# Social differentiation and regional disparities:

## educational development in Cameroon

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# Contents

# Introduction

Regional disparities are not solely the prerogative of developing countries. None the less, they do create specific problems for them, particularly for those countries which, until recently, were colonies and whose borders are not the outcome of a long historical process but rather the result of colonial partitions. Although such disparities are, in their most obvious aspects, related to differences in the level and type of economic development, they do in fact give rise to questions which concern not only the problem of equalities *v.* inequalities but also those of national unity and political consensus.

These regional disparities have the triple feature of being easy to recognise, difficult to explain—despite appearances to the contrary—and even more difficult to remedy. There is no lack of figures to support this conclusion—they provide a measure of the facts but in no way can they explain the links between the global processes. The global nature of these disparities is in fact what makes them so difficult to analyse and so complex to explain. Remedying them raises problems of another kind. Development policies are for the most part based on intangible postulates, borrowed from abroad and applied in accordance with rigid operational models. The rigid logic of such models maintains these disparities, when it does not aggravate them, and the world economic order is such as to make this logic difficult to circumvent.

In the sphere of education, these disparities are expressed in terms of unequal levels of enrolment. More often than not such differences are explained as reflecting the various levels of educational demand in different areas. But this is more of a description of epiphenomena than an explanation. Moreover, it results in a particular form of educational policy which sets out to satisfy demand in the better-equipped areas and proposes, for the less well-equipped areas, a similar type of supply to that which created the demand elsewhere, without heed to the overall divergencies between these areas. The gaps are therefore maintained.

Regional disparities in education exist in a number of African countries. Their seriousness and therefore the need to find a remedy is sufficient to justify in-depth study. However, if this question were to be dealt with over a large number of countries, there would be a danger that the problems would be treated only superficially. This can be avoided only by restricting the scope of the

enquiry. This present study focuses on the situation in Cameroon, with some references to neighbouring states, in particular Chad and Nigeria. By drawing a parallel with Cameroon's neighbours, it will be possible to vary, as it were on an experimental basis, various factors within the Cameroon situation in contexts which are different but sufficiently close to enable us, where appropriate, to test the validity of our process of analysis.

Cameroon's regional diversity has been often emphasised. Stretching from the edge of the Sahel to the border of the vast equatorial forests and from the Atlantic shore to the banks of Lake Chad, the country divides into broad natural regions—forest, savannah and mountains—inhabited by a wide variety of population. Added to these natural, geographical divisions, are wide differences in population density and economic activity. And colonisation has also left its mark by a deeper penetration in the south than in the north and by its legacy of two official languages—French and English.

These then are the various dimensions of this diversity, which has often given rise to the comment that Cameroon is in many ways a microcosm of Africa. If an analysis of the situation in Cameroon can provide an illustration of this African diversity, then it may well prove to have additional value as an explanation of regional disparities. The regional diversity of Cameroon can in fact be expressed in terms of disparities: the various regions have widely different levels of 'development'. They participate to a very different extent in the trading economy and in the political-administrative power which goes with this, and they share to a different degree in such modern amenities as health care, education and communications.

It may be argued that it is a more serious matter to be under-equipped in terms of education than in terms of roads or hospitals. A lack of medical or communication facilities can be easily remedied, provided one is willing to foot the bill. Educational disparities, however, have specific social implications. One does not expand the school system at will. Aside from the fact that the unit of time in education is by definition a generation, it must be emphasised that a population's participation in an educational system is not brought about by a mechanical response to certain stimuli. Such participation, whether it be active or hesitant, forms part of a socio-economic 'rationality'. It needs to be seen as one of the expressions of a global social context, linking the historical orientation and pattern of reproduction of the various social groups.

By this we mean that a socio-historical approach is required to explain regional disparities in education, since this alone allows one to go beyond the simple phenomenology of educational demand. Such an approach is useful first of all as a means of clarifying the notion of a region. It so happens that in Cameroon the regions are not merely administrative territorial divisions but, in most cases, coincide with socio-historical units which bear the imprint not only of their constituent social groups but also of the relationships which these have maintained in the past between themselves and with the colonisers—all of which determines their present status in the national, post-colonial context. The task then is to piece together this historical and inter-relational dynamic.

This approach is also useful in throwing light on educational phenomena *per se*. All of these, i.e. the structure of the educational system, its uneven distribution, the relationship between state and private education, the objectives to be achieved, form part of a socio-historical evolution whose various elements are in interaction. It is particularly important to assess the character and importance of the various periods in the historical development of education in order to measure their impact on the present situation.

And finally, this approach brings into focus the relationship between education and economic development, a question directly linked to that of regional disparities. The nature of education is profoundly political and ideological, since its purpose is to shape society, and it will always reflect the major thrust of society as a whole. However, this thrust has not always been the same throughout history, and it is precisely such changes in the direction of this thrust which it is important to grasp, together with their sequence, in order to understand the present situation where education is in advance of the economy—in contrast to the early colonial period, where economic development was ahead of educational development.

What is more, an analysis on a national scale means taking into account the degree of development of the national social formation, which is the result of an overall socio-historical process and which defines a new set of forces. Regional disparities, and in particular those in the educational area, which sustain one another and multiply are the sign that a form of social structuration is at work. Which explains the choice of our title: the uneven development of education in the different regions in Cameroon reveals the existence of processes of social differentiation affecting the national formation. The main feature of such processes is the gradual creation—or the beginnings of the reproduction—of a national 'bourgeoisie' based on regional disparities—rural *v.* urban and manual *v.* intellectual—a bourgeoisie whose position derives from its proximity to the machinery of State power at the different regional levels. The national pattern of educational inequalities corresponds, for the most part, to inter- and intra-regional inequalities with respect to participation in the political-economic power and wealth of the country. For its part, the educational system contributes to the creation of these inequalities, but it is not the primary cause. It reveals their nature and their evolution. This is what we shall attempt to investigate in this study.

Once we have analysed the processes which have produced the disparities—on the basis of the socio-economic history of the colonial period and the characteristics of the different social groups—and the regional socio-economic environment in which they flourish at present, we will proceed to draw up a detailed, factual inventory of these educational disparities and examine them in relation to their social and global aspects. We shall then attempt to define the nature and importance of the obstacles to their being remedied, which will provide us with the necessary elements for an overall assessment of the situation.

# I. The historical dimension and regional context of the disparities

Cameroon's present borders are the result of successive or simultaneous conquests by three European powers—Germany, Great Britain and France. The Germans were finally driven out by the French and British armies after thirty years' control of the area, during which time they had begun to set up a German-language system of education. As from 1916 there were two educational systems, one based on the British model in the territory known as West Cameroon and the other, based on the French model, in East Cameroon. When it became independent in 1960, the Republic of Cameroon inherited these two systems and allowed them to co-exist until 1972. Harmonisation of the two systems, begun in 1963, has been speeded up since the adoption of a policy of centralisation and bilingualism. None the less, there are still two languages of instruction, i.e. French and English, each of which has remained predominant in its territory of origin.

Although Cameroon was already well in advance of other African ex-colonies—at least in the French zone—it has considerably extended school enrolment since independence. This expansion has not been due solely to the freeing of educational demand during the years 1958-60; it is also the fruit of a concerted policy which itself was the product of a way of thinking during the period when it was thought that education was an essential tool of economic and social development (or at least that a high level of enrolment could only be an asset) and the cornerstone of national construction.

As a result, the primary-school population was multiplied 2.5 times between 1960 and 1973. Over the same period, the numbers in secondary education (general, technical and colleges of education) increased 6.5 times and the number of *bacheliers* was multiplied by 10. However, this spectacular growth should not be allowed to conceal two facts:

1. The fundamental inequality which is linked to the spread of formal education in any country, but more especially in those where the trend towards mass education is a recent one. In Cameroon the majority of adults are and will remain illiterate, since education is aimed primarily at the younger

generation; and then again, the enrolment of all children of school age is still a remote goal;[1] lastly, boys are given precedence over girls. For the school year 1971/72 there was a ratio of 158 children per 1,000 inhabitants attending primary school.[2] For the same year, girls represented only 43 per cent of the primary-school population, 29.7 per cent of the secondary-school population and 9 per cent of those enrolled in higher education. Added to these factors of inequality relating to age and sex is that created by the hyper-selectivity of a system whose fundamental élitist character will need to be analysed: we have calculated that between 1970 and 1973, for every 1,000 children starting their first primary grade, 173 obtained their CEPE, 90 continued on to the secondary level, and less than 40 obtained their BEPC; 29 carried on into the second grade and 11 obtained their *baccalauréat.*

2. The uneven spread of education in the various regions (see Map 1).

As J. Bugnicourt points out,[3] the concept of educational lag is an ambiguous one. A region's educational lag may imply a preservation of indigenous cultures and educational systems—no matter whether these are institutionalised or based on written texts—which the sociologist will consider as positive. But in the majority of cases, educational lag implies under-development, in other words the set of processes linking poverty, domination and exploitation. This is the case in central Africa: the most backward regions from an educational point of view are those where one encounters those societies which have been the most successful in preserving their liberty to transmit their social and cultural heritage. These are also regions where agriculture is the most vulnerable, where the constraints of the central authority weigh most heavily and where the manpower and money drained off by the latter are greatest in proportion to the advantages received in return.

Regional inequalities in the educational area thus go hand in hand with inequalities in the areas of welfare and health care, wealth and agricultural and industrial produtive capacity and, of course, power.[4] Concrete evidence of this is shown in Table 1, which gives comparative figures for Cameroon's regions. Those regions which are most backward in terms of education, i.e. the North, the East and West Cameroon, are equally backward in other respects. In the case of the North, for example, its lot is to have the lowest school enrolment, the lowest degree of urbanisation, an insignificant number of businesses, the lowest

1. In 1976 Nigeria began an ambitious programme of universal primary education (UPE).
2. Enrolment amongst the school-age population, i.e. 6-13 years olds, is estimated at around 300 per 1000.
3. J. Bugnicourt in *Disparités scolaires en Afrique.*
4. Education will not in itself guarantee a position in the politico-administrative structure, but it is essential.




MAP 1. *Cameroon: administrative regions.*

TABLE 1. Comparison of regional characteristics in Cameroon, 1970

| Regions | West Cameroon | Central Southern | East | Coastal | North | West | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Area (km²) | 42 200 | 116 180 | 108 990 | 20 220 | 163 520 | 14 140 | 465 250 |
| Population (1971-72) | 314 826 | 1 293 368 | 302 947 | 747 956 | 1 590 248 | 878 252 | 6 118 097 |
| Pop. density (inh./km²) | 31 | 11 | 3 | 37 | 10 | 62 | 13 |
| Degree of urbanisation (%) | 14 | 22 | 13 | 58 | 10 | 20 | 21 |
| School enrolment prim. (71/72) | 139 | 209 | 175 | 189 | 58 | 214 | 158 |
| School enrolment gen. sec. (68/69) | 5 | 15 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 19 | 8.5 |
| No. of businesses[1] | 9 | 47 | 1 | 95 | 5 | 3 | 160 |
| Inhabitants per doctor | 61 700 | 15 000 | 26 000 | 10 400 | 61 000 | 28 000 | 33 800 |
| Inhabitants per post office | 35 200 | 25 800 | 20 000 | 29 600 | 93 700 | 56 700 | 39 000 |
| Rural *per capita* income (F.CFA) 68 | — | 27 000 | 10 800 | 34 000 | 4 100 | 26 000 | |
| Asphalt roads, km/10.000 km² | 2.5 | 2 | 0 | 13 | 1.6 | 6.4 | 2.1 |

1. Listed in the Register of Companies at 31.12.1970.
SOURCE A. Valette, op. cit., 25.

density of doctors[1] (together with West Cameroon) and post-offices, the lowest ratio of asphalt roads (together with the East) and lastly, the smallest rural *per capita* income. On the other hand, the Central-Southern region and the West-Coast axis—in other words, the south-west territory—account for two-thirds of the asphalt roads, three-quarters of the installed electrical capacity, 75 per cent of the hospital beds, 80 per cent post-office box numbers, 90 per cent of the business undertakings, and 95 per cent of the candidates for the *baccalauréat*. It is more easy to understand these disparities when one realises that the hub of this south-western area is the town of Douala, which alone accounts for 40 per cent of the industrial undertakings and 60 per cent of the commercial undertakings with an annual turnover in excess of 5bn. FCFA, 60 per cent of the staff of the 40 largest companies and 75 per cent of the jobs scheduled in the Third Plan (1971-76). The present boundaries of this 'developed' south-western zone correspond exactly with those of what the Germans in 1914 termed the 'useful Cameroon'.

