

14

The Fall of the Elephant

Two Decades of Poverty Increase in Côte d'Ivoire, 1988–2008

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14.1 Introduction

After having been praised as a model to follow, at the turn of the twenty-first century, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) began to stand as a counter-example for those eager to find auspicious signs of the 'emergence' of Africa. For now, the case of this country is perhaps a reminder to others that some golden ages may end in nightmares. In 2012, Côte d'Ivoire had just emerged from a contested presidential election that came close to turning into a civil war between the followers of the incumbent (Laurent Gbagbo) and the challenger (Alassane Ouattara). For five years between the end of 2002 and 2007, the country had also been partitioned between North and South, with UN-mandated forces interposing between legalists and rebels. And in 1999, a coup by General Robert Guéï had expelled the president Henri Konan Bédié from power. When did it all start? Even on that point, different readings of history already disagree; furthermore, it is certainly possible to find roots of such a great crisis in the distant past, dating back at least to the colonial period (Dozon 2011). However, opting for a narrative that is not too deterministic, it is safe to say that bad economic and political conditions started to combine between 1990 and 1993. Macroeconomic imbalances and growth failures appeared in the mid-1980s, the first structural adjustment programme (SAP) being launched as early as 1981; still, the halving of cocoa producer prices was delayed until 1990, and this delay can be seen as symptomatic of a kind of denial of macroeconomic issues by the government (Berthélemy and Bourguignon

1996; Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps 2002a, 2002b). In the same year, the first multi-party presidential election was conceded and won by the father of the nation Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who had ruled the country since independence (1960), and who died in December 1993. The death of the '*vieux*' (old man) raised the last obstacle to the CFA franc devaluation in January 1994, illustrating how economics could be determined by politics (Jones and Olken 2005). Reciprocally, it can be argued that neoliberal economic reforms undermined the country's capacity to preserve a fragile political equilibrium, in particular between Northern and Southern elites (Boone 2007).

This chapter proposes a retrospective analysis of the evolution of living standards in Côte d'Ivoire over two decades, from the end of the 1980s until the end of the 2000s. It focuses on income distribution and monetary poverty, but also looks at access to education and to health. This is made possible by the exploitation of the large sample household surveys that were implemented at various times during that period. Our analysis also makes use of available national accounts, as well as of regional and sectoral price data. To our knowledge, the most recent past decade has not yet been analysed in those terms, and no such historical perspective has yet been tried. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 14.2 is a background section that reviews the main lines of Ivorian economic history from the colonial era until the 1980s. Section 14.3 then presents the data and the analytical methodology, further details being given in Cogneau et al. (2014). Section 14.4 reviews the first decade of uncertainties (1988–98), inaugurated by the great cocoa shock (1989–93) and followed by the devaluation bounce-back (1994–8). Section 14.5 then delves into the less-studied decade of the civil war (1998–2008), which we divide again into two halves. The first half saw three presidents follow one another into power (Konan Bédié, Gueï, Gbagbo) until the partition of the country in 2002. The second half ended in 2007 after the signature of the Ouagadougou agreements between Northern rebels and legalist forces. We then briefly discuss recent developments between 2008 and 2013, and set out a few prospects for the ten years to come. Section 14.6 concludes.

14.2 The Rise of the Elephant until the End of the 1980s

The present-day territory of Côte d'Ivoire was first constituted as a colony of France in 1899. Côte d'Ivoire became independent in 1960, like all the French colonies of West and Equatorial Africa. Before 1899, the French already had established trade posts on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, in particular on the (Ébrié) lagoon in the Southwest (Grand-Bassam), close to the future capital of Abidjan, and not too far from the Gold Coast (Ghana) border where the British

were settled. They also arrived in the North, coming from the coasts of Senegal; at the present-day Northern borders of the country with Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, they fought a series of wars against the *Diula* leader Almami Samori Ture, that ended with his capture in 1898. Before the arrival of the French, the most structured pre-colonial polities were the kingdoms located in the North; from West to East: the Senufo kingdom of Kenedugu, whose capital city was Sikasso (in today's Mali), the Kong and Buna kingdoms (with eponymous capital towns in today's Côte d'Ivoire), and the Gyaman kingdom (around Bonduku). Other small polities (Sefwi, Indenie, Sanwi) along the border with Ghana were under the dominion of the Ashanti Empire, whose capital Kumasi lay in central Ghana. Economically speaking, the Northern kingdoms were mostly based on trade with trans-Saharan caravans, which exchanged salt, cattle, and a few manufactured goods for the gold from the Northern mines and the kola nuts bought from the people of the Southern forests. The slave trade was also present in the Northeast and along the border with Ghana (the Ashanti Empire was based on gold and slave trades), but this affected the populations of Côte d'Ivoire to a relatively small degree.

