



Working Papers

Paper 124, December 2015

Beyond War and Peace:

The IOM and International Migration Control in Libya

Julien Brachet

This paper is published by the International Migration Institute (IMI), Oxford Department of International Development (QEH), University of Oxford, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford OX1 3TB, UK (www.imi.ox.ac.uk).

IMI does not have an institutional view and does not aim to present one.
The views expressed in this document are those of its independent author.

The IMI Working Papers Series

The International Migration Institute (IMI) has been publishing working papers since its foundation in 2006. The series presents current research in the field of international migration. The papers in this series:

- analyse migration as part of broader global change
- contribute to new theoretical approaches
- advance understanding of the multi-level forces driving migration

Abstract

The war that took place in Libya in 2011 forced 1.5 million people to leave the country. Many of them, from sub-Saharan Africa, were helped to return to their countries of origin by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This paper questions the purely humanitarian nature of the IOM intervention with reference to its activities before and after the conflict. It shows that this organisation has long participated in the implementation of European migration policies in Libya, and more widely in the Sahara. Through the replacement of local politics by international crisis management, this desert is gradually integrated into a zone of international bureaucratic expedience. War and humanitarian intervention appear as contingencies in the progressive implementation of a global system of surveillance, spatial control and management of mobility in Africa.

Author: Julien Brachet, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and IMI, University of Oxford, julien.brachet@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Acknowledgements and comments

This project has received funding from the EU's Horizon 2020 research programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement N° 652755.

Contents

	The IMI Working Papers Series	2
	Abstract	2
1	Introduction	4
2	IOM in the Sahara or the European drive to control an African migratory system	5
3	Before the war, the IOM already at the heart of the battle. Campaigns and projects	7
4	And the war started. From ‘assisted voluntary return’ to ‘assistance to refugees’: continuities and change.....	9
5	Return to ‘normal’: everyday life in a rough patch.....	11
6	Conclusion	14
	References	16

1 Introduction

‘One of the largest migration crises in modern history’ (IOM 2011a: 3). This is how the International Organization for Migration (IOM) described the overall displacement of people in Libya during the 2011 war. This conflict, which began with uprisings in Benghazi in February 2011 and turned into a war with the intervention of NATO forces from March to October of the same year, indeed caused an impressive displacement of people. Of a total Libyan population estimated before the war at less than seven million (among whom 1.5 to 2.5 million were foreigners), more than 600,000 Libyans and 800,000 foreign nationals were counted fleeing the country between February and November 2011. To these figures should be added those who left without being recorded, and more than 200,000 internally displaced. These kind of displacements have always been easily instrumentalised in Europe to stir up longstanding and largely unfounded fears of an invasion (de Haas 2008; Lessault and Beauchemin 2009). Hence, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini predicted, at the very beginning of the conflict, ‘a wave of 200,000 to 300,000 immigrants’ arriving in Italy if the Libyan system fell, claiming that there would be a ‘biblical exodus’ (Reuters, 23.02.2011). Although wildly exaggerated - in fact, fewer than 26,000 refugees from Libya arrived in Italy during the whole conflict (IOM 2011b: 15) - his predictions were repeated by several other European ministers, thereby creating the need to ‘manage’ these population movements. Hence began in February 2011 the international management of this ‘migration crisis’, even before it had emerged on the ground.

One of the most active organisations in this ‘management’ was the IOM, which participated in the evacuation of about 250,000 foreign nationals from Libya over the year, funded by their habitual sponsors, particularly the EU and its member states. Like other international organisations, the IOM knew how to present its activities in the eyes of international public opinion through the distribution of regular reports, photos and press briefing notes with suggestive titles, such as ‘Despite Heavy Shelling IOM Rescues Several Hundreds of Migrants’ (IOM 2011d). The assistance offered in difficult conditions by the IOM to people fleeing the fighting was unanimously welcomed abroad, and its humanitarian emphasis might lead one to believe that the IOM had specifically intervened to remedy a crisis. Yet the organisation had been active in the country for several years, and, on closer examination, and taking into account that the IOM does not specifically intervene in emergency situations, changes in their policies on the ground seem to have been slight, beyond publicly redefining them in humanitarian terms.

A leader in the field of migration management on all levels, the IOM tends to adopt a model akin to consultancy: it offers a diagnosis, develops projects *ad hoc* with precise purposes, dispenses advice, and estimates the efficacy of its actions on the ground with regard to the objectives stated. In this, it is part of a broader trend towards international ‘migration management’. The wealthiest and most diplomatically powerful governments are increasingly active in the worldwide management of ‘crises’, and in particular in the control of populations considered undesirable. This they do through, on the one hand, supranational organisations and their specialised agencies (the EU and Frontex, for instance) and on the other, through international organisations which they finance and/or whose policies they guide – such as the UNHCR or the IOM. This indirect internationalisation of (Western) state activities through the intermediary of international organisations, which is not specific to the field of migration (see Glassman 1999; Harvey 2005; Peet 2008; Sparke 2005), ultimately dilutes state responsibility with regards to policy and implementation: they cannot be held to account even if the latter, on the ground, results in illegitimate or illegal activities. This allows governments to avoid potential criticism, both abroad and at home, and to intervene outside their borders, in places and at times where otherwise this would be impossible. It is in these ‘unconventional spaces of government’, in Ong’s words (2006: 75)

that the effects and the logics of interaction between the international organisations and Western states fully come into view, including in their darkest aspects (Fassin 2011).

Such interventions create new forms of political centralities and of extra-national territorial control, as national borders are replaced by shifting frontiers of intervention or security buffer zones, and as national political institutions are replaced by supra-national organisations that are beyond democratic control. Politics at the level of the nation-state – however inefficient and undemocratic they might in fact be – are replaced with management, and the lip-service paid to equality between independent nation-states sacrificed to bureaucratic expedience, or at least to representations of bureaucratic efficiency (MacIntyre 2006 [1981]: 107). Humanitarian rhetoric, such as that deployed by the IOM to legitimise its activities during the 2011 war in Libya, participates in this general drive towards migration management, that, despite its inevitable failure, transforms local and regional patterns of exchange and territorial ordering, with often devastating effects on the ground.