We do not wish to suggest that there is a direct relation of cause and effect between educational development and economic development. For the moment, we wish to do no more than point out the co-existence of these two trends within the broad regional divisions of Cameroon. A similar pattern is true for Chad and Nigeria. In these two countries the areas of highest school density (in the south-west in both cases) are also the areas with the highest concentration of industrial and commercial wealth and correspond to the 'useful zones' of the early colonial era.

The reasons for regional educational disparities should not therefore be sought solely in the differential characteristics of the educational system—this would be to mistake the effect for the cause. Thus, for example, the tendency for highly qualified teachers to be concentrated in towns within the more-advanced

1. In 1971, at the end of Second Five-Year Plan, the availability of regional health facilities in Cameroon was as follows:

| Region | Number of hospital beds | | Total | No. of inh. per bed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Public sector | Private sector | | |
| North | 1561 | 497 | 2 058 | 710 |
| East | 618 | 236 | 845 | 350 |
| W. Cameroon | 1 259 | 982 | 2 241 | 540 |
| Central-Southern | 2 438 | 1 425 | 3 863 | 300 |
| West | 1 268 | 2 201 | 3 469 | 300 |
| Littoral | 1 523 | 835 | 2 358 | 250 |
| Total | 8 667 | 6 176 | 12 843 | 408 |

SOURCE J.L. Morinière, in *L'organisation de l'espace au Cameroun.*

zones is only a reflection of these zones' overall progress. One has therefore to find an overall explanation for these overall disparities, and to do so by attempting to situate them within the context of a socio-historical trend. This trend needs to be split up into its two main elements, i.e. firstly, the economic, political and ideological relationship which existed between the African societies and the colonial powers and, secondly, the socio-regional framework within which these relationships were at work or which they helped to shape. This will be the aim of this first section.

## A. The historical processes

There is no denying the fact that European colonisation in Central Africa has played a major role in creating disparities. However, it should be noted that the current evaluation of these disparities makes direct reference to what in fact was introduced by colonisation, i.e. the school, the town, medical care, a communications infrastructure, cash crops, industries, etc. which is in a way a statement of the obvious. Aside from the obvious, confining one's attention to the actions of Europeans would merely mean tracing a linear process in which the African societies exercised no initiative and which followed a path dictated only by economic imperatives. This again would be lending support to an economic interpretation of history. In fact, the historical process producing these disparities is the outcome of the continuing interaction between European colonisation and local societies. This interaction occurred in every area, but the importance of each has varied at different periods and, in our view, the main feature in this changing pattern of interaction was the gradual replacement of the economic determinants, which had been preponderant during the early colonial period, by political and ideological determinants. The education system, as both a thinking and an independent agency, has contributed to this evolution. Despite its impressive growth, its present pattern of distribution still bears the mark of the period when economic relationship dominated the other forms of social relationship. This is due to its hierarchical structure, which produces inequalities, to its role as state apparatus, which regards these inequalities as functional, and lastly, to the influence of the socio-regional context, as will be seen later.

The introduction of schools by the colonial powers formed part of a broad programme—economic, political and ideological—designed to provide them with overall control. The societies marked by colonialism have had to react in every sector of their social life, and the relationship which they have had with the school system is likewise part of an overall process of production and reproduction. This relationship with the school—as with other colonial structures—has not been the same for all the societies concerned. One can suggest two major reasons for this. The first of these can be expressed as follows: although the operation of colonisation was certainly an all-embracing one, it was nevertheless *phased in terms of space and time* and did not have the same radical character for every group. The second reason has to do with the

nature of the societies concerned, i.e. they were neither similar nor impervious to change. On the one hand, the coloniser intervened at *different stages in their historical evolution* and, depending on the situation, he either arrested or accelerated various processes within the internal or external relationships of these societies. On the other hand, different types of social and political structures were already in existence and did not have the same degree of *compatibility—or incompatibility*—with the new structures which the Europeans wished to introduce. It was the combination of these three factors, i.e. the phased intervention of the white overlords, the historical evolution of each group and the different types of socio-political organisation, which has produced such widely differing responses from the societies brought into contact with Europe's colonial powers. It is however true that the margin for manœuvre—particularly during the initial colonial period—was narrow and in most cases amounted to the following alternative: submission or death. The Europeans' success was due to their superior weapons and military organisation. The ideology of white power, the principal factor in the process of colonial feudalisation, had as its historical and practical basis the machine-gun.

What are the societies we refer to? Today, the concept of an ethnic group has less and less of an ethnological connotation in so far as it no longer refers solely to a single cultural dimension as its dominant and constant feature. It also connotes a political space, one or more modes of production, social relationships of a specific type with their consequent stratifications, a degree of participation within regional relationships, and a past and present history. The concept of an ethnic group, as a complex and mobile reality involved in events, has to be conceived of in an historical and changing perspective. The ethnic groups to which one tends to refer nowadays are, for the most part, a result of colonial activity, particularly in the area of taxonomy. The Europeans arriving in Africa were quick to notice the differences between the groups encountered, i.e. language, dress, habitat, the relationships between men and women, diet, beliefs, etc. In order to establish a territorial and ideological basis for their power, they were obliged to implement two contradictory policies: firstly, to identify, name and classify the various groups and then to confine them to a fixed abode and group them into administrative areas, which put a stop to their earlier migrations and gave rise to specialisation by encouraging them to adopt certain specific forms of economic activity; secondly, to undermine the political and religious foundations of these groups in order 'to make a clean sweep of the past'. The groups which had to bear the brunt of this double policy were those living in the zones under direct colonial rule, i.e. the southern regions of Cameroon, Chad and, to a certain extent, Southern Nigeria. In the zones under indirect rule, Islam has proved an effective barrier to the penetration of European ideology, protecting both Moslems and non-Moslems; none the less, the colonial system of classification has been applied, either as an adaptation of, or as an addition to, that of the preceding colonisers, as in the case of the Fulani in Cameroon and Nigeria.

*1. The different periods*

Let us look now at the different stages in this process of interaction:

*(a). The pre-colonial period.* The present-day disparities in Cameroon follow a south-north or coast-interior pattern. This pattern is the outcome of two historical currents, which became separate during the pre-colonial period as a result of contact with Europe.

The north-east zone of Cameroon, generally less advanced than the rest of the country, as the figures in Table 1 show, has always been last on the list of the colonisers' priorities in terms of both space and time. As with most African countries with access to the sea, initial contact with the Europeans was along the coast. The Portuguese landed on the estuary of the Wouri river as early as 1492 and the coastal region of Cameroon was thus exposed to European influence more than four centuries before the savannah region—it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the German troops penetrated into this area after covering a distance of more than 1,000 km. From the sixteenth century onwards the coastal societies—in particular the Duala—became directly involved in commerce with white traders from various countries. They acted as intermediaries between the populations of the interior (Basa, Bamileke, Bulu) and the Europeans for slave-trading in all its forms. During this same period, the history of the societies in the north followed a purely African pattern, influenced by their ties with the Islamic empires. From the point of view of trade, they were linked to the long-distance routes crossing the Sahara and the western savannah. The Hausa traders were unsuccessful in their attempts to establish a lasting trading relationship with the forest region to the south. By the beginning of the nineteenth century this southern region was already fully committed to the slave trade and, as a result, to a foreign mercantile economy: all the channels of trade now led to the sea. Gradually trading posts were set up along the coast and treaties of friendship concluded with the local chieftains. The missionaries arrived close on the heels of the traders and began to set up schools, dispensaries and places of worship. Pastor J. Merrick, the son of a negro slave freed in Jamaica, in 1844 founded the first school in Cameroon at Bimbia. The second was founded the following year at Douala.

*(b). The German period (1884-1914).* When the Germans landed in 1884 and set out to conquer the territory, the system of trade and the missionary activity had already had a profound impact on the coastal tribes. The neighbouring populations of the interior were involved in the slave trade but as yet had been little influenced by missionary activity, whereas the northern savannah tribes continued to form a warring but independent group united by the *Jihad* of the Fulani. The Germans, by subordinating all their operations—territorial conquest, system of administration and education—to their development objectives, tended to perpetuate and strengthen this north-south division.

Although it was a relatively easy matter to establish authority over the coastal populations, it proved very difficult to penetrate the interior owing to the nature

of the terrain, i.e. forest, and the hostility of local groups. The Germans were forced to crush the Bakweri, Basa, Bakoko and Bulu societies at the cost of heavy losses on the African side. Once beyond the forest, the conquest of the north was to prove even more difficult because of its remoteness and the military organisation of some of the tribes. It took all of ten years to destroy the Fulani strongholds. By 1902 the Germans were in control of the north, at least theoretically since they had not yet penetrated the Mandara mountains and most of the non-Islamic societies were still unsubdued.

Whilst the armies continued their advance into the interior, the new occupying power began to exploit the coastal region with the overall objective—here as elsewhere—'of constructing facilities at the lowest possible cost in order to "maximize" a development which is intended to benefit the mother country and its merchants'.[1] After an initial period, during which the traders were allowed a free hand—under military protection—the administration took over control. In order to convey products from the interior to the coast vast infrastructures were built, i.e. railroads and highways terminating at the port of Douala. Large plantations of heveas and oil palms were laid out. Thus there grew up within a 200-km radius of Douala the so-called 'useful Cameroon'—an area devoted to trade, with a modern system of transport and a whole network of urban centres. Since the colony had to cost the mother country a minimum—otherwise Bismarck would never have been able to justify the German colonial adventure to his parliament—the bulk of these major construction programmes were financed from the colony's budget. The 'Cameroonians' were made to contribute heavily towards this, not only via a multiplicity of taxes and levies, but also by providing porterage and various kinds of forced labour to build the highways and railroads. In the forest zone 'to facilitate the tasks of collecting taxes, recruiting porters, collecting products and policing the area, the Germans grouped the populations along the main caravan routes'.[2] Those living on the fertile slopes of Mount Cameroon were expropriated and their land allocated to the European planters. Since the supply of local manpower soon proved insufficient, the Bamileke country gradually came to be used as a source of labour. The savannah was not developed and the Northern Region was simply left under military jurisdiction.

Up until 1907 the Germans regarded education as a secondary matter; their military strength was considered as sufficient justification for their presence. The 'white man's burden'—the task of civilising the country[3]—was left mainly in the hands of the missionaries, whose schools were sufficient to supply the local agents required for the public administration and private organisations and whose private ideological activities lent support to the military action in subjugating the local groups. As a result, there was a remarkable expansion in

1. In Morinière, op. cit., p. 97.
2. J. Weber, *Types de surproduits et formes d'accumulation: la province cacayoère du Centre-Sud Camerounais*, p. 71.
3. Here too, the German government followed a policy of minimum cost.

private education, particularly amongst the Duala—in the colony's capital—and amongst the coastal societies, and subsequently amongst the Basa, Bulu and Beti in the Yaoundé region. By 1913 there were 631 primary mission schools concentrated in the south, with a total of 43,500 pupils. State education started only in 1907, when the partial failure of the missionary schools in spreading the German language became obvious and when a growing need arose for local European-trained personnel. However, there was much leeway to be made up and by 1913 there were only 833 pupils in goverment schools, i.e. Douala 362, Victoria 257, Yaoundé 160 and Garoua 54.[1] The only school in the North was the one at Garoua, run by two African assistants.

Thus, during the thirty years of German rule, the populations in the south-western region were subjected to an extraordinary number of constraints in every area: firstly military, secondly economic and finally, politico-administrative and ideological. The school served as an instrument for indoctrination by helping to change outlooks and systems of needs. The introduction of money into the system of barter, coupled with the setting-up of schools, was instrumental in creating new wants, and embryonic in the missionary activity was the philosophy of development. Apart from the somewhat symbolic school in Garoua, none of this was happening in the North—no major construction projects, no plantations, no missions. Moreover, the difference between the two zones was further accentuated by the type of administrative activity. In the south-west the chief towns, originally military strongholds, were gradually transformed into administrative centres equipped with schools, post-offices, etc., involved in varying degrees in trade and commerce and becoming more like towns. In the North the Germans, once they had subdued the Fulani, set up military zones and used members of the vanquished tribes to administer the area: 'residents' were assigned to the Sultan's courts, which served to strengthen the position of most of the pre-colonial Moslem chieftains and in fact guaranteed their ascendancy over the non-Moslem groups, which had been considerably shaken by a century of guerilla conflict. By so doing, the Germans set up a system of Indirect Rule in the Northern region similar to the system the English were creating in the neighbouring country of Nigeria. It could be said that there were two types of German colonisation in Cameroon, both linked however to the same overall economic objective. Developing the South and turning it into a profitable operation required the radical measures described above. The policy of lowest possible cost justified no more than a minimal development of state education in the South and the absence of projects in the North. Cameroon today still bears the marks of this initial period of colonisation and the extent of the disparities between the south-west coastal zone and the north-west has remained unchanged ever since 1914, the year when the French and British armies decided to put an end to German ascendancy in this area. The underlying reasons for this

1. Source: R. Santerre, in *L'école au Cameroun sous souveraineté allemande.*

state of affairs are complex. By and large, it can be said that the same economic logic was still at work, i.e. a spatial strategy of profit, but that another logic, political and ideological this time, had begun to assume importance, although the end-result was to be the same, i.e. a socio-economic differentiation along the lines of the earlier model.