During the colonial era, Côte d'Ivoire did not receive more investment than other comparable areas like Guinea or Dahomey (today's Benin), but much less than Senegal, which was the central seat of the government of former French West Africa (Huillery 2009). Cocoa production only took off after the Second World War, in the 1950s, and this drove urbanization (Jedwab 2011). It started at the border of Ghana, which was the world's first producer of cocoa at that time, as *Akan planteurs* (cocoa growers) imitated their co-ethnic neighbours. A *Baule* physician and cocoa grower, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, was elected to the French National Assembly in 1945, and occupied a series of ministerial positions in the governments of the French Fourth Republic. After having turned into an independentist leader, he became the first president of Côte d'Ivoire in 1960 and, as 'father of the nation', stayed in power until his death in December 1993. Houphouët-Boigny consolidated his rule by making a political alliance with Northern leaders (a Centre-East/North axis), allowing him to counterbalance the influence of non-*Baule Akan* kings and chiefs (Southeast) and to downplay the opposition of *Kru* leaders (Centre West).¹

At the same time, he preserved very strong links with the French, becoming one of the main actors of what would later be called the '*Françafrique*'. He was

¹ Baules are part of the larger Akan ethnic group. This political equilibrium fell apart after his death in 1993, because of the individual competition between the Northerner Ouattara, prime minister, and the *Baule* Konan Bedie, president of the National Assembly.

rewarded by high levels of French foreign aid, as well as by the allocation of French engineers and administrators to key technical positions within the Ivorian administration.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the 'Ivorian miracle' was built upon the two pillars of cocoa and French aid. The Baule planteurs colonized forested areas to plant cocoa and coffee trees, moving the cocoa frontier progressively from the East (Ghana border) to the West (Guinea border), where it had arrived by the end of the 1990s. Part of the sharecropper labour force for cocoa was provided by very large migration flows from Northern neighbours, first Burkina Faso and then Mali. According to the 1998 census, 26 per cent of residents were 'foreigners', even if half of them were actually born in the country (Tapinos et al. 2002). Cotton production was developed in the North, and kept increasing until the end of the 1990s as well. Administered producer prices were managed by parastatals as an implicit taxation on farmers, so that cocoa, coffee, and cotton income became central in the government revenue. With growing fiscal resources and generous amounts of aid, the Ivorian state could invest in roads and transportation infrastructures and in the construction of schools, and could also pay high wages to its civil servants, including teachers. Growing cocoa income spurred urbanization (Jedwab 2011). Great emphasis was placed on education, and Côte d'Ivoire succeeded in catching up with neighbouring Ghana in terms of literacy, where it was very much lagging behind at the end of the colonial era (Cogneau and Moradi 2014). Houphouët nicknamed Côte d'Ivoire the 'République des bons élèves' (Republic of the good pupils), paraphrasing the name 'République des professeurs' (Republic of the teachers) that was used to refer to the French Third Republic.

Figure 14.1 illustrates how growth was determined by income from cash crops, in particular cocoa. Between 1960 and the beginning of the 1970s, real GDP per capita rose by around 50 per cent, from 600 to 900 dollars (in constant 2000 US\$). In 1974–5, the international prices of cocoa, coffee, and cotton followed the boom in oil prices and other raw materials, and internal producer prices were dramatically increased as well, bringing GDP per capita to the heights of US\$1,100. Côte d'Ivoire overtook Ghana as the world's largest cocoa producer in 1977 (Eberhardt and Teal 2010). However, this price boom did not last very long, and with the first adjustment programme in 1981 also came disillusion with growth. The short-lived bounce of international prices in 1985–6 allowed macroeconomic stabilization to be postponed for a while; in 1987, Côte d'Ivoire failed to influence cocoa international prices by accumulating stocks. At the end of the 1980s, the growing deficits of the state budget and of the cocoa and coffee marketing board could no longer be sustained, and a large cut of producer prices was finally implemented in 1989.

Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction




Figure 14.1. GDP per capita and cash crop income, 1960–2010

Note: In plain line and on left scale, gross domestic product per capita in 2000 US\$. In dotted line and on right scale, sum of cocoa beans, green coffee, and cotton seeds output, valued at international prices, deflated by GDP deflator, converted in 2000 US\$ and lagged by one year.

Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from World Bank (2012) and FAOSTAT (2012)

Figure 14.2 provides a kind of summary of the Ivorian miracle and reversal of fortune, using height data covering eighty-five years (1903–88). For the early period (1903–40), we use recently collected military data on conscripts in the French army; data on conscripts' height gains connects nicely with data from the 1985–8 and 2008 surveys in which the heights of males aged twenty years and over were measured.²

The graph reveals the impressive height gain of four centimetres that was obtained in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century. This gain compares well with Fogel's (1994) figures for twentieth-century France or United Kingdom (6 cm over the 1875–1975 period). For cohorts born after 1975, i.e. when GDP per capita began its great decline, we observe a significant fall in stature, of around 1.5 cm.

² In retrospective survey data, the heights of the oldest cohorts are affected by old-age shrinkage. See Cogneau and Rouanet (2011) for an analysis of 1925–85 height evolutions and a comparison with Ghana.




Figure 14.2. Average height stature of males aged 20–59 years, 1900–90

Note: Grey diamonds, circles, and triangles are average height of birth year cohorts, drawn from three distinct data sources. Lines are locally weighted regressions of average height on year of birth. ‘French army’ (diamonds): Data from a 10,000 sample of conscripts (aged around 20 years) and volunteers in the French army (1923–60). ‘LSMS 1985–8’ (circles): Males aged 20–59 years from CILSS 1–4 household surveys (1985–8). ‘ENV 2008’ (triangles): Males aged 20–59 years from ENV1 (2008) household survey.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from French army (indigenous soldiers born in Côte d’Ivoire), CILSS household surveys 1–4 (1985–8) and ENV1 (2008)

14.3 Data Description and Methodology

This section presents the main choices that were made in terms of measurement of living standards and poverty.³

14.3.1 Construction of the Consumption Variable

The consumption variable is the sum of consumption of own food production, food expenditures, and sufficiently frequent non-food expenditures like

³ The working paper version of this chapter (Cogneau et al. 2014) provides a presentation of the main data sources used in this study (five nationally representative household surveys conducted by the Institut National de la Statistique de Côte d’Ivoire in 1988, 1993, 1998, 2002, and 2008). Please refer to section 3.1 of this chapter for a discussion of the accuracy of the sample designs of household surveys, and in particular the statistical representation of people born in Burkina Faso and Mali. Refer as well to Appendix A1 of this chapter for more details on the construction of variables from micro data (consumption, durable goods ownership, school enrolment), and to Appendix A2 on macroeconomic indicators drawn from national accounts.

housing, education, clothing, transport, and communication. We paid great attention to the comparability of all the components across surveys. For instance, we realized that imputed rent estimations could change significantly depending on how the number of rooms had been reported (e.g. whether toilet and bathroom were included or not).