Addressing ‘the spatiality of all forms of governments’ (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 996) within neoliberal globalisation, this paper aims to critically analyse the close connections between economically dominant states and international organisations, with regards to the international control and management of mobility. Based on a close description of the IOM’s activities, before, during and after the 2011 conflict in Libya, it argues that the IOM exemplifies a kind of institution dedicated to the neoliberal government of the world, by combining what Bourdieu (1999) called the right and the left hand of the state (coercion and social care, respectively), without democratic control. Despite a changing context, and thus a consciously changing public emphasis on either aspect of its intervention, the main objectives of the IOM’s activities remain the same, and partake in a broader trend towards global governance, which radically changes spatial orderings on the ground. Saharan Africa thus provides a test case for a much wider trend of fundamental spatial restructuring through a transformation of the nature of politics and humanitarian intervention at the international level. This paper is based on field research carried out in Niger (between 2003 and 2010) and Chad (2011–2012). In addition to participant observation and informal conversation, I recorded some 150 formal interviews in Niger, and 80 in Chad, with migrants, managers of ‘ghettoes’, drivers, civil servants, traders, and NGO staff. Interviews were mostly conducted in French and English.

2 IOM in the Sahara or the European drive to control an African migratory system

The IOM is an intergovernmental organisation created in 1951 and based in Geneva. It is not a member of the United Nations system, although the initials ‘UN’ are frequently affixed to its vehicles, as observed in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, creating some confusion on the ground. Notwithstanding, the IOM constitutes the most important international organisation worldwide concerned with migration, and has 68 member states, 1,100 employees and a budget of \$240 million in 1998. In 2014, barely twenty years later, it had 156 member states, 8,400 employees and a budget of \$1.3 billion. Its budget is mostly raised through donations from individual states (and the EU), almost exclusively for the implementation of specific projects. This means that the projects put into practice correspond to the expectations of their sponsors, in other words the wealthiest countries, although these expectations are in turn strongly influenced by the IOM. Through its expertise, supposedly ‘technical’ rather than political, but that is inescapably ideological and normative (cf. Ferguson 1990), the IOM establishes categories (like ‘trafficking’ or ‘third-country nationals’) that shape the representation of population movements, thereby creating the possibility of intervention for political actors of all kinds. Despite its financial dependency on member states, the IOM thus proactively generates a certain type

of migration policy, by spelling out the terms of the debate. As Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 700) put it, international organisations are ‘more than the reflection of state preference’ but rather ‘powerful actors in global politics’.

Nonetheless, once the terms of the debate are set, the IOM primarily acts as an institutional lever for the governments of these countries to implement, abroad, migration policies that might be challenged by their own citizens, i.e. by part of their electorate. African migrants clearly perceive the European origin of the resulting changes in local migration policies:

Italy asked Gaddafi to close the borders, now in Libya it is very hard because Gaddafi said yes. Now if you are caught in Libya you will be put in prison. You can die in prison in Libya.

(Gambian, Bilma, Niger, 24.10.2009)

Everywhere here, Europe spends millions to stop the adventurers. They are afraid that we all want to go to Europe and now they are making it difficult for us. We are always told that we want to go to France, to Italy. The police just say this to take money from us. Sometimes you are obliged to say that you want to go to Europe, even if that's not true, but that's what they want to hear.

(Malian, Faya-Largeau, Chad, 28.03.2012)

The tightened grip of EU governments on migration in the Sahara has its own history. In the 1990s, a small section of sub-Saharan migrants – long-standing temporary labour migrants to Algeria and Libya – began to join migration networks from the Maghreb to carry on to Europe. The vast majority of migrants, however, remained in northern Africa: mobility in the Sahara has always been – and still is today – mainly intra-African (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005), and is a central part of local economies and societies. Trans-Saharan migrants and their demand for transport have revitalised regional and cross-border trade that supplies people in northern Sahel with foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Moreover, migrants have settled in Saharan towns, contributing to economic growth and urbanisation (Brachet 2011).

Yet since the beginning of the 2000s, the exclusive focus in European and African media and government on migrants travelling to Europe has meant that virtually all journeys undertaken by sub-Saharan migrants across the Sahara are misinterpreted as transcontinental economic migrations (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005). Because of this confusion between Saharan, trans-Saharan and trans-Mediterranean migrations, the Sahara gradually became a priority zone for European governments in their so-called fight against irregular migration to Europe. New migration policies, increasingly decided on the EU-level, were implemented in ‘partnership’ first with North African, then Sahelian states (Perrin 2012). Seeking to control population movements further and further ‘downstream’, the southern migration frontier of the EU has been progressively externalised, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Sahara: Europe attempts not only to control entries in its territory, but also movements within the African continent.

As part of this externalisation of border controls, the IOM opened offices in Tunisia in 2001, in Mali in 2004, in Libya and Niger in 2006, in Mauritania in 2007, then in Chad and in Sudan by 2009 and in Algeria in 2013. This was done with the aim to ‘enhance the humane and orderly management of migration’ and ‘to contribute to economic and social development’, in collaboration with national governments. But if the IOM is committed to the principle that ‘humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society’, in fact, the underlying concepts and the practices of the organisation correspond above all to EU policy. In the Sahara, this means trying to prevent as many sub-Saharan migrants as possible from reaching the Mediterranean coast, as it is widely assumed that any black African arriving there is trying to get into Europe illegally (Nyberg-Sorensen 2006; Andrijasevic 2010).

As a result, Saharan geopolitics changed, and three main frontiers emerged. The first corresponds to the political borders of the Schengen Area; its control is increasingly effective, although it remains permeable, as this porosity is part of its function (Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos 2008). The second, following the North and West African coastline, acts as a buffer zone, dotted with retention camps and where migrants and refugees are slowed down and filtered (Valluy 2007). The Sahara has been turned into a third frontier, with fuzzy and ever shifting borders. Throughout this area, from the Sahel to the Mediterranean, the rapid expansion of the IOM bears witness to the success of the services it offers to the EU governments, or perhaps rather of the latter's success in employing the IOM to externalise and implement their projects abroad. In any case, it underlines the growing importance of 'migration management' in northern Africa.

