Senegal
Philippe Antoine and Gora Mboup

Senegal had about 7.7 million inhabitants in 1992 (6.88 million at the last census in 1988); more than 40 percent of the population live in cities, with one-half in Dakar, the capital. Essentially Sahelian, the country is in the middle of an economic and social crisis. Its economy depends very much on the exportation of raw products such as peanuts and phosphate. Urbanization does not rely on industrialization.

Agriculture, dominated by the production of peanuts, was particularly affected by the drought of recent years and by the fluctuation of the world prices of peanuts; therefore, income in the rural areas has become scarce. Without the diversification of crops, food production is insufficient to feed the population. Rice is a food of first necessity in Senegal and remains mostly imported. The local production of rice fails to meet the needs of the population. The phenomenon of rural exodus is still going on, and the rural population continues to migrate forced by the deterioration of their natural, economic, and social environment.

Data from Dakar, organized by the Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer (ORSTOM) and the Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire (IFAN), provide an important quantitative inquiry. This inquiry was implemented on a stratified sample of residences (2,100 households spread out in the whole city) to obtain a comprehensive picture of the migratory system and of the economic activities in the city. The inquiry has provided the gathering of migratory, professional, and family biographies of 1,550 individuals (men and

Translated from the original French text by Sarah G. Browne and John Giron.
URBANIZATION IN SENEGAL

The Steps of Urbanization

Colonization gave urbanization the character it still has today. The large cities of today were founded by the former colonial authorities in chosen sites, with functions linked to its needs, and the localization of large urban centers had a great impact: Dakar constitutes the perfect prototype (Figure 17.1).

Urbanization in Senegal went through several phases linked to colonial history (Champaud, et al., 1985). First of all, the towns on the river Senegal, the ports of call, developed along this artery of communication and have carried on particularly the rubber trade (Saint-Louis founded in 1659, Podor, Matam, Bakel). The next phase was marked by the colonization of the whole country, the developing of the culture of peanuts, and the expansion of towns near railroads (between 1885 and 1924). Peanut trading led to a pyramid-like urban network composed of multiple collecting centers and three port outlets: Dakar, Rufisque, and Kaolack.

Independence in 1960 ended the peanut trade, roads supplanted railways, and urban functions were modified. The urban system lost its balance, and through the years, a whole series of factors combined to make Dakar the main urban development pole of the whole country. Dakar's history shows a progressive monopolizing of activities spread out in various parts of the century; the Dakar harbor supplanted those of Saint-Louis and Rufisque. In 1930, Kaolack's port activities were transferred to Dakar. In 1958, Saint-Louis was stripped of its function as Senegal's capital to the benefit of Dakar. Little by little, starting in 1960, Dakar began to monopolize the country's industrial activities, including the peanut oil factories and the wholesale businesses (large business companies shut the doors of their branches located in the inland towns).

The Growth of Dakar

Dakar is the oldest French-speaking city of black Africa. For a long time (seventeenth and eighteenth century or during the whole period of the slave trade) Europeans stayed on the Isle of Goree, facing Cape Verde. In 1857, the French took control of the Senegal coast, and Dakar was established as an urban district, independent of Goree. In 1866, Goree had 3,400 inhabitants and Dakar only a few hundred. By 1891, Dakar already had 18,000 inhabitants and Goree hardly 1,200. In 1885, the railroad from Saint-Louis to Dakar was completed. The great construction works at the Dakar harbor and public buildings were completed during the 1898–1914 period, and Dakar became the capital of the French West-Africa federation. From this time on colonial authorities decided to separate European districts from African descent. In 1915, the native district of the Medina, next to the Plateau, was created. Later, the town expansion took place by consecutive operations of housing developments, especially at the end of World War II, when an attempt was made to implement a new urban policy favoring the integration of the communities.

Dakar's demographic growth rate was 5.8 percent annually between 1921 and 1951; it increased substantially between 1951 and 1961 to 8 percent. Capital of the French West African nations until 1958, Dakar lost its political role in French-speaking Africa at the time of its independence. But the transfer of Senegal's capital from Saint-Louis to Dakar has allowed Dakar to reinforce its prominence among the other towns of Senegal. Between 1955 and 1961 its growth reached a rate of 9 percent.

As Dakar continued to grow, it generated its own replica: Pikine (according to M. Verniere's expression). In 1955 the administrative quarters in Dakar began expanding, resulting in people moving to Pikine. Although Pikine was not as
well equipped as Dakar and most of its habitat was irregular in land values, but its buildings had definite qualities.

In spite of a slowing down in the demographic growth—4 percent annually between 1976 and 1988 (Mbodj, 1989), Dakar still has an increase of 55,000 people per year, the size of an average regional capital. This concentration of population goes together with a variety of activities such as administration, services, and industries. The city contributes 67 percent of the industrial production and 73 percent of the national added value.