Consumption of food products accounts for more than 50 per cent of total consumption. Food expenditures and consumption of own food production are recorded in two separate parts of survey questionnaires. Surveys do not use diaries, and instead ask about consumption over a product-specific recall period; not all surveys cover the whole year, and when they do, different households are surveyed in successive waves. We identified four features in survey questionnaires that could threaten comparability across time: (i) changes in the selection of goods for which expenditures were recorded; (ii) changes in recall periods for some goods; (iii) modifications in survey duration and controls for seasonality of consumption; and (iv) differences in the detail of goods. In their methodological experiment on the measurement of consumption in Tanzania, Beegle et al. (2012) identify the same strategic dimensions. Their results suggest that, when compared with the benchmark of individual diaries, a detailed list of products with short recall periods is preferable. Appendix A1 in Cogneau et al. (2014) explains in detail the way we computed non-food and food consumption aggregates and the potential bias induced by the changes to questionnaire designs since 1988. We produced four estimates for total consumption, which vary according to recall periods and declared frequency of consumption within these periods. Even if levels may differ very much, reassuringly enough, the time pattern of consumption is quite consistent across estimates.⁴

14.3.2 *Consumer Prices*

It has been revealed to be impossible to derive reliable/comparable unit prices from surveys. Quantities are declared in units that can be very heterogeneous across space, like bags or basins; furthermore, many times, units are not specified.

For both the 1988–96 and the 1996–8 periods, disaggregated consumer price levels in Abidjan, along with budget coefficients, were communicated by the Ivorian National Institute of Statistics (INS). Unfortunately, the 1988–96 price

⁴ Dabalen and Paul (2013) propose a reweighting procedure in order to account for changes in questionnaire designs between the 1985–8 surveys and the 1993–2008 surveys. The assumptions implied by their methodology are questionable, as they themselves acknowledge, in particular that of stability in the distribution of sociodemographic variables over twenty years. Further, the correction they make appears relatively limited, and provides estimates that are rather consistent with ours.

data proved to be very inconsistent with the World Bank figures (World Bank 2008), as well as with the IMF figures (IMF 2013), in particular with respect to the high inflation following the CFA franc devaluation of 1994. The communicated price data showed very modest inflation in 1994 and 1995, in contrast with World Bank or IMF figures, which record a 26 per cent inflation rate for 1994 and 14 per cent for 1995. The cumulated 1996–2008 inflation from INS data was also lower, compared to other sources: the World Bank, IMF, and even Afristat, the regional statistical office. We could not elucidate the origin of such discrepancies.

In order not to run the risk of underestimating inflation, we resolved to stick with the consumer price index drawn up for the African Development Indicators (World Bank 2008). Household consumption is deflated by this national consumer price index, with 2005 as the base year, and translated into 2005 international dollars using World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012) purchasing power parity exchange rates for the year 2005. The poverty line chosen to compute poverty indicators is US\$1.25 (at the 2005 PPP level).

We only used the disaggregate price data to analyse the potential impact of a change in consumer baskets. For instance, we computed another consumer price index using the budget coefficients of the average household in the first quartile of consumption per capita as of 1998. This 'poverty-oriented' price index showed little difference from the consumer price index computed with average budget coefficients. We also varied the consumer baskets according to the region of residence (North, East Forest, West Forest, Abidjan) and found little difference in aggregate price evolutions (keeping in mind that only prices collected in Abidjan were available).

Last, sparse data on price levels were also obtained for some provincial capital cities other than Abidjan, and for two or three years lying between 1998 and 2008. Due to the disruptions of civil war, Northern provinces have no data at all. In Southern provinces differences in price levels were found to be small and no correction was made.

14.4 The Decade of Uncertainties: 1988–98

14.4.1 *The Great Cocoa Shock: 1988–94*

By all accounts, the 1988–94 period was the turning point when macroeconomic crisis spread all over the country, reaching the still relatively protected cocoa growers and formal wage earners. A fourth structural adjustment programme was signed with the International Monetary Fund, involving very large cuts to public wages and expenditures, and a halving of cocoa and coffee producer prices. Félix Houphouët-Boigny had already been struck by cancer,

Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction




Figure 14.3. GDP per capita, cash crop income, and oil income, 1988–2008

Note: GDP per capita and Cocoa+Coffee+Cotton: see Figure 14.1. Crude oil output is valued at international prices lagged by one year, deflated by GDP deflator, and converted in 2000 US\$.

Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from World Bank (2012) and FAOSTAT (2012)

and Alassane Ouattara, the first prime minister since 1960, was in practice ruling the country. Social unrest and insecurity developed, with a series of street demonstrations, the occupation of Abidjan University, and a mutiny within the army. In the first multi-party election held in 1990, Houphouët-Boigny still beat his younger opponent Laurent Gbagbo, with more than 80 per cent of votes.

Between 1988 and 1993, according to national accounts, GDP per capita again fell by US\$100 (see Figure 14.3) and final private consumption per capita was reduced by 16 per cent. Our survey data indicates an even more dramatic collapse of household consumption per capita, from US\$2.92 to US\$2.02 per capita and per day respectively (constant 2005 international dollars), i.e. a 31 per cent reduction. As a result, the US\$1.25 poverty headcount almost doubled, from 20 to 38 per cent (Table 14.1). All regions in the country were evenly affected; whereas poverty had formerly been absent from the capital city Abidjan, 13 per cent of its inhabitants could be counted as poor in 1993.

In 1988, welfare was unambiguously much higher on the Eastern side of Côte d'Ivoire, at the border with Ghana. In 1993, the border differences in income or in child nutrition had become much smaller, even if, thanks to past investments, a significant Ivorian advantage in public utilities (electricity, water) remained (Cogneau et al. 2015).

Table 14.1. Daily consumption per capita and poverty measures over time across regions, 1988–2008

	1988	1993	1998	2002	2008
Panel A: North					
Consumption per capita	2.06 (0.10)	1.49 (0.02)	1.81 (0.12)	2.17 (0.10)	1.41 (0.03)
Poverty headcount	0.33 (0.02)	0.52 (0.01)	0.47 (0.02)	0.40 (0.01)	0.62 (0.01)
N	416	2,527	977	2,611	3,622
Panel B: East Forest					
Consumption per capita	2.68 (0.09)	1.99 (0.03)	2.07 (0.06)	2.34 (0.04)	1.87 (0.03)
Poverty headcount	0.10 (0.02)	0.34 (0.01)	0.33 (0.02)	0.31 (0.01)	0.39 (0.01)
N	400	2,414	934	2,604	3,003
Panel C: West Forest					
Consumption per capita	2.29 (0.16)	1.62 (0.02)	1.91 (0.04)	1.75 (0.05)	1.69 (0.02)
Poverty headcount	0.29 (0.02)	0.46 (0.01)	0.38 (0.01)	0.50 (0.01)	0.47 (0.01)
N	479	2,885	1,417	3,533	3,864
Panel D: Abidjan					
Consumption per capita	5.59 (0.28)	3.39 (0.09)	3.77 (0.12)	4.29 (0.11)	3.96 (0.09)
Poverty headcount	0.00 (0.00)	0.13 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	0.09 (0.01)	0.09 (0.01)
N	304	1,676	860	1,970	1,968
Panel E: All regions					
Consumption per capita	2.92 (0.08)	2.02 (0.02)	2.31 (0.04)	2.47 (0.04)	2.14 (0.02)
Poverty headcount	0.20 (0.01)	0.38 (0.00)	0.32 (0.01)	0.35 (0.00)	0.41 (0.00)
N	1,599	9,502	4,188	10,718	12,457

Note: Daily consumption expenditures per capita are in constant 2005 US\$ PPP and the poverty line used is US\$1.25 PPP a day. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Authors' calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys

All social classes were affected: the consumption growth incidence curve is nearly flat, meaning that proportional decreases in consumption per capita were evenly spread across the income distribution (Figure 14.5).

For the first time, net primary school enrolment fell from 56 to 47 per cent (see Appendix Table 14.A1). Early-age child nutrition deteriorated, especially among small cocoa and coffee producers (Cogneau and Jedwab 2012). This is also when the AIDS epidemics began to spread (Cogneau and Grimm 2008).

During the fifteen years that followed, the country would never recover from this great shock, and poverty would mainly oscillate around the 1993 level, even reaching 41 per cent in 2008 (see also the cumulative distribution




Figure 14.4. Cumulative distribution function of consumption per capita across time
Note: Percentage of people whose consumption per capita and per day lies below the level on the horizontal axis. Vertical bar is the US\$1.25 poverty line.

Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from CHSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys

function curves in Figure 14.4). Figure 14.2 suggests that cohorts affected by early-age stunting and height losses had not entirely recovered from these effects when they reached adult age. The results of Demographic and Health Surveys for the years 1994, 1998, and 2012 suggest that early-age stunting has stayed on the increase throughout the last two decades (Coulibaly and N'Dri 2012). However, aside from consumption or nutrition, after having fallen back, primary school enrolment recovered in 1998 and carried on increasing in 2002. Secondary school enrolment exhibited continuous progresses (Appendix Table 14.A1). Finally, on the side of durable goods, households benefitted from the price decreases in radio and TV sets, and, most impressively, in mobile phones (Appendix Table 14.A2).

14.4.2 *The CFA Franc Devaluation Bounce-Back: 1994–8*

After the 1993 legislative elections in France, the new French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur aligned his position with those of the IMF and the World Bank regarding the need for a devaluation of the CFA franc. Côte d'Ivoire being the most important economy of the Franc Zone, the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 removed the last obstacle to its implementation, given the oath made by President Mitterrand to the old leader not to devalue the CFA franc. The CFA franc was immediately devalued by 50 per




Figure 14.5. Growth incidence curves

Note: Average growth in consumption per capita for each percentile of consumption per capita in the initial year.

Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1-4 household surveys

cent in January 1994—meaning an ex ante doubling of import prices. The objective of this devaluation was the reduction of public deficits, through the reduction of the public wage bill in real terms, as well as increased fiscal revenue from import tariffs and duties on cocoa. Consumer price inflation stayed under control (around 30 per cent in 1994), so that a large real depreciation was achieved. In terms of macroeconomic stabilization, and according to the criteria set by the Bretton Woods institutions, the CFA franc devaluation was to some extent a success (Cogneau and Collange 1998).

In terms of income growth and poverty, fortunately enough, international commodity prices bounced back concomitantly, allowing increases in real producer prices of coffee and cotton; however real cocoa prices were kept constant, so that the marketing board deficits could be cleared (see Appendix Figure 14.A1). Fortunately again, national cocoa output reached a historical record (over 1.2 million tons), thanks in particular to trees reaching maturity in the West Forest, and perhaps also to increased collection effort. In the

North, farmers planted more cotton (Appendix Figure 14.A2). Further, the new structural adjustment programme was backed by large amounts of foreign aid, translating into a doubling of public investment in infrastructure; private capital also flowed back to the country and the construction sector boomed.

According to national accounts, in 1998 consumption per capita had returned to its pre-shock level of 1988. Survey data are much less optimistic: household consumption per capita reached US\$2.31 per capita per day, i.e. only 80 per cent of the 1988 value. Compared to 1993, the poverty head-count at the US\$1.25 level was reduced by six percentage points. Consumption growth incidence was even slightly distorted towards upper-middle income levels (Figure 14.5), so that poverty was reduced to a lesser extent than an evenly distributed consumption growth would have allowed. Indeed, in rural areas, cash crop evolutions benefitted more the 'gros planteurs' (large cash crop growers), as illustrated by the high consumption growth among farmers (+17 per cent) that contrasts with the modest poverty decrease of four percentage points (Table 14.2 Panel A). In cities, informal workers benefitted from the boom in investment and from the recovery of household consumption (Table 14.2 Panel B). Civil servants, however, suffered as their wages were not indexed to inflation; this most likely explains why the consumption growth was very much mitigated in the top decile (Table 14.2 Panel C).

On the political side, in accordance with the Constitution, the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié, became the new president of the country in 1994; he was a *Baule* and a Christian, like Houphouët-Boigny. This came to the disappointment of former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, a Northern *Dioula* and Muslim. The political competition between the two heirs broke the Houphouëtian political equilibrium that relied on the alliance between Centre South *Baule* elites and Northern elites. To bar Ouattara's ambitions, Konan Bédié and his followers resurrected the theme of Ivorian national identity ('*Ivoirité*') that Houphouët's opponent Laurent Gbagbo, a *Kru* Southwest leader, had already promoted in the 1990 elections. Prior to the October 1995 presidential elections, the National Assembly passed an anti-Ouattara amendment in the Constitution, according to which presidential candidates ought to have two parents of 'Ivorian nationality' and should not have served as officials in another country, two criteria that Ouattara did not meet. The 1995 elections were also boycotted by Gbagbo, giving Konan Bédié an easy victory.

Strengthened by this victory and good economic conditions, Konan Bédié and Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan launched a vast programme of public investment called the '12 works of the African elephant', meant to transform Côte d'Ivoire into an emerging 10 per cent growth country by the

Table 14.2. Poverty measures by socioeconomic status of the household head

	1988	1993	1998	2002	2008
Panel A: Household head is a farmer					
Consumption per capita	1.99 (0.05)	1.45 (0.02)	1.69 (0.06)	1.67 (0.05)	1.39 (0.02)
Poverty headcount	0.30 (0.02)	0.52 (0.01)	0.48 (0.01)	0.51 (0.01)	0.59 (0.01)
N	800	4,277	1,908	4,744	4,675
Panel B: Household head is self-employed					
Consumption per capita	3.38 (0.16)	2.37 (0.06)	2.49 (0.07)	2.78 (0.08)	2.44 (0.04)
Poverty headcount	0.08 (0.02)	0.26 (0.01)	0.22 (0.01)	0.26 (0.01)	0.32 (0.01)
N	249	1,885	835	1,950	3,388
Panel C: Household head is a civil servant					
Consumption per capita	4.28 (0.23)	3.49 (0.15)	3.46 (0.21)	4.09 (0.27)	3.92 (0.18)
Poverty headcount	0.06 (0.02)	0.10 (0.01)	0.07 (0.02)	0.10 (0.01)	0.07 (0.01)
N	208	627	216	543	447
Panel D: Household head is a private-sector wage-earner					
Consumption per capita	4.85 (0.37)	2.94 (0.07)	3.04 (0.10)	3.40 (0.09)	3.12 (0.07)
Poverty headcount	0.02 (0.01)	0.17 (0.01)	0.14 (0.01)	0.18 (0.01)	0.21 (0.01)
N	218	1,876	883	2,321	2,510
Panel E: Household head is not working					
Consumption per capita	3.51 (0.56)	2.07 (0.06)	2.85 (0.24)	3.09 (0.10)	2.39 (0.06)
Poverty headcount	0.18 (0.03)	0.34 (0.02)	0.22 (0.02)	0.22 (0.01)	0.31 (0.01)
N	124	837	346	1,160	1,437

Note: Daily consumption expenditures per capita are in constant 2005 US\$ PPP and the poverty line used is US\$1.25 PPP a day. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Authors' calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys

2025 horizon. It was mostly based on colossal and costly infrastructures centred around the capital city Abidjan (new airport, highways, urban train, new thermal plant, etc.), relying on Build–Operate–Transfer agreements with private firms; in 1999, only four projects had effectively started. Capital-intensive industrial projects were also envisaged, in particular for the transformation of cocoa. In the meantime, the liberalization of the economy accelerated. Non-tariff barriers as well as internal price controls (on e.g. rice, transport) were eliminated. More liberal regulations were adopted for private investment, mines, labour, and telecommunications. The privatization of the cotton parastatal in 1997 was followed by the liberalization of the coffee (1998) and cocoa sectors (1999). Around 60 public firms were privatized, in diverse industries from sugar through telephones to railways.

14.5 The Erratic Civil War: 1998–2012

With the prospect of the presidential elections of 2000, political tensions carried on increasing. In 1998, a new law on land was passed that introduced not only unequal rights for nationals and foreigners, but also a notion of autochthony; it was hardly applied in the years that followed, but contributed to violence around access to land and land rights (e.g. Chauveau 2010). Electoral lists were also scrutinized in order to exclude voters whose Ivorian nationality could be contested. At the same time, growth slowed down, and Konan Bédié was accused of stratospheric corruption. A scandal around the embezzlement of European aid in the health sector erupted in 1998. On Christmas Eve, 1999, a military coup overthrew Konan Bédié and called to power Robert Gueï, the chief of the army under Houphouët, whom Konan Bédié had forced into retirement in 1997. This event inaugurated a period of erratic civil conflict, punctuated by intermittent episodes of hard political violence.

14.5.1 *The Elephant Falling Down: 1998–2002*

General Robert Gueï committed to organizing elections, first declared he would not present himself, then changed his mind. Ouattara's candidature was again barred by the new 2000 Constitution and Konan Bédié was exiled to Ghana, so that only Laurent Gbagbo and Robert Gueï competed in the 2000 elections. Turnout was very low at 37 per cent. Yet Gueï was defeated and ousted from power by street demonstrations by Gbagbo partisans; he was later assassinated in Abidjan after the coup attempts of 2002. Political violence reached a peak as fights also arose between Ouattara and Gbagbo followers—in particular, a mass grave was found in the outskirts of Abidjan (Yopougon). The long-term opponent of Félix Houphouët-Boigny then became the third president of the Ivorian Republic. Gbagbo quickly endorsed the topic of '*Ivoirité*', trying to build an alliance of Southern 'autochthons' (*Krus* of the Southwest, non-*Baule Akans* of the Southeast), orthogonal to the Houphouëtian alliance, based on long-lasting resentments dating from the colonial and early post-colonial times (Dozon 2011).

Liberalization had not reduced corruption, nor increased fair competition in markets, as it was not accompanied by progress in the enforcement of the law (Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps 2002a, 2002b). No export diversification took place. Besides, following the liberalization of the marketing of coffee, producer prices collapsed. Foreign aid was cut following the military coup, resulting in public and private investment collapse. At the same time, public wages were increased by 15 per cent over the period, perhaps to buy loyalty from civil servants and the military in times when political legitimacy was undermined.

Over the period 1998–2002, national accounts data on final consumption stagnated in per capita terms, while our survey aggregate increased by a small 6 per cent, from 2.31 to 2.47 (2005 international dollars per capita per day). Despite this sluggish growth, the poverty headcount increased by three percentage points, from 32 to 35 per cent. The consumption growth incidence was indeed strongly anti-redistributive and urban-biased (Table 14.4 and Figure 14.5). Coffee producers, food crop farmers, and the poorest informal

Table 14.3. Poverty measures in households headed by a farmer

	1988	1993	1998	2002	2008
Panel A: Cocoa and coffee farmers					
Consumption per capita	2.14 (0.06)	1.51 (0.02)	1.66 (0.05)	1.60 (0.03)	1.46 (0.03)
Poverty headcount	0.24 (0.02)	0.49 (0.01)	0.47 (0.02)	0.52 (0.01)	0.53 (0.01)
N	476	2,147	953	2,206	2,015
Panel B: Cotton farmers					
Consumption per capita	1.47 (0.10)	1.35 (0.04)	1.32 (0.08)	2.22 (0.46)	1.20 (0.16)
Poverty headcount	0.56 (0.05)	0.54 (0.02)	0.64 (0.03)	0.50 (0.03)	0.76 (0.04)
N	113	398	206	387	136
Panel C: Other farmers					
Consumption per capita	1.98 (0.15)	1.38 (0.03)	1.91 (0.14)	1.65 (0.03)	1.33 (0.03)
Poverty headcount	0.23 (0.03)	0.58 (0.01)	0.43 (0.02)	0.50 (0.01)	0.64 (0.01)
N	211	1,732	749	2,151	2,524
Panel D: All farmers					
Consumption per capita	1.99 (0.05)	1.45 (0.02)	1.69 (0.06)	1.67 (0.05)	1.39 (0.02)
Poverty headcount	0.30 (0.02)	0.52 (0.01)	0.48 (0.01)	0.51 (0.01)	0.59 (0.01)
N	800	4,277	1,908	4,744	4,675

Note: Daily consumption expenditures per capita are in constant 2005 US\$ PPP and the poverty line used is US\$1.25 PPP a day. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Authors' calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENVI-4 household surveys

Table 14.4. Decomposition of changes in poverty headcount, 1988–2008

	1988–93	1993–8	1998–2002	2002–8
Changes in poverty headcount	18.26	–6.06	3.38	5.64
Growth	20.81	–8.45	–3.72	6.72
Redistribution	–0.41	2.35	6.86	–2.36
Residual	–2.14	0.04	0.24	1.27

Note: The poverty line is set at 2005 US\$1.25 PPP per day.

Source: Authors' calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENVI-4 household surveys

workers lost, while skilled civil servants gained (Tables 14.2 and 14.3). In the North, very good cotton yields (Appendix Figure 14.A2 and Table 14.2 Panel C) also very much reduced poverty in this area. Could it be that this sudden inflow of income helped the rebels to arm themselves?

14.5.2 *A Country Split in Two: 2002–8*

In September 2002, military insurgents made coup attempts in the main cities of Abidjan, Bouake, and Korhogo, and invaded the North of the country. They were rising up from within the country and also coming from Southern Burkina Faso and Mali where they had organized and trained; two other movements also crossed the border of Liberia and took control of the cities of Man and Odienne in the Northwest. The UN mandated French and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops to interpose between rebels and loyalists. In January 2003, the belligerents signed the Marcoussis agreement according to which a 'national union government' had to be formed, with the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior given to rebel representatives, and the participation of all political parties. The agreement failed, as members of the coalition withdrew or were dismissed. Another reconciliation meeting was organized in Accra in June 2003, according to which Laurent Gbagbo was expected to prepare new presidential elections while also changing the eligibility conditions that were barring the candidature of Ouattara. The country remained split in two, with French, ECOWAS, and UN troops seated along an East–West interposition line. In November 2004, loyalist planes bombed Bouake and French troops that had settled in the airport; French planes retaliated and destroyed the Ivorian airforce. Gbagbo's partisans then held large street demonstrations and began attacking French citizens, whom French forces tried to evacuate; the Ivorian and French governments blamed each other for murders committed during these days. Some French, Lebanese, and other foreigners left the country towards the end of 2004. Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa, was then mandated by the African Union to act as a mediator. Under strong international pressure, a change in the constitution was finally adopted at the beginning of 2005, allowing the candidature of Alassane Ouattara in future presidential elections. A political '*détente*' process ensued, which resulted in the Ouagadougou agreements that were signed in March 2007, and the nomination of Guillaume Soro, head of the rebels, as prime minister. Presidential elections were, however, delayed every year until 2010.

Figure 14.6 presents the timeline of these events, along with the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project's (ACLED) count of political violence. It illustrates that the two household surveys we use, carried out in 2002 and 2008, lie at the two ends of this second phase of the civil war. The ENV3




Figure 14.6. Civil conflict

Note: Number of political violence events, 1997–2011. Political violence events reported are violence against civilians that occurs during civil and communal conflicts, battles, and riots or protests.

Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from ACLED (2013)

2002 survey was implemented between May and July, hence just before the September rebellion, while the ENV4 2008 (June–August 2008) came after the Ouagadougou agreements had brought some peace to the country.

Between 2002 and 2008, national accounts of consumption per capita fell by 11 per cent, and rather consistently the household survey mean dropped by 13 per cent. According to our estimates, the national poverty headcount increased by six percentage points, from 35 to 41 per cent, i.e. the highest figure ever recorded over the past two decades, and most likely even before that: GDP per capita fell below the level of 600 dollars (constant 2000 US\$), as it had done in 1993, falling back to the level of the early 1960s. Very strikingly, the Northern areas that were cut from the 'legal country' suffered a lot economically: the poverty headcount increased by twenty-two percentage points, skyrocketing to 62 per cent. Cotton production collapsed; as of 2008, only 1 per cent of households were still growing this crop; aggregate figures suggest that cotton production only started its recovery in 2010–11 (Appendix Figure 14.A2). Other areas instead experienced little change in poverty, or in the case of East Forest, a limited increase, so that the bulk of poverty increase stemmed from the impact of the partition on the North.

14.5.3 *The Last Episode of Civil War (2008–11)*

Presidential elections were finally organized at the end of 2010. The two former heirs of Houphouët-Boigny, who had been enemies throughout the 1990s, Konan Bédié and Ouattara, formed an alliance against Gbagbo, and hence reconstructed the Centre–North alliance of the past. Alassane Ouattara opposed Laurent Gbagbo in the second round, and both candidates claimed victory. A last episode of civil war erupted, causing the deaths of between 900 and 3,000 and the displacement of 1 million people (IDMC 2012). With support from French troops, the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo was arrested in his palace in April 2011 and presented to the International Court of Justice in The Hague in December. Since 2012, progress towards national reconciliation has been limited. The Commission for Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation, launched in July 2011, has been criticized for its slowness and partiality: to date, only crimes by Gbagbo supporters have been judged, while Ouattara's partisans also committed reprehensible acts of violence. Whereas the most influential leaders of Gbagbo's political party (the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)) went into exile in Ghana, the FPI refused to participate in any official reconciliation committee and boycotted the municipal elections of April 2013. Security in the country depends on the reintegration into civil society of thousands of former members of armed militia. On the economic side, Ouattara's government benefits from the strong support of international donors: a substantial reduction in external debt stock was obtained, and budget support of around 7 per cent of GDP has been received each year since 2011. After limited growth in 2010 (2 per cent), and a fall of 5 per cent in 2011, growth in 2012 was estimated at around 8.6 per cent (IMF 2012). This quick recovery is the result of public reconstruction programmes and the revival of formal economic activities.

After around two decades of political and economic turmoil, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, it took some time for neighbouring Ghana to finally reconstruct a stable democracy and a buoyant economy, at the turn of the twenty-first century (Eberhardt and Teal 2010). In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, getting back to (political and economic) 'business as usual' will probably not be sufficient. In the short run, new rents from natural resources like oil or minerals could enable the restoration of the political and economic equilibrium of the old days, involving a cautious balance in the distribution of state resources: jobs and public investments. In the longer run, the burning issues that fuelled the conflict will have to be addressed, at the least, the acquisition of nationality and the regulation of land allocation. Further, in the context of the exhaustion of the 'rent' from the forest, the intensification of smallholder practices should become an urgent necessity, if only to enable preservation of the high level of cocoa output that still makes up the wealth of Côte d'Ivoire (Gockowski and Sonwa 2011). Dark predictions regarding the impact of

climate change on the conditions for cocoa growing even suggest that shifting away from cocoa could become an obligation (Läderach 2011).

14.6 Conclusion

At the end of the 1980s, Côte d'Ivoire entered a deep macroeconomic crisis that put an end to the often-praised 'Ivorian miracle'. After the death of the founding father Houphouët-Boigny, unrestrained political competition was combined with bad economic conditions and led to the nightmare of civil war. Drawing from a series of five household surveys covering two decades (1988–2008), we have told the story of this descent into hell from the standpoint of poverty and living standards. Despite the bounce-back allowed by the CFA devaluation in 1994, the country could never recover from the initial shock created by the halving of cocoa producer prices and huge budget cuts. In 2008, after five years of civil war and with another episode yet to come (2010–11), the extreme US\$1.25 poverty headcount had reached a historical record for poverty, with Northern areas deeply impoverished by the partition of the country.

Appendix

Table 14.A1. School net attendance rates over time

	1988	1993	1998	2002	2008
Panel A: Primary school ^a					
Girls	0.48 (0.02)	0.42 (0.01)	0.51 (0.01)	0.55 (0.01)	0.56 (0.01)
Boys	0.64 (0.01)	0.51 (0.01)	0.58 (0.01)	0.63 (0.01)	0.62 (0.01)
Net rate	0.56 (0.01)	0.47 (0.00)	0.54 (0.01)	0.59 (0.00)	0.59 (0.01)
N	1,985	11,439	4,504	9,980	9,479
Panel B: Secondary school ^b					
Girls	0.10 (0.01)	0.12 (0.00)	0.16 (0.01)	0.16 (0.01)	0.21 (0.01)
Boys	0.17 (0.01)	0.22 (0.01)	0.26 (0.01)	0.22 (0.01)	0.29 (0.01)
Net Rate	0.14 (0.01)	0.17 (0.00)	0.21 (0.01)	0.19 (0.00)	0.25 (0.00)
N	1,550	10,399	4,443	9,892	9,231

Note: Attendance rate is estimated using the highest grade completed at the time of the survey. ^a The sample is restricted to children aged 6–11 years at the time of the survey. ^b The sample is restricted to children aged 12–18 years at the time of the survey.

Source: Authors' calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1–4 household surveys

Faltering Growth and Poverty Reduction

Table 14.A2. Durable goods ownership

	1988	1993	1998	2002	2008
Panel A: National					
Cooker	10.7	10.0	11.8	13.9	14.4
Fridge	20.7	18.1	18.4	17.0	15.6
Radio	57.8	60.0	64.6	67.4	74.7
TV	26.7	29.2	31.1	34.9	45.3
Bike or motorbike	35.6	33.7	33.5	35.6	53.2
Car	4.6	5.2	4.7	5.8	3.4
Phone			6.5	20.0	65.5
Wealth score^a					
Mean	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.1
Std. Dev.	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.1
N	1,600	9,599	4,200	10,800	10,958
Panel B: Urban areas					
Cooker	25.1	21.2	22.0	30.4	30.8
Fridge	45.1	37.6	32.7	34.3	29.8
Radio	71.3	76.8	69.9	75.0	74.9
TV	57.2	57.2	52.9	61.3	73.9
Bike or motorbike	17.8	20.1	18.7	20.1	26.0
Car	10.6	10.4	8.5	11.9	6.7
Phone			13.0	41.8	89.4
Wealth score^a					
Mean	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.3	2.4
Std. Dev.	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.3
N	736	5,360	1,919	4,980	6,119
Panel C: Rural areas					
Cooker	1.6	1.4	3.6	1.4	1.6
Fridge	5.2	3.3	6.8	3.9	4.5
Radio	49.3	47.2	60.3	61.6	74.5
TV	7.5	8.1	13.3	14.9	23.0
Bike or motorbike	46.9	43.9	45.5	47.4	74.4
Car	0.8	1.3	1.6	1.1	0.8
Phone			1.1	3.4	46.8
Wealth score^a					
Mean	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.8
Std. Dev.	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9
N	864	4,239	2,280	5,820	4,839

Note: Share of individuals living in a household with at least one of the durable goods listed.

^a Wealth score: Sum of cooker, fridge, radio, TV, bike, motorbike, and car per capita

Source: Authors' calculation based on data from CILSS 4 and ENV1-4 household surveys




Figure 14.A1. Real producer prices for cash crops

Note: Real producer prices: nominal producer prices deflated by consumer price index and converted in 2000 US\$. Cocoa and coffee prices on left scale, cotton prices on right scale (2000 US\$ per kilogram).

Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from World Bank (2012) and FAOSTAT (2012)




Figure 14.A2. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton output

Note: Output in thousands of tons. Cocoa on left scale, coffee and cotton on right scale.

Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from FAOSTAT (2012)

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