 1980, net intercensal migration cannot be assessed for this country. Based on the number of Antiguans admitted to the United States and Canada in the 1970's, however, we can assume an increased net emigration from Antigua for this period and the total population estimate has been altered accordingly.

Barbados, although rarely mentioned in this context, has also become a favoured destination of inter-Caribbean migrants. According to censuses, the foreign-born population in Barbados increased from about 7,000 in 1946, to 10,000 in 1960, 13,000 in 1970 and to 18,500 in 1980. Thus the increase between 1970 and 1980 was about 5,500. However, of the 18,500 foreign-born enumerated in 1980, some 10,000 arrived in Barbados during the 1970's, which shows that departures have been balanced by new arrivals. This suggests a pattern that is more circular than that usually admitted. Finally, of these 10,000 newcomers more than 6,000 were born in other Commonwealth Caribbean countries while some 3,000 were born in the metropolitan countries: 2,000 in the United Kingdom and the remainder in the United States and Canada. As nearly 70 per cent of the latter group were younger than twenty years of age, most of the metropolitan-born were clearly children accompanying return migrants.

Thus, even though the 1970's were indeed a period characterized by restricted outlets, high emigration levels persisted during the decade. Increasing illegal emigration has been the adaptive response to significant numbers of emigrants to the limitations of the usual outlets. Secondly, emigration levels remained high, although they have been partially balanced by return migration - which, of course, depends both on the volume of past emigration and the opportunities existing in the home country. It seems, therefore, that local conditions have been more influential than available outlets - free or restricted - in shaping increasingly complex migration patterns and determining net emigration levels in the region. As a result, predicting future emigration levels may become even more hazardous than it was in the past. Although conventional predictive approaches have proved to be unreliable, the migration phenomenon is too important to be ignored. Accurate assessments of present and future migration trends remain of paramount importance if we are to have a more reliable foundation for demographic and social planning.
ASSESSMENT OF MIGRATION TRENDS

The net emigration during the 1970's suggested by the censuses of the early 1980's, has been openly questioned. In most countries the 1970's entry-departure statistics suggested that levels of net emigration were not only lower than those derived from the censuses, but in some cases were even negligible. Therefore it is believed that the totals of the 1980 censuses are underestimates. However, available data in the receiving countries confirm this net emigration from the Caribbean countries during the 1970's. What data sources should be used to assess the annual net movements and the migration assumptions on which population projections are based? As each source differs in scope and as migration is, by nature, very difficult to measure, there is no simple answer to this question. Let us start with a comparison of the three main data sources on migration movements: the entry-departure statistics, the census migration balances and the data available in the receiving countries.

Consistency Between Sources and Illegal Movements

Most of the countries of the region use entry-departure statistics to estimate their annual net migration. The main problem with these statistics is that they do not show what they are supposed to show. First of all, entries and departures include both temporary and permanent movements whereas, for planning purposes, only migration and emigration are of interest. Secondly, these statistics may be incomplete because of clandestine movements, and/or because the counts are not properly handled. As long as the total of entries and departures was not too large and involved mainly immigration and emigration movements, this source could give a reasonable estimate of annual net migration. But, with the development of tourism, cruise boat movements, and temporary visits abroad by residents, the situation has changed. The number of annual entries and departures has sky-rocketed and now total from one to four times the resident population. Consequently, immigration and emigration now account for only a very small proportion, frequently less than one per cent, of the total annual movements. Thus, even when statistics make the distinction between movements of residents and non-residents, and between permanent and temporary immigration, it has become more and more difficult to make accurate counts. This explains, for instance, the huge difference observed between the various figures depicting total net emigration from the CARICOM countries in the 1970's. Net emigration estimated from entry-departure statistics was 200,000; whereas census results suggested a figure of 600,000 - three times as many emigrants.

However, net migration figures derived from census results may also be questioned. It is true that if the 1980 census was underestimated, then the net migration computed for the 1970's is inflated. But this reasoning assumes that the 1970 censuses are completely reliable. Net migration derived from censuses is the balance between the last census count and the expected population, without migration, at the date of the present census - that is, the previous census count plus the natural increase registered between the two censuses. Thus the quality of both censuses determines the accuracy of the computed net migration.

However, intercensal migration balance is accurate not only when both censuses are correct - which is extremely rare - but also when both censuses are equally underestimated or overestimated. If the censuses are both underestimated or overestimated, but to different extents, it is the difference in quality between the two censuses which affects the computed migration balance. Finally, only when one census is overestimated and the other census is underestimated do both errors add up to distort the migration balance [Guengant, 1980]. For example, let us examine the case of an overestimated net emigration due to the latter type of error - cumulative errors on both censuses. Let the population figure be about 100,000 with a computed intercensal net emigration of 20,000. If we assume that the 1970 census is overestimated with an error of 5,000 and the 1980 census is underestimated with the same error of 5,000 - that is if we assume a cumulative error of about five per cent on each census - the computed net emigration is reduced from 20,000 to 10,000.

But, one should be aware of the limits of this type of numerical analysis. First of all, there is no reason to believe that the worst scenario can be applied to all Caribbean countries. Secondly, the quality of the 1970 census has not really been questioned, at least for the CARICOM countries, and the 1980 census results do not seem to be particularly unreliable, when compared to the 1970 results. Thus, intercensal net emigration figures derived from the censuses for the 1970's and 1980's, seem to be of acceptable quality in most CARICOM countries, as well as in most other countries of the region - except in Haiti and the Dominican Republic where migration balances are difficult to assess because their civil registration systems are incomplete.

In fact, the immigration statistics of the United States and Canada confirm the high emigration of the 1970's. During that decade, these two countries admitted...
nearly one million Caribbean immigrants: 815,000 to the United States between fiscal years 1971 and 1980, and 166,000 to Canada between calendar years 1970 and 1979. Almost a half of these immigrants (456,000), were from CARICOM countries (see Appendices 2 and 3). These figures are consistent with net emigration figures derived from the censuses: 1.5 million for the countries with restricted outlets and 600,000 for the CARICOM countries. Moreover, if the U.S. data are translated into calendar years (using interpolation), the total number of Caribbean immigrants admitted to both countries increases from about 80,000 per year in 1971-1972 to about 120,000 in 1976-1977, then decreases to about 90,000 in 1979. Interestingly, the dramatic decrease in admissions which occurred in Canada, from the 1974 peak of 28,000 to 10,000 in 1978 and 1979, has been largely balanced in most CARICOM countries by the significant increase in admissions to the U.S. during the late 1970's. Exceptions to this trend were Trinidad and Tobago from which admissions decreased, Montserrat where admissions remained more or less the same and Belize whose admissions to Canada are minimal. Thus, between fiscal years 1971 and 1980, the number of admissions to the United States from Guyana, the Windward Islands, Antiqua, St. Kitts-Nevis and Belize have increased three or four times. Consequently, even if recent data suggest a decline in U.S. admissions, it would be hazardous to predict an overall decline especially for CARICOM countries—where the backlogs of applications are said to be significant.