**The Urban Network**

Dakar monopolizes numerous functions, and its relative weight in the urban population increases. In 1955, the Senegal urban population was 545,000 people in 24 cities, 16 of them with less than 10,000 inhabitants (Mainet, 1988). At present, out of the 37 districts classified as cities, the number with over 100,000 inhabitants went from 4 in 1976 to 7 in 1988, including Dakar and Pikine. Two districts have less than 5,000 inhabitants; by contrast, 16 districts have more than 5,000 inhabitants. According to the criteria, all districts or cities of more than 5,000 inhabitants, the urban population varies between 2,650,000 and 2,890,000 inhabitants (Ba and Sarr, 1990), which demonstrates that 40 percent of Senegal’s population live in cities.

On the whole, internal migrations have little effect on some interior cities. For example, Saint-Louis (115,372 inhabitants in 1988 and 2 percent annual growth between 1976 and 1988), Longa (2 percent), and some smaller towns of the country’s interior regions have lower growth rates. The two main cities of the interior, Thiès (175,465 inhabitants in 1988 and 3.6 percent annual growth) and Kaolack (152,007 inhabitants and 3.2 percent annual growth), have slightly higher rates. The cities of the interior rarely show a substantial demographic growth: typical average cities that became major centers of their regions are Fatick (18,416 inhabitants and 5.2 percent growth) and Kolda (34,337 inhabitants and 5.1 percent growth). Mbour (6.3 percent growth) and Ziguinchor (124,283 inhabitants and 4.9 percent growth) also represent high population gains which rest on real economic dynamism.

The urban hierarchy of the ancient interior town of Richard Toll changed very little. Thanks to sugar cane plantations and sugar mills, it grew from 1,000 inhabitants in 1970 to nearly 30,000 in 1988 (and became the 12th largest city). On the whole, the imbalance of the urban network is increasing to the benefit of the capital, which receives about one Senegalese migrant out of every five.

**THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPONENTS OF URBAN GROWTH**

The main factors of urban growth are, of course, mortality, fertility, and migration. The Senegalese fertility survey (ESF, 1981) and the Senegalese demographic and health survey (EDS, 1988) are sources for mortality and fertility estimates; for migration data the results come chiefly from the 1988 census.

**Mortality on the Decline**

For the last two decades mortality has declined significantly, particularly at the child level (from birth to age 5). At the national level, the infant death rate (from birth to the fifth birthday), between 1963 and 1985, dropped from 287 per thousand to 191 per thousand, a decrease of 32 percent. This decline is relatively larger after than before the first birthday: the risk of dying from birth to the first birthday declined from 103 per thousand to 86 per thousand at the national level (a decrease of 17 percent), while the risk from the first to the fifth birthday dropped from 190 per thousand to 114 per thousand (a decline of 40 percent). During this period, child mortality remained higher in the rural zones than in cities, particularly in the capital city.

Child mortality in urban areas is now 68 percent as high as in rural areas (70 per thousand compared to 102 per thousand) (EDS, 1986). This inequality of mortality becomes higher when children have reached their first birthday. The likelihood of an urban one-year-old dying before its fifth birthday is, indeed, less than twice that in the rural area (71 thousand versus 164 per thousand). The crude death rate at the national level dropped from 27 per thousand in 1960 to 19 per thousand in 1978, then to 16 per thousand in 1981 and 1985. In Dakar, where the mortality level is the lowest, the mortality rate was estimated to be 12.7 per thousand in 1981 and 1985.

As an indication of the excellent state of health of the population, the decline of infant and childhood mortality reflects the proliferation of health programs, the improvement of sanitary infrastructures, and the better knowledge people have of hygiene conditions and children nutrition. In Dakar, there are concentrations of sanitary units (more than 50 percent of health centers, centers of child and maternity care, and hospitals), and an increasing propagation of public health counseling, which have contributed to lowering the mortality rate of infants and children. The most highly educated women live in Dakar, and the training of young mothers contributes significantly to the lowering of child mortality—eliminating deaths due to the lack of hygiene, encouraging better care for nursing and feeding the newborn, and eliminating poor interpretations of symptoms or use of medicines.

In 1986 only 9 percent of the females 15–49 years of age had a secondary education, whereas 21 percent of those living in urban areas studied in secondary schools. Twenty-five percent of the urban Senegal women had a primary education, compared to only 14 percent in the entire Senegal population. In the urban areas slightly over half of the urban women never attended school, whereas almost 80 percent of them in the République de Senegal had no formal schooling (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, 1988).

The demographic and health survey (1986) demonstrated that children whose
mothers had an elementary or a secondary school education had two or three times more chances to reach their fifth birthday than those whose mothers never attended school (140 or 225 vs. 72 per thousand) (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, 1988).

Deaths due to measles, diarrhea, and malaria are decreasing rapidly in the cities. Children of women who have a high school education, or whose husband or partner is working for the modern sector, are better protected against malaria, diarrheic diseases, and malnutrition than others. In Dakar and other urban areas respectively, 10 to 15 percent of all children suffer severe malnutrition versus 25 percent in rural areas.