The EU has long funded a large part of IOM activities in Libya, especially through the programme Aeneas, which has since 2004 been the main European programme concerned with migration (EU 2011). Through Aeneas, the IOM has received – in conjunction with the Italian Ministry of the Interior – more than €3 million to secure the border between Niger and Libya, which is considered to lie across the principle route taken by irregular migrants (project Across Sahara I and II, launched in 2005 and 2007). It has further been granted €2.7 million to organize the 'voluntary return' of migrants in irregular situation in Libya (project Enhancement of Transit and Irregular Migration Management in Libya, 2006–2008).

Several other projects touching upon various aspects of migration in Libya were carried out by the IOM with European money. In March 2010, the European Commission entrusted the Italian Ministry of the Interior with the leadership of the project Sah-Med (Prevention and Management of Irregular Migration Flows from Sahara Desert to Mediterranean Sea), with a budget of €10 million. The exclusive objective of this project was to 'fight' irregular migration across the Sahara and the Mediterranean. Once again in close cooperation with the Italian and Libyan Ministries of Interior, the IOM was at the heart of its implementation, in charge of enhancing border control through the provision of technical equipment and the training of border police in migration management. The objective of the EU is clear and frequently reaffirmed: 'as regards more particularly Libya, particular attention will be paid to measures to curb irregular migration flows into the EU, [and] to support migration management capacities' (European Commission, n.d.).

3 Before the war, the IOM already at the heart of the battle. Campaigns and projects

The various programmes that the IOM implemented in Libya had two aims: the propagation of a 'management' approach to international migration, and the organisation of migration and border control. They involved information campaigns (Geiger and Pécoud 2010), staff training in immigration departments, and advice regarding border management or the elaboration of migration policies. Partnerships with local governments were highly valued, and questions of direct coercive power systematically left to them (however bad their human rights record might be). The strength and subtlety of these campaigns lay in their focus on 'management' talk, to suggest rather than impose, to lead by example, to convince without forcing. The IOM does not operate as a closed entity but rather as an open device that constantly attracts and integrates new players into its networks, as interlocutors, consultants, experts or even partners. Trained locally or abroad, paid, and often pleased to be involved in or to work with such an organisation, police officers, freelance researchers, NGO, UN or ministry staff members are gradually led to share and adopt its own reasoning. In this way, the IOM incites states as well as non-state actors (see below) to think and act in similar ways. It thereby strengthens a particular kind of globally homogeneous governmentality of borders and international migration.

Media campaigns addressed at migrants exclusively aim at dissuasion, eliding human trafficking and undocumented migration (Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007). This is justified on the IOM website with the well-worn proverb: ‘prevention is better than cure’. Broadcast in several African countries, the IOM media campaign takes the form of small clips on national television channels, of radio messages, newspaper advertisements, or message boards in streets and bus stations, and even of posters and leaflets distributed in police stations and at border posts. It also includes theatrical sketches performed, for a non-paying audience, in public places (IOM 2010a). Whatever the medium, the message is always the same: migration towards the Maghreb and Europe is a kind of madness, a source of suffering and of physical and moral violence, and inevitably doomed to failure. Migration is presented under its most negative aspects, in order to dissuade possible candidates. According to the IOM, these ‘awareness campaigns’ present information ‘in a way that cannot be rejected by the target population but forcibly makes them adhere to it’, in order to ‘bring about a change in the target population’s conduct’ (IOM 2010a: 53–54).

These campaigns seem to have little success locally. For most Sahelians, descriptions of Saharan migration in terms only of ‘suicidal risks’, ‘fatal dangers’, ‘atrocities’ and ‘nightmares’ are caricatures. Especially as, for many of them, temporary labour migration to the Maghreb has been an ordinary part of life for decades: everyone knows it to be difficult, but also mostly fruitful (Brachet 2009). This shows the disjunction between the IOM’s globally informed models of communication and local perceptions of space, informed by a long history of inter-regional exchanges. Locally, the northern Sahel and the Algerian and Libyan south are known to be intimately related and interdependent, as much through trade as through family connections (Scheele 2012). In these practical perceptions of space, the IOM’s attempt to redefine Libya as unreachable and foreign, and the implicit distinction between North and sub-Saharan Africa that underpins it, makes little sense. Where for the IOM, trans-Saharan or even trans-continental migration starts on the southern shore of the Sahara, seen from the inside, the Libyan south is an integral part of, as well as a privileged destination within, a regional migration system.

We saw people from the IOM, I told them that their communication doesn't work. On their poster there is a big lorry, coming back from Libya, with boxes, mattresses, lots of people on top, and they put a cross through it like that, with a text saying that migration is bad. But that's contradictory. Clearly contradictory. How are you going to say that it is bad when they come back with so much stuff. It's absurd. [...] But it is such a contradiction, because your peasant, he will look at this and he will say 'just see how stupid the people who wrote this are, just look at all those people who left and now they return with lots of things'.

(Staff member of the NGO Arc-en-ciel, Niamey, 18.03.2008)

The IOM’s vision of space, however, has means of imposing itself in ways that are incommensurably more forceful than newspaper adverts. They find full expression in their second main area of intervention: border and migration control and management, in partnership with public authorities (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010). The IOM has launched several such projects, generally more for the benefit of its state sponsors than for migrants themselves (Georgi 2010). One of these is the repatriation of migrants, in particular through ‘voluntary assisted returns’. The ‘voluntary’ nature of these returns is systematically put forward in the media coverage of IOM interventions – although, in view of the situation of foreigners in Libya, and of the IOM’s overall objectives, it is in fact more than questionable. Libyan migration policy has for a long time been one of repression and periodic collective repatriation, carried out in deplorable conditions and coupled with regular violence against blacks (Hamood 2008). In this context, individual informed choice seems wholly illusory. According to the UNHCR, for whom ‘voluntariness is more than an issue of principle’, if people’s rights ‘are not recognised, if they are

subject to pressures and restrictions and confined to closed camps, they may choose to return, but this is not an act of free will' (UNHCR 1996: chapter 2, Section 2.3). While some IOM employees might be unaware of what they are doing when they propose to people who are under threat, mistreated or imprisoned to voluntarily 'return home', others, based in the European headquarters, are less so. As Gianluca Rocco, Head of Implementation and Management Services of the IOM Brussels, recognised: 'How voluntary is a voluntary return when you are in a closed center?' (Human Rights Watch 2003: section 4 §4).