In summary, Caribbean admissions to the United States and Canada have indeed been high during the 1970's. They accounted for about 20 per cent of total immigrant admissions to the United States and about 10 per cent of the admissions to Canada, large proportions for a region which represents less than 0.7 per cent of the world's total population. Moreover, most of these admissions were from the smaller Caribbean countries. Although the population of CARICOM countries accounts for only 16 per cent of the region's population, admissions to the U.S. of CARICOM nationals amounted to about 40 per cent of the Caribbean admissions and 85 per cent of the admissions to Canada.

However, the limitations of immigration statistics must be borne in mind. First of all, immigrant visas granted during one given year may result from arrivals that had occurred previously. Secondly, the country of former residence or the place of birth used in immigration statistics may be different from the immigrant's initial country of emigration. Thirdly, some admissions may have been followed by returns or re-

Annual Net Migration and Yearly Population Estimates

Finally, U.S. and Canadian immigration statistics cannot be matched on a per country basis with net immigration figures derived from censuses, because these figures measure balances between immigration and emigration movements whose origin or destination may not be the United States or Canada.

Despite these limitations, Canadian and U.S. immigration statistics are helpful in explaining the net immigration figures derived from censuses taken in CARICOM countries, especially given the growing complexity of migration movements. Net immigration is lower than the number of immigrants admitted to the United States and Canada from Barbados, Trinidad, Montserrat; and almost the same for St. Kitts-Nevis. This can be explained by the importance of return migration and/or immigration from the neighbouring islands. In contrast, net emigration is about twice the number of admissions from the Windward Islands, Belize, Guyana; and about four-thirds the admissions from Jamaica. These "missing people"—who total 170,000—call for an explanation. Although some of them are legal immigrants in countries other than the United States and Canada, especially in the receiving Caribbean countries of Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Bahamas and Venezuela, most of them are illegal immigrants either in these Caribbean countries or in the metropoles. Census results, together with estimates of illegal immigrants in all potential receiving countries, need to be considered if one is to provide a clearer picture of these movements. Given the fact that censuses are generally thought to underestimate immigrant populations, that estimates of illegal immigrants are usually considered unreliable, and that some illegal movements would have occurred from Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and St. Kitts-Nevis, it is likely that illegal movements from CARICOM countries alone total anywhere between 150,000 and 200,000—i.e. from one quarter to one third of the total net emigration of these countries during the 1970's.
used to compute the population estimates after the 1970 census, the results of the 1980 census were well below all current population estimates. For the CARICOM countries, current estimates were, on average, 10 per cent higher than the census results, but ranged from an acceptable percentage of less than 5 per cent for Barbados to an extreme of almost 25 per cent. All indicators based on population estimates - crude birth rate and death rate, total fertility rate, per capita gross domestic product - were also underestimated accordingly. In addition, annual rates of population growth were grossly overestimated.

Many countries have updated their population estimates, based on their 1980 census results. But two problems remain. Firstly, not only has the updating not yet been done in several countries but some countries are still hesitating because they feel that their census results are inaccurate. Secondly, most countries still use entry-departure statistics to estimate their annual net migration and total populations.

On the first problem, population updating: in order to avoid endless and useless discussions on population and net migration estimates, let us clearly state a major point. Population and migration figures are, in essence, provisional until the next census. The foremost objective of a census is to update the information available on the size and main characteristics of the population. Consequently, past figures have to be revised as soon as new census results become available: census results must not be manipulated to fit previous estimates. Otherwise, undertaking a census would serve no purpose. Should the occasion arise, minor adjustments of census results can be made if they are fully documented. But these adjustments should not bring major changes to the computed intercensal net migration figure; and in all they should not alter its consistency with other sources. Moreover, it should be realized that any adjustment of recent census results will have carry-over effects on the next intercensal migration balance. This, in turn, can cause even greater inconsistency and adjustment problems when the next census results become available.

The second problem can be summed up in the following question: should the countries continue to use entry-departure statistics to estimate their annual net migration and total population? Although this source has proved to be unreliable, it remains the only local annual source of information on migration. In contrast, the migration balance derived from censuses is more reliable, but these are only available every ten years. Thus, the entry-departure statistics should be improved in every possible way. But, improving such a routine operation is not as simple as it seems. First of all, such an improvement may require more personnel and resources which could prove impossibly expensive. Secondly such an improvement cannot be made if clandestine movement - by land or small boats - remain significant. Thirdly, it is doubtful whether accurate counts of the movements of residents - the only data that should be used for population estimates - can be properly kept. For example, departing residents who intend to leave for a short period may stay abroad, while returning residents may actually be return migrants. Thus, if we continue to use entry-departure statistics, the same problems will arise in 1990 as were encountered in the early 1980's. In addition, we run the risk of believing that the "soon-to-be" negligible emigration is at last really becoming negligible.

Would it be better if we used crude estimates of net emigration based on the latest census results? This method has already been used in St. Lucia and in the French territories. In St. Lucia, yearly population estimates made since the 1970 census were based on the assumption that yearly net emigration was 4.1 per cent of the total population (St. Lucia, 1977). The 1980 census count was 4 per cent lower than the current population estimate - which was not perfect but much better than the results obtained in the countries using entry-departure statistics. However, one must note that the age and sex distribution of the census differed significantly from the age and sex distribution of the population estimate, which probably reflects inaccurate estimates of the age and sex distribution of the assumed net emigration.

For the French Islands, net emigration was estimated from age-specific net emigration rates by sex calculated for the previous intercensal period (Guengant, 1980) and in French Guiana, a total net immigration was assumed every year. In these cases, the 1982 census results were 4 to 6 per cent higher than the current population estimates. These results are the opposite of those observed in the CARICOM countries, but they are not too bad. The main reason for these differences is that for French Guiana the assumed net immigration was underestimated, and for Guadeloupe and Martinique the assumed high net emigration was overestimated. This led, in the three cases, to an underestimate of the total population. What conclusions can we draw from these experiences? Even if migration patterns are changing, these changes are cumulative. Consequently, there is some justification for estimating present and future migration levels from those observed during the last intercensal period.
Estimates of present and future net migration can be improved. Each component: emigration, return migration of local-born, and net immigration of foreign-born should be assessed for the last intercensal period. Based on this assessment, assumptions need to be made for each of these components. In the case of emigration, assumptions have to be made about the immigration policies of the receiving countries as well as the quantity of illegal immigration; for return migration assumptions would be based on the number of local-born abroad and their characteristics; and for the net immigration of foreign-born, assumptions have to be made about the future immigration policy of the country in question. Secondly, comparative analyses could be made which would assess the trends in each country as well as fill the present gaps in information - volume, age and sex of emigrants abroad, and characteristics of return migrants - data which are now available only for Puerto Rico and the French Islands.