*(c). British Cameroons (1914-1945).* At the end of the War the allies divided up the German colony, with England being given the entire border section adjoining Nigeria. West Cameroon, which was attached administratively to Nigeria, was more or less neglected on account of its remoteness from the main centres of the British colony. Indirect Rule was set up systematically, following a detailed census of the major clans, although in the northern area some groups escaped all administrative authority; the vast plantations in the south were returned to their German owners; some improvements were made to the ports of Victoria and Tiko, but little was done to set up urban centres, and medical care and education were left to the missionaries. As a result, the British Cameroons were to fall even further behind the southern region of the French Cameroons.

*(d). French Cameroons (1914-1945).* The French applied the same development policy as the Germans, with the exception of the fact that the mother country was more generous with its supply of funds, in particular for harbour and roadworks and social services. The port of Douala grew in size and importance, the rail system was improved, and Douala was linked with Yaoundé and with the system of waterways to the east. In 1913 there were 600 kilometres of roads suitable for motor vehicles; by 1945 this figure had risen to 6,000 km. Finally, medical facilities were considerably improved and hospitals built at Douala, Yaoundé, Ebolowa and Dschang. However, most of this investment was concentrated in 'useful Cameroon', where development was continued and extended to within a radius of 300 km. from Douala: timber, cocoa, oil palms and coffee became the principal crops; the Bamileke country was no longer merely a source of manpower but started to become the granary for the Mungo valley and the coast; the towns expanded and the division of the territory between the various missions was finalised.

Although the same type of colonial exploitation continued after the departure of the Germans, several new elements appeared which helped somewhat to modify the scheme of things. The first was that the French were profoundly anxious to justify their presence and achieve a 'moral conquest' of the communities within the territory; the second was an important change in the ideological structures of certain local groups, which promoted a desire for religious conversion and education. The missions still bore the brunt of the educational work, but under very strict control with regard to the teaching of the French language and culture. The French in fact sought to emphasise education, because they felt it would provide a solid base for their presence following the departure of the Germans and, what is more, the League of Nations' mandate contained certain stipulations regarding the outside world. However, education

remained a heavy financial burden and a two-edged weapon. The wisest course was therefore to rely on the missionary structure and do no more than lay the foundations for a subsequent development of mass education. The result was that the spread of education was slow, due to the lack of resources and competent personnel, but sure because of the popular demand. Once again, economic development preceded educational development since the demand arose only in those areas where the economic value of education was apparent in the form of job opportunities: primarily those areas which were being developed.

The Northern region was to remain on the fringe of all this. The road network was extended, but the north-south highway was still impassable during the rainy season. The growing of groundnuts was given some timid encouragement, basically as a 'way of producing money', but the prices were unfavourable and it was considered that there was no future for cotton. In certain districts, such as Mokolo, taxes were still being paid in kind as late as 1940. Missionary activity was not authorised in any region where the main political, commercial, religious and cultural centres were the capitals of the Moslem chieftains, whose authority had been confirmed by the French following the departure of the Germans. The only schools were therefore state-run... and rare: in addition to Garoua, 11 schools were set up which had about 600 pupils in 1945, as against an enrolment of more than 100,000 in the south-west zone.

What is more, the French set up a highly centralised administrative system. By and large, they adopted the Germans' administrative units and centres. These units were progressively subdivided: the nine original districts were split into seventeen administrative regions which correspond more or less to today's departments. Here again, the north-south differentiation is apparent: in the North, the capitals of the 'regions' were ( with the exception of Mokolo ) the pre-colonial Moslem political centres, which gave them additional prestige.[1] In the South, however, the location of such capitals was based solely on the geographic or commercial position of the towns developed by the Germans.

*(e). Cameroon from 1945 to Independence (1960).* This period was marked above all by a change in the political and ideological scene, rather than by economic changes, to the extent that politico-ideological relationships began to dominate social relationships as a whole. After the Second World War relations between colonies and mother countries underwent a profound change: the colonial powers came out of this war considerably weakened, whereas in the colonies a desire for a different status began to take root. This was followed by a period of great political ferment amongst both the Europeans and the Africans, and the debate on the question of sharing power with the natives and the manner in which this should be achieved often took on a dramatic form.

In the case of Cameroon, there was not only the Brazzaville Conference (1944)

1. The French were very quick to realise the existence of this Moslem v. pagan opposition but, for various reasons, nothing was ever done to change the boundaries of the smallest administrative divisions (i.e. the 'cantons') which serve to maintain Moslem ascendancy over the pagans.

on the French side, but above all the U.N., which imposed on the two European powers a system of trusteeship with independence as a clearly defined objective. One outcome of this situation was the educational development of the territory following the introduction of mass education, secondary education and the diversification of vocational education. It was at this stage that educational development began to overtake economic development in the sense that the job market was no longer able to absorb the number of school-leavers. In the case of the Cameroonians, the most obvious result of this educational expansion was the emergence of an anti-colonial nationalism, the creation of independence parties and finally, the Basa revolt encouraged by the U.P.C.

This was also the major period of development[1] for both East and West Cameroon, which was to result in real progress in many areas—if not in all the regions—and also lead to a much closer integration and dependence upon the international system of trade: capitalist exploitation was to increase with development. This development was geared to criteria of cost-effectiveness, i.e. investment was allocated to the various regions in relation to their estimated profitability, and the gap between North and South was widened as a result. Although a permanent highway was built in the Northern region in 1950, linking it with the South, and the planting of cotton and a programme of agricultural improvement begun in 1952 plus, at long last, an investment in schools, the relations between Moslems and pagans were to remain unchanged; and in the south-western zone the projects and improvements were on a much larger scale, particularly in the area of urban and educational development and in the economic and social structures.

*2. The interaction at work*

The dominant feature of colonial rule in Cameroon had been the selective nature of development, in which administrative structures and education played a subordinate role. Since, in the eyes of the Europeans, economic objectives remained paramount, one can consider that it was through pressure from the local populations that the predominance of these objectives was challenged by the need to create a political structure which would no longer be based on military force alone, but which would be required to justify its own existence. In this situation, education became both the end-product and the instrument for modifying the relationships between the colonial masters and their subjects. It became the point at which, and from which, conflicts both crystallised and developed. The paradox is that it was from the moment when education was raised from its status as a supplier of recruits for minor posts to that of an agency for legitimising the colonial system, that this very legitimacy was called into question. In order to strengthen its legitimacy, the colonial power was forced to develop education, both horizontally and vertically, in those areas where the demand was making itself felt, i.e. the development zones, and the logic inherent

1. With the FIDES plans (*Fonds d'investissements pour le développement économique et social*) for French-speaking Cameroun.

in any system of education did not fail to operate: from a desire to possess all the European's knowledge the next step was a demand to possess all the European's power.

However, although it is possible to trace this as an overall process, we have already mentioned (cf. p. 31) the existence of various factors which contributed to a differentiation in the evolution of the various groups. It is these specific trends which we now have to examine.

In the southern zones, the action of the authorities, i.e. the efforts to classify and relocate societies, intensified ethnical individuality along artificial lines by destroying the entire pre-colonial political and ideological structure.[1] These groups, their resistance crushed, their political structure destroyed, integrated within an economic system geared to the mother country, were completely subjugated by the ideology of the white man's power. The schools and in particular the missions were remarkably successful—enormous numbers were converted to Christianity in South Cameroon during the 1920s. The initial contradiction continued to develop, and in a paradoxical manner. The nationalist, anti-colonial movement originated in these 'ethnic groups', which had been stripped of their own culture, taking as its point of reference the pre-colonial cultural patterns, yet without any trace of Messianism (in Cameroon). It was the same ethnic groups which, when they rose to power after independence, spearheaded the struggle against tribalism in the name of national unity and applied the same policy of cultural destruction as their former masters amongst those tribes which had been most successful in preserving their pre-colonial roots.

In South Cameroon the Duala, already profoundly marked by their secular contacts with Europe, were the first to lose their cultural cohesion[2] by submitting to progressive political decapitation at the hands of the Germans and by gradually absorbing the western habits of acquiring wealth, skills and power. They were thus the first group to become politically active. The Basa and the Bulu proved much more recalcitrant in the face of the political and cultural pressure from the whites. Their westernisation, however radical it later became, was delayed and occurred only in a surreptitious way through their somewhat circuitous integration within the trading system: the wage-earning ethos introduced by the system of porterage and in the plantations had a lot to do with this. What is more, 'cocoa was not taxed. When the Germans left Cameroon in 1916, the plantations which they left behind were pillaged by people who planted somewhat in any fashion (in Bulu country). To the north of Yaoundé (Beti country) cocoa was also introduced without restriction from the Basa country (in the Edea-Eseka region)'.[3] Later on, the Basa country was to be the birthplace of the U.P.C. movement (*Union des Populations du Cameroun.*)

1. South Cameroon had been for a long time inhabited by migratory groups; the groups which the whites found there were finally settled only between the 16th and 19th centuries.
2. Cf. V.T. Le Vine, *The Cameroons from mandate to independence.*
3. J. Weber, op. cit., p. 73.

Amongst the southern societies the Bamileke succeeded in maintaining their pre-colonial political structures the longest, and the tragic form which their destruction took was evidence of the extent to which these were ingrained. The persistence of these structures, coupled with the gradual but easy insertion of the Bamileke into the economic system and the urban environment, was no doubt due to the fact that the Bamileke ideology with regard to personal advancement (via wealth, knowledge etc.) was the one most compatible with western ideology. This ideology still exists. In contrast to the Basa rebellion, with its strong anti-colonial character, the Bamileke rebellion was above all the product of contradictions within their social system, contradictions which had been sharpened by population pressures and the extension of trading activities.

In the northern regions ethnic nationalism had been inflamed in quite a different manner and before the arrival of the whites. In the case of the Moslem groups, Islam provided the leaven. It led—in some cases—to wars of conquest and the creation of empires whose economy was based on pillage and slave labour. The most recent of these empires, that of Sokoto, built up by the Fulani, had set out to destroy—rather than convert—the pagan ethnic living within its territory or on its borders. These non-Moslem groups used various strategies to resist this pressure from the Fulani; the effect of these strategies however—particularly in the western area, i.e. Cameroonian Adamawa—was to exhaust the energies of these tribes in guerilla warfare and strengthen tribal rivalries. Some groups even formed resistance groups in the mountains and created veritable economies.[1] As mentioned earlier, the English and French colonisers confirmed the Fulani's control over the area, since their political structures were in fact completely compatible. Although they had been conquered by the whites, the Fulani succeeded in obtaining *de facto* recognition of their independence with regard to their internal ideological and social relationships. Moreover, since the military situation was frozen, the antagonism between Moslems and non-Moslems could find expression only on a political and ideological plane and within the conditions imposed by the colonial administration. In North Cameroon this initially resulted in a total opposition on the part of the pagan groups to all the measures undertaken by the colonial government, since these were applied via the Fulani. Subsequently, the evolution of each social formation followed a separate path, but always conditioned by a specific attitude towards the dominant tribe, e.g. uncompromising resistance amongst the mountain societies and a complete acceptance amongst others such as the Mundang (not only in Cameroon but also in Chad), but always with an eye to outmanoeuvring the Fulbe, using the means supplied by the whites and on the stage which they had created. On the other hand, the Fulbe were able to make the most of their position as town-dwellers and their proximity to the administration. There grew up within their ranks a modern element who, without abandoning their traditional ties, adapted to the economic system, followed the paths of western knowledge and set out on the road to the new power.

1. Cf. J.-Y. Martin, *Les Matakam du Cameroun.*

This brief survey of the interaction between the Europeans and the African communities in Cameroon enables us to indentify basic structures of a spatial, historic, sociological and economic kind, each with its own dynamic. It also enables us to recognise within these structures the various social behaviour patterns which provide the context as well as an explanation for them. This is what one can term the regional context of the disparities.

## B. The regional context

The concept of a region has many and often conflicting meanings, because its content depends primarily on one's viewpoint, i.e. whether this is geographic, politico-administrative, economic or sociological. Since our prime concern is with educational disparities this regional concept needs to be given the content most appropriate to this problem. Our objective is therefore to look not for an all-embracing concept but for one which is meaningful—one which would enable the problem of disparities to be expressed in the most pertinent terms, i.e. which would provide a clearer explanation of their origin and growth. We shall therefore be emphasising the socio-historic dimension.

The regional concept which we have been using so far (page 28) is the one which corresponds to geographico-administrative divisions. These have primarily a descriptive value, since they are used as the basis for various statistical data, such as educational statistics which are broken down into these geographical units. They therefore enable comparisons to be made between regions on the basis of quantitative data, thereby making it possible to measure these disparities but not to explain their mechanisms. The existence of these spatio-regional divisions implies their nature as sub-units and, by the same token, the existence of an aggregate entity which can be analysed at national level. These spatial units have been created as a framework for politico-administrative activity. They are the levels through which the state acts and the basis for regional planning. However great the degree of decentralisation, the existence of the state cannot be ignored, particularly where educational policy is concerned.

This being the case, these units can have no other unity than that which is in fact conferred upon them by the administration. Where the problem of educational disparities is concerned, it is not just the relationship between the state and the regions which needs to be taken into account but also the relationship between the region and its constituent elements—a relationship which is often ignored by planners. From a sociological viewpoint, the existence of a region is not something conferred upon it by the state but primarily the *structure of the relations* between the different actors or social systems comprising it, irrespective of whether the state has taken this structure into account or not. The social systems may be completely dissimilar; what is essential for a region to exist is that they should be in *interaction* (politically, economically, ideologically, etc.). The structure of these relations is the product of history and, in the

case of the countries which concern us here, of pre-colonial and subsequent colonial history.

The sociologist therefore may consider the region as a well-defined socio-historic complex—or unit—occupying a certain geographical area. What is determinant is the notion of integrated heterogeneity—or relative homogeneity. This implies the existence of an integrating—or focal—element, a point of convergence for the social relationships linked to natural conditions and historical events, which may be a system of production, a social group or a town. Whatever viewpoint one adopts, one cannot discard the others; and a region is always the combination of several dimensions, i.e. natural, historical, economic and political. We have opted for the socio-historical dimension because it enables us to integrate the others. A component of any social system is its relation to natural conditions, and the state of these relations is conditioned by history and by internal and external politico-economic determinants. In the case of former colonies it is important to assess the part played by different periods of history in the shaping of regions as we see them today. In particular—as pointed out earlier—one has to identify the pre-colonial and colonial components.

One often hears it said that the pre-colonial social movements were disrupted during the colonial period only to reappear after independence. Such a statement needs qualifying. It would for example be difficult to find influences today which can be traced back to the former Kanem-Bornou empire in Central Africa, despite the fact that in Chad an administrative unit bears the name Kanem and in Nigeria a State is called Bornu. The most important task is to discover what was more or less overshadowed by the colonial conquest and which is regaining importance today, such as the distinct Arab-Islamic influence in the 'Chad of the Sultans' or the focal role (positive or negative) of the Fulani in North Cameroon. The pre-colonial relations must also include those which had existed between Africa and Europe ever since the fifteenth century, and no one needs reminding of the importance of commercial relations (the slave trade in all its forms) and ideological relations (missions and schools) in the coastal zones.

One must also bear in mind the part played by the historical factors of the colonial period in shaping today's regions and the typical measures which were applied in the colonial 'regions' during this period, and in particular the type of government, i.e. Direct Rule—Indirect Rule, economic policy. Thus it would appear for instance that the system of Indirect Rule functioned best in those regions which had had the least contact with Europe during the pre-colonial period. In other words, it was those socio-political entities whose own indigenous evolution had been the least affected up to the time of the colonial conquest which were subsequently subjected to intervention of the least radical kind or, to put it another way, that which was the most respectful of local society.

A region is therefore at the same time a geographical area, a socio-economic unit and a history.

*1. The regions of Cameroon*[1]

In Cameroon the geographico-administrative divisions, with which we are already familiar, can, with very little rearrangement, be made to correspond fairly closely with the kind of 'region' which have just described. In other words, most of the 'provinces' of Cameroon constitute well-defined socio-historic units.[2] Their relatively integrated character has its basis in history and geography. The urban pattern inherited from the colonial period has been grafted onto these units, i.e. each region or province now has one or more towns of major or secondary importance (in relation to the country as a whole) as its focal point(s). One characteristic common to all these regions is therefore the cleavage between rural and urban population. In the following pages a brief description will be given of each of these regions (cf. Map 1).

*(a). The West Cameroon region.* Since the creation of a unified state the former territory of West Cameroon has been divided into two provinces, i.e. the North-West and the South-West. Although made up of diverse and dissimilar elements which have more in common with neighbouring regions or with Nigeria, this West Cameroon region possesses what is, in our view, one over-riding unifying feature which justifies its description as a separate region: its recent history under British rule, the marks of which it still bears. English (or its variant pidgin-English) as the means of communication between ethnic groups, the system of education, the political habits, the economic and cultural ties with the former mother country or with its African 'representatives' (such as Nigeria, to which the British Cameroons were attached for administrative purposes) are all factors which lend unity to the life of the region in relation to the other provinces of Cameroon. What is more, Cameroon has two towns of secondary importance which act as focal points; Buea on the coast and Bamenda in the North, at the access to the Ring Road.

However, variety is by no means the least of this region's features and it has many aspects. There are three major natural zones: the coastal zone with its equatorial climate, the central forest-land, and the savannah and grassfields of the north. Population density varies widely; from more than 150 inhabitants per km$^2$ around Bamenda to the almost semi-desert zones along the Nigerian frontier. As far as ethnic groups are concerned, these are divided into the coastal peoples (chiefly Bakundu and Duala) with their long contact with Europe, and the northern tribes (Tikar, Widekun, Cross River) who have characteristics very similar to those of their neighbours the Bamileke and Bamoum. The type of crop grown varies greatly (cocoa, coffee, tea, hevea, palms, maize) as does the type of production (agro-industrial units—family holdings). In addition, pasture cattle are raised in the north.

1. Cf. Y. Marguerat, *Analyse numérique des migrations vers les villes du Cameroun*, and A. Valette, *Les méthodes de la planification régionale au Cameroun.*
2. We shall not be discussing the Eastern Province, which seems to us to exist only as an administrative division, resembling the North in some ways and the Central-Southern region in others.

*(b). The Central-Southern region.* The Central-Southern region is dominated by Yaoundé , the country's administrative and political capital and the centre of an important trading network covering the entire region. The development of Yaoundé has caused the decline of a number of secondary towns (Ebolowa. Mbalmayo, Bafia). Yaoundé is at the centre of a heavily-populated area (about 100 inhabitants per km²—a density which decreases as one moves away from the centre). The main ethnic groups living in this region are the Beti (Ewondo, Eton), the Bulu and the Basa, who were subjected to western influence at a later date than the coastal tribes but none the less to a considerable degree. They have been exposed for some long time to the influence of Christian missions and to formal education. The natural features of the region comprise a zone of savannah in the north and a zone of forests becoming increasingly dense toward the south. Cocoa is by far the most important crop, the others being coffee, oil palms, foodcrops (tuberous plants) and timber. Several industries are located at Yaoundé and there are several agro-industrial operations in the savannah zone (cane sugar, fruits).

*(c). The region along the Bafoussam-Douala axis.* We have combined the Western and Littoral Provinces into one region. There is intensive trade between these two provinces, carried on principally by the Bamileke society. The main languages used for communication between the ethnic groups are French and pidgin-English. At one extremity of this region lies the town of Douala which, with its port, its industrial and commercial undertakings and its large population (about 500,000) is the economic capital of the country. At the other extremity is the Bamileke country, with Bafoussam as its chief town. The area around this town has the highest population density of the entire country (between 200 and 300 inhabitants per km²). The economic and demographic vitality of the Bamileke has for a long time encouraged them to migrate. As a result, they have spread throughout the Mungo river valley along the Bafoussam-Douala axis; they are the largest single group in Douala, and most of the major towns in Cameroon have a resident population of Bamileke traders. The other important groups are the Duala, the Basa and the Bamum, the first of these having the longest history of relations with the Europeans. The main agricultural resources of the region are maize, plantain, coffee and bananas.

*(d). The Northern region.* In our view, the North is the most highly individual region in Cameroon, the one which most closely corresponds to the definition of a well-defined socio-historic entity. The focal element is the Fulani tribe; all the other tribes, in one way or another, have had to take the lead from them —geographically, politically, ideologically. The colonial era ensured the pre-eminence of the Fulani tribe and it is the relationship which the other tribes have with them and, through them, with the state which conditions the present evolution of this region. The Fulani in the strict sense of the term represent less than a quarter of the population in the north. However, they are present in all the towns (both large and small) and occupy most of the important administrative

and political posts. Confronting them, or alongside them, are a large number of social groups, for the most part non-Islamic, of which the most important are the mountain societies (Matakam, etc.), the Massa and the Toupouri, these two latter groups straddling the frontier with Chad. The only genuine language of communication between ethnic groups is the Fulani language. The urban poles of attraction within the region are Garoua (which acts as a true regional capital), Ngaoundere and Maroua. The highest population density in the north is to be found within a radius of 100 km from Maroua: the three departments there, covering 13.5 per cent of the area, contain about 60 per cent of the population. This implies that there are areas which are practically semi-desert, in which animal preserves have been created. The main resource of the north is millet, which is the staple diet of the population. In addition, cotton, groundnuts and rice are grown. The Adamawa plateau, in the south of the region, has the largest herd of cattle in the country, estimated at 2 million head. There are very few industries.

*2. The regions in Chad and Nigeria*

Chad and Nigeria, like Cameroon, are the products of colonial partitions and certain population groups have been cut in two by the frontier either between Cameroon and Nigeria or between Cameroon and Chad.

In both Nigeria and Chad a process of north-south differentiation, similar to that in Cameroon, has been at work as a result of the pre-colonial past, the pattern of economic development and the political implications of the method of government.

As can be seen from Map 3 (page 68), the territory of Chad is the geographic prolongation of Cameroon. The south and central sections of the country are relatively densely populated—on either side of the alluvial basins of the Logone and Chari rivers—but the northern area is desert. As the poor relation of French Equatorial Africa, state education of the French type was late and slow in starting—roughly around 1920, when the decree setting up the 'Military territory of the Countries and Protectorates of the Chad' dating from 1900 was annulled.

Chad is at present divided into 14 *Préfectures,* which provide the structure upon which the school system is based. However, these 14 *Préfectures* can be divided into three groups, which form relatively distinct regions.[1] *The Northern region,* mostly Sahel and desert, is peopled chiefly by nomads and a few sedentary Arab tribes. The traditions of these tribes, and in particular their allegiance to Islam, have always made them somewhat hostile to European influences. *The Central region* is very similar to the North in its hostility to colonial and post-colonial interference. Most of the population are followers of Islam, but nomads are in a minority. In an area which is mainly scrub, the agricultural resources are millet, groundnuts, maize and some cotton. The language of communication in both these regions is Arab. *The Southern region* is

1. Although what is happening today would tend to prove that there are only two regions in Chad, with the Chari river more or less the dividing line. Cf. I. Khayar, *Le refus de l'école.*

the wealthiest and most heavily populated of the three, with its savannah and baobab trees and its grassy flood plains. The European operations were concentrated in this region. The main groups are the Saras, the Massa and the Toupouri—sedentary peoples and cultivators of millet, rice, groundnuts and cotton (and fishermen in the case of those living along the Logone and Chari rivers). By and large these societies, and in particular the Saras, were more receptive to the colonial influence (missions, schools, cotton) than those in the other regions. The Saras—closely associated with the machinery of government—can be considered as the dominant group. Two towns provide the focal points for the region: Sarh (formerly Fort-Archambault) and Ndjamena, the capital.

The Federation of Nigeria, which is next door to Cameroon, has more or less the same natural features from the Atlantic coast to the Sahel. The main difference is in terms of population—Nigeria has in fact ten times as many people, i.e. 70-80 million inhabitants. European-type education was introduced in the coastal area by Christian missionaries in the 1860s. Its development was haphazard and irregular.

The demographic, commercial and cultural vitality of the major groups, fostered by the systematic application of Indirect Rule by the British, has meant that the problem of balance between the country's different regions has become far more acute than elsewhere, as the events of recent years have clearly demonstrated. The Federal government's reaction was to increase the number of regions—i.e. Federal States—so as to prevent one or other of the former colonial regions from assuming too great an importance in relation to the remainder. However, the earlier regional divisions seem to us more appropriate to the understanding of the problem of disparities, in particular with respect to their socio-historic basis. Apart from the Lagos region, which is a special case, the three other original regions (Northern, Eastern, Western) seem to us to be quite distinct, aside from the wide variety of economic activity, traditions and religions. Each region has a densely populated zone and a key agricultural zone, i.e. the Cocoa Belt (West), the Palm Belt (East) and the cotton and groundnut plantations in the North. Each has also a major ethnic group (Yoruba in the West, Ibo in the East, and Hausa-Fulani in the North), a dominant language, a religion (except in the West, where Islam and Christianity have an equal number of followers), an urban network (the Kaduna-Kano axis in the North, Port Harcourt-Enugu in the East and the cluster of Yoruba towns in the West). The Western region was the one subjected to the earliest and most direct European influence. The British policy of Indirect Rule in the North encouraged the social and cultural conservatism of the Fulani chieftains, but there was no preventing the profound changes which development brought about in the Yoruba and Ibo countries.

Had it not been for the colonial frontiers, North Cameroon, part of the former Northern Region of Nigeria and part of South-West Chad could have formed a single, integrated region. This region (cf. Map 3) corresponds to the territory ruled by the Fulani empire of Sokoto in the nineteenth century. In addition to its

common pre-colonial history, it has also a similarity of natural features (savannah), agricultural production and inter-ethnic relations where the Fulani influence is still very much alive. However, as in the case of West Cameroon, colonial rule followed by independent nation states have left their mark to such an extent that the three parts of this pre-colonial region have become part of the structure of their respective countries.

In this first chapter we have highlighted the main historical processes in the constitution of the disparities in Cameroon, mentioning their similarity with processes which have been at work in Chad and Nigeria. These processes, stemming from the interaction between the colonisers and the African communities, can be seen as an overall movement of socio-regional differentiation, combining various economic, political and ideological currents. We have thus defined our framework of analysis, which enables us to position regional disparities within a pattern of trends which has nothing fortuitous about it and whose path is determined by the dialectical relationship between its different determinants. We have noted in particular the progressive strengthening of the political and ideological determinants, a strengthening which has led to independence. This pattern of trends is now evolving within a national context which can only accentuate the regional context which we have analysed. What is more, the legitimising function of the educational system has become fundamental. As was seen earlier (p. 26), this has resulted in a spectacular expansion of the school population independently of the growth in the job market and in parallel with the persistence of regional disparities which have retained their importance and their pattern of distribution. We shall be examining these disparities in detail in the next section.

# II. The regional disparities in education

In this section we shall be analysing the different aspects of the geographical distribution of education in Cameroon, and thereafter summarising the situation in Chad and Nigeria. Here, as elsewhere, the educational system is organised along the same lines as the administrative system and educational statistics are broken down in accordance with the administrative regions. As our regional units of reference we shall therefore be using the geographical-administrative divisions. In the United Republic of Cameroon there are seven such units termed 'provinces': five provinces corresponding to the former French East Cameroon (North, East, Central-Southern, West and Littoral) and two corresponding to the former British West Cameroon (North-West and South-West).

## A. The present pattern of regional educational disparities in Cameroon

The regional distribution of primary education for the 1971/72 school year is shown in Table 2.[1] This table shows that there are two types of region: those with a high index ratio, which correspond to the colonisers' 'useful zone' (West, Central-Southern and Littoral) and the rest, with an average or low ratio. In this second category the most backward provinces are the South-West and the North-West (i.e. the former British Cameroons whose marginal status as part of

1. For the sake of conformity in the data on disparities, we have taken the figures for the year 1971/72. 1972 is the latest year for which educational statistics and an official population estimate are available. It is also the first year of the Third Plan. A population census was carried out in Cameroon in 1976. Global data per province have been published (see appendix) but the official educational statistics for the corresponding year are not available—at a later stage, we shall be using estimated figures.

Nigeria was mentioned earlier[1]) and in particular the North, which is way behind the rest.[2]

The figures for general secondary education, given in Table 3, show even wider gaps between these two groups of regions than was the case with primary education.

TABLE 2. Regional disparities in primary education (1971/72)

| Region | Population | %I | Enrolment in primary education | %II | Index II/I[1] | Enrolment per thousand population |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | 1 590 248 | 26.0 | 93 132 | 10.0 | 0.38 | 58 |
| Central-Southern | 1 293 368 | 21.0 | 269 254 | 29.0 | 1.38 | 209 |
| West | 878 252 | 14.4 | 188 679 | 20.3 | 1.40 | 214 |
| North-West | 759 881 | 12.4 | 95 605 | 10.3 | 0.83 | 125 |
| Littoral | 747 956 | 12.2 | 141 804 | 15.2 | 1.24 | 189 |
| South-West | 554 945 | 9.0 | 88 415 | 9.5 | 1.05 | 159 |
| East | 302 947 | 5.0 | 53 242 | 5.7 | 1.14 | 175 |
| Total | 6 118 097 | 100 | 930 131 | 100 | | 158 |

1. This index, which is used by a number of authors (Bugnicourt, Foster, etc.), could be termed the 'selectivity index', since it expresses the relationship between enrolment and population within each region. It serves as a rough measure of inter-regional disparities.

SOURCES *Annual Statistical Abstract.* Nat. Min. of Ed., Un. Rep. of Cameroon.
*Population of Cameroon in 1972 by province* (SAT.V. Nov. 72). Department of Educational Statistics.

TABLE 3. Regional disparities in secondary education (1971/72)

| Region | Population | %I | Enrolment in secondary education | %II | Index II/I |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Littoral | 747 956 | 12.2 | 15 856 | 24.27 | 1.98 |
| Central-Southern | 1 293 368 | 21.0 | 26 413 | 40.41 | 1.92 |
| West | 878 252 | 14.4 | 12 154 | 18.60 | 1.29 |
| East | 302 947 | 5.0 | 2 387 | 3.66 | 0.73 |
| South-West | 554 945 | 9.0 | 3 668 | 5.91 | 0.62 |
| North-West | 759 881 | 12.4 | 2 453 | 3.75 | 0.32 |
| North | 1 590 248 | 26.0 | 2 421 | 3.70 | 0.14 |
| Total | 6 118 097 | 100 | 65 352 | 100 | |

SOURCE *Annual Statistical Abstract.* Nat. Min. of Ed., Rep. of Cameroon.

1. In the British Cameroons, the main educational impulse came from (in order of importance): the missions, the Native Authorities and the administration. The administration restricted the intake into the 'English' schools, of which there were very few, because it employed persons trained in Nigeria. Cf. the study by C. and G. Courade.
2. It should also be noted that the distribution of girls in primary education follows a similar pattern, i.e. provinces with the highest proportion of girls in the school population are also those with the highest enrolment levels e.g. Central-Southern: 28.35% of girls; Littoral: 47.58%; West: 46.8%. By the same token, the region with the lowest enrolment level is also the one with the lowest proportion of girls i.e. the North: 24.77%.

However, the data in Table 3 reflect only an 'apparent' pattern for secondary education,[1] since they give only the numbers of children enrolled in a region, without specifying what region they come from. In other words, what this table really shows is the pattern of the regional 'supply' in terms of general secondary education. Everyone is aware of the extent to which the location of secondary schools is geared to the location of towns. Cameroon is no exception to this rule: the regions with the highest ratios, i.e. the Littoral and Central Southern Provinces, contain the two largest cities in the country—Douala and Yaoundé.[2]

Y. Marguerat (op. cit.) succeeded in getting information on the geographical origin of students in general secondary education in 1968/69, and on the basis of this Table 4, showing the 'real' secondary enrolment per region, was compiled.

As far as the ranking of the different regions is concerned, this table is absolutely identical with Table 2 concerning primary education. Where it differs is in the size of gaps between regions, which here are much wider, e.g. the index variation between the West and the North is 1.02 in the case of primary education and 2.05 in the case of secondary education.

TABLE 4. 'Real' secondary enrolment per region (1968/69)

| Region | Estimated population 1968 (%I) | Enrolment in secondary education[1] | %II | Index II/I[1] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| West | 14.84 | 14 486 | 31.96 | 2.15 |
| Central-Southern | 20.0 | 14 672 | 34.53 | 1.72 |
| Littoral | 11.20 | 7 493 | 16.50 | 1.47 |
| East | 4.92 | 1 309 | 2.88 | 0.58 |
| W. Cameroon | 21.48 | 5 195 | 11.44 | 0.53 |
| North | 27.56 | 1 223 | 2.69 | 0.10 |
| Total | 100 | 45 378 | 100 | |

1. Not including 1,336 foreigners and non-classified.

Taking the figures for higher education for the same year 1968/69, these gaps widen still further, as is evidenced by the distribution of candidates for the Baccalaureat in 1969.[3] Of the 948 candidates from Cameroon (including 98 candidates for the English GCEAL), 379 were originally from the Western region, i.e. ca. 40 per cent (index 2.69). Only 5 students came originally from the North, i.e. 0.52 per cent (index 0.02, which gives an index variation of 2.67

1. Cf. Y. Marguerat, *Problèmes géographiques de l'enseignement au Cameroun*. This study contains extremely detailed information on the regional and departmental distribution of education.
2. The littoral region, or more accurately the town of Douala, the economic capital of Cameroon, alone accounts for 45% of total enrolment in technical education.
3. Information supplied by Y. Marguerat.

between the West and the North). The imbalance between the aggregate distribution of these candidates is such that, when one plots it on a map, it looks almost ludicrous. If one takes just the French system of education, a line running more or less between the towns of Bamenda and Djoum, (i.e. with to the north-east of this line the North and East regions and the Northern departments of the Central-Southern and West regions) divides Cameroon into its two scolastic zones: the South-West, i.e. the coastal zone, with about 49 per cent of the total population, which supplies 95.5 per cent of the *Baccalauréat* candidates; and the North-West, which supplies the remaining 4.5 per cent (see Map 2).[1]

This provides us with a gross measure of regional educational disparities in Cameroon. The imbalances, which are already acute in primary education, increase as one goes up the educational ladder. However, the synchronic cut we have taken across the educational spectrum records different scholastic periods. For instance, the students in the secondary level in 1971/72 correspond for the most part with those who were in the primary level 7 years earlier, i.e. in 1964/65. By contrast, the 1971/72 primary students—that is, the survivors—will not appear *in toto* in the secondary level until 1977/78. One has therefore to analyse the situation in real time in order to see to what extent these disparities have evolved and are likely to evolve.

## B. The evolution of regional disparities in education

### *1. The relative pace of regional educational development*

Table 5 traces the development of primary education within each region (1954 = 100).

Despite the fact that the total trend shows a fourfold increase in enrolment over this 20-year period, the pace of growth in some regions has been even more spectacular. However, this is more a measure of their handicap at the start. The North, for example, has increased its capacity 12.7 times and similarly, West Cameroon and the West and East regions show a fivefold increase. The coastal region has the lowest coefficient (3.04), but this is the region with the longest established educational structure in the country.

However, if one takes a look at the trend in the proportion for each region over the same 20-year period, as shown in Figure 1, one notes changes of a different kind.

First of all, the trend has not been regular, in particular between 1954 and 1964. Secondly, the share of each region has changed; e.g., the North's share has risen from 3.5 per cent of total enrolment in 1954 to 10.3 per cent in 1975. West Cameroon and the West have also increased their shares (the first from 17 to 22 per cent, the second from 17 to 20 per cent). By the same token, the original

1. This map is based on Y. Marguerat (op. cit., p. 58).




MAP 2. *Geographic distribution of candidates for the baccalauréat in 1969 in Cameroon.*




FIGURE 1. *Cameroon: regional trends in enrolment, primary education, 1954-75.*

TABLE 5. Development of primary education by region, 1954-75

| Region | 1954 | 1957 | 1961 | 1964 | 1967 | 1971 | 19751 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central-Southern | 100 | 128 | 201 | 218 | 253 | 283 | 318 |
| East | 100 | 166 | 194 | 350 | 375 | 442 | 489 |
| Littoral | 100 | 126 | 151 | 195 | 226 | 257 | 304 |
| North | 100 | 231 | 397 | 619 | 781 | 1 031 | 1 274 |
| West | 100 | 135 | 207 | 313 | 361 | 420 | 493 |
| W. Cameroon | 100 | 123 | 213 | 278 | 389 | 412 | 553 |
| Total | 100 | 135 | 201 | 261 | 314 | 358 | 428 |

1. Estimate arrived at by taking the latest available figures (1973-74) and applying the average annual growth rate in enrolment over the preceding 5 years.

leaders have dropped back, e.g. the Central Southern region's share has fallen from 36.5 to 27 per cent and the Coastal region's share from 21 to 15 per cent. On the other hand, the East, despite a fivefold increase in enrolment, has only slightly increased its share (from 4.6 to 5.2 per cent). Lastly, it will be noted that certain regions have improved their position, e.g. West Cameroon and the Western region have moved ahead of the Littoral region, whilst the North has overtaken the East.

However, these figures showing the overall growth in enrolment in each region and its respective share of the total do not provide a full picture of the evolution of educational disparities. A true measure of this can be obtained only by relating the increase in enrolment to the overall growth in population.

*2. Changes in the degree of disparity*

The graph in Figure 2 shows the variation for each region's selectivity index[1] over the period 1954-1975. In our view, this graph provides a fairly accurate picture of the evolution of disparities over this period. It calls for several comments.

The overall pattern would indicate that the relative disparity between the various regions has diminished during these 20 years: the variation between the upper and lower indices has dropped from 1.99 to 1.12. Thus it can be said that the inter-regional disparities in primary education are less great now they were 20 years ago.

It will be seen that this reduction in disparities occurred primarily between 1954 and 1964 and was most marked between 1961 and 1964 (when the index range dropped from 1.58 to 1.18), i.e. in the four years immediately following independence. Thereafter, one has to acknowledge the fact that the gap has been narrowing at a far slower rate—over the past ten years, the index range has

1. Cf. footnote to Table 5. The statistical data used to plot this figure are contained in the appendix.




FIGURE 2. *Cameroon: regional evolution of selectivity indices, 1954-75.*

decreased only from 1.18 to 1.12. Moreover, it will be noted that the regions with the highest ratios in 1954 (Littoral, Central-Southern and West) were still in the lead in 1975, even though their positions have been reversed, the West now having the highest enrolment level in Cameroon. As far as the regions with low ratios are concerned, it will be seen that, although the overall situation in the North has improved steadily, it is still in last position and its relative handicap is still substantial—in twenty years, the gap between it and the West has shrunk by only 0.04 and the gap between it and West Cameroon, immediately above it, has increased by 0.07.

At the present rate, it will need a lot of time before these disparities are completely eliminated. There are two possible hypotheses in this connection. In fact, if one assumes the same rate of reduction as that for the period 1954-1975—a purely theoretical hypothesis—it would need another thirty years before the disparities disappear. On the other hand, if one takes the rate of reduction of the last ten years—a more realistic hypothesis since the enrolment 'boom' occurred earlier—it would take several generations!

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the relative stabilisation of disparities over the past ten years coincides with a period during which national structures were set up and consolidated and during which processes of socio-economic differentiation were at work at national level. In other words, what is happening at present is that structures are emerging which will reproduce these disparities and make their spontaneous elimination all the more difficult. The Northern region, which accounts for about 28 per cent of the total population, has since 1964 contributed only 14 per cent of the new annual enrolment in primary education and 3.9 per cent of that in secondary education. During this same period the three Central-Southern, Western and Littoral regions, which account for about 46 per cent of the total population, have provided 57.65 per cent of new enrolment in primary education and 83.06 per cent of that in secondary education.

Our next task is to highlight the processes within the educational system which contribute to this situation. These processes are linked to what one might term the differential efficiency of the system or, in other words, to differences in performance.

## C. Regional educational performance

The internal performance of an educational system is measured by three related indicators, the promotion, repeating and drop-out rates. These three indicators vary according to region and educational level. We shall see this in the case of Cameroon.

### *1. Primary education*

The average rates for these performance indicators have been calculated for the different regions in French-speaking Cameroon for the period 1970-1973. The graph representing the repeating rate is given in Figure 3.




FIGURE 3. *Regional repeating rates, primary education, 1970-73.*

By and large, the five regions analysed show a similar profile, i.e. in each case the peaks for repeating occur in the first and last primary grades, and particularly in the last grade, which is when the final examinations and transition into the next cycle occur; the lowest repeating rates occur in the fourth grade (CE2). None the less, it is possible to distinguish two patterns in the level of these rates over the six-year period. These two patterns correspond to the two categories of region already identified, i.e. the regions with high enrolment and those with low enrolment. Those with low enrolment, i.e. the North and East, have the highest repeating rates in every grade. The difference is most marked in CI and CM2. It should also be pointed out that the Littoral region has the lowest and most even curve of all.

The next indicator is the drop-out rate, which is shown in Figure 4. Once again, we find the North and East regions with the highest drop-out rates throughout the cycle. The Coastal region, with its much lower rate, shows the same regular curve as before. The Central-Southern and Western regions however have an irregular curve.

The repeating and drop-out rates combine to give the promotion rate, which is the most important indicator of an educational system's performance. The 'typically ideal' system is one with a 100 per cent promotion rate throughout the cycle. This is far from being the case here, as is obvious from Figure 5. The overall pattern is similar, but there is a more obvious gap between the two categories of region. When these promotion rates are applied to notional cohorts of 1,000 students for a time-span T, we obtain the results shown in Figure 6.[1].

The progress of these different cohorts demonstrates how the gaps between regions widen during the course of primary education. Starting with an equal number of entrants in year 1, the vastly superior performance of the Littoral, Western and Central-Southern regions enables them to keep more than half through to the final year, whereas the North and East keep barely a third. Comparing the two extremes, it will be seen that the Coastal region's performance (653) is twice as high as the East's (330). A closer look at the figures shows that *most of the gaps* (in absolute figures) *occur during the first three years*. By the time the CE2 level has been reached the North and East have already lost more than half of those originally enrolled, whereas the other regions have retained two-thirds of them. In this connection a further point should be made: the drop-outs which occur in the North and East are, in most cases, definitive, including those which occur after the first primary grade. In the other regions, dropping out does not necessarily mean leaving the system entirely, particularly after the first grade. It may simply mean transition from one type of education to another. In the regions in the South-Western part of the country, not only is the family attitude generally hostile to children abandoning school at an early age, but in addition there is a very wide range of alternatives available, which means that a student who drops out from a state school after

1. In calculating these figures we have used the method described by P. Perrot and A. Labrousse in IIEP Occasional Paper No. 24.




FIGURE 4. *Regional drop-out rates, primary education, 1970-73.*




FIGURE 5. *Regional promotion rates, primary education, 1970-73.*




FIGURE 6. *Promotion of notional cohorts of 1,000 in primary education.*

one year, for example, has still the choice between several types of private school. This choice is much more restricted in the North and East, as is evident from the figures in Table 6, which show enrolment in primary education per province in 1972/73 broken down between state and private schools.

TABLE 6. Enrolment in primary education per province in 1972/73 broken down between state and private schools in the Cameroon (percentages)

| Province | State | Private | Private education broken down between: | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Catholic | Protestant | Franco-Arab | Non-denom. |
| Central-Southern | 55.20 | 44.80 | 73.48 | 23.95 | 0.43 | 2.10 |
| East | 77.83 | 22.17 | 59.30 | 39.15 | — | 1.53 |
| Littoral | 43.50 | 56.50 | 52.44 | 31.81 | 0.59 | 15.14 |
| North | 80.50 | 19.50 | 60.46 | 33.92 | 3.61 | — |
| North-West | 24.35 | 75.65 | 43.22 | 56.77 | — | — |
| West | 57.38 | 43.62 | 68.94 | 29.75 | 1.30 | — |
| South-West | 36.25 | 63.75 | 50.01 | 49.99 | — | — |
| Total | 52.90 | 47.10 | 59.97 | 35.99 | 0.63 | 3.40 |

We have so far been reasoning on the basis of an equivalent intake, since the differences in performances are sufficient to illustrate the process of differential growth in enrolment levels. It is important now to take a look first at what happens to these intakes—which of course are not equivalent in every region—and secondly at the performances themselves, so as to get some idea of the real evolution of primary education within the regions.

Let us first of all take the trend for enrolment in the first primary grade. Taking the year 1966/67 as our base (i.e. 100), the rates of growth recorded for 1972/73 were as shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7. Enrolment in first primary grade, 1972/73

| | Central-Southern | North | West | Littoral | East |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New enrolment | 132 | 143 | 126 | 124 | 131 |
| Total enrolment | 110 | 129 | 108 | 112 | 116 |

It will be noted that the North has the highest growth rate both for new enrolment and for total enrolment in the Language Initiation Course. This to some extent explains the spectacular growth in enrolment in the North which has already been mentioned. In view of the performance ratios which we have just been looking at, this also means that the growth rate in the Northern region is nowhere near sufficient to allow it to catch up. In fact, even if this same growth

TABLE 8. Performance ratios at end of first grade, 1966/67 and 1971/72

| Year | Central-Southern | North | West | Littoral | East | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1966-67 | | | | | | |
| promotion | 46.52 | 35.45 | 50.32 | 55.96 | 35.45 | 46.26 |
| drop-out | 10.56 | 23.53 | 8.14 | 7.16 | 21.73 | 12.45 |
| repeating | 42.91 | 41.10 | 41.52 | 36.86 | 42.80 | 41.28 |
| 1971-72 | | | | | | |
| promotion | 48.76 | 40.98 | 52.09 | 56.24 | 35.35 | 48.28 |
| drop-out | 18.03 | 15.47 | 11.03 | 12.25 | 30.16 | 16.09 |
| repeating | 33.14 | 43.54 | 36.86 | 30.96 | 34.47 | 35.59 |

rate were combined with performances equal to those of the Littoral region, this would still not be sufficient to enable it to close the gap in the near future. Moreover, although the performance of the Northern region is improving , so too are those of most of the other regions, as we are about to see.

We will now take a look at the performance figures at the end of the first grade. The figures in Table 8 give the performance ratios at the end of the 1966/67 and 1971/72 school years. From this table it would appear that the system has, on the whole, improved its efficiency or rather, one could say, increased its selectivity: the increase in the promotion rate is accompanied not only by a decline in repeating, but also by an increase in drop-outs! However, the situation is not identical in every region. The three regions with high enrolment show a similar trend, which is identical with the overall trend. The same is not true for the North and East. In the East, drop-outs have increased to such an extent that this has lowered the promotion rate—this is the only case where this occurs throughout the whole of French-speaking Cameroon. The trend in the Northern region is equally unusual: promotions increase, drop-outs decrease, but it is the only region where repeating increases. In other words, the increase in enrolment levels in the North is as much due to an increase in the retention rate as to a real increase in the numbers attending school. The system is therefore improving its efficiency in the North, but is not expanding to the same extent. This paradoxical situation can be explained by the following hypothesis, which we shall be referring to again at a later stage: school attendance amongst certain societies in the North is developing to an extent similar to that for the societies in the South-West zone, whereas others continue to show no progress and these are the more numerous.

*2. Secondary education*

The growing disparities noted in primary education are reproduced and magnified at the secondary level, and this is due not to any difference in the actual performance ratios for secondary education, which are in fact similar in each region, but to one very well defined phenomenon, i.e. the disparities in the transition rates from the primary to the secondary level. The rates for each

region in French-speaking Cameroon for the period 1970-73 were as shown in Table 9.

TABLE 9. Transition from primary to secondary level, 1970-73

| Region | Entrance exam. to 6th grade (%) | Enrolment in 6th grade (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Littoral | 4.75 | 19.83 |
| Central-Southern | 5.79 | 19.69 |
| West | 4.62 | 15.49 |
| East | 4.76 | 12.77 |
| North | 13.38 | 9.66 |
| Total | 5.50 | 17.58 |

The success rate in the entrance examination to the 6th grade varies considerably between regions. In the North it amounts to 13.4 per cent, whereas for the whole of West Cameroon the average is only 5.5 per cent. However, this in no way implies that in the North access to secondary education is broader than in other regions of the country. What counts in fact is not success in the examination but actual enrolment in the 6th grade—and here the differences are enormous. Whereas the success rate for East Cameroon as a whole is 5.5 per cent, the enrolment rate is 17.6 per cent. In other words, in the 6th grade the number of students enrolled is three times the number who pass the examination. What does need underlining is the fact that in the North the situation is completely reversed: of all the regions in Cameroon, it is the only one where the enrolment rate is lower than the success rate, i.e. 9.7 as against 13.4 per cent.

All this tends to show that the entrance examination to the 6th grade does not really constitute a means for controlling access to secondary education, and one wonders on what criteria enrolment in the 6th grade is based since everywhere, except in the North, enrolment is considerably higher than the numbers passing the examination.

As far as enrolment is concerned, it is once again the North and East which rank lowest, and there is still the same dichotomy between the two groups of regions. This dichotomy is much less apparent in secondary education as far as its internal performance is concerned, as is shown in Figure 7.

We have traced the pattern for the two extreme regions as far as the transition rate to secondary education is concerned, i.e. the North and Littoral regions. There is no noticeable difference between the curves for the promotion rates in these two regions, nor do they differ greatly from the average for East Cameroon, and transition from the first to the second cycle causes similar heavy losses. There is however one slight difference, i.e. the performance of the Northern region is better in the first cycle than in the second, whereas the reverse is true for the Littoral region. When these ratios are applied to notional




FIGURE 7. *Promotion rate in secondary education, 1970-73.*

cohorts of 1,000 students enrolling in the 6th grade,[1] the results are as shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10. Promotion rates in secondary level (notional cohorts of 1,000)

| | East Cameroon | North | Littoral |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6th | 1 000 | 1 000 | 1 000 |
| 5th | 862 | 962 | 870 |
| 4th | 782 | 911 | 769 |
| 3rd | 705 | 873 | 713 |
| *BEPC* | *438* | *714* | *418* |
| 2nd | 321 | 403 | 314 |
| 1st | 267 | 300 | 281 |
| Final grade | 224 | 248 | 238 |
| *Baccalauréat* | *118* | *183* | *142* |

The respective performance ratios of the North and Littoral regions enable both of them to push about the same number of students through to the final grade, but one observes that the success rate at the different examinations is incomparably higher in the North. Despite the measures taken by the authorities with regard to the functioning of the system, measures which in this case are aimed at reducing a definite imbalance, no change has resulted in the overall operation of the system. The backward regions are unable to overcome a handicap which—as we have seen—makes itself felt right from the first primary grade, increases as a result of low performance rates up to CM2, and is at its widest at the transition to secondary education.

Thus, after the first chapter, where we described the global processes of both an historical and external kind, our detailed analysis in this second chapter has enables us to trace the evolution of regional educational disparities in Cameroon by focusing on the operational processes within the educational system—processes which tend to sustain these educational disparities. Despite the progress observed in the situation at a local level, the gaps are still very wide, they have been only slightly reduced over the past ten years, and the Northern region's handicap will remain a difficult one to overcome. What is more, it is apparent that the situation is worsening in the Eastern region. The system's highly selective character—as emphasised earlier—operates within the educationally backward regions in a much more drastic fashion than elsewhere, since the North and East continue to record the lowest promotion rates.

1. It should be noted that in the North, the cohorts have never numbered 1000 pupils! (691 in 1972/73, compared with 4328 for the littoral region and 18,635 for the whole of former West Cameroon).

The kind of educational stratification which this produces takes place within primary education—and particularly in the first three grades—which makes any lessening of this gap impossible during the secondary cycle and even more so at the higher-education level. Our analysis however does not end with the highlighting of these processes. The next task is to investigate the relationship which exists between regional disparities and social inequalities. We have already seen that the dynamic of the socio-regional framework is partly based on the heterogeneity of its elements and that the educational area cannot avoid being affected by this. However, before proceeding to this next stage, we shall give a brief outline of the educational disparities in the countries bordering on Cameroon.

## D. Regional educational disparities in Chad and Nigeria

The north-south pattern of regional disparities in Cameroon applies in a similar way to Chad and Nigeria, as will be seen from Map 3.

Despite the different forms of colonisation (i.e. British on the one hand and French on the other) it will be noticed that the enrolment levels in primary education are similar in Cameroon and Nigeria and show the same pattern of becoming lower the further North one goes: more than 150 per thousand in the zones close to the coast and around 50 per thousand in the more remote zones. Chad is, as it were, an extension of the situation in these two countries, i.e. the highest level of enrolment is in the Southern part of the country—equivalent to the levels for the same latitude in the two other countries but lowest of the three—whilst the lowest level of enrolment is in the North. What is more, in all three countries, whatever the level of education, one finds similar processes, with some local variations, perpetuating these disparities.

Like most countries in the Sahel, Chad is underdeveloped in terms of education (48 per thousand in 1974/75). Moreover, performance is very low, as was shown by a study conducted by IEDES in 1967:[1] for every 1,000 pupils enrolling in the first primary grade, less than half (449) move up to the second grade, 312 reach 6th grade, 121 obtain their CEPE and only 64 go on to the secondary level.[2] Lastly, as we have seen, this educational underdevelopment is not uniform throughout the regions and the disparities are diminishing only very slowly. The three zones shown on the map are those mentioned earlier, i.e. North, Centre and South.[3] In 1974/75 the pattern of primary school enrolment was as shown in Table 11.[4]

1. In *Les rendements de l'enseignement du 1er degré en Afrique francophone*, T. III, Analyses nationales, 2ème partie.
2. These performance levels are slightly higher than those for the North and East regions of Cameroon for the same period, but much below the national average for Cameroon (cf. A. Labrousse, op. cit.).
3. The Northern zone comprises the *préfectures* of Ouaddai, Biltine, Batha, Kanem, Lac and B.E.T. (Borkou, Ennedi, Tibesti); the Central zone comprises Chari-Baghirmi, Guera and Salamat; the Southern zone comprises Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjilé, West Logone, East Logone and Central-Chari.
4. Source: *Educational statistics 1974-1975*, Min. of Ed., Rep. of Chad.




MAP 3. *Enrolment levels in primary education: Nigeria (1974/75), Cameroon (1971/72), and Chad (1974/75).*

TABLE 11. Primary school enrolment in Chad, 1974/75

| Region | Population | %I | Enrolment in primary education | %II | Index II/I | Enrolment per thousand population (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North | 1 293 000 | 32.08 | 14 397 | 7.47 | 0.23 (0.17) | 11 (5) |
| Centre | 840 000 | 20.84 | 34 581 | 17.94 | 0.86 (0.67) | 41 (20) |
| South | 1 897 000 | 47.07 | 143 747 | 74.58 | 1.68 (1.84) | 75 (55) |
| Total | 4 030 000 | 100 | 192 735 | 100 | | 48 (30) |

The selectivity indices shown in this table give some idea of the extent of inter-regional disparities. The Northern region in particular is way behind. However, on the basis of the figures in brackets, which correspond to the school year 1960/61, one can see that the situation has improved during these fifteen years and that the more backward regions have caught up somewhat; though, just as in Cameroon, the progress achieved is not sufficient to justify the hope that these gaps can be closed in the near future.

These disparities in primary education are reflected in secondary education, but they follow a different pattern. The figures for state education in 1974/75 are given in Table 12.[1] The North and, in particular, the Centre have a better position than at the primary level, with the Centre even being the one with the highest ratio; however, this is due to special conditions related to the urban pattern. The North owes its position to the town of Abeche (Ouadaï) whose Lycée Franco-Arab alone accounts for 695 students, i.e. 51 per cent of enrolment in the region and 6 per cent of total enrolment. In the Centre, the town of N'djamena alone accounts for 3,275 students, i.e. 87.5 per cent of enrolment in the region and 28 per cent of total enrolment.

TABLE 12. Secondary school enrolment in Chad, 1974/75

| Region | Enrolment in secondary education | %II | II/I |
|---|---|---|---|
| North | 1 362 | 11.04 ( 9.04) | 0.34 |
| Centre | 4 311 | 34.96 (34.30) | 1.67 |
| South | 6 658 | 54.0 (56.65) | 1.14 |
| Total | 12 331 | 100 | |

In fact, a line drawn on a map following more or less the Chari river from the Central African Empire to Lake Chad divides Chad into two educational zones (see Map 4). To the south-west of this line lie the former colonial administrative regions of Mayo-Kebbi (which at the time included the former Fort-Lamy), Logone and Moyen-Chari. This zone comprises about 50 per cent of the population but provides 84.30 per cent of the enrolment in secondary education. The zone north-east of the Chari provides only 15.70 per cent, of which it must be remembered 6 per cent are at Abeche.

As far as Nigeria is concerned, the enrolment level for 1973 was estimated at 78 per thousand,[2] which is higher than the figure for Chad but much lower than that for Cameroon.[3] As has already been said, this average figure conceals

1. This table gives the figures for 'apparent' secondary education, but this differs little from the true level of secondary education.
2. Source: Unesco, *Statistical Tables: Africa*. Dec. 1975, CCR.E.17.
3. According to the above source, the level in 1973 was 164 per 1000 for Cameroon and 51 per 1000 in Chad.




MAP 4. *Chad: limits of north-east and south-west zones.*

TABLE 13. Primary education in Nigeria, 1971

| Region | Population[1] %I | Enrolment in primary education | %II | II/I |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern | 53.6 | 767 895 | 19.7 | 0.36 |
| Eastern | 22.3 | 1 596 989 | 41.0 | 1.83 |
| Western | 23.0 | 1 288 796 | 33.1 | 1.43 |
| Lagos | 1.1 | 240 769 | 6.2 | 5.63 |
| Total | 100 | 3 894 539 | 100 | |

1. These percentage figures are derived from the 1963 census (when Nigeria's population was 55,600,000) and therefore only serve as an indication.
SOURCE *Statistics of Education in Nigeria*, Federal Ministry 1971, Series II. Vol. IV.

regional disparities—in 1971 the regional breakdown for primary education was as shown in Table 13.

As will be seen from the selectivity indices, the Northern region is far behind the West and even further behind the East. The figure for Lagos needs to be considered separately, because this is a region which consists basically of one town, i.e. Lagos, the Federal capital, and which has therefore no rural population.

In contrast to what we have seen happening in the neighbouring countries, the Northern region of Nigeria is developing very rapidly. It has, however, considerable leeway to make up, as may be seen from Table 14, which shows the regional trends over a period of 20 years.

The ten years which followed the grant of self-government (1952) marked the major period of educational expansion within the Federation. During this period the country as a whole progressed at an annual rate of 17.2 per cent. This progress was relatively uniform throughout the regions, with Lagos and the North in the lead. During the next ten years (1962-1971) the pace slowed

TABLE 14. Trends in primary education enrolment, Nigeria, 1952-71

| | Enrolment in primary education | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Region | 1952 | 1962 | % increase 1952-62 | 1971 | % increase 1962-71 |
| Northern | 122 034 | 359 934 | 19.5 | 767 985 | 12.6 |
| Eastern | 518 966 | 1 266 566 | 14.4 | 1 596 989 | 2.9 |
| Western | 400 000 | 1 109 000 | 17.7 | 1 288 796 | 1.8 |
| Lagos | ... | 98 511 | 23.7[1] | 240 769 | 16 |
| Total | 1 041 010 | 2 834 010 | 17.2 | 3 894 539 | 4.15 |

1. 1955-62.
SOURCE *Statistics of Education in Nigeria*, 1963, Series I; Callaway & Musone, 1968.

considerably, particularly in the two Coastal regions where it was slower than population growth. The Northern region, however, maintained a high growth rate (12.6 per cent), which enabled it to begin closing the gap between it and the rest of the country, as the following figures show:

| | | 1952 | 1962 | 1971 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Difference: | Eastern-Northern: | 396,932 | 906,632 | 839,004 |
| Difference: | Western-Northern: | 277,966 | 749,934 | 520,811 |

However, one fact needs to be borne in mind: for the North to reach a level of enrolment equivalent to that of the Southern section of the country, its school population would need to exceed the combined total for the other regions—which would mean a fourfold increase.

Following the traditional pattern, the disparities at the primary level reappear in the secondary—and to an increased extent. The figures for general secondary education in 1971 are given in Table 15.[1]

TABLE 15. Enrolment in general secondary education, Nigeria, 1971

| Region | Population[1] %I | Enrolment in secondary education | %II | II/I |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern | 53.6 | 51 512 | 15.0 | 0.27 |
| Eastern | 22.3 | 92 547 | 26.96 | 1.20 |
| Western | 23.0 | 171 411 | 43.93 | 2.17 |
| Lagos | 1.1 | 27 843 | 8.12 | 7.38 |
| Total | 100 | 343 313 | 100 | |

1. See note to Table 13.
SOURCE As Table 13.

It can be seen that the Northern region lags even further behind at this level than at the primary. Lagos has also increased its lead, but it can be assumed that this is due, to a large extent, to the influx of population into this town, the students from outside the town being more numerous than those from within. It will also be noted that the Eastern and Western regions have changed places, with the West now ahead of the East. Finally, this table is an accurate reflection of the degree of urbanisation within the different regions. However, it shows only the

1. The output from primary education in the different regions is no more uniform than the level of enrolment. Two features however do merit comment: regions with the highest enrolment rates are not always those with the highest output (sometimes quite the reverse is true, as in the West and in the Kano region); secondly, there is no correlation between output from primary education and transition into the secondary level. Cf. Hawes and Aarons, *Curriculum and curriculum development in Nigeria*.

number of students attending the region's schools, without specifying where they come from. The official statistics of the Federal Republic do however provide such information in the case of students in higher education—in 1971/72 the figures were those in Table 16.

TABLE 16. Enrolment in higher education, Nigeria, 1972/72

| Region | Enrolment in higher education | %II | II/I |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northern | 3 347 | 23.72 | 0.44 |
| Eastern | 4 614 | 32.72 | 1.46 |
| Western | 5 750 | 40.76 | 1.77 |
| Lagos | 394 | 2.80 | 2.54 |
| Total | 14 105 | 100 | |

SOURCE As Table 13.

Curiously enough, regional educational disparities in Nigeria are less pronounced in higher education. This is the outcome of a deliberate policy of creating regional university residences. It will, however, be noted that the Northern region is still way behind. Nigeria, like Cameroon and Chad, can be divided into two scholastic regions (or rather university regions, since our figures concern only higher education). If one draws a line dividing the former Western and Lagos regions plus part of the Eastern region (i.e. the present states of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Bendel, Anambra and Imo) from the rest of the country, the zone to the south-west of this line, which includes less than 40 per cent of the total population, provided close on 70 per cent (68.19) of university students in 1971 (see Map 5, overleaf).




MAP 5. *Nigeria: limits of north-east and south-west zones.*

# III. Regional disparities and social inequalities

So far we have managed to draw up an inventory of the regional disparities and identify the processes which to a certain extent explain their creation and their reproduction. We have also seen how these educational disparities form part of global disparities. The task now is to discover the relationship between this regional stratification and the structure of educational disparities within the social structure of the country as a whole. Are these regional inequalities an accurate reflection of the social inequalities of an ethnic, rural *v.* urban or socio-professional kind in terms of education? All the data which we have presented so far are based on statistical averages which can conceal an underlying dissimilarity which concerns not only patterns of behaviour *within* the educational system, but around it and in connection with it. The different dimensions of the intra-regional disparities with regard to education will form the subject of this third chapter.

## A. The rural *v.* urban origin

The first dimension concerns unequal participation in the educational system as a result of one's rural or urban origin. This cleavage is perfectly in keeping with the logic of educational development, which is itself inseparable from the logic of urban development. The school is an institution designed *by* and *for* urban society. It inculcates an urban ideology and leads to employment of an urban kind.

Historically, in Cameroon (and elsewhere) education was developed mainly in the towns and spread down through the different levels of the urban structure to reach rural areas last of all, with secondary education following the same pattern, fed first of all by students living in the towns. What is the situation today? It varies according to the level of education.

It was after the Second World War—following the Brazzaville Conference—that measures were decided with regard to mass primary education in Cameroon, and it was from that time that enrolment increased at a more rapid rate. To what extent has this growth affected rural areas? Y. Marguerat (op. cit.) analysed this situation in detail in 1970. Firstly, he worked

out what percentage of students in a district 'attended school' in the main town(s) and, by subtraction, the numbers in the 'bush'. He then compared this rural *v.* urban distribution of students with the levels of enrolment. He discovered a very clear pattern: 'the regions with the highest overall levels of enrolment are those where enrolment in remote rural areas is also highest' (p. 8), i.e. Central-Southern (Bulu, Ewondo, Bane, Basa, Bafia, and Yambassa country) and West (Bamileke country). By contrast, 'districts with lower enrolment levels are those where the less-advanced rural areas are to be found'. Exceptions to this are the highly urbanised regions such as the Coastal belt, where the towns (e.g. Douala) tend to absorb the rural population, giving a (relatively) low rural enrolment. The reverse is equally true—regions with a low degree of urbanisation and a high proportion of rural population (as for example, the base of the extreme northern triangle of Cameroon) have a proportionately good spread of primary education in the country areas.

Y. Marguerat also calculated the relation between school density and population density per district for the urban centres. The result was the very interesting map reproduced as Map 6, which highlights several features of the rural *v.* urban cleavage: of the 118 urban centres (chief towns), 102 have a school density equal to or higher than their population density. Of these, 10 have an equal density, 31 a higher density (less than twice) and 61 a density twice as high. However, several comments are called for with regard to the nature and distribution of the 26 urban centres with a school density lower than or simply equal to their population density. Firstly, they are for the most part located in zones which are both the most heavily urbanised and with the highest levels of enrolment. Secondly, they are the only ones which can justifiably be termed towns, since they include the country's two major cities and some 15 *préfectures* (regional administrative centres). There are several explanations for these anomalies. The situation in the two major cities is due to the nature of the country's administrative divisions; the city of Douala contains almost all the schoolchildren and almost all the population of the Wouri Department, whilst Yaoundé contains half the schoolchildren and half the population of the Mefou Department. In the case of the other towns—and to a certain extent Yaoundé—the situation is due to the type of rural exodus which they cause; for the most part they attract young adults who, although they have nearly all attended school since they come from rural zones where enrolment is high, inflate the figure for the urban non-school-age population. Thus, these apparent anomalies are not in contradiction with the educational predominance of these towns. This predominance is even more marked in the case of secondary education.

The school 'supply' in terms of secondary education is concentrated in the towns, since almost all the secondary schools are to be found in the *préfectures*. The bulk of the secondary-school population is located in the larger urban centres, namely Douala 10,496, Yaoundé 9,748, Bafoussam 4,094 and Nkongsamba 3,833 out of a national total of 65,352 (figures for the year 1971/72). Thus, four towns account for more than 43 per cent of the secondary-school




MAP 7. Relation between school density and population density per district.

population. Unfortunately, data are not available as to the rural *v.* urban origin of the students. However, there is every reason to believe that town-dwellers are over-represented in secondary education because they are already so in primary education. It should also be pointed out that *lycée* and college students from rural areas will rarely if ever return. A survey carried out in 1969[1] amongst all the third-year students in state schools in East Cameroon does however provide some figures in this connection. Out of the 2,153 students concerned, only 26.30 per cent lived as boarders and 8.50 per cent in rented accommodation. Of the remainder, 38.12 per cent lived with a member of their family (parents, etc.) and 26.21 per cent with a guardian or friend. Thus, 61 per cent of the students were from outside, but almost half of these had a more or less direct link with the town. This family connection is to be found most frequently in the Central-Southern (49.06 per cent) and Coastal (44.18 per cent) regions. More detailed information is in fact available for the North region:[2] in 1969 the population living in urban centres (i.e. *préfectures* and *sous-préfectures*), which account for 10.28 per cent of the total population, provided 28.15 per cent of the children in primary schools and 42.17 per cent of those in secondary schools.

## B. The ethnic origin

The second dimension of the inequalities with regard to schooling is the person's ethnic origin. This is by no means a false problem, since there is an obvious ethnic behaviour pattern with regard to education (particularly, although not exclusively, in the backward regions) which manifests itself in the form of an unequal participation in the educational system on the part of the various ethnic groups. These inequalities, which may be considerable, both overlie and condition the regional inequalities. They are, as we shall see later, partly linked to differences in the degree of integration within urban society.

With the exception of the West, where the Bamileke are predominant, the regions of Cameroon comprise a wide variety of ethnic groups. In our description of these various regions we were able to give only a rough indication of this, but in fact no less than 13 major ethnic groups and almost 180 sub-groups have been identified. Most of these sub-groups have their own vernacular. It is extremely difficult to obtain precise figures as to the level of primary enrolment for all these groups. An approach by department and by district does however provide some clues, since in any one region there are internal disparities which may reflect the presence of a given majority group within one or other administrative unit. (The figures in the following paragraphs are per 1,000 inhabitants.)

1. Unpublished survey carried out by the Department of School and University Guidance of the Ministry of Education in Cameroon.
2. Cf. J.-Y. Martin, *Inégalités régionales et inégalités sociales: l'enseignement secondaire au Cameroun septentrional.*

In the Central-Southern region (average primary enrolment 209) the highest enrolment level (265) is to be found in the Department of Nyong and Kelle, where the population is almost entirely Basa. The lowest enrolment rate is in the Upper Sanaga (154), which comprises various tribes (e.g. Fong, Yebeka, Yesum, Voute). As far as the districts are concerned, the one with the highest enrolment is Obala (296), where the Eton (Beti group) predominate, and the lowest enrolment is in the Yoko district (90), where the Voute predominate.

In the Littoral region (average 189), at one extreme is the district of Pouma (281) with its Basa majority, and at the other, Melong (138), where the Mbo are the most numerous.

In the West (average 214) there is a marked difference between the Bamum Department (190) inhabited by the Bamum and the other five departments, predominantly Bamileke, where the figure varies between 204 and 233.

One can therefore see that marked ethnic variations exist in regions with high enrolment levels. They are even more obvious in the more backward zones such as the North-West province (average 125) where the figures per district range from 180 (Kumbo, where the population is primarily Nso) to 77 (Ndop, where the population is almost entirely Ndop). For the North region (average 58) more detailed information is available; Table 17 shows the enrolment levels for the main ethnic groups.

TABLE 17. Enrolment levels of main ethnic groups

| Ethnic group | Population %I | Enrolment in primary education (%II) | II/I |
|---|---|---|---|
| Highlanders | 24.28 | 8.42 | 0.34 |
| Fulani | 21.99 | 20.05 | 0.91 |
| Massa | 6.25 | 2.68 | 0.42 |
| Toupouri | 5.53 | 7.34 | 1.32 |
| Guiziga | 3.56 | 2.10 | 0.58 |
| Moundang | 2.45 | 5.42 | 2.21 |
| Choa | 3.24 | 0.93 | 0.28 |
| Kotoko | 1.81 | 2.27 | 1.25 |

SOURCE J.-Y. Martin, *Inégalités régionales*, op. cit.

From this table it will be seen that the ratio difference (1.93) between the extremes (Moundang 2.21 and Choa 0.28) is far greater than that which exists between the two regional extremes, i.e. 1.02 (West 1.40, North 0.38—see Table 2). The present enrolment level for the Moundang can, in all probability, be reckoned at between 150 and 200, a level close to that for the Coastal region (189), while that for the Choa and the highlanders is about 25.

For Cameroon as a whole, the inter-ethnic disparities have been most thoroughly catalogued in the case of secondary education. In the case of West

Cameroon, a study by C. and G. Courade[1] shows that there is a direct correlation between the distance of an ethnic group from the coast and its percentage share of secondary education. Thus, the following groups were over-represented (in 1969/70): the Bakweri (selectivity index: 4.94), the Banyang (3.28) and the Bakossi (3.14), all ethnic groups from the South-West province. In contrast, almost all the ethnic groups from the North-West province are under-represented. In the case of French-speaking Cameroon, Y. Marguerat (op. cit.) was able to trace the ethnic origin of candidates for the *baccalauréat*. He related this to the number of inhabitants and mapped the zones with a similar 'output' of candidates (see Map 8). What results from this is an ethnic 'hierarchy' and it is easy to see how this corresponds with the different regions and relates to the distance from the coast:

Zone A (6 candidates on average per 10,000 inh.): Basa (7 candidates for the Basa and Bakoko alone);
Zone B (5): Bamileke;
Zone C (3): Boulou, Ntumu;
Zone D (2): Ewondo, Eton, Bafia; this zone includes the town of Yaoundé where the size of the over-school-age immigrant population lowers the average for the Beti who are therefore underestimated;
Zone E (2): basically the town of Douala, with a large adult immigrant population like Yaoundé. The average for the Douala (in the strict sense) is therefore underestimated and should be equivalent to that for the Basa;
Zone F (1): zone with a predominantly Bamileke immigrant population;
Zone G (1): Sanaga, Yebekolo, Voute, Bafeuk;
Zone H (0.8): Bamoum;
Zone I (0.3): Maka, Kaba, Baya;
Zone J (0.04.): the entire Northern region. This ratio of 0.04 represents 5 candidates (2 Fulanis, 1 Kotoko and 2 of undetermined ethnic origin) for 1,340,000 inh. (in 1969). In fact, the main Northern groups were represented in the following proportions in secondary education for the same year:

| Ethnic group | Enrolment in secondary education | Selectivity index |
|---|---|---|
| Highlanders | 7.96 | 0.32 |
| Fulani | 23.14 | 1.05 |
| Massa | 7.78 | 1.24 |
| Toupouri | 7.96 | 1.43 |
| Guiziga | 2.90 | 0.81 |
| Moundang | 10.29 | 4.20 |
| Choa | 0.18 | 0.05 |
| Kotoko | 1.93 | 1.06 |

1. C. and G. Courade, *L'école au Cameroun anglophone*.




MