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Reconfiguring Power Relationships: Policies towards Urban Services in Mumbai

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Introduction

The processes of liberalisation, globalisation and restructuring of capitalist forms of production have not annihilated the importance of space and geography. On the contrary, these transformations favour economies of agglomeration, leading to concentration in large cities due to the importance of interpersonal relationships, the need for proximity and the insurance role of cities.[1] As Sassen[2] argues, cities are today's strategic places embedded in a hierarchy, where 'global cities' concentrate command and control functions. The number of global cities are limited but many others aspire to climb the ladder, among them many 'global city regions'.[3] This concept of 'global city regions' is more encompassing as it includes large metropolitan cities that share common processes and are not necessarily characterised by holding central and command functions in the world economy. It highlights a number of processes, in particular, the changes towards polycentric urban spatial forms and increasing inequalities. These are ongoing processes in Indian cities according to Kennedy and Ramachandraiah.[4] Nevertheless, these two authors also draw our attention to the specificities of Indian cities such as the lack of integration in the world economy, the relative absence of urban planning at the metropolitan level, and the weakness of local elected councilors. In this context, the impetus to 'globalise' Indian cities most often results from the states through strategies and plans (often called visions),

aggressively marketed to reap the benefits of urban economic growth through their capital cities (Bangalore for Karnataka, Chennai for Tamil Nadu, Hyderabad for Andhra Pradesh and Delhi).

Mumbai, though interestingly the most global city-regions of all Indian cities[5] seems to have joined this competition later, both in terms of proponing its image of a future 'global city' and in defining a reform agenda. Despite losses in employment in financial services and a rise of unemployed informal labour force in the last decade, the government of Maharashtra wishes Mumbai to compare with Shanghai through the expansion of its banking and finance services and the development of high-end services (with the potential of special economic zones) as well as dynamic sectors such as IT, tourism and health services. In order to succeed, there is an 'adopted' agenda, that emanates from a business think tank report (the Vision Mumbai document), later re-appropriated by the state government (the Task Force report). This process is also supported (even though contested in some aspects) by a vocal globalised middle-class. The importance given to the ongoing reform agenda also suggests a change in the political economy of the state and an acknowledgement of the potential roles of cities as engines of growth. A basic premise of the reform agenda is that infrastructure is facing a major crisis and hampers growth. Expanding and improving the state of infrastructure, especially the large technical networks such as transport primarily but also power and water, is seen as the backbone for sustaining economic growth, increasing mobility and improving the quality of life for Mumbai and its agglomeration.

The starting point of the chapter is to consider that urban public services and the new modalities of providing them are a good entry point to understand the new geometry of powers in Mumbai that partly shape this reform agenda. The existing literature on urban services reforms has mainly dealt with questions of efficiency on the one hand or on impact on the poor on the other hand. Less attention has been given to the impact on urban physical spaces and urban segregation and even less to the understanding of the changing power relations in cities and the emergence of the middle class. The purpose of this paper is therefore to address some of these issues, through the lens of the changes noticeable in the governance of urban services (water, solid waste management, electricity distribution). A specific context in Mumbai has led the corporation to devise a number of schemes involving private operators and participatory programmes both in middle-class areas and slums.[6] Consumer groups have also organised to take part in the debates surrounding the re-organisation of the electricity distribution sector.[7] In this chapter, we focus specifically the attention on the ability of inhabitants to derive benefits or not from these programmes and to put forward their claims on governance and public space. The main questions are: What are the main conceptual changes in the governance of urban services in the ongoing process? What are the impacts of participatory programmes in middle-class colonies? Does it lead to the setting up of new claims and which is the basis for these new claims? What are the impacts of participatory programmes in slums? Is there a process of empowerment and self-employment as propelled by the government? Finally, what are the consequences of both processes in a disjunctive democracy where there is a 'discrepancy between form (the formal status of citizenships) and substance (the substantive rights people exercise)'.[8]

Placing the Discourse on Urban Services within the 'Mumbai Transformation Project' Context

Even before the adoption of the new vision for Mumbai, changes have occurred in relation to the provision of urban services with the unbundling of the power sector and a focus on community participation to provide basic amenities.[9] However, the strong commitment demonstrated in the last few years by the Government of Maharashtra (GoM) has generated both a debate and a 'corpus' of documents, which make explicit the directions taken. One needs to make explicit the strategies regarding the modalities of service provision, as it is one of the 'pillar' of the strategy to restructure the functioning and the economy of Mumbai and to make it at par with 'Shanghai' in this sometimes called Shangaïsation process.

A first important landmark is the publication in 2004 of the Vision Mumbai report by the consulting firm McKinsey. This report was commissioned by Bombay First, a think tank of industrialists that represents the business interests of the city (more than 80 public or private companies are members of Bombay First). This report has three main objectives: identifying the existing infrastructure backlog, assessing the levels of investments required to be at par with performing Asian cities and making a number of suggestions to improve the situation. It estimates that Rs 200,000 million crores[10] are to be invested during the 2003–13 decade. However, only the summary report is available, which makes it impossible to validate or not the basis for these calculations. This figure as

well as the philosophy of this report was presented to the GoM that decided to act upon it. It was taken up almost word for word in an official document, the 'Task Force Report', which stands as the official policy of the government. This shared vision is to 'Transforming Mumbai into a World Class City with a Vibrant Economy and Globally Comparable Quality of Life for its Citizens'.[11] For this purpose, five pillars are identified: strategic planning and finance, housing, physical infrastructure, governance and economic growth. Despite a rhetoric highlighting the need to provide low-income housing and to build an inclusive city, the plan suggests to develop high-premium spaces (office and residential complexes) with end to end transport connectivity, to relax land use control and to redevelop large chunks of land such as developing the sea front into a modern complex and to make Mumbai a consumption centre. Critics have been numerous, especially regarding the elite bias of the plan (see other contributions in this issue), the focus on private transport over public transport[12] and the overreliance on public–private partnerships. Further, one can be critical of the absence of clear assessment of the infrastructure need (including investment) based on sound economic scenario. If this policy is inspired by the growth model of other Asian cities, based upon the capture of the land market rent to fund infrastructure and on city-centre redevelopment as well as the planning of the sea face, the modalities of the policies are not yet properly identified and defined.

Our focus here is to understand what are the policies for urban services provided in the context of Mumbai by the MCGM (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai). The GoM document clearly mentions: 'We believe that MCGM should play the role of regulator rather than the provider of services,'[13] indicating a shift in the role of the urban local body. This policy is more clearly explicated in the document of the governance subgroup of the Mumbai Transformation Support Unit.[14] This document reiterates a number of directions. First, the public sector should be an enabler that sets standards, designs objectives and monitors them rather than a producer of services. Second, the text brings a strong focus on citizens to improve local governance. Third, it acknowledges the limits of the democratic decentralisation and insists on increasing the powers of ward committees and on the deconcentration of administrative powers at the ward level. This leads to an emphasis on the improvement of service-delivery mechanisms that could be brought in with private partnerships or citizen's involvement; the promotion of a 'customer focused governance' with increased transparency and accountability. This document, which contains other proposals (property tax reforms, new institutional set-ups) reflects the role that the GoM still retains in guiding the policies of the urban local bodies.

Nevertheless, it is not in contradiction with the policies of the municipal corporation itself, which has focused part of its transformations on the development of e-tools, benchmarking and evaluation tools, the increased reliance on private operators, especially for solid waste management as well as the involvement of participatory practices for garbage collection, management and 'adoption' of parks.[15]

What are the underlying values of these new modes of service provision? First of all, there is an ongoing process of commodification. We insist here in differentiating commodification from privatisation. Commodification strictly relates to the introduction of commercial and market-based principles in the management of user services and can occur with public service provision. For Mumbai, at this point of time, it mostly implies that very few urban amenities remain free, especially since the introduction of participatory schemes is based on a financial contribution from users. In the case of water, many analyses underscore the need to increase water charges. Indeed, there are real critical issues related to the financing of the cost of urban services, especially for water as cost increases with new and further away resources. Nevertheless, the issue of affordability still remains very crucial, especially as poor users have to face new user charges (for toilets, garbage collection) as well as augmentation of some of their bills, in particular for electricity. This is also linked to a second common argument that denounces the (real) distortive effect of subsidies that favour the non-poor connected to a service. This weak efficiency of subsidies is demonstrated and can call for a restructuring of subsidies[16] but a rapid phasing out of those subsidies linked with a corporatisation process would undermine redistributive policies, especially in Mumbai where electricity distribution does subsidise public transport.[17]

Second, there is a discourse to transform institutional set-ups. It promotes primarily corporatisation[18] and the introduction of small private operators rather than 'orthodox' privatisation. By orthodox privatisation, we refer to contracts involving large-scale private operators, through concession or delegated management contracts. Part of the transformation of the institutional set-up also relies on accountability and transparency, implemented via partnerships with non-governmental organisations. Thus, a double process of corporatisation and ring fencing as well as subcontracting are the main tools to reform the public sector at this stage for the public urban services. As such, it demonstrates a different path compared to the privatisation seen in other countries and reflects a specificity of Indian cities, where no large private contracts were awarded to international infrastructure firms as compared to other Asian and Latin American cities.

Implementation of New Modalities in Governing and Managing Urban Services

However, this shift towards new service delivery mechanisms is related to the acceptance of the 'good governance agenda' that is partly based on the stand that public sector's functioning is deficient and not able to deliver. Therefore, the foundations of reforms are inscribed in a tryptich of decentralisation-participation-privatisation[19] also inspired by neo-institutionalist economic thought that gives importance to institutions, recognises the importance of incentives, credible institutions and enforcement of contracts. In Mumbai, the challenge to improve existing services and to expand them to the growing suburbs, while the performance of the administrative machinery is insufficient, has led to a proliferation of 'new programmes' by the municipal corporation.

In Mumbai, the first panel of the tryptich, that is, decentralisation is afflicted with major flaws. In the domain of the urban local body per se, political decentralisation remains limited despite a process of democratisation due to seat reservation, especially for women.[20] Even though, contrary to most other Indian cities, NGOs are participating in ward committees, they have mostly been selected on the basis of clientelist relationships, thereby limiting their potential role.[21] Most importantly, despite a vibrant tradition of local political life, the role of elected councillors remains marginal as compared to the Municipal Commissioner. Regarding administrative decentralisation (or de-concentration), the urban local body still remains centralised and functions in a command and control manner, hampering a process of changes in the functioning of the administrative and elected machinery of the BMC. The study of solid waste management highlights the lack of decisionary powers at the ward level as well as the failing of regulatory and monitoring abilities. Further, inefficient deconcentration goes along with uneven management capacities at the ward level. In a context of more complex and differentiated policies according to sectors and social groups, it leads to a process of increased differentiation among wards.[22] Regarding power, in the first place, reforms are actually driven by the centre and implemented by the state. Tariff fixing and the functioning of the sector (license authorisation, organisation of competition) is vested with the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission. On the one hand, it ensures a depoliticising process related to tariff issues and on the other hand, for the case of Mumbai, where the

set-up for electricity distribution is very specific, local authorities have no role to play. Even if reasons are to be found within some technico-economic characteristics of the sector, the lack of involvement of local leaders into these debates, especially in a context of tariff increases, is also an indicator of their weakness to raise larger issues for the city.

The second 'panel' of the tryptich, the role of private operators is often the most decried and resisted one. Interestingly, in the case of Mumbai, large scale internationalised private firms do not play yet a significant role.[23] There are directions towards trying to implement a management contract for water in one ward of the city, despite a failure to do so a few years ago.[24] This project is mobilizing a large 'antiprivatisation front', which partly underlines the difficulty to follow an 'orthodox' privatisation path in Indian cities. Nevertheless, this project is far from being approved. At the same time a more discreet form of privatisation is being implemented as a response to expand services via the number of small contracts awarded to small private operators (and even as we will argue later to community-based organisations). Garbage collection provides once again an example of this policy of partnerships, used in order to bypass the freeze on hiring, to have more flexible labour and to expand services to the suburbs. In one such scheme, private contractors have to collect garbage and sweep the roads. The contract has established costs and provides a fixed profit margin of 8.5 per cent. Incentives are therefore limited and this form of privatisation is in fact a case of subcontracting, rather than betting on the claimed potential innovations and efficiency gains of private operation.[25] Regarding power, the case of Mumbai is peculiar with three operators for distribution, one of them being a private company, the second one a municipal utility and the third one a parastatal. The main issue at this stage is therefore increased competition and its consequences. The directives of the regulatory commission indicate a push for competition with the possibility to provide second license to providers. The industrial consumers and even the large domestic consumers could benefit from such a system, especially as the regulatory commission favours a restructuring of the cross-subsidies structure but one can perceive trends towards cherry picking for power and increased prices for lower sections of the population.

The third 'panel' of the tryptich corresponds to the whole gamut of schemes revolving around the notion of participation, user's involvement and civil society engagement. Many schemes have been promoted in Mumbai by the urban local body both in residential and slum areas with a

number of premises. The first premise is that services can be co-produced in the sense given by Öström where 'citizens can play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them'.[26] A second premise is the positive belief in the communities' social capital despite potential flaws and issues. Thus, Durlauf[27] warns against the enthusiasm around this notion by highlighting some of the 'social bads' it can generate. For instance, mechanisms that reinforce group behaviour can also lead to group heterogeneity and intergroup hostility (such as racism in an extreme case), where outsiders are not accepted. Kapoor[28] also demonstrates how participatory method when transferred to urban areas have some limits related to justice, legitimacy and inclusion as some leaders tend to capture decision-making processes that exclude some specific groups (the poorest, the women, for instance). A third premise is that users can participate financially and that in slums, in particular, beneficiaries of programmes need to contribute monthly to the payment of services. These three premises are present in two of the main schemes related to basic amenities in slums: the Slum and Sanitation Programme (SSP) for the construction of toilets and the Slum Adoption Programme (SAP) for the collection of garbage.[29] In these schemes, and others (such as the rehabilitation programmes due to transport infrastructure projects), importance is given to the NGOs, supposed to understand better the demand, to be able to develop a social approach and to act as a bridge with the municipality. In both SAP and SSP, community based organisations from the area itself are formed and have to maintain the infrastructure and collect fees for the service provided. Somewhat differently, but within the same conceptual framework of involving users, the electricity regulatory commission has given a voice to consumer groups during hearings. Similarly, the municipality applied its participatory approach in residential areas with the very prominent and well-known scheme of the Advanced Locality Management, where at the street level, users organise themselves to collect and segregate waste and coordinate with the administration for collection. As these policies strengthened in the last few years and are being pursued consistently, we wish here to understand their consequences in the political sphere. These programmes and new roles given to users of public services could also be analysed purely in terms of economic efficiency. However, we choose here to shift the focus to the political sphere and to understand what these apparently managerial new approaches to service delivery mechanisms contribute in shaping urban citizenship as well as reconfigurating power relationships.

Better Urban Services: A Trojan Horse for the Claims of the 'New Middle Class'

We shall mostly base our analysis here[30] on the Advanced Locality Management (ALM) scheme devised to improve the garbage collection situation in residential areas. This programme started in July 1997 is conceived as a 'citizen-MCGM partnership for environmental friendly waste management'.[31] The ALMs are usually registered micro-level institutions representing one building, or a group of buildings covering one or two lanes. ALMs either get funds from donations or collect a fee from their members. They commit to organise door-to-door collection their area, to segregate their waste and to compost the biodegradable waste. In return, their complaints and grievances are considered on a priority basis to evolve a 'proactive administration' by the municipal administration.[32] A detailed analysis of this scheme demonstrates that they act as pressure groups, especially with the local bureaucracy at the ward level. In doing so, they not only use institutionalised mechanisms such as monthly meetings at the ward office, but also rely on interpersonal relationships, access to bureaucracy and continuous visits to the ward office. In general, even though in more recent times one can notice a stronger capacity and wish to interact with local elected councillors, ALM leaders tend to bypass the elected leaders as they consider most of them as being corrupt, non transparent and not favouring their vision of the city.[33] Apart from their relative impact on cleanliness (at the micro level, though), one positive outcome of this programme is the process of formation of a technical expertise that can counter the previously undisputed authority of municipal officers. As they themselves put it, they play the role of a watchdog. However, ALMs are not spread evenly in the city. According to official figures, around 70 per cent of these ALMs are concentrated in six or seven of the 24 administrative wards, and especially in wards with a larger share of middle-class residents.[34] Furthermore, their ability to put pressure on the administration is correlated with their capacity in creating a collective force and to enforce collective bargaining. To do so, they have regrouped in larger associations or federations that enable them to be more numerous and to create a more solid network at their locality and ward level. This is the case in the very elite area of Juhu with two federations with a very active network. They disseminate news through a local newsletters, organise a Juhu festival. This enables them to coordinate most of the ALM work at the administrative ward level. In other wards, despite informal or formal network, collective bargaining is not so strong.[35]

Yet, in most cases, ALMs have expanded their activities to other urban services-related issues into beautification projects, water and electricity, coordination with police for traffic, among others. Like consumer groups in the power sector, they have been able to create a strong voice in the Hirschmanian meaning.[36]

A second level of analysis consists in deciphering the identity claim of these ALMs and the voice it represents. Most interviews converge and members of ALMs insist on their status as taxpayers and law abiding citizens. As such, they can claim for better services and they are entitled to the administration responsiveness. Similarly, civil society groups involved in the discussions surrounding electricity distribution are able to stand as the representatives of the 'consumers', a semantic shift from the 'user of a public service' or the 'beneficiary of a public programme'. As 'consumers', their claims are built around the payment of a fair price for the service they are provided with. This approach values economic efficiency, which implies a principle of economic equity (rather than social equity). This explains that at the core of their argument stands a call for a reduction of cross-subsidies. In the same vein, some of the ALMs[37] argue for a 'subsidy' linked to the amount of waste composted and therefore not to be collected by the municipality.[38] This notion of paying a 'fair price' can indeed mean paying less when contributing to the general improvement of infrastructure. Figures are difficult to get on the budget spent for solid waste management in residential areas and in slums but approximate calculations show that the number of rupees spent in residential areas is significantly higher than in slums. Nevertheless, the position of consumer groups and ALMs displays a limited vision of the notion of redistribution and a lack of solidarity among users, as well as identifying slum dwellers to be outlaws.

Hence, a third level of analysis is to look at the outcomes of some of those middle-class groups and their ability to exert their claims on the urban space. Interviews with ALM members bring out their concern over public space, more so at their locality level, especially for active and networked ALMs. Their actions, in particular in the western suburbs, arouse and bring to the fore disputes over the hawkers, illegal encroachements and slums. In two elite-based wards, resident federations, often regrouping a number of ALMs, resort to PIL (public interest litigation)[39] or court proceedings to get stay orders against hawkers but also high premium infrastructure such as malls. This reflects upon the equivoqual and parochial desire of a clean, beautiful and modern system that co-exists with a NIMBY[40] syndrome. On hawkers, Anjaria[41] shows similarly that ALMs are strongly

mobilised but he also underlines that large number of people belonging to the middle class do support hawkers. This supports the stand that ALM is rather an upper middle-class group, underlining the ambivalent use of the term of the 'middle class' in today's Indian cities. Their successful attempt to be recognised and to act as important actors in redefining urban services provision and use of public space can be explained by their socio-economic profile that give them direct access to bureaucracy on the one side but also to have networks with lawyers and professionals that can volunteer or provide services cheap to follow up their cases. Second, they have been able to form federations not only at the ward level but further to network with city level (most often theme-based) organisations, such as CitiSpace or Dignity Foundation, in order to escape their purely otherwise local dimension. Their ability to articulate scales of action has given them much stronger leverage in disproportion with their sheer number.

Finally, there is an assumed and clear shift towards political engagement of some of the ALM groups either through mobilisation during elections (encouraging middle class voting, organising platforms to discuss candidates' programmes) or through direct political engagement. This was the case in the last municipal elections in one of the electoral ward in Juhu, where the coordinator of the ALM stood and won the municipal election in one of the poshest ward of the city.[42] This evolution, from civil society to political society,[43] still represents a marginal number of those movements and the sustainability of this political engagement cannot be asserted at this point of time. Nevertheless, it is a telling illustration of the renewed form of power of the middle class and the increasing role they can play in the management of local affairs.

Better Urban Services for the Poor: Informalisation, Patronage, Depoliticisation and Displacing Claims

Fascinatingly, ALMs built part of their strength out of a scheme devised by the municipal corporation. Even though, it was not very formally institutionalised, like the Bhagidari scheme in Delhi,[44] it gave a formal acceptance and tools for some informal groups to build a collective. Consequently, by analogy, one should try to analyse the impact of the public programmes in low-income areas, ever more so as their participatory stance is to improve services while also providing employment and empowerment. Have those schemes, which brought to the forefront

NGOs (large and small) and CBOs (community-based organisations) resulted in transforming or voicing the claims of the informal sector and the inhabitants of the slums?

A review of the role of NGOs constitutes a first leg of the analysis. Prominent NGOs are involved the municipal Slum and Sanitation Programme and in the rehabilitation and resettlement exercise linked to the displacement of thousands of people due to the various metropolitan transport projects in the city.[45] Despite their credentials, in both these programmes, the role of the NGOs is very ambivalent as it is a 'producer' of the service (the toilet blocks or the houses) contractually linked with the authorities as well as perceived as a bridge between the administration and the inhabitants. In both schemes, it provokes major troubles. First of all, NGOs turn out to put more emphasis on their role as a 'contractor' and end up being more concerned with the technical dimensions of building infrastructure than their role in informing and supporting communities. This is patently obvious in the transport rehabilitation programme where fieldwork displays the top-down approach of NGOs. They do not help inhabitants to make informed choices and on the contrary act as agents of the government and put pressure on people to accept schemes and get the work done.[46] In some cases, people are not even aware that those who collect their papers and visit them are representatives of the NGOs! (This also gives an idea of the very bureaucratic functioning of those NGO.) Yannic,[47] in her analysis of the Slum and Sanitation Programme, explicates some of the hurdles that an NGO faces in being in charge of a public programme that makes it a very complex set-up. On the one hand, they have to face strong resistance from the administration and on the other hand they have to rapidly scale up, which is a steep challenge in terms of organisation. Little focus is therefore put on the empowerment dimension as very critically argued by Sharma and Bhide.[48] Thus, it appears that from the government side, the reliance on NGOs is purely seen as contractually delegating responsibilities, another less criticised form of 'privatizing' service delivery mechanisms. As such, this is not specific to Mumbai but rather a shift in governance, and especially in urban governance and projects in slum areas as argued forcefully and convincingly by Dewan Varma.[49]

Another layer of reflection is the new competences given to CBOs in a range of projects. Based on the study of one such programme, the Slum Adoption Programme, I argue that participation is mostly a smokescreen and perpetuates clientelist relationships. This programme aims specifically at ensuring proper waste collection and disposal in slums. Communities

are to be organised in CBOs who take charge of the implementation of the scheme and get some financial support by the corporation. A supportive grant is provided to the CBO for a period of three years. The grant is phased out over this period as the CBO should be able to fund itself through the monthly payment asked from the residents (Rs 10 per month). Field-work demonstrates that the corporator plays a key role in the selection process of the CBOs as well as the ability to get it selected at the ward level.[50] Desai and De Wit[51] confirm these findings in other wards and detail more precisely the fluctuating relationships between the ward level administration, the elected councillor and the CBOs according to the existing links between the CBOs and the political leaders. In most cases, CBOs' leaders were involved in community activities (organisation of festivals, social work); they also have some political affiliation or keep a cordial working relationship with all political leaders of their area. Most CBOs whose contracts were not renewed had some problems with the local political leaders. Consequently, these leaders influenced the ward level administration not to renew the contract. In one of the extreme cases we studied, the councillor literally 'adopts' the slum by employing someone trustworthy in charge of ensuring cleanliness but officially registers a CBO. Thus, the corporator can say about the presence of this programme in his area: 'Yes, I know about Slum Adoption Programme, I manage them'.[52] A number of such schemes have indeed promoted a form of empowerment and democratisation, where CBOs led by dedicated leaders have made a dent in the paternalist functioning of service delivery in slums. Nevertheless, these CBOs are fragile institutions, especially since they face opposition and they need to ensure long term financial sustainability.

Beyond reshaping patronage, such schemes also contribute to a process of informalisation. Both the sanitation and the cleanliness programme are an indigenous form of subcontracting. In some of the areas studied, the NGO even subcontracted the management of some toilet blocks to 'the community' without any checks and control, leading to a form of capture by selected groups within the community. From the municipal corporation's point of view, it is a way of delegating to a flexible, poorly paid and badly equipped labour force as there is a freeze on hiring. Bhide[53] even argues convincingly that the introduction of the Slum Adoption Programme is a way to cut employed labour and has led to a cartel of large CBOs, which in due course of time sidelined smaller organisations. Indeed, in some wards, the same organisations operate the Slum Adoption

Programme (designed for CBOs) and the street sweeping programme (designed for private operators).[54] In the end, though, officially, these schemes endorse a process of informalisation and low paid labour force. In this context, the claims of the poorer sections of the society get very little reflected in these programmes, which are promoted as a tool not only of providing services but also as poverty reduction and empowerment tools. Consequently, an underlying reaction of civic organisations might be to focus their activities on services and urban amenities, while in reality, this might not be the best locus for slum dwellers to claim their rights or demand stronger equity and social justice.

Conclusion

Urban services are a valid and relevant tool to analyse the shifts in the public sector agenda as well as to analyse the reconfigurations of power relationships in Indian cities. The 'good governance' agenda has led local and metropolitan authorities to reshape modalities of service delivery by introducing more flexible rules. In Mumbai, I argue that it takes the shape of delegating number of responsibilities to unobstrusive organisations (smaller private contractors, NGOs or CBOs) rather than the larger globalised forms that usually are involved in more classic forms of privatisation. Apart from maintaining a 'contractual chain' with a strong role behind the scene of larger contractors, it also contributes to reconfigurating power relationships.

First of all, these new mechanisms in urban governance enable the framing of counterclaims of the newly globalised as well as old residing middle class based on a control of urban space and an idea of a 'clean' city. These counterclaims are based on their perceived rights as tax payers, and also underline a desire for economic equity rather than social equity. In this model, each individual pays for what it consumes, undermining the potential and the very meaning of redistributive policies. Further, these counterclaims are also articulated at different scales and varying platforms, which in the end give them a presence disproportionate to the sheer number of people they actually represent.

On the contrary, on the other end of the spectrum, democratisation is a remote project as public policies seem to reinforce clientele and patronage relationships as well as leads to informalisation of labour in lower income areas. This situation fragments and localises the claims of the poorer sections, even though Mumbai has a strong tradition of claims of the poor and progressive social movements. In this dismantling process, NGOs, focusing on poverty reduction through service delivery or rehabilitation programmes, to some extent, contribute to a depoliticising process. This appears as a paradoxical situation as the inability of the state to deliver services is weakened but cannot bypass solutions based upon some degree of involvement of users themselves, especially in poorer areas.

However, in a city such as Mumbai, where poverty and wealth coexist in close proximity, there is an ongoing and subdued battle for the position as the 'representatives' of the people. This not only refers to the power struggles between the claims of the poor and the counterclaims of the elite but also refers to the conflicting positions of many NGOs and civic movements to assert themselves as the representative voice, which also lead to unexpected alliances. Further, the political engagement of some elite-based groups that decided to enter political contest underlines a radical push for asserting new power tools. Even though, it could be interpreted also as a way of compelling an inefficient and corrupt local political system, it is built on a group interest. On the contrary, maintaining of patronage on the other end, impoverishes the collective claims for rights of the poorer in the city, contributing to this disjunctive democracy that partly characterises global city regions.

Notes

1. Veltz, P. 1996. *Mondialisation, Villes et Territoires. L'Economie d'archipel*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
2. Sassen, S. 1994. *Cities in a World Economy*. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press.
3. Scott, A.J. (ed.). 2001. *Global City-Regions. Trends, Policy, Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Kennedy, L. and C. Ramachandraiah. 2006. 'Logiques spatiales d'une stratégie régionale « high-tech ». L'exemple de HITEC City à Hyderabad (Inde)', *Flux*, 63/64 (Innovations et territoires): 54–70.
5. According to the City Development Plan of 2006 (http://www.mcgm.gov.in/forms/grindex1.aspx), Mumbai accounts for 33 per cent of income tax collections and 60 per cent of custom duty collections. It also represents 40 per cent of India's foreign trade.
6. Zérah, M.H. 2009. 'Reforming Solid Waste Management in Mumbai and Hyderabad: Policy Convergence, Distinctive Processes', in J. Ruet and S. Tawa Lama-Rewal, *Governing India's Metropolises: Four Case Studies*, pp. 241–69. Delhi: Routledge.
7. Prayas. 2003. *Performance of Private Electricity Distribution Utilities in India: Need for In-depth Review and Benchmarking*. Pune: Prayas.
8. Hoslton identified another type of disjunction, the uneven citizenship that characterises democracies combining modern rule of laws and systematic violations of civil rights. See Holston, J. 2001. 'Urban Citizenship and Globalization', in A.J. Scott (ed.), *Global City-Regions*.

9. Zérah, M.H. 2008. 'Splintering Urbanism in Mumbai: Contrasting Trends in a Multilayered Society', *Geoforum*, 39(6): 1922–32.
10. Around USD 40 billion. Prud'homme considers, through a convincing method, that those figures are underestimated by a ratio of 1:5. See Prud'homme, R. 2005. 'Financing Mumbai Investment Needs', *Note for the World Bank and the Mumbai Transformation Project*, p. 15.
11. Government of Maharashtra. 2004. *Transforming Mumbai into a World-Class City. First Report of the Chief Minister's Task Force*, p. 24. Mumbai: Government of Maharashtra.
12. D'Monte in this volume.
13. Government of Maharashtra, *Transforming Mumbai into a World-Class City*, p. 21.
14. To implement the Vision Mumbai, a special cell, the 'Mumbai Transformation Support Unit' was set up in the end of 2005 with the objectives of preparing and discussing policies. This unit is organised in a number of subgroups that correspond to the different pillars of the Task Force Report. See Mumbai Transformation Project Support Unit. 2005. *Document of Sub-Group on Governance*, p. 18. Mumbai: MTSU.
15. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. 2001. *Charter of Good Governance, MCGM's Initiatives towards a Better Mumbai*, p. 43. Mumbai: MCGM.
16. Raghupathi, U. and V. Foster. 2002. *Water Tariffs and Subsidies in South Asia: A Scorecard for India*, p. 14. Washington D.C.: Water and Sanitation Program.
17. Zérah, 'Splintering Urbanism'.
18. The process of coporatisation transfers the management of services to government-owned corporations, rather than directly government controlled department. This process aims at reducing discretionary powers of political intervention.
19. This metaphor is used by Alain Dubresson (University of Paris X, Nanterre).
20. Ghosh, A. and S.T. Lama-Rewal. 2005. *Democratization in Progress. Women and Local Politics in Urban India*. New Delhi: Tulika Books.
21. Nainan, N. and I.S.A. Baud. 2009. 'Negotiating for Participation: Decentralization and NGOs in Mumbai, India', in I. Baud (ed.), *New Forms of Urban Governance in India: Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations*, pp. 115–44, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
22. Zérah, M.-H. 2006. 'Assessing Surfacing Collective Action in Mumbai: A Case Study of Solid Waste Management', paper presented at workshop on Actors, Policies and Urban Governance, Mumbai, February 23.
23. With the exception of the two largest Indian conglomerates, Reliance and Tata, both present in the power and telecommunications sector.
24. For more information on the project, one can visit the official project website: http://www.keastwardwater.org/(downloaded on 1 October 2005).
25. Zérah, 'Reforming Solid Waste Management'.
26. Oström, E. 1996. 'Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy and Development', *World Development*, 24(6): 1073–97.
27. Durlauf, S.N. 1999. 'The Case 'Against' Social Capital', *Focus*, 20: 1–5.
28. Kapoor, I. 2002. 'The Devil's in the Theory: A Critical Assessment of Robert Chambers' Work on Participatory Development', *Third World Quaterly*, 23(1): 101–17.
29. For an official presentation of these schemes, one can refer to http://www.mcgm.gov.in/forms/grindex1.aspx. For a detailed analysis of the Slum and Sanitation Programme, one can refer to Sharma, R.N. and A. Bhide. 2005. 'World Bank Funded Slum Sanitation Program in Mumbai. Participatory Approach and Lessons Learnt', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40(17): 1784–89; Yannic, N. 2003. 'The Slum Sanitation Programme in Mumbai: A Community-Participative Approach: At What Conditions Co-production of Sanitation Services Can Achieve Higher Sustainable Operation and Maintenance by the Communities through Construction of Social Capital?' M. Phil Thesis University of Paris-Nanterre.

    For the Slum Adoption Scheme, one can refer to Desai, P. and J. De Wit. 2006. 'Slum Adoption Program—SAP in Mumbai—An Analysis', paper presented in IDPAD Seminar on New Forms of Urban Governance in Indian Mega-Cities in New Delhi.
30. This section partly draws from Zérah which presents the results of a survey of around 50 ALMs carried out by the author with the assistance of Ms Mitali Kamkhalia during the period of December 2005 till February 2006. See Zérah, 'Assessing Surfacing Collective Action in Mumbai'.
31. See (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 2001).
32. Ibid.
33. Nevertheless, in some cases, they are using the argument of 'vote bargaining' to garner the support of municipal councillors.
34. The official figures on ALMs provided in www.karmayog.org do reflect this uneven distribution of ALMs according to ward, though imperfectly. Indeed, official figures mention the presence of ALMs in almost every ward, while surveys contradict this stand. For instance, one of the ward we surveyed (the S ward which includes part of Powai and Bhandup) had not one active ALM.
35. Zérah, 'Assessing Surfacing Collective Action in Mumbai'.
36. Hirschman, A.O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
37. This is a debated matter among ALMs, not because of differences regarding the question of redistribution, but rather on the basis of a refusal to institutionalise relationships with the municipal corporation and consequently entering relationships of dependence.
38. Palnitkar, S., A.K. Jain and CSF Team. 2005. *Reviewing the Advanced Locality Management (ALM) concept and Institutionalization of the ALM Movement in Mumbai*. Mumbai: CLEAN-Sweep.
39. One well-known instance is the PIL related to the Juhu beautification process, that was largely carried out by the Juhu Citizen Welfare Association that includes all the active ALM of this area.
40. NIMBY or Not In My Back Yard.
41. Anjaria, J.S. 2006. 'Street Hawkers and Public Space in Mumbai', *Economic and Political Weekly*, XLI(21): 2140–46.
42. A recent follow up to the 2006 survey was carried out in January–March 2007 to understand the relationship between ALMs and political engagement. The data are in the process of being analysed.
43. Chatterjee, P. 2004. *The Politics of the Governed. Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*. Columbia: University Press.
44. To some extent, this can also be compared to the experience of Delhi with the Bagidari programme that institutionalised the partnership between resident welfare associations and the Delhi government that later translated into these resident welfare associations being more vocal, and in the end contributed to the failure of some of the reforms initiated by the Delhi government. See Tawa Lama-Rewal, S. 2007. 'Delhi in the 1990s–2000s: Good Governance and Bad Governability', paper presented at *Urban Actors, Policies and Governance in four Indian Metropolitan Cities*, Centre de Sciences Humaines and the India International Centre, Delhi, p. 12.

45. One of them, SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres), is involved in both projects and have been participating in numerous schemes both in Mumbai and Maharashtra. SPARC is associated with two other organisations, in the Alliance, which is worldwide known and much written about both in professional and academic literature, often with a very positive viewpoint. See Appadurai, A. 2000. 'Spectral Housing and Urban Cleansing: Notes on Millenial Mumbai', *Public Culture*, 12(3): 627–51. The other one is Slum Rehabilitation Society (SRS) working for more than 30 years on shelter issues.
46. Ozel, D. 2007. *Mumbai Urban Transport Project (Mumbai, Inde). Les politiques de rehabilitation et de relogement. Pour une nouvelle ethique de développement?* Paris. Institut France d'Urbanisme.
47. Yannic, 'The Slum Sanitation Programme in Mumbai'.
48. Sharma and Bhide, 'World Bank Funded Slum Sanitation Program'.
49. Dewan Varma, G. 2002. *Slumming India. A Chronicle of Slums and Their Saviours*. Delhi. Penguin Books India.
50. Zérah, 'Reforming Solid Waste Management'.
51. Desai and De Wit, 'Slum Adoption Program'.
52. Interview conducted in 2006.
53. Bhide A. 2006. 'Governance, Civil Society and Partnership: A View from the Periphery in Social Development Issues', Spring 28(1), 53–68.
54. Zerah, 'Reforming Solid Waste Management'.

Zérah Marie-Hélène. (2010)

Reconfiguring power relationships : policies towards urban services in Mumbai

In : Banerjee-Guha S. (ed.) Accumulation by dispossession : tranformative cities in the New Global Order

New Delhi : Sage, 151-168. ISBN 9788132103134