Finally, a revision of these estimates could be made, say once during a ten year intercensal period, if the situation changes or, if new data become available. Thus, such revisions would be based on recent immigration statistics - in the receiving countries, local entry-departure and immigration statistics, as well as on other sources such as household survey results which might provide estimates of migration. Such a survey, which gave a fair estimate of emigration, was conducted in Barbados during 1980 and 1981 [Beckles, 1982].

Whatever method is chosen for assessing present net migration levels, it is clear that revisions of net migration and population estimates, as well as of the related socio-economic indicators, will have to be made. The magnitude of migration movements as well as the difficult issues involved in adequately measuring migration make these revisions inevitable.

Population Projections and Migration Assumptions: A Confusing Debate

A negligible factor can be ignored. During the past thirty years, migration has more or less been ignored in the various population projections made for the region. This situation has not only led to an overestimation of populations and growth rates, but it has also confused the already controversial debate on population problems in the region.

In the 1950's, the populations of the Third World began growing at unprecedented rates of growth. In an effort to assess the consequences of this dramatic growth, demographers developed population projections. Because fertility was the only variable by which a reduction of population growth could be envisaged, attention was logically focused on fertility assumptions. Most population projections have used three fertility assumptions: high, medium and low as well as an assumption of constant fertility. But only one mortality assumption, and one migration assumption have been used.

As fertility levels started to decline during the 1960's, often faster than expected, attention has shifted from decreasing rates of growth to absolute decreases of growth, which occur much later, so that zero population growth can now be envisaged. This unlikely end to population evolution is supposed to result, in decades, in fertility at replacement levels, or 2.1 children per woman. Using this assumption and assuming decreased net emigration until 2000, and no migration afterwards, the United Nations have calculated that the population of all Caribbean Islands, estimated at 30.6 million in 1980, could attain zero population growth by the mid 21st century. Using an assumption of high fertility the Caribbean population could stabilize at 58 million around 2070, while according to an assumption of low fertility, stabilization could be at only 54 million around 2040 [United Nations, 1981]. Of course, the idea underlying these projections is that fertility decline could be fostered through vigorous family planning programmes - hopefully integrated into a broader population policy, which in turn becomes an integral part of development strategies.

All this is fine. But as a matter of fact, according to the 1980 censuses, 11 out of the 25 main countries of the region had already virtually achieved zero population growth by the 1970's or had even experienced population decrease (see Appendix 4). In addition, out of the 14 remaining countries only 3, the Dominican Republic, the U.S. Virgin Islands and French Guiana still had average annual rates of population growth over 2 per cent in the 1970's. Except for the Dominican Republic, growth was caused by net immigration. Therefore what is the population problem?

The problem is that these outstanding results have been achieved mainly by persistent and often growing, levels of net emigration - which is alright for those countries that want to reduce their population growth. But in several cases, this zero population growth was not expected so soon and therefore might generate concern which could result in less attention being given both to fertility decline and to migration. Moreover, the
demographic and socio-economic impacts of emigration and fertility decline are not the same. In the case of the Caribbean countries, this crucial point has been overshadowed, in population projections, by the attention given to fertility.

Over the past thirty years, migration assumptions in the population projections made for countries in the region, have largely reflected the prevailing ideas on negligible Caribbean emigration. Projections of the 1950's and early 1960's assumed no migration, while those of the late 1960's and the 1970's did include migration assumptions. But generally, only one assumption was made: low or decreasing emigration levels [United Nations, 1963, 1973, 1978, 1980; Harewood, 1974 for Trinidad and Tobago] or at the most, two assumptions: continuation of past levels and zero migration [Roberts 1974 for Jamaica; Massiah 1976 for Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Bermuda, Bahamas; Guenegro, 1970 for Guadeloupe].

Interestingly, in the last four United Nations projections - which have three fertility assumptions, but only one migration assumption - the level of regional net emigration assumed for the 1970's has never reached the present estimate of 1.7 million. It has varied from nearly 600,000 in the 1968 projections, up to 1,000,000 in the 1973 projections, then down to 700,000 in the 1978 projections, and down again to 550,000 in the 1980 projections. Moreover, since 1973 the decreased net emigration assumed for the 1970's, has constantly been associated with an assumption that net emigration would decrease sharply in the 1980's, would drop even more in the 1990's and would be negligible thereafter.

The other local projections that included two migration assumptions - continuation of previous levels and no migration - generally considered only one fertility reduction assumption. Consequently, among the three scenarios considered: 1. constant fertility and no migration 2. declining fertility and no migration 3. declining fertility and continuation of previous net emigration levels, the last scenario always seemed a low and unlikely projection. Together, these projections contributed to an underestimation of the importance of migration in the population dynamics of the various countries of the region, as well as to an overestimation of their populations and rates of growth.

Finally, until recently, only two projections in the region have examined several assumptions for both fertility and migration: in 1972-1973 for Guadeloupe and Martinique [Guenegro and Dumas, 1972; Martinique - ADAG, 1973]. The scenario that seemed most likely at the time - increased net emigration and rapid fertility decline - resulted for both countries in a projection of a population maximum to be reached in the mid 1970's, and then a decrease thereafter.

The predicted decrease did not materialize since, as indicated earlier, net emigration was reduced by immigration movements. But, total population has stabilized in the later 1970's in both islands and, given their present fertility levels of 2.5 children per woman, their future population growth will now depend mainly on net emigration or, more likely, on the respective evolution of each component of the migration balance [Guenegro, 1983].

Combined Migration and Fertility Assumptions: Potential Demographic Impacts and Implications for Policy-Making

The recent population projections made by the Population Reference Bureau for Barbados, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, Belize [Bouvier, 1983-1984] give a much clearer picture of the varying effects of different migration and fertility levels. These projections, for the 1980-2030 period, combine three assumptions for fertility (continued current fertility, "moderate" fertility decline, and replacement-level fertility by 1990-1995) with three migration assumptions (continued current net emigration based on the 1970's intercensal migration balance, a 50 per cent reduction in current net emigration, and no migration).

The first scenario used in these projections combines current fertility and current net emigration (see Figures 1-4 Scenario A). This Scenario produces surprising and apparently paradoxical results for 2030: significant population decrease for Barbados and St. Kitts-Nevis, a four-thirds increase in the case of Dominica, but dramatic tripled population in the case of St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Belize.

In fact, these results can be easily explained by the magnitude of each component in each country. The projected population decrease in the case of Barbados is the result of a very low fertility level - 1.9 children per woman - combined with moderate net emigration - 0.7 per cent of the present population per year. In the case of St. Kitts-Nevis the decrease comes from a moderately high fertility of 3.6 together with continued massive net emigration - around 2 per cent of the present population per year. For St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Belize, the tripled population projected for 2030 in Scenario A is the
Figure 3: Population Future of Saint Vincent

Year 1980
Population: 96,724

Year 2000
Scenario A
Total fertility rate: 4.5
Annual net emigration: 1000
Population: 137,137

Year 2030
Scenario A
Total fertility rate: 4.5
Annual net emigration: 1000
Population: 248,972

Scenario D
Total fertility rate: 2.1 (1990-95)
Annual net emigration: 0
Population: 140,275

Figure 4: Population Future of Dominica

Year 1980
Population: 72,311

Year 2000
Scenario A
Total fertility rate: 3.4
Annual net emigration: 800
Population: 96,767

Scenario D
Total fertility rate: 2.1 (1990-95)
Annual net emigration: 0
Population: 86,387

Scenario C
Total fertility rate: 2.1 (1990-95)
Annual net emigration: 0
Population: 98,431

Year 2030
Scenario A
Total fertility rate: 3.4
Annual net emigration: 800
Population: 96,767

Scenario D
Total fertility rate: 2.1 (1990-95)
Annual net emigration: 0
Population: 128,789

Scenario C
Total fertility rate: 2.1 (1990-95)
Annual net emigration: 0
Population: 128,789
result of continued high fertility of 4.5 with continued moderate levels of net emigration - about 1 per cent of the present population per year - so that population continues to increase. Finally, in the case of Dominica, a similar assumption of moderate net emigration of 1 per cent per year - but combined here with moderately high fertility of 3.4 - leads to a population growth that is negligible in comparison.

If we assume current fertility but no migration (Scenario D for Barbados and Scenario C for St. Kitts-Nevis) we observe a population increase for Barbados and St. Kitts-Nevis. However, in this scenario, the 2030 population of Barbados is only four-thirds of its 1980 population, whereas the 2030 population of St. Kitts-Nevis becomes three times its 1980 population. This huge difference is the result of fertility levels that are twice as high in St. Kitts-Nevis, as they are in Barbados. If we assume moderate fertility decline but current net emigration (Scenario C) for St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Belize, instead of the threefold increase in population projected in Scenario A, the increase is only somewhere between 30 and 40 per cent.

From these dizzying results - not to mention the results obtained for the other scenarios - one may get the feeling that these exercises are indeed interesting, but that they are purely academic. In fact, these variations reflect formidable challenges and have important policy implications.

In the case of Barbados, and St. Kitts-Nevis keeping net emigration at its present levels - much lower than those observed in 1960's - may be necessary until year 2000 to alleviate the local labor markets (Figures 1-2, Scenario A). But if such levels are continued after the turn of the century, the age structure of the population in year 2030 looks like the age structure of an old folk's home. In contrast, for St. Kitts-Nevis continued moderately high fertility till year 2030 (Figure 2, Scenario C) not only cancels the effects of massive past emigration, but also leads to a constantly growing population, with a high proportion of young people. Such a situation puts a strain on the resources of a country. For Barbados, however, fifty years of fertility below replacement level, combined with no migration (Figure 1, Scenario D), does not impede population growth before 2030. This is because the 1980 age structure contains a high "built-in momentum for growth". Incidentally, this shows that for developing countries, continued below-replacement-level fertility need not be a concern for at least fifty years, if net emigration is really negligible.

For the countries with still high levels of fertility and moderate levels of net emigration - St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Belize - even if continued present net emigration, combined with current fertility levels, does reduce population growth, it does not halt the process of growth initiated by high fertility levels. This can be seen in the 2000 and 2030 age pyramids (Figure 3, Scenario A). In contrast, fertility decline alone - even without emigration - can stabilize the number of births and thus, the base of the age pyramid (Figure 3, Scenario D).

Interestingly, with assumptions of moderately high fertility levels, and moderate levels of net emigration, Dominica presents an intermediate case between the two extreme patterns described above. Thus, fertility combined with net emigration, both at current levels, results in a similar number of births to those obtained in the scenario combining replacement-level fertility and no migration. This result is illustrated in the age pyramids (see Figure 4). Superficially, the only difference between 2000 and 2030 seems to be the missing people who have emigrated. But, it must be noted that the relative equilibrium reached in Scenario A, with continued fertility and net emigration at current levels, implies an infinite continuation of emigration. In contrast, a possible end to emigration is envisaged in the replacement-level fertility and no migration scenario (Scenario C).

What lessons can we draw from these comparisons? First of all, we must remember that projections are not predictions. Secondly, the case of each country is obviously unique. Thirdly, different but specific levels of both fertility and emigration can lead to more or less similar results of population growth. Finally, but most important, there is really no choice between fertility and emigration policies for controlling population growth and age structure. As we have seen, continuation at present levels may transform emigration from an "escape valve" into a "lethal haemorrhagic process". Besides, continued high or moderately high fertility levels condemn Caribbean people to be perpetual "knockers at the doors of others" [Marshall, 1979]. Thus, policies affecting population and the future of our people must be conceived and implemented with a full understanding of the far-reaching consequences they involve. In the case of emigration, this means taking into account not only the demographic aspects, but also the economic and human impacts of emigration.
ECONOMIC AND HUMAN ASPECTS OF MIGRATION

Up to now, regardless of its level, emigration has generally been considered beneficial to Caribbean countries. In the context of large labour surpluses, it relieves the pressure on local labour markets. Moreover, the remittances help those left behind and provide much needed foreign earnings. In fact, emigration can be considered aid from the Caribbean countries to the metropoles. However, emigration has its negative side. To some extent, Caribbean emigration is a form of dependence on the metropoles. Since excessive economic dependence is obviously a major barrier to development, one must wonder whether emigration fosters or impedes the developmental process of Caribbean nations. In addition, because of the large number of Caribbean people already abroad, emigration has created a legacy whose potential impacts on the Caribbean are not yet clearly perceived. This legacy may not be all positive. There is the potential for significant return migration as well as the strong desire widespread among the more qualified section of the population to continue emigrating. Finally, in the Caribbean, emigration is still seen as the expression of the basic human right to move in search of better opportunities. However, even if most countries respect their own citizens' right to emigrate, none accept the emigrants of the others without restriction. This raises the touchy question of illegal migration.

Reciprocal or Unequal Exchange

As has been indicated, Caribbean people have been on the move since Emancipation. At first, the plantocracies of the sending countries resented emigration, seeing it as a threat to the large labour force they needed for the sugar plantations. However, this feeling changed rapidly, especially when the sugar crises of the late 19th century created situations of labour surplus. Then, emigration was seen as an "escape valve". Because the labour surplus situation has continued due to the rapid population growth experienced by the Caribbean since the 1920's, the concept of safety valve has continued to be perceived as the prevailing impact of emigration on the sending countries.

However, it has been argued that, while the Caribbean countries were exporting their labour surpluses to the metropoles, the metropoles were exporting their capital surpluses to the Caribbean. Therefore, Caribbean emigration to the metropoles was to be analyzed not only in terms of safety valve but also in terms of mutual necessity or reciprocal exchange [Marshall, 1979].

Because emigrants have continued to send remittances to their home countries, one could say that there is no reason to worry about continuing emigration. However, all these positive effects hide several features which are, in the long-term, detrimental to the Caribbean. Let us examine two of them: the immigration policies of the metropoles and the impact of the remittances on the sending countries' economies.

Of course, it is the sovereign right of each country to determine its own immigration policies. This is deemed normal and has never been questioned. However, the changing criteria on which policies are based have had profound effects on the sending countries which must not be ignored. For example, for almost ten years - from the mid 1960's to the mid 1970's - the United States and Canada have had "open-door" policies because of their manpower needs. This obviously created the conditions for greater emigration from the Caribbean. Subsequently, the gradual closing of their doors inevitably created frustrations in the Caribbean, and illegal movements to these countries as well as elsewhere within the region. Secondly, these immigration policies facilitate the admissions of well-trained or skilled immigrants. This obviously deprives the sending countries of needed personnel. Finally, the immigration policies of the United States and Canada give preference to family reunification, and above all, to permanent immigration as opposed to temporary immigration. Both preferences can be considered a humanitarian approach to immigration. But this selective process also means that the immigrants - especially the better qualified - are not only lost to their home country, but also if no family is left behind, there will be few remittances.

By and large, remittances have been seen as the most visible and positive outcome of emigration. When in the late 19th and early 20th century emigration was mainly contract labour, that is temporary and male-dominated, remittances were likely to be high. But this is not necessarily the case of the present Caribbean movements to the metropoles. Therefore, continuing substantial flows of remittances need to be fuelled by the continuation of substantial emigration [Palmer, 1979]. In the long run, this could well prove to be demographically and economically harmful to the sending countries.

However, in the short run, remittances remain an appreciable source of foreign earnings which most countries need in the present context of balance of payments difficulties and high foreign debts. Indeed, for the late 1970's, various sources indicate that annual
remittances range from 5 per cent to about 15 per cent of the gross domestic product of selected Caribbean countries or, more strikingly, from about 10 per cent to about 30 per cent of their total exports. Nevertheless, these ratios are misleading. Whereas export earnings add sustain local activity and employment, remittances sustained nothing locally except for those left behind - which is, of course, important for them. Furthermore, remittances are mainly used for purchasing food, clothes, radios, television sets, as well as more or less extravagant imported items. Therefore, remittances not only do not support any local activities, but they also contribute to some extent to increased imports. Finally, remittances might well return quite quickly to the metropoles from whence they came, just passing through the sending country, creating no economic multiplier effects whatsoever.

Thus, Caribbean emigration to the metropoles seems to be not a reciprocal exchange but an unequal exchange. First of all, the benefits gained from the open-door immigration policies of the metropoles, as well as from the remittances, are in essence short-term and volatile. Secondly, up to now, the Caribbean countries have had no control - or influence - on the volume, criteria or types of immigrants admitted by the metropoles, nor on the magnitude and use of the remittances. This means that, in the final analysis, massive emigration which is already a result of the huge economic disequilibriums that plague the Caribbean economies, is also a component of the unequal exchange which characterizes the relationships between "North" and "South" nations. This leads logically to the question of possible impacts of migration movements on economic development.

Emigration: Positive or Negative Effects on Development

Until recently, the escape valve and reciprocal exchange concepts have overshadowed the fundamental question of the relationship between migration movements and development. Consequently, this problem, termed "the unexplored connexion", has been advocated as one of the issues in need of urgent consideration by Caribbean Governments (Pastor, 1983). One can argue that emigration must be considered an unavoidable, temporary necessity that will eventually lead to development. Emigration reduces excessive population growth both through emigration itself and through locally-avoided births. Even if emigration exacerbates already high dependency ratios by the loss of people of working age, this deterioration is compensated by remittances. Similarly, even if emigration implies the loss of the education costs and the productive outputs of the emigrants, there is no reason to worry. Since there are not enough jobs for everyone, these losses would have occurred anyway. Therefore, the positive impacts of emigration seem greater than its negative impacts.

Besides, the development process creates conditions which foster emigration, noticeably by destroying traditional low productivity activities, especially in the rural areas. This is confirmed by the example of North European nations which, during their industrial revolution, experienced an emigration of 55 million people between 1820 and 1920, mainly to North America (Bouvier, 1979). More recently, for the Caribbean, it has been noticed that periods of accelerated economic growth have coincided with the beginning of massive emigration: Puerto Rico in the 1950's, Dominican Republic in the 1960's (Pastor, 1983) as well as in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guadeloupe and Martinique, during the 1960's. According to this reasoning, emigration should decrease as development proceeds and should eventually stop when development is achieved. Therefore, we should try to optimize the benefits from emigration while the Caribbean is going through the transitional stage of change from traditional low-productivity economic structures to more productive modern activities. Do the very mixed emigration levels and economic performances recently observed in the Caribbean confirm this hypothesis?

Figure 5 does, indeed, show a negative relationship between the estimated annual rates of net emigration for the 1975 - 79 period and the per capita gross domestic product of 1977. This means that the higher the per capita GDP, the lower is the rate of net emigration. In contrast a low per capita GDP is associated with a high net emigration rate. Of course this relationship is far from perfect, which to some extent can be explained by the uncertainties of the data used. But, most of the deviations could be explained by other factors. Where levels of net emigration by per capita GDP are higher than expected, this could be explained: by recent peculiar domestic circumstances, in the case of Suriname, Grenada and Guyana; in the case of Guadeloupe and Martinique by the destination - France - which allows free emigration. Where levels of net emigration are lower this could be explained by the lower qualifications of emigrants in the case of Haiti and Dominican Republic, and in the case of Montserrat and Puerto Rico by the fact that massive emigration started earlier, in the 1950's. Incidentally, the negative
FIGURE 5: NET EMIGRATION IN RELATION TO PER CAPITA GDP, 1975-79

ESTIMATED ANNUAL NET EMIGRATION PER 1,000, 1975-79

- Suriname
- Grenada
- Guyana
- Dominica
- St. Lucia
- St. Kitts-Nevis
- Guadeloupe
- Antigua
- Martinique
- Haiti
- Barbados
- Montserrat
- Dominican Republic
- Puerto Rico

GDP PER CAPITA, 1977, IN US$ 1977

*For 1970-1974 & 1972

FIGURE 6: ASSUMED INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES VIS À VIS THE CARIBBEAN LABOUR MARKET
relationships observed between net emigration and per capi
ta GDP confirm the relatively weak significance of
restricted versus free outlets, a factor which seems less
important in setting emigration levels than the factor of
local conditions. But above all, this negative
relationship does seem to suggest that emigration should
decrease when a certain level of development or higher
average income is attained.