Further south, similar projects raise similar doubts. In its transit centre built in Dirkou, in northern Niger, the IOM has, since 2009, received migrants expelled from Libya by the Libyan authorities, offering a 'voluntary repatriation grant' to send them back to their country of origin (IOM 2010b). Even here, the term 'voluntary', based on a never unambiguous value judgement, aims first of all at making acceptable, in the eyes of public opinion, the implementation of this policy of return (see Webber 2011). A policy which, until the war of 2011, was criticised by local authorities and migrants alike:

The problem is that, with ECOWAS, we have to let these people travel in Niger. At least all those who are from ECOWAS countries. [...] We don't have the right to stop them here.

(Policeman, Agadez, Niger, 12.10.2009)

The IOM it is dangerous. It's just good for those who are depressed. [...] But otherwise, if it was really an agency to help migrants, instead of paying us plane tickets to return home, they should just give us the money of the ticket and let us do what we want with it.

(Cameroonian on his way to Libya, Faya, Chad, 16.08.2012)

'Voluntary returns', moreover, are implemented primarily in those areas that the IOM and its funders want to 'make safe'. In this way, a large part of the Sahara is redefined as a grey zone of transit migration, supposedly beyond state control, and where international 'management' is thus necessary – and legitimate.

4 And the war started. From 'assisted voluntary return' to 'assistance to refugees': continuities and change

'The IOM announced that it was negotiating with the Libyan authorities to send a humanitarian mission to Libya, where thousands of immigrants are waiting to be repatriated' (Le Monde, 11.03.2011). Shortly after the beginning of the war, the IOM increased its activities in Libya under the banner of humanitarian aid, participating in getting hundreds of thousand people out of the country. In northern Libya, boats, planes and buses were hired to organise cross-border rotations towards Tunisia and Egypt. In the south of the country, transport towards Niger and Chad was mainly organised on board large lorries, rented from traders, and that transported on average one hundred passengers per trip. Travel conditions were arduous, in particular as convoys going to Agadez, Faya or Abéché took several weeks to arrive at destination.

During the first four months of the conflict, 75,000 persons fled from Libya to Niger overland – 95 per cent of whom were nationals of Niger, according to the IOM (2011a). A peak was reached on 18 March 2011 with 2,400 arrivals in the small Saharan oasis of Dirkou (IOM 2011c). To avoid a long wait in Dirkou, with the risk of rapidly causing health and supply problems, the IOM obtained from the Nigerien army agreement that they would secure more convoys heading south than usual. Instead of the regular one IOM convoy per month to cover the 650 km between the oasis of Dirkou and the city of Agadez, at the height of the crisis, a convoy took place almost every week. This, however, did not

prevent thousands of migrants from staying in an oasis that usually numbers only a few thousand inhabitants, and where vital local resources are limited at the best of times.

A similar situation occurred in the oasis of Faya-Largeau in northern Chad, where tens of thousands of returnees arrived in transit from Libya. Tents had hastily been set up to shelter them, and UNHCR funds were officially assigned to help them during their stay. Those most urgently in need were looked after by the medical staff of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and were given some food. Yet most of the migrants I met during or after their stay in Faya in 2011 and 2012 said that they never received any of the blankets and mats with which the IOM was supposed to provide them. There is no doubt that these items had been bought by the IOM national head office in N'Djamena, but they were only distributed in small quantities, in an arbitrary fashion. IOM stores were thus at times overflowing, with little sign of redistribution, while there was much talk of local officials who had benefited. Many migrants, on the other hand, hoped for financial support, in order to avoid having to return home empty-handed, but this hope remained unfulfilled.

The IOM, at the beginning, they promised us €500 per person if we left Libya, to cover our expenses. We left via Kufra to go back home. We should have had the same sum but they gave us nothing, not one franc. They gave us nothing. We have been here for three weeks, we are waiting. There should be a truck but it doesn't come. We are waiting, we don't know, and the IOM don't tell us anything.
(Cameroonian coming back from Libya, Faya, Chad, 24.01.2012)

This, however, did not stop the IOM from advertising the financial and material aid offered to repatriated migrants. According to the interviews I conducted in Niger and Chad, IOM local and foreign employees did not seem to mind much that their attempts at management crumbled when faced with local realities, as long as the show could go on and justify their salaries. This is perhaps why, aware of the performative nature of IOM activity, migrants claimed what they considered to be their due, as participants in the show, in much the same way as they knew that local authorities were paid off.

During the year 2011, more than 100,000 Nigeriens and 100,000 Chadians were escorted by the IOM to their home countries, together with thousands of other nationals of sub-Saharan countries. The latter, called 'Third-Country Nationals' (TCNs) in the migration management lingo, are defined as those who have crossed a Libyan border to find refuge in a country which is not their country of origin. From there, the IOM plan was to send them to their home countries, again with IOM support. But this was not always possible, and, according to potential beneficiaries, required a long and complicated procedure that had not much chance of succeeding. Hence, many gave up and finished their trip by their own means, or simply decided to turn back. This did not stop the IOM from putting forward their assistance to TCNs as a particularly positive aspect of their activities. In practical terms, IOM interest and its capacity to act seem to wane proportionally to the distance put between migrants and the Mediterranean shore. Their principal aim is thus clearly not to help migrants return, but rather to police the Sahara, and to reject all problematic cases beyond it.

Other humanitarian claims appear similarly unfounded. The IOM puts much emphasis on the violence which sub-Saharans would suffer were they to stay in Libya, and addressed to the international media numerous Press Briefing Notes with titles such as 'Race against Time to Save Lives of Thousands of Migrants Stranded in Southern Libya' (IOM 2011e). Among Western governments, media and various institutions, there was much alarm at the situation of black foreigners in Libya at war. And indeed, nationals of sub-Saharan countries were victims of two kinds of violence, since, to the general violence of the war, were added targeted exactions. Easily assimilated to mercenaries paid by Gaddafi's army, even when they stayed away from the fighting, many fell victim to lynching, as also happened to many Tubus and other dark-skinned Libyans. It is true that Gaddafi had long staffed his army, and in particular his Islamic Legion, with soldiers recruited in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in times of war.