Children living in the capital city are not only better protected against these diseases, but are also better taken care of when they are affected by them (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, 1988).

The low level of mortality of children living in the capital does not apply to poor families, although their mortality rates are not as high as in rural areas. In fact, the EDS data (1986) demonstrate that the children of Dakar women whose husbands or partners work for the informal sector have less chance to survive than those employed in the modern sector.

Fertility

For the first twenty years after independence, fertility remained high in both rural and urban areas. The Senegal fertility survey (ESF, 1981) shows that Dakar families have as many children as rural families. The offspring of women 45–49 with completed families is over seven children for each woman. Urbanization does result in a decrease in fertility, but at present the opposite is true, as the social transformations taking place in cities are favorable to an increase. Dakar women marry young: more than half before the age of 19. The ESF (1981) and EDS (1988) estimate the average age at marriage is respectively 18.3 years old and 18.6 years old (MBDUP, 1992), close to the national average. Therefore, Dakar women start their maternity very early, at an average age of 19.

Urbanization, while bringing improvements in sanitation and a better knowledge of hygiene, decreases the risks of miscarriages and involuntary abortions and therefore increases fertility. Moreover, it contributes to the decline of traditional beliefs related to sexual taboos and lengthy nursing. Indeed, Dakar women breast-feed and abstain during the postpartum period not as long as rural women (respectively 16.5 months versus 20; 5 months and 6.7 months versus 8.4 months). The reduction in the duration of postpartum and nursing abstinence is not accompanied by a concomitant increase of contraception. Less than 5 percent of city women use contraceptive methods. Thus, intervals between births are shorter for Dakar women than for those living in rural areas. There is an increase in potential of children, that is to say in natural fertility, as demonstrated by B. A. Easterlin and M. C. Crimmins (1982) and J. Bongaarts (1982).

At the present time, urbanization, instead of reducing fertility as it does mortality, tends to increase it or to maintain it at its high level.

The lack of synchronization between mortality and fertility in Dakar shows that the only “urbanization” criteria is insufficient to explain the demographic regime specific to Senegalese cities. It is important to integrate other dimensions such as the level of education and the family’s social position in the economic life and in the modern sector.

Fertility levels depend, indeed, on the conditions of production and reproduction specific to each social group, according to its degree of involvement in the urban active life (Locoh, 1988; Mboup, 1992). A decrease in the fertility of women with higher education or a husband employed in the modern sector occurred. However, those constitute a minority in the Dakar female population (less than 10 percent.) In 1986 Senegal women 45–49 years old with no formal education had 6.8 children, those with a primary education had 5.7 children, while women with a secondary education had only 3.8 children (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, 1988).

The majority of the women in urban Senegal (79 percent) are either illiterate or have only an elementary level of education, and belong to poor families: their employment is precarious (informal sector), their salary is very low, and they do not have pension or retirement benefits. This is the reason that their behavior vis-à-vis procreation has no significant impact in lowering the fertility of all women of Dakar. For those families, a child remains a very important economic value (security in old age and labor). The ESF (1978) and the EDS (1986) demonstrate, as a matter of fact, that city women seek large families (more than 6 children per woman).

Finally, bearing in mind that the evolution in fertility has not followed the decrease in mortality, city women, particularly those in the capital, have more surviving children than their rural counterparts. The EDS data show that, indeed, for women of 15–19 years of age, 89 percent of the urban children at birth survive compared to 75 percent in the rural areas; at 45–49 years of age the gap is even wider: 81–55 percent.

Migration Patterns

According to the 1988 results (Ba and Sarr, 1990), out of a population of 6,881,919 individuals born in Senegal and residents in 1988, there were 999,060 lifetime migrants who had changed their region of residency. They are migrants who reside in a different region from their birthplace; this does not take into consideration the length of residency, nor the number of migrations; finally, it hides return migrations. The areas of Saint-Louis and Louga constitute genuine poles of emigration. These two regions supplied 277,180 lifetime migrants, that is, 31 percent of migrants from inside the country. The Dakar region, which constitutes the main pole of destination, received 462,090 migrants, 46 percent of the total. The Kaolack, Fatick, and Thiès regions are other poles of destination,
but not comparable with Dakar. If one takes into consideration the "soldes migratoires" migratory balances among the ten regions of Senegal, only two showed a positive balance: Tambacounda with a slightly positive balance of +2,740 (this region has a low migration but it is helped by the cultivation of cotton); and Dakar, which has a net gain of 325,580 lifetime migrants. Of the 889,550 lifetime migrants who migrated within the country, 462,090 or 52 percent settled in Dakar.

The main migratory flow toward Dakar originated from Thiès (105,940 persons in Dakar were originally from that region); then from Saint-Louis (86,190), and natives of three regions, Ziguinchor (58,440), Dourdel (55,020) and Louga (52,290); and finally, migrants from Kaolack (39,630) and Fatick (38,400).

The proportion of lifetime migrants in the departure area was reported. In relative weight, Ziguinchor provided the most migrants to Dakar.

The 1988 results provide the regional direction to Dakar, in the last five years. For the entire Senegal, only three regions have positive balances: Dakar (+19,260), Ziguinchor (+6,660), and Tambacounda (+150). The Ziguinchor region is a paradox insofar as it supplies an important share of Dakar immigrants (15.2 percent) and receives migrants from neighboring regions. Of the internal migrants to Dakar, the main flux was of natives of Thiès followed by those of Saint-Louis and Ziguinchor. Emigrants from these three regions went essentially to Dakar since 62 percent of emigrants from Saint-Louis, 61 percent of the emigrants from Ziguinchor, and 57 percent from Thiès went to the capital.

The migratory flux continues, but it is not a rural exodus. On the contrary, the diversity of the flux shows (IFAN-ORSTOM survey) that a large number of the rural-urban migrants were originally from an urban milieu or else passed through an urban milieu. The important urban migrations to Dakar suggest the evolution of a Senegalese urban network.

APPRAISAL OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH

The decline in mortality, much faster than that for fertility, results in a natural increase of the population at the national level at 2.9 percent. The latter is higher when one considers the capital, which has the lowest mortality rate (between 10 and 15 per thousand), and a birthrate identical with the national average (46 per thousand). The rate of natural increase in Dakar is between 3 and 3.6 percent.

According to the IFAN-ORSTOM study, the yearly immigration rate is approximately 3 percent. The difference between the annual growth (4 percent) and the natural growth in Dakar (between 3 and 3.6 percent) gives an estimate of the migratory remainder, between 0.4 and 1 percent. Therefore, each year, between 2 and 2.6 percent of the population leaves Dakar. These emigrants (approximately 30–37,000 people) are for the most part migrants returning to their homeland; the others are international immigrants who are leaving Senegal either for other African countries or for Arab countries, Europe, or North America.

International migrations are becoming more and more diversified and represent one of the strategies used to escape the crisis.

Even if the demographic growth of Dakar has slowed down, the city continues to welcome a great number of interurban migrants from Senegal. The migratory phenomenon is particularly evident with the active age-group, and even a low migratory growth can hide important fluxes with certain age-groups. For instance, in Dakar, in 1989, 30 percent of the men and 24 percent of the women between the ages of 25 and 29 arrived after 1980. Regardless of the generation, arrivals are concentrated between 15 and 25 years of age. Migration affects especially adolescents and young adults, who must face new responsibilities in unknown surroundings.

Migrations have an impact on the age and sex structure in Dakar; 48 percent of male migrants are between 20 and 39 years of age, and 47 percent of female migrants are between 15 and 34 years. Women migrate at a younger age than men, but the women represent a slightly smaller percent at each age than male migrants. This infusion of younger blood in Dakar, which shows for 1989 a relatively regular age profile, contrary to that of 1955 which showed a narrowing at the 10–15 age level, and a definite increase at the 25–30 level, along with an overrepresentation of men beyond 30 years of age. This reflects the typical profile of an expanding city welcoming migrants.

Despite the slowdown in urban growth, the situation remains very alarming: urban equipment and employment are not keeping up with the rhythm of demographic growth.

LIVING CONDITIONS IN DAKAR

Varied living conditions are found in Dakar; villas, buildings from the end of the colonial era, developments which are more or less socially oriented, more traditional concessionaire evolutive dwellings, and sheds.

The dwelling is an indication of social differentiation. Three large categories of dwellings can be identified in the city of Dakar. The first constitutes the dwellings of high and middle standing: villas, apartment buildings, and apartments in housing developments Habitat à Loyer Modéré (HLM) and Société Immobilière du Cap Vert (SICAP). The middle class remains the principal beneficiary of urban planning. The SICAP (Cap Vert Real Estate Corporation) was created in 1950, and the OHLM (Low Income Housing Office) in 1959. Since their creation, the real estate corporations have built more than 11,000 housing units for SICAP (mostly between 1960 and 1980), and around 8,000 units for HLM (mostly between 1960 and 1970).

The second category includes the rather low-income style of housing: multi-storey houses, houses with terraces, and houses with corrugated iron or tile roofs. The third category includes the sheds.

Several modes of housing construction are possible. One part of the construction is a direct consequence of the cleared lots development project (particularly
the project dealing with the clean-up of 10,500 land lots in Cambarene which have not yet all been completed. Construction can also be private, but with the help of loans (BHS [The Construction Bank]). Yet the greatest part of today's construction comes from "self-construction" and jobber's projects. Habitations of the HLM or SICAP type represent only 14 percent of all dwellings. The second category is the most often seen in the city of Dakar; it includes multistory houses, houses with terraces (24 percent of available dwellings), and houses with corrugated iron or tile roofs, which by themselves represent 53 percent of all dwellings. Finally, the sheds are few (8 percent). One finds more sheds in Dakar (10 percent) than in Pikine (5 percent).

From the results of the IFAN-ORSTOM study, and comparisons with the adjusted figures from the 1955 census, one can describe the evolution of the living modes of the dwellings, and the consequences of the increase of the family size on residential strategies.

The nature of the dwellings changed between 1955 and 1990. The 1955 census provides eloquent information on the topology of habitations and the composition of households. Of all traditional constructions, only 13 percent were made of concrete, 54 percent were made of wood, and 33 percent were made of straw. Constructions made of traditional material (straw) or salvaged materials (boards) are being replaced by concrete.

The improvement of dwelling conditions is above all the result of judicial constraints and the evolution of urban developments during the past thirty years. Before independence, construction with temporary building materials was authorized in the "African Quarters," but "the inhabitant only obtained a final property title when built out of permanent materials" (Sinou, 1990). Rather quickly, in the fifties, authorities were overwhelmed by the arrival of new migrants, and many shantytowns appeared on the nondeveloped urban fringes. It was at that time that a new policy of massive exodus of the "illegals" toward the periphery began. This policy was intensified after independence. Although, the 1967 urbanization plan did not have the means necessary for its implementation, it represented a turning point. Spontaneous urbanization is no longer considered "an urban perversion which must be eliminated" (Sinou, 1990). Dwelling norms are being lowered to allow more people to find a minimal habitation and to avoid the emergence of shantytowns. As far as the latter is concerned, the plan did succeed because no real shantytowns exist, and there are very few districts of only sheds, since these are rather scattered in various districts, sometimes hidden behind concession walls.

This construction topology is independent of the land status of the dwelling: a spontaneous habitation can be of good quality, and a shed can occupy a lot which has been divided and registered for a long time. Probably, 17 percent of all dwellings come from state construction companies, 5 to 6 percent are private dwellings subsidized by the state (loans), 22 percent result from private real estate transactions, and 53 to 56 percent of the dwellings have no official origins (CCCE, 1991).

The proportion of homeowners is relatively high in Dakar, where 48 percent of heads of families own their dwellings. The proportion of homeowners increases from the center to the periphery, and it goes from 38 percent in the downtown area, where renters are in the majority, to 49 percent in the nearby suburbs (Yoff, Patte d'oe, Cambere, Parcella) and to 56 percent in the more remote suburbs of Pikine. Among those who call themselves "homeowners," half have property titles, or lodging permits, while the other half are living without property titles, especially when the lots have been obtained from tribal chiefs.

Homeowners have large families. If we take into consideration the population as a whole (and not just heads of families), 67 percent of the population lives in families whose head is a homeowner, and 28 percent are renters. We should emphasize the large number of dependents who live with the heads of households. More than 30 percent of the population lives with a parent.

The family composition has undergone major changes, and several assessments can be made of its evolution between 1955 and 1989. The average family size went from 4.2 persons in 1955 to 8.3 in 1989. The second assessment deals with the decrease in the number of women who are heads of households (15 percent in 1989 and 18 percent in 1955), although the trend is reversed in other African capitals. The two most striking evolutions deal with the aging of the male heads of households and the increase in the number of polyuneuclear households. In 1955, 21 percent of male heads of households were over 49 years of age, and in 1989 this number has reached 37 percent. On the other hand, the proportion of polynuclear households has increased from 7 to 24 percent of all households.

One may wonder about the consequences of the increase in size of households and its effects on the living conditions of the residential space. As far as the concessions, or lots, are concerned (in general 200 to 400), one or more households often live together (1.5 households on the average in 1989). There is a densification of the concessions, especially in the downtown districts of Dakar; but the overpopulated concessions do not increase; 5 percent of concessions had more than 30 inhabitants in 1955, and 4.9 percent in 1989. If the increase in the size of households has resulted in a very relative densification of the concessions, the density per room has evolved. Whereas in 1955, 29 percent of all households and 45 percent of the population lived with more than 3 persons per room, the situation worsened by 1989 when 44 percent of households and 54 percent of the population lived in more than 3 persons per room. Accordingly, the density jumped from 2.1 to 2.9 persons per room. Obviously, the increased size of households had repercussions on the living conditions of the house space available to households.

**URBAN EQUIPMENT**

The access of households to drinking water (faucet in the home) and electricity has markedly improved. In 1955, two major types of habitations are considered:
the “European” dwellings (18 percent of the population lives in them, of which only a little more than a quarter are Africans), and the “African” habitation (housing 82 percent of the population). This dichotomy no longer has much meaning today. But, in order to allow for comparisons, we have for 1989 (IFAN ORSTOM study) grouped, in the same category, high-standing habitations and the constructions completed by real estate corporations, and on the other hand, habitations in the concessions.

The first category sheltered 15 percent of the population in 1989, and the second category sheltered 85 percent. The first category, regardless of the time period, is connected in 93 percent of cases to the network of running water and electricity. In the 1989 concessions, the situation improved: nearly 40 percent of households have both water and electricity at their disposal; still 57 percent are without water (91 percent in 1955) and must gather it mostly at public fountains, while 40 percent (80 percent in 1955) have no electricity.

The fight against shantytowns has turned out to be relatively effective; the dwellings made of temporary building materials have given way to dwellings constructed of concrete. However, that doesn’t mean that everyone has a decent place to live. As far as the water and electricity supply is concerned, successful efforts have been carried out, but more than half of the population of working-class districts do not have running water in their homes, with all the consequences for hygiene and health which result from problems linked to the stocking of water.

The city of Dakar is better equipped than the rest of the country in community equipment but, nevertheless, suffers from a lack of infrastructure. The city budget is approximately 6,700 cfa francs per inhabitant (1 U.S. dollar = 300 FCFA).

Without spending much time on major equipment with a national orientation, what does neighborhood equipment consist of? There are three primary classes for each 1,000 inhabitants in Dakar, only one in Pikine, and only one health station for each 23,000 people in Dakar and one for 19,000 in Pikine. The sewer network is insufficient, and many districts in Dakar and all of Pikine have no sewer system. Equipment and budgets for its upkeep remain too small to meet the needs of the population of a city with more than one and a half million people.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

To analyze employment, it is necessary to distinguish between the modern sector (such as jobs in businesses with accounting services) and the nonstructured sector. Employment statistics show that the modern sector, exclusively developed in cities, has undergone a growth of more than 6 percent during the first two decades of the independence of Senegal. But since the eighties it has declined. The work force has gone from 86,500 in 1971 to 173,000 in 1982, and 169,000 in 1986 (Bocquier, 1991).

Government employment represents 40 percent of the modern sector. During the seventies, the administration work force increased, and the supervising ratio (number of government workers per 1,000 habitants) went from 8 to 11. On the other hand, during the 1980s, the supervising ratio decreased 4 percent (Bocquier, 1991).

The decrease in the employment of the modern economy during the 1980s had an impact on the private sector which, after an 11 percent growth, went through a slower evolution of 2 percent. The private-sector share went from 18 percent in 1971 to 30 percent in 1988. Business in the modern sector had a spectacular drop: its share decreased from 14 percent in the 1970s to less than 7 percent in the 1980s. Industrial production, after a 14 percent growth in the 1970s, had a very slow growth rate of 3 percent in the 1980s. In 1974, it represented 26 percent of the modern sector, and in the 1990s, less than 20 percent (Valette, 1990).

This decrease in the activity of the modern sector is also felt in the capital where the public and parapublic sectors account for 51,200 salaried employees, including 78 percent male, 67 percent in government jobs, and 29 percent working for private businesses. Its share in salaried employment was 44 percent (Zarour, 1989; Bocquier, 1991).

The private sector represents an important part of the modern sector (18 percent in 1971 and 30 percent in 1988). Employment in the private sector has jumped from 42,209 in 1960 to 107,164 in 1980, or a 5 percent yearly increase.

Industrial production, mostly concentrated in the capital, includes products derived from peanuts, phosphates, and fishing, as well as exports from Senegal. The harshness of climatic conditions limits peanut production. The low productivity and competitiveness of local industrial products, the deterioration of the exchange rate, the technological and energy-related production costs represent as many road blocks against investments, which are essentially foreign. Thus, the industry employs only 11 percent of salaried workers. This percentage is highly insufficient to support an urbanization that is qualitatively sufficient. The rates of workers from the industrial sector and the whole population reached its lowest level in the 1980s (1.7 percent, compared with 2.4 percent in previous years).

The modern sector represents less than 25 percent of the total employment in the great Dakar area, and is unable to meet the needs of new job seekers. During the last decade, the total number of active workers increased 4 percent, which corresponds to 98,723 new job seekers. The private sector has been able to absorb only 5,144 of them, or 5 percent, and the public sector 17 percent. The remainder, or 78 percent, must look to the informal sector (Bocquier, 1991).

Given the low absorption capacity of the modern, public, and private sectors, the majority is forced to work in the activity sector called "nonstructured." In production activities (woodwork, sewing) or services (mechanics, tailors) or commercial activities, it is still difficult to determine exactly the number of jobs in the nonstructured sector, these usually being temporary, in production, qualification, and income.
According to the IFAN-ORSTOM study, apprentices and family helpers, unpaid for the most part, represent 27 percent of all jobs, and 46 percent of the unstructured sector. Self-employed workers represent 45 percent of the unstructured sector. In the subdivisions of production and services, the independents, the apprentices, and the family helpers represent 71 percent (90,300) of the men and 25 percent of the women (18,000).

Building construction belongs for the most part to the nonstructured sector, and the number working is widely underestimated. The IFAN-ORSTOM study estimates the independents at 6,000, the apprentices at 1,800, and the salaried employees in the modern sector at 3,200, a total number of 11,000.

An important segment of the active population in the unstructured sector is engaged in commercial activities. Also, there are more women than men there: 40,000 compared to 31,000. Among employed women (109,600), only 15 percent are salaried workers in a business. Among the employed men, 39 percent work for a business. Thus, women are not as well represented as men in the modern sector.

Not all unemployed active people in the modern sector succeed in finding jobs in the nonstructured sector. The general population census of 1988 indicated an unemployment rate of 27 percent for males and 31 percent for females. In Dakar, an employed person supports an average of 3.4 other persons. The high level of unemployment is explained particularly by massive layoffs and the closing of private businesses. Industry is the sector of activity which accounts for the largest number of unemployed: 22 percent and 15 percent in the services and production sectors, and 19 percent of women in commercial activities. For men, the unemployment rate is approximately 14 percent in the industry sector.

Unemployment is worsened by structural adjustment programs (Diouf, 1992). In order to reduce its expenditures and lower the national debt, the state, which is the main employer in the modern sector (40 percent of administrative jobs), is forced to limit new recruiting and lay off government workers. With the use of custom and fiscal measures, the revision of work laws, the abolition of restrictions on the importation of products, and the liberalization of prices, the government of Senegal is attempting to rejuvenate industry and make it more competitive internationally. The limits of the modern sector in its ability to employ the urban population, along with lesser involvements from the state, have resulted in a progressive development of the sector of independent workers, family helpers, and apprentices. These are usually rural migrants and laid-off workers who have sought a new type of employment. The decline of the industrial and administrative sectors has had a great impact on temporary jobs generally held by rural migrants without an education.

The unstructured sector is dealing primarily with survival tactics in which all family members are involved, particularly women and children. The necessity of the participation of all members in production leaves unchanged the life cultural pattern of poor populations in the cities. Polygamy, fertility, the reproduction of social and identity alliances are integral parts of the process of survival tactics (Antoine et al., 1992).

The participation of members in family production takes place along varied pathways: children and women head mostly for the unstructured sector. Independent male workers and apprentices represent 71 percent in the subdivisions of production and services, and women 25 percent. The estimated number in independent businesses is 31,300 men and 40,000 women.

AN IMPOVERISHED URBAN POPULATION

There is little available information on revenues in Dakar. The net industrial income per person in Senegal has gone from 214,000 cfa francs in 1960 to 143,000 cfa francs in 1985 (in 1985 cfa francs). In 1980, the average monthly family income was estimated at 83,300 cfa francs in Dakar, and 51,200 cfa francs in Pikine (Ministère de l’Urbanisme, 1986). The official minimum wage in 1969 of 50.6 cfa francs an hour increased to 201.06 cfa francs in 1988, which is insufficient to offset inflation (the price index being 492.2 in 1989, with a base of 100 in 1967); with a constant currency value, the official 1988 minimum wage declined 13 percent since 1969. Some workers earn a salary below the official minimum wage.

In the IFAN-ORSTOM study (1992), seven questions dealt with the ownership of domestic goods, including radios and automobiles. Despite these structural imperfections, this variable reflects a standard of living scale going from 0 to 5. At both extremes, we find those who have no domestic goods, or at the very least a radio; such a situation is the norm for more than half of households (52 percent), and indicates the poverty which strikes an important proportion of households in Dakar. At the other extreme, 4 percent of households own almost all types of domestic goods. Between the two extremes are approximately 23 percent of the households (category 1 and 2), which own comparatively little equipment. Those in category 3, “average equipment” (16 percent), and category 4, “rather good equipment” (5 percent), own a minimum level of equipment which includes in most cases radios, refrigerators, televisions, and living room furniture.

Heads of households who have a satisfactory level of equipment belong for the most part to the categories of management level personnel (48 percent), important independent businessmen (7 percent), manual workers (8 percent), and retired people (10 percent). The majority in several active categories have no goods. Thus, 83 percent of unskilled laborers, 67 percent of independent businessmen, and 67 percent of the manual workers fall in this situation. Even among the heads of households who are salaried workers of service industries, 45 percent have no domestic goods. Eighty-five percent of the management level personnel have average or higher quality equipment. Except for management personnel, retired individuals enjoy a relatively better situation than other professionals.
When equipment is considered by type of household, one category stands out very clearly: households with one or more nonrelated individuals, most of whom own no domestic goods. The percentage for men is 81, and for women, 76. These households take in other people (mononuclear households with children and other parents), and polyonuclear households own most of the goods. Does this relative affluence result from sharing common goods with one another, or do the wealthier heads of households assume the responsibility for a greater number of persons? One is inclined to choose the second hypothesis, which corroborates our previous analyses. Usually, the households with female heads are poorer than those headed by men, particularly single-parent families.

Most people with good equipment live in high-standard dwellings (81 percent) or in good-quality dwellings made of concrete (19 percent). The poorest reside either in inadequate dwellings or in concrete dwellings of inferior quality; also a large proportion (41 percent) of people in high-quality concrete dwellings are impoverished. The poor live in poor dwellings, but a few households without many goods also live in better dwellings. Eighty-three percent of the heads of households with good equipment are owners (83.3 percent).

**LIMITS OF APPLIED PROJECTS**

As a sign of the rapid growth of cities, the government has included in its official population planning a national and regional development program. The regional integrated development projects aim to centralize modern activity (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances 1988:10).

Among the stated objectives were the decentralization of industrial and administrative infrastructures to enhance the value of other cities and decrease the migratory flow to the capital. The progressive elaboration of regional poles of cultural, social, and economic development will enhance the production activities, stabilize the local population, and slow migration toward the Dakar area. The objectives also include the adoption of incentive measures for the implementation of small and mid-size businesses inside the country, and new activities in secondary cities to achieve a balanced distribution of national manpower; and the restructuration of urban equipment, of sewer systems and water networks in the spontaneous dwelling district of Dakar and in the suburbs to improve sanitary conditions. The implementation of these objectives is being hampered by demographic constraints and problems linked to the long- and mid-term structural adjustment programs Programme d’Ajustement à Long et Moyen Termes (PALMT).

The natality rate remains high in Dakar, and this shows that the redistribution policy would not itself reduce the rapid population growth of the capital. While continuing its sewer and hygiene policies, the state must instill new blood in its policies concerning the natality rate.

The priority investment and action programs dealing with the population, which were elaborated in 1989, have a tendency to revitalize the family plan programs, by integrating them within the health programs aimed at mothers and children. The communication, education, and information programs (Information, Education et Communication [IEC]) concerning populations are also financed to increase information concerning family planning (Ministère de la Sante Publique, 1989). The association between mortality and natality is not linear. The decrease in the mortality rate does not necessarily entail the adoption of family planning which leads to a decline in natality rates.

Despite the repeal in 1980 of the 1920 law forbidding contraception publicity and the use of contraceptives, and the integration of programs and modern services of family planning Planification Familiale (PF) within the health services for mothers and children Santé Maternelle et Infantile (SMI), the use of contraceptives remains low in the country (EDS, 1986).

Family planning programs are in fact inseparable from the economic conditions which prevail in the country. Among the most impoverished social groups, who operate according to survival tactics in which the participation of large numbers of individuals is indispensable to increase family production, the improvement of living conditions constitutes a prerequisite to the acceptance of family planning.

The structural adjustment program resulted in important negative social impacts on the job market, which are linked to the policy of deregulation from the state, to new industrial and agricultural policies, and to a clean-up in public finances.

Despite the creation of the insertion and reinsertion delegation Délégation à l’Insertion et à la Réinsertion (DIRE), whose function is to direct young and old workers “removed” from government jobs to other development sectors and regions, unemployment is at the most critical level of its history: not only are the young without jobs, but their parents occupy an unstable position in the job market. Administrative measures are rarely sustained by very concrete financial and economic programs: the distance between laws and regulations and facts still remains very important. This means that policies are rarely translated into concrete actions. The solutions to revitalize the economy are correctly identified, but the organizational and financial abilities necessary for their implementation are absent. The payment of the national debt and the drain of capital constitute an obstacle to the accumulation of capital on a national scale.

**CONCLUSION**

The employment crisis manifests grave consequences: the modern sector is no longer a career prospect for young people, the unstructured sector has insufficient abilities to offer jobs to the unemployed, and Senegal offers few opportunities of reconversion in agriculture, despite hopes generated by the development of the Senegal River valley.

Within this context of vanishing employment, the responsibilities of the heads of households increase, and are aggravated by low revenues and resources. The
heads of households contribute to the maintenance of the entire household by assuming responsibility for household expenditures. The crisis enhances the dependence of young people on their elders. Besides the progressive densification of dwellings, the increase in the size of households results especially in the heads of households contributing to the maintenance of the entire household by assuming responsibility for household expenditures. The crisis enhances the delayed departure of youths from their parental homes. The system of family concessions which is reproduced in the city lessens the tensions of the real estate market. But how long will one segment of the population be able to shelter another?

Demographic perspectives do not foresee any important slowdown of urbanization, given the natality rate which constantly remains high. The results from family planning programs remain mediocre. In fact, reproduction is inseparable from the economic conditions of production. The acceleration of migratory movements results in the rapid development of the unstructured sector, which will eventually reach its saturation point.

The 1990s began in Dakar with a saturated job market because of a lack of job opportunities and with a real estate market poorly adapted to the requirements of the population. The inequalities of access to resources are accentuated even within households. The orientations of the Structural Adjustments Plan of Senegal, compressing the resources from the modern sector, do not herald a positive solution to the crisis.

REFERENCES


Urbanization in Africa
A Handbook

EDITED BY
James D. Tarver

FOREWORD BY
Thomas J. Goliber

GREENWOOD PRESS
WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT • LONDON