However, as we have already seen, the relatively
low levels of net emigration from the more developed
countries of the region are the result of recent return
migration as well as immigration from neighbouring poorer
islands. Can we, therefore, argue that the better
economic performances have already succeeded in reducing
emigration? Moreover, the economic success of some
Caribbean countries has obviously generated return
migration and immigration from neighbouring countries.
Nationalities may see these movements as a threat to their
share of their country's economic achievement.
Furthermore, past and continuing massive migration from
the smallest, poorest countries of the region has not yet
resulted in better economic performances. These somewhat
disappointing results may be balanced by the positive role
which emigration seems to play as a regulating factor in
the local labour markets. What is the importance of
migration, as an individual strategy, in Caribbean labour
markets?

Caribbean economies are characterized by a modern
sector which provides the best-paid and steadiest jobs of
the labour market. However, up to now this modern sector
has not been able to provide enough jobs for all people
willing and able to work. Individual strategies towards
the highly desired but scarce "good" jobs of the modern
sector, can be classified into four groups (Guengant,
1982; see Figure 6). The first strategy, practised mainly
by the young, is to wait for the desired, steady job.
This strategy results in open unemployment and depends on
families or social networks to support these unemployed,
sometimes for an extended period. The second strategy is
the result of discouragement due to the lack of job
opportunities. This discouragement forces job seekers out
of the labour market. This strategy also depends on
support from others, and does not preclude employment in
marginal activities nor future entry into the labour force
if job opportunities become more favourable. The third
strategy is, for those without support and therefore
without choice, the acceptance of any available
opportunity to work, regardless of the working conditions
or the wages. These jobs are more likely to be found in
what is called the traditional or informal sector,

characterized by low productivity. They are
manifestations of visible underemployment. The fourth and
last strategy is to migrate either to a local urban centre
or, as is usually the case in the Caribbean, to foreign
countries, in search of better employment opportunities
and higher earnings. This migration can occur after a
long period of unemployment, before any local job seeking
is carried out, or when current jobs become unbearable.

According to this reasoning, it is clear that
open unemployment - even when it is high - reflects only
one aspect of the huge labour surpluses which characterize
the Caribbean labour market. Moreover, it is also clear
that in the Caribbean, unemployment levels as well as
numbers of people out of the labour force, depend mainly
on the abilities of others to support these two
categories. These two features largely explain the poor
results of most employment generating policies adopted in
the region (Harewood, 1975). Is emigration a more
efficient method of reducing unemployment?

Let us first consider the case of countries where
the importance of the modern sector is assumed to have
generated quite high unemployment levels, large numbers
out of the labour force together with relatively low
levels of underemployment (see Figure 7). In this type of
situation, any creation of additional jobs in the modern
sector is likely to attract not only the unemployed, but
also the discouraged and the underemployed, as well as
immigrants from the metropoles and qualified return
migrants. Thus any decrease in unemployment induced by
new job creation is likely to be countered by the
emergence of a "new" unemployed group: the discouraged
or the underemployed as well as return migrants who enter the
labour market because they think that their chances of
getting a good job have improved. Moreover, the resulting
job vacancies in the informal sector are likely to attract
unskilled immigrant workers from the poorer, neighbouring
countries. In this type of situation, the impact of
emigration on the reduction of unemployment is also likely
to be minimal. As with job creation, emigration of the
unemployed and job vacancies resulting from emigration are
likely to result mainly in the displacement of labour
surplus from one category to another.

Indeed, this is more or less what has been
observed in several of the more developed countries of the
region: Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guadeloupe,
Martinique and to a lesser extent Jamaica and Guyana.
First of all, the number of jobs which are associated with
underemployment seems to have decreased recently, in some
of these countries. Secondly, several countries have
Figure 7: Assumed Direct and Indirect Effects of Job Creations in the Modern Sector in Caribbean Economies with Already Important Modern Sector

Figure 8: Assumed Direct and Indirect Effects of Job Creations in the Modern Sector in Caribbean Economies with Weak Modern Sector

1. Unskilled immigrants from neighbouring countries
2. Discouraged
3. Others out of the labour force
4. Immigrants form the metropoles & return migrants

→ Direct effects of job creations
--- Indirect effects of job creations
experienced continuing or even growing immigration of unskilled workers from their neighbours. Last but not least, in spite of continuing emigration, over the past twenty years, the rates of unemployment in these countries have remained at a minimum level of 10 per cent of the labour force - and well above 20 per cent in the case of Jamaica, Guadeloupe and Martinique.

Let us consider now the case of countries where the weakness of the modern sector is assumed to have generated lower unemployment levels and greater participation in the labour force together with higher underemployment (see Figure 8). In this type of situation, the direct effect of new job creation in the modern sector is also likely to benefit the unemployed, the discouraged and the underemployed. But this job creation, via the increased potential for support, is also likely to lead to an increased number of "new" unemployed from the discouraged and the underemployed. Moreover, this job creation is also likely to lead to greater dissatisfaction by those working in jobs associated with underemployment. As a result labour market conditions will seem to have worsened and may generate increased emigration, which in turn, through remittances, can contribute to further dramatic unemployment increases.

The results of the 1980 censuses of the Windward Islands and St. Kitts-Nevis, when compared with the 1970 census results, give some support to this hypothesis. We must remember that during the 1970's these five countries lost about 20 per cent of their 1970 population by emigration. Nevertheless, during the last intercensal period, the numbers of unemployed have at least doubled in every country, and the rate of unemployment which was at a low 10 per cent or so in the 1970's is now about 20 per cent of the labour force. It would be tempting to see this dramatic increase of unemployment as the beginning of the transitional phase toward development. But this does not seem to be the case. First of all, during the last intercensal period the increase in the working population has been quite moderate, 20 per cent at the most; and, above all, in the early 1980's at least 30 per cent of this population was still engaged in low productivity, agricultural activities. Therefore, for these countries, in spite of some job creation, the main response to the 1970's economic conditions has been increased unemployment and continuing, even increasing, massive emigration.

Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, in the present demographic and economic context, Caribbean emigration, despite its massive level, does not seem to alleviate the pressure on the local labour markets.

Emigration is only one of the options, but the use and abuse of this option affects all other economic parameters. Emigration perpetuates dependent and outward-looking modes of development. Secondly, in relying on job opportunities in other countries and making a large part of the sending community dependent on remittances, emigration might well delay the necessary social and economic adaptations in the sending countries [Pastor, 1983]. In making these adaptations seem less urgent, continuing emigration might well weaken further economic development in the sending countries. Therefore, Caribbean development strategists must not only stop relying implicitly on continued emigration, but should also begin to seriously consider the very nature of emigration.

The Legacy of Emigration

Another neglected aspect of emigration is the legacy of more than thirty years of massive movements. This legacy has many facets - demographic, economic, psychological - and is the result of multiple interactions between emigrants and non-emigrants. Some aspects of this legacy may be indelible, others may change. But in any case, Caribbean societies will be faced, more and more with migration-related problems.

The first legacy of past emigration movements is the number of Caribbean people living outside their home country. From the migration balances presented in Appendix 1 - and taking into account the magnitude of the intra-Caribbean movements, the importance of the non-Caribbean immigration, as well as the deaths which have affected the emigrant population - the number of Caribbean-born people living outside their country of birth in the early 1980's can be estimated at about 4 million. To this figure one may add the first generation born abroad. According to partial sources and assumptions based on the fertility of the migrants [Banks, 1972, for Barbados; Guengant, 1982 for Guadeloupe] the number of emigrants' children born abroad may today be about a half of that of the emigrant Caribbean-born population. This gives an estimated 2 million "children" and a total of about 6 million Caribbean people living outside their "countries of origin".

The 4 million Caribbean-born emigrants represent nearly 15 per cent of the 1980 population of the region. But for the CARICOM countries the number of CARICOM-born emigrants, nearly 1.5 million, represents about 30 per cent of the 1980 CARICOM population. However, the ratio
of emigrants to current population varies greatly from one country to another—from an estimated low of 20 per cent for Trinidad and Tobago, to an outstanding 70 per cent for St. Kitts-Nevis, with an average of almost 50 per cent for the Windward Islands as a whole. What is the future of this emigrant population? Will these people eventually be assimilated into the host countries? How many want to, or actually, return? Do Governments have to take a position on this issue?

Government attitudes to return migration may vary according to the categories of migrants involved: skilled versus unskilled migrants, retired or illegal migrants. Up to now, favourable circumstances have permitted a generally liberal or "laissez faire" policy toward return migrants. However, this may change.

Up to now, with the noticeable exception of Puerto Rico whose massive emigration started earlier in the 1940's, return migration has been quite small compared with the number abroad. In the French Islands, returnees now represent slightly more than 10 per cent of the total number of emigrants in France, but returns are definitely increasing. The magnitude of return migration might be similar in several CARICOM countries. Massive emigration started in most CARICOM countries in the late fifties. As return migration occurs after a certain time spent abroad, the returns reported in the 1970's probably involved the first emigrants. Since emigration increased sharply in the 1960's and remained high thereafter, it is probable that in the near future these countries may experience rapidly growing return migration.

Several factors foster return migration. The first one is an "ideology of return" among the emigrants. Nevertheless one must point out that, in the 1970's, more than 50,000 CARICOM nationals—from Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados—were granted U.S. citizenship. This occurred after an average stay of about 10 years in the U.S., and the number of naturalizations have increased sharply since the 1970's. The second factor fostering return migration is the creation of job opportunities at home. The third factor may be a push—factor resulting from the deteriorating economic situation in the host countries which affects the emigrants and thus stimulates their return. However, for citizens of independent countries, willingness to return may be countered by the fear of losing the right to reside again in the host country, if necessary. In other words, these emigrants may fear an unsuccessful return. In the case of the non-independent countries whose migrants are allowed to move freely to their metropoles, the pattern is more of a circular migration.

Thus, whether large or small, some return migration will undoubtedly occur. Even if the numbers are small, return migrants may create problems in their own countries. Most of them are still of working age, the oldest in their early fifties. Thus, their arrival may exert additional pressure on small, local labour markets and generate hostile attitudes from the non-emigrants.

Generally, it is hoped that not too many unskilled emigrants will return, while in contrast, any return of skilled personnel, professionals, scientists as well as entrepreneurs is usually welcomed. However, none of the Caribbean countries have yet engaged in return schemes like the "return of talent" programme initiated by the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICM). These schemes imply certain privileges, (travel expenses, jobs) for the returnees. But these privileges may be considered excessive, both by the non-emigrants and the unskilled emigrants. Moreover, these privileges may not prove adequate to attract the coveted returnees because wages may be lower than in the metropoles while conditions of work or promotion may seem inferior.

Obviously, the problem of return is not a simple one. On one hand, it is difficult to deny the unskilled the right of return. On the other hand, it may be difficult to attract much-needed categories of personnel. Definitely, the return issue needs to be studied. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the French Government which, in 1982, stopped its twenty year old policy of encouraging emigration of Guadeloupans and Martinicans, is now encouraging French West Indian emigrants to make regular visits home. Another legacy of migration is the possible return of a substantial number of retired persons. Many of the first emigrants of the 1950's are now reaching the age of retirement and the number of retired returnees may soon increase dramatically. These returns may have a positive effect if the returnees come with foreign pensions, but the number of elderly already in the Caribbean is growing rapidly. In this context of an aging Caribbean population, an additional influx of aged may require specific actions. These also need to be seriously considered.

In spite of substantial illegal migration, so far the sending countries have not experienced massive return deportations—except in the case of large numbers of Haitians who were deported from the Bahamas in the late 1970's. Depending on the magnitude of illegal movements in the future, as well as the attitudes of the particular host countries, more deportations may occur. It is, of course, preferable that this be prevented.
But the foremost legacy of the massive migration that has occurred during the past thirty years is probably the fact that migration has become a "way of life". Not only have emigrant communities abroad formed a "cushion" for further emigration, but also emigration has become associated with prestige, better education and success. Conspicuous consumption by emigrants on vacation at home, the attitudes of returnees who frequently praise the advantages of living abroad and denigrate many aspects of the local way of life together with the development of transportation, education and the media - especially television via satellite - all these factors reinforce the desire to leave. But this almost congenital "propensity to migrate" usually goes hand-in-hand with a devaluation of the local way of life, thus contributing to further alienation. Furthermore, this "ready-to-leave" attitude is associated with a minimal commitment to facing the challenges of development. These foreign-oriented attitudes are perhaps the most difficult legacy of past emigration. Changing these attitudes will clearly take time. But fostering these changes is certainly the most urgent action needed to ensure a full commitment of all to the development of the new Caribbean nations.

Illegal Migration and Human Rights

Until these attitudes change, and until development occurs - and perhaps even after - policies aimed at controlling migration movements risk being countered by Caribbean peoples' propensity to move. In fact, the freedom of moving from one country to another has been recognized as a basic human right in many international conferences. But, this freedom is clearly limited by each country's obligation to protect its own citizens' wealth, security and rights. In this context, the most acute migration problem related to human rights now facing the countries of the region is definitely the problem of growing illegal migration. This problem concerns all the countries of the region whether sending or receiving illegals.