But these mercenaries had never represented more than a tiny fraction of black Africans in Libya. In any case, racist violence against blacks preceded the conflict and existed for a long time independently of accusations of military collaboration. Hence, in 2000, several hundred blacks were wounded or killed in racist riots in Tripoli, and several thousands officially left the country (Pliez 2002: 37). Even before the war, this kind of violence was a common occurrence, and the IOM and other international organisations' sudden interest in it – after failing to raise this issue throughout many years of cooperation with the Libyan regime – hence needs further explanation. Moreover, the IOM indirectly participated in setting up an imaginary division between 'black' and 'white' Africa, by helping to return 'blacks' to their 'homeland': south of the Sahara. The slippage, common in media reports, between 'blacks' and 'poor immigrants', was telling in this respect.

Before the war, Libyan racism was exacerbated by the implementation of an extremely ambiguous migration policy, encouraged, even in its most repressive aspects, by the EU, while there was no doubt that Libya did not respect even the most elementary rights of migrants (Lutterbeck 2009). Although links between popular racism and institutionalised discrimination are never straightforward, the general absence of any respect for the little legal protection for sub-Saharan residents in Libya that there was certainly encouraged an overall climate of xenophobia. Before the war started, few international organisations and UN agencies ever expressed any concern about this. In 2011, France, the UK, Italy and the US said that they had to intervene militarily, in the name of NATO, 'to prevent the massacre of civil populations', and justified their intervention with 'the responsibility to protect' guaranteed by the UN. But none of these IOM sponsors had evoked a similar responsibility when faced with blatant non-compliance with conventions on the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, on the rights of migrant workers, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, or the European Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Non-compliance that, for decades, has caused the death of thousands of civilians (see Fekete 2005, Spijkerboer 2007, Carling 2007 and Migreurop 2009).

If NATO's use of human rights rhetoric to justify intervention in Libya has been denounced as a farce, the use of this same rhetoric by the IOM to justify the development of its own activities in the country equally merits interrogation. Human rights issues have never been high on the IOM's agenda in Libya; moreover, as Human Rights Watch put it in 2003: 'IOM has no formal mandate to monitor human rights abuses or to protect the rights of migrants and other persons' (Human Rights Watch 2003). But this use of humanitarian language allowed the IOM to redefine their field of intervention as an area beyond the law, potentially dangerous for migrants, where they needed to be helped; referring to the notion of the 'responsibility to protect', interventions were thus *a priori* justified, whatever they might be. This rhetorical use of humanitarian concerns, common also among other international organisations (Agier 2010), blur the way in which the IOM's projects are perceived both by international public opinion and by their own employees, who intervene in liminal spaces and at liminal times, where the power and control of regional states and civil society is weak. This is particularly relevant in the contemporary Sahara, which is on the way to being redefined as a geographical zone where crisis is permanent, and where hence intervention and crisis management – with the low degree of accountability this implies – have become the norm.

5 Return to 'normal': everyday life in a rough patch

Although quantitative estimates of Saharan and trans-Saharan mobility are always both uncertain and highly politicised, it is important to look at them more closely. There is no doubt that in 2011, many people left Libya. With regards to the Sahel, however, while the increase in overall departures is noticeable, it does not indicate a radical change. If we add the number of migrants who returned

independently, hiring private transport, ‘voluntary assisted returns’ organised by the IOM, and deportations by the Libyan authorities, departures from Libya to the Sahel were already counted in the thousands every week since the early 1990s (Brachet 2009). What, then, changed with the fall of Gaddafi?

The official end of the war, which was supposed to have led to a return to ‘normal’ political relations, was accompanied by new treaties of cooperation between the winners (i.e. the National Transitional Council of Libya and the member states of NATO). This cooperation was instantiated in the continuation of the activities of a number of international organisations, the IOM among them. In the aftermath of the conflict, most of the IOM’s projects in Libya, financed directly or indirectly by the EU, were reactivated to address a ‘surge in irregular migration’. Thus, the programmes Sah-Med, Impact and Mepi started again, as did Ravel: the ‘Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programmes for stranded migrants in Egypt and Libya’. If the Libyan authorities had changed, European migration policies had remained the same.

With the programme Ravel, managed by the IOM, the European Commission had announced in 2009 its intention to assign €20 million to Libya to help it fight against irregular migration. If the war had suspended this programme for a while, this did not alter the EU’s desire to implement it. This is clearly spelt out in a report by the European Commission drafted even before fighting ended:

Similar dialogues will follow with other countries in the Southern Mediterranean region, notably with Libya, as soon as the political situation permits. The dialogues allow the EU and the partner countries to discuss in a comprehensive manner all aspects of their possible cooperation in managing migration flows and circulation of persons with a view to establishing Mobility Partnerships.
(European Commission 2011)

During the war, then, the IOM officially only carried out programmes of ‘assistance and repatriation of the refugees’. But from 2012, the ‘dialogue’ with the new Libyan authorities started again, and everything returned to business as usual: the programme of ‘voluntary assisted returns’ was launched again, with its initial budget.

As soon as the new ‘Libyan authorities’ were (again) organising the deportation of Sahelian nationals, the latter were taken in charge and accompanied by the IOM that remains present in Libya, Niger, Chad and Sudan. In the media, this is presented, once more, as a humanitarian intervention: ‘Stranded Chadian migrants deported from Libya receive emergency aid’, as the IOM put it (IOM 2013). More discreetly, Libyan military officers who work for the Department for Combating Illegal Migration of the Ministry of Interior, and whose job it is to arrest and return migrants entering Libya illegally, expressed their ‘gratitude for the IOM’s assistance’ (Libya Herald, 3.03. 2013). Exit ‘assistance to refugees’, (re)enter ‘voluntary returns’, again to a backdrop of an unfounded but politically belaboured fear of trans-Saharan ‘invasion’ in Europe. Hence, in early 2014, the Italian government claimed that ‘up to 600,000 would-be migrants are in position to set sail from North Africa, in an onslaught on Europe’s coastline’. Meanwhile, the Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano reassured his electorate that ‘we’ll fight to ensure that Europe defends its border’.

‘Nothing’, writes Michel Dobry (1983: 395), ‘allows us to confirm that the means made available at times of crisis are radically different from those employed under more routine conditions’. It seems that by repeatedly declaring a ‘migration crisis’, here supposedly linked to political transition in North Africa, the EU and its member states legitimised the accelerated realisation of their own objective, developed independently of any crisis, namely the implementation of a comprehensive apparatus of surveillance and control of international mobility in the Sahara. This is particularly true in

Libya, where the EU has substantially contributed to establishing the new government, and continues to be involved in internal political matters.

As Mountz and Hiemstra argue, Western governments label situations as ‘crises’ also in order ‘to expand sovereign claims and powers’ (2014: 383, see also Bonnacase and Brachet 2013). Today, Libya seems to have settled into a lasting ‘state of war’, characterised not necessarily by armed struggle, but rather by the constant possibility of new eruptions of violence. As Hironaka (2005) shows, this ‘never-ending war’ changes relations between individuals, groups and institutions. In the case of the IOM, this translates into an increased capacity to pursue its chores, within a legal framework that is exceedingly blurred due to the instability of national institutions and their almost total lack of territorial control. These times of uncertainty and arbitrariness further reinforce the IOM’s freedom of action.

Beyond Libya, the current succession of ‘crises’ in the Sahara and Sahel gradually turn the Sahara into a security belt to enable EU migration management. After the Mediterranean Sea and the northern African coastline, the region now appears as the third extraterritorial zone in which supposedly irregular and northbound African migration is surveyed and controlled. In this new geography of control, the Sahara acts as a frontier zone where numerous actors attempt to slow down and push back sub-Saharan migrants, without stopping to inquire into their legal situation, their origin or even their destination – and even less so into their projects and desires. In this way, former historical ‘regions’ of exchange and interaction are redefined and reshaped, for reasons that remain largely beyond local control; while national claims to sovereignty are even further undermined by those of international organisations. This breaking-up of Saharan space is the result of the international remodelling and the multiplication of borders that might be fixed or mobile, lines, zones or points in space (checkpoints, for instance), and that cut through and profoundly modify more longstanding areas of connectivity, regional economies, and national territories. This opens up new economic and political possibilities for some (transport agents, ‘development’ brokers), but is economically disastrous for most; in any case, it indicates a clear and much resented loss of control and of local spatial autonomy.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that despite its far-reaching impact on the ground, IOM ‘management talk’ remains aspirational. While IOM policies make travel in the Saharan increasingly difficult, and undermine longstanding regional systems of transport and supply, they slow down rather than stop migration. Hence, as the IOM were still busy repatriating ‘stranded migrants’ from Libya, others had already decided that it was time to go back north. Some went looking for work, well aware that war creates many opportunities for those who are ready to take risks, and that in times of reconstruction demands for labour are high. Others were going back to fetch their belongings, left behind during a hasty departure. Many former migrants still have not been able to pick up their savings (money or goods) or their personal belongings; some never received their last salary. As a result of this, some migrants say that they have been repatriated twice by the IOM, the first time to get away from the fighting, the second time several months later after having returned to fetch their belongings. The IOM’s services were thus incorporated into regional transport systems:

We have become a travel agency. We do not anymore assist refugees fleeing Libya, but we organise their removal. Some have 30 kg of luggage, that still goes, but some really have too many things. We have become a removal company. And all the money that it costs... Humanitarian intervention has become ridiculous. And now they make round trips, some are going back to Libya already.”
(Chadian IOM official, Zouarké, Chad, 4.02.2012)

Libya continues to need foreign labour, and the migratory adventure to North Africa or beyond will continue to attract sub-Saharans, whatever their social or geographical background. This is mainly for economic reasons, but also because migration to Libya provides the experience of an international journey, of escaping the constraints of their society of origin, of becoming autonomous individuals

(Brachet 2009: 57–64). Much as the IOM is now pursuing its prior remit, the migratory networks are back in place, after only a few months of interruption at the height of the war in early 2011. The IOM intervention and EU pressure on regional governments have merely made prices go up, exacerbating the hardship of the journey. From several Sahelian cities of Niger and Chad (Niamey, Zinder, N'Djamena, Abéché), via towns and oases of transit (Agadez, Arlit, Dirkou, Faya), it is again possible to travel to the towns of southern Libya (Murzuk, Al-Gatrun, Sebha, Kufra) and, beyond, to Tripoli or Benghazi. Trans-Saharan transport continues to be expensive and risky, and states agents continue to 'tax' migrants who travel across the desert. For many private and public actors, be they state officials or not, migration has become once again a business almost like any other. And yesterday's refugees, the irregular migrants of the day before, look again like unwanted immigrants. Meanwhile, the IOM, aware of this continuity or not, renews its contracts, and carries on playing its part in the worldwide illusion of bureaucratic efficiency and control.

6 Conclusion

There is no doubt that it is important to denounce the tragedies that happened during the war in Libya: refugees escaping into the desert, or about 1.500 probable deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, with summits of inhumanity reached when, in late March 2011, a NATO helicopter and ship spotted a craft of castaways without helping them (63 out of 72 passengers on the craft subsequently died). This, however, must not make us forget that not so long ago, just before the war, Libya expelled tens of thousands of sub-Saharan foreigners into the desert, and that Italian or Libyan coastguards routinely fired at migrants' boats to force them to turn back (Migreurop 2009). All this with means partially supplied by the EU and with its approval, or at least its tacit agreement. Meanwhile, an organisation such as the IOM, which is rightly congratulated for the assistance it offered to refugees and returnees during the Libyan conflict, and still publicly emphasises the 'humanitarian' aspect of its activities, it continues to repatriate migrants from Libya to their home countries.

Emergency has turned into post-emergency, war-torn Libya into unstable Libya, but the IOM's activities on the ground have changed little, as the same people are still sent southwards by the same organisation, with the same methods and using the same equipment and funds. Despite their temporary humanitarian labelling, there can be no doubt that the main rationale for IOM's presence is EU's concern about preventing 'transit' migration from Libya, whatever are the migrants' own needs and desires. This easy change of vocabulary reflects the double nature of an organisation like the IOM that can structure territories, strengthen border control and modify human mobility, both by providing assistance to refugees and by promoting the fight against irregular migration. This blurs the boundaries between protection and coercion, attention and persuasion, help and control, and thereby makes the different registers of intervention difficult to distinguish, and thus to evaluate critically. The rhetoric of humanitarian intervention can easily become a fig leaf that allows the implementation of migration policies that, in Europe, are increasingly criticised by several associations and NGOs in spite of the general habituation of international public opinion (Squire 2011).

The IOM today has offices in more than 150 countries, with 480 field locations. It is carrying out more than 2,600 projects around the world. It is difficult to measure the concrete impact of specific projects on migration policy, and even more so on the many factors that influence migration itself. Yet the IOM appears as one of the leaders of an increasingly global and permanent system of surveillance and control, of the 'management' of populations who are considered, simultaneously or alternatively, as vulnerable and invasive, as victimised and dangerous, as refugees and illegal immigrants. This system takes shape in the sites where material devices are set up to further it (machines, tools, vehicles, arms, buildings and personnel) and in anti-migration rhetoric, circulated by experts, media and politicians,

that bias both elite and popular notions with regards to migration. As a result, the physical and social space of the Sahara is transformed, as travel becomes increasingly difficult, risky and expensive – at least for those defined as ‘undesirable’ because their mobility has been redefined as ‘illegal’ (see Dauvergne 2008, Hiemstra 2010). At the heart of this process of flexibilisation of regimes of citizenship and of the hierarchisation of the right to mobility (Bauman 1998), between the two unattainable ideals of totally smooth spaces of freedom of movement, and space hermetically sealed, emerge more or less rugged terrains, according to whom is travelling and when, according to political, economic, social or cultural criteria. International migration policies thereby create their own geographies of movement, restraining and curtailing national and regional sovereignty.

Proclaiming themselves to be simply administrating the local consequences of global historical necessity, our governments take great care to banish the democratic supplement. Through the invention of supra-State institutions, which are not States, which are not accountable to any people, they realize the immanent ends of their very practice: depoliticize political matters, reserve them for places that are non-places, places that do not leave any space for the democratic invention of polemic. So the State and their experts can quietly agree among themselves.
(Rancière 2006: 81–82)

International organisations increasingly appear everywhere as devices to make governable a world marked by tensions and conflicts, without having to govern it directly (Shore, Wright and Però 2011), and, as put Rancière, without having to give people an account of their activities. In this way, they reconfigure the contours of the territories where state or popular sovereignty is nominally exercised, broadening spatially their and their sponsors’ authority to the detriment of local and regional conceptions and practices of space. International ‘management talk’, while creating jobs for a new international elite of experts, speaks of a world where space is supposed to be socially and culturally neutral. In fact it implements a value hierarchy based on location (cf. Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 995): the closer one gets to what used to be the first world, the less autonomy is granted to individual movement and local control. What is at stake here is brute coercion, of course, but also spatial autonomy and the power to define ‘zones’ (of war, security, protection, control, victimhood), irrespective of the historical specificity of place, and the desires and values of those who live there. This is an impossible task, and much international government remains thus spectacular rather than efficient, with nonetheless dire consequences to those involved at the bottom end.

At the level of the Saharan migratory system, the Libyan conflict will have been only an additional tragic epiphenomenon, aggravating an already critical situation that preceded it and that is still ongoing. For years, the militarisation of border regions, the presence of foreign operational police agents in third countries, the deployment of considerable technical means, preventive information gathering, media propaganda, laws of exception, and arrests, deportations and deaths by the thousand constitute the reality of the implementation of European migration policies in Libya and in the Sahara more generally. These policies pay little heed to international law, and their managers and agents deny responsibility for the effects they might have on the ground, hiding behind the need to respect orders and administrative obligations. In a sense, then, the war in Libya has only accelerated the implementation of migration policies that, for years, already bore many of the trappings of war, without bearing its name. Through the replacement of local politics by international crisis management, the Sahara is thus gradually transformed, from an area of interregional connectivity, into a rugged terrain of exception.

References

- Agier, M. (2010) *Managing the Undesirables. Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Andrijasevic, R. (2010) 'From Exception to Excess: Detention and Deportations across the Mediterranean Space'. In: De Genova, N. and Peutz, N. (eds.) *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*. Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 147–165.
- Andrijasevic, R. and Walters, W. (2010) 'The International Organisation for Migration and the international government of borders'. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28(6): 977–999.
- Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (1999) 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations'. *International Organization* (53): 699–732.
- Bauman Z (1998) *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bonnecase V. and Brachet J. (2013) 'Les "crises sahéliennes" entre perceptions locales et gestions internationales'. *Politique africaine* (130): 5–22.
- Bourdieu, P. (1999 [1993]) 'The Abdication of the State'. In: Bourdieu, P (ed.) *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (181–188). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brachet, J. (2009) *Migrations transsahariennes. Vers un désert cosmopolite et morcelé (Niger)*. Paris: Le Croquant.
- Brachet, J. (2011) 'The Blind Spot of Repression: Migration Policies and Human Survival in the Central Sahara'. In: Truong, T.D. and Gasper, D. (eds.) *Transnational Migration and Human Security. The Migration-Development-Security Nexus* (57–66). New York: Springer.
- Bredeloup, S. and Pliez, O. (2005) 'Migrations entre les deux rives du Sahara'. *Autrepart* (36): 3–20.
- Carling, J. (2007) 'Migration Control and Migrant Fatalities at the Spanish-African Borders'. *International Migration Review* 41(2): 316–343.
- Dauvergne, C. (2008) *Making People Illegal. What Globalization Means for Migration and Law*. Cambridge: CUP.
- de Haas, H. (2008) 'The myth of invasion. The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe'. *Third World Quarterly* 29(7): 1305–1322.
- Dobry, M. (1983) 'Mobilisations multisectorielles et dynamique des crises politiques : un point de vue heuristique'. *Revue française de sociologie* 24(3): 395–419.
- European Commission (no date) 'Cooperation with Third Countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum, 2011–2013'. Multi-Annual Strategy Paper, Annex. Brussels: EC.
- European Commission (2011) 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The Global approach to Migration and Mobilities – 18.11.2011'. Brussels: EC.
- Fassin, D. (2011) 'Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries: The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40(1): 213–226.
- Fekete, L. (2005) 'The deportation machine: Europe, asylum and human rights'. *Race & Class* 47(1): 64–91.
- Ferguson, J. (1990) *The Anti-politics Machine: "development", Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: CUP.

- Ferguson, J. and Gupta, A. (2002) 'Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality'. *American Ethnologist* 29(4): 981–1002.
- Geiger, M. and Pécoud, A. (eds.) (2010) *The Politics of International Migration Management*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Georgi, F. (2010) 'For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and its global migration management'. In: Geiger, M. and Pécoud, A. (eds.) *The Politics of International Migration Management* (45–72). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Glassman, J. (1999) 'State power beyond the territorial trap: the internationalization of the state'. *Political Geography* 18(6): 669–696.
- Hamood, S. (2008) 'EU–Libya Cooperation on Migration: A Raw Deal for Refugees and Migrants?'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21 (1): 19–42.
- Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: OUP.
- Hiemstra, N. (2010) 'Immigrant "Illegality" as Neoliberal Governmentality in Leadville, Colorado'. *Antipode* 42(1): 74–102.
- Hironaka, A. (2005) *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Human Rights Watch (2003) 'The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Human Rights Protection in the Field: Current Concerns'. IOM Governing Council Meeting 86th Session, 18–21.11.2003, Geneva.
- IOM (2010a) 'Agir contre la traite des personnes et le trafic de migrants'. Geneva: OIM/Department of State USA. p. 86
- IOM (2010b) Press Briefing Note, 25.05.2010. www.iom.int/news/centres-niger-provide-humanitarian-assistance-stranded-migrants
- IOM (2011a) 'Humanitarian Emergency Response to the Libyan Crisis, 28.02.2011–27.09.2011', Seven-month Report on IOM's Response'. Geneva: IOM.
- IOM (2011b) 'Migrants caught in crisis: the IOM experience in Libya'. Geneva: IOM.
- IOM (2011c) Press Briefing Note, 18.03.2011. www.iom.int/news/thousands-more-african-migrants-arrive-niger-libya-iom-evacuates-first-group-algeria
- IOM (2011d) Press Briefing Note 05.05.2011. www.iom.int/news/despite-heavy-shelling-iom-rescues-several-hundreds-migrants-and-wounded-civilians-misrata
- IOM (2011e) Press Briefing Note, 28.06.2011. www.iom.int/news/race-against-time-save-lives-thousands-migrants-stranded-southern-libya
- IOM (2013) Press Briefing Note, 12.02.2013. <https://www.iom.int/news/stranded-chadian-migrants-deported-libya-receive-emergency-aid>
- Le Monde* (2011) 'Les pro-Kadhafi prennent Zaouïa et poursuivent leur avancée vers l'est', 11.03.2011. www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/03/11/les-pro-kadhafi-prennent-zaouia-et-poursuivent-leur-avancee-vers-l-est_1492053_3212.html?xtmc=oim&xtcr=1
- Libya Herald* (2013) 'Illegal immigration – a concern but “under control”', 3.03.2013. www.libyaherald.com/2013/03/03/illegal-immigration-still-a-concern-but-under-control/
- Lessault, D. and Beauchemin, C. (2009) 'Ni invasion, ni exode. Regards statistiques sur les migrations d'Afrique subsaharienne'. *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 25(1): 163–194.
- Lutterbeck, D. (2009) 'Migrants, weapons and oil: Europe and Libya after the sanctions'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 14(2): 169–184.
- MacIntyre, A. (2006 [1981]) *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. London: Duckworth.

- Migreurop (2009) *Europe's Murderous Borders*. Paris: Migreurop.
- Migreurop (2011) *At the margins of Europe. The externalisation of migration controls. 2010–2011 report*. Paris: Migreurop.
- Mountz, A. and Hiemstra, N. (2014) 'Chaos and Crisis: Dissecting the Spatiotemporal Logics of Contemporary Migrations and State Practices'. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 104(2): 382–390.
- Nieuwenhuys, C. and Pécoud, A. (2007) 'Human Trafficking, Information Campaigns and Strategies of Migration Control'. *American Behavioral Scientist* 50(12): 1674–1695.
- Nyberg-Sorensen, N. (ed.) (2006) *Mediterranean transit migration*. Copenhagen: DIIS.
- Ong, A. (2006) *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Papadopoulos, D., Stephenson, N. and Tsianos, V. (2008) *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century*. London: Pluto Press.
- Papastavridis, E. (2010) "'Fortress Europe" and Frontex: Within or Without International Law?' *Nordic Journal of International Law* 79(1): 75–111.
- Peet, R. (2008 [2003]) *Unholy Trinity. The IMF, World Bank and WTO*. London/New York: Zed Books.
- Perrin, D. (2012) 'The Impact of European Migration Policies on Migration-Related Legislative Activity in Maghreb Countries: An Overview of Recent Reforms'. In: Gortazar, C., Parra, M.C., Segart, B. and Timmerman, C. (eds.) *European Migration and Asylum Policies: Coherence or Contradiction?* (251–260). Brussels: Bruylant.
- Pliez, O. (2002) 'Vieux réseaux et nouvelles circulations entre les deux rives du Sahara'. *Méditerranée* 99(3-4): 31–40.
- Rancière, J. (2006) *Hatred of Democracy*. London: Verso.
- Reuters (2011) 'Italy sees 300,000 fleeing Libya turmoil - minister', 23.02.2011. <http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE71M06J20110223>
- Scheele, J. (2012) *Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shore, C., Wright, S. and Però, D. (eds.) (2011) *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the Anatomy of Contemporary Power*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Sparke, M. (2005) *In the Space of Theory: Post-Foundational Geographies of the Nation-State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Spijkerboer, T. (2007) 'The human costs of border control'. *European Journal of Migration and Law* (9): 127–139.
- Squire, V. (ed.) (2011) *The contested politics of mobility: borderzones and irregularity*. Oxford: Routledge.
- UNHCR (1996) 'Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection'. Geneva: Handbook.
- Valluy, J. (2007) 'Algérie, Libye, Maroc : des camps européens au Maghreb'. In: Le Cour Grandmaison, O., Lhuillier, G. and Valluy, J. (eds.) *Le retour des camps ? Sanguatte, Guantanamo, Lampedusa*. Paris: Autrement. pp. 139–151.
- Webber, F. (2011) 'How voluntary are voluntary returns?' *Race & Class* 52(4): 98–107.