As we have shown, migration is the result of a variety of factors. Among them, however, the perceived lack of opportunities at home stands out. The fact that, in spite of the widely known constraints on settling in the host countries, hundreds of thousands of people have preferred to try their luck abroad rather than stay home, should incite reflection. Whether the illegals are called "economic refugees" or "undocumented" depends on one's personal opinion. As human beings, these illegals do have human rights, but as illegal migrants they are discriminated against and exploited. Clearly, from the point of view of both the receiving and the sending countries illegal migration should be eradicated. How can we achieve this objective?

The problem of illegal migration has been seen as a police matter [United Nations, 1982]. In the 1970's, virtually all receiving countries - metropoles as well as Caribbean countries - reacted to increasing illegal migration by increasing deportations. In some cases - Canada in 1974 and again in 1981, Venezuela in 1982 - amnesty and regularization of status have been granted to the illegals under certain conditions. In the United States, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill on immigration, which has been under examination for several years, includes provisions for amnesty which will eventually be adopted. Moreover, U.S. regulations still allow some adjustment of status within the U.S. But, surprisingly, the amnesty and regularization process granted to illegal immigrants in Metropolitan France in 1982 has not yet been extended to Caribbean illegal migrants living in the French territories. Certainly, in the present context, amnesty is a prerequisite to ending the discrimination against, and victimization of, illegal migrants. Amnesty also appears to be a necessary starting point for more efficient immigration policies, even though some feel it may induce further illegal migration.

Nevertheless, the police approach, even when coupled with a more humane approach, is bound to fail if the causes of illegal emigration are not fully analyzed. First of all, it is unrealistic to think that strict regulations and controls will succeed in stopping traditional movements between specific countries, especially between neighboring countries in the Caribbean. Secondly, the persistence of huge differences in standards of living between countries fosters continuing illegal immigration. A great deal of imagination will be necessary to solve the present problem of illegal immigration. But alternative approaches do exist; among them economic assistance programmes, bilateral or multilateral agreements on circular movements, a greater consciousness in the sending countries of the very nature of emigration, and above all the economic development of these countries.

Special mention must be made of the present intra-Caribbean movements. The present strict regulations automatically place intra-Caribbean migrants in an illegal situation, if they are not deported immediately after entry. This leads to critical situations not only for the immigrants themselves, who may have to engage in illegal activities, but also for the authorities of the receiving
countries who may be unable to control this immigrant population. Immigration officers become suspicious about most intra-Caribbean tourists, immediately identifying them as potential illegal immigrants. Thus, by and large, the present situation may foster strong hostile feelings, instead of the Caribbean identity that we should be developing.

Finally, the efficacy of future emigration policies requires more than official statements or efficient controls. Above all, they require the full support and commitment from individual citizens, since all policies are bound to fail if they are not backed by the consensus of the nation.

CONCLUSION

It took about two centuries to build the present Caribbean nations by immigration, both forced and voluntary. Ironically, it may take only a couple of decades to cripple several of these nations if the recent massive emigration movements continue.

Thus, over the past thirty years, Caribbean emigration has been far from negligible, but several of its many impacts on Caribbean societies have been neglected. It is true that Caribbean emigration is an escape valve, a reciprocal exchange and a way of life for Caribbean people. But Caribbean emigration may also be considered an hemorrhagic process, an unequal exchange and the expression of a form of cultural alienation. So far, we have complacently focused our attention on the positive aspects of Caribbean migration and its negative effects have been largely ignored.

Meanwhile, in only thirty years, more than 4 million Caribbean people have left their home countries - a total equal to the number of slaves brought into the region during the late 17th and 18th centuries. Certainly, Caribbean migration will continue. Whether, for any specific country, it will decrease, stabilize or increase, remains difficult to predict. But socio-economically, as well as in migration, the Caribbean nations are presently at a crossroad. Almost all of them are now independent countries; control of population growth can now be envisaged; the modernization process has affected all countries. Thus, development also seems possible.

Nevertheless, there are still serious barriers to development. Among them are the legacy of the dependent and outward looking mode of development that has been imposed on the Caribbean since colonization, the
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### APPENDIX I

POPULATION, NATURAL INCREASE AND ESTIMATED NET IMMIGRATION 1950 - 1980

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<td>69</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>(27)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(64.3)</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(75.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM CARIBBEAN ISLANDS</td>
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<td>1,443</td>
<td>1,492</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>29,753</td>
<td>12,091</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>4,958</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>24.8</td>
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</table>

Notes: (1) Figure derived from available census results, undertaken in 1980 or later
(2) Negligible
(3) Estimates
(4) ( ) Correspond to net migration
### APPENDIX 2

**CARIBBEAN IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25,243</td>
<td>30,485</td>
<td>29,515</td>
<td>30,115</td>
<td>29,955</td>
<td>30,285</td>
<td>30,575</td>
<td>31,075</td>
<td>31,575</td>
<td>311,575</td>
<td>312,075</td>
<td>312,575</td>
<td>313,075</td>
<td>313,575</td>
<td>314,075</td>
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### APPENDIX 3

**CARIBBEAN IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO CANADA**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15,975</td>
<td>20,135</td>
<td>20,235</td>
<td>20,335</td>
<td>20,435</td>
<td>20,535</td>
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<td>20,735</td>
<td>20,835</td>
<td>201,335</td>
<td>201,835</td>
<td>202,335</td>
<td>202,835</td>
<td>203,335</td>
<td>203,835</td>
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</tr>
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### Notes:

1. Immigrants from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not included since they are part of the United States and are not restricted.
3. **1976:** From June 30 to September 30, 1976.
4. **1975:** Provisional results. **1983:** Includes Anguilla till September 30.
5. **1975:** No data available for 1982.

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**Country of Birth**

**Caribbean Islands**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25,243</td>
<td>30,485</td>
<td>29,515</td>
<td>30,115</td>
<td>29,955</td>
<td>30,285</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15,975</td>
<td>20,135</td>
<td>20,235</td>
<td>20,335</td>
<td>20,435</td>
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<td>202,835</td>
<td>203,335</td>
<td>203,835</td>
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</table>

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**Notes:**

1. **Year of the operation "my country":** allowing regularization of status for illegal immigrants.
2. **Include immigrants classified "West Indies".
3. **Provisional results.**
### APPENDIX 4

**POPULATION ESTIMATES OF CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES**

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<td>4,885</td>
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### APPENDIX 5

**ESTIMATES OF NEW INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS**

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**Notes:**
1. Figures for 1950 - 1970 are estimates of the change in numbers of persons.
2. Figures for 1970 - 2000 are based on the assumption of net migration.
3. Figures for 1980 - 2000 are based on the assumption of net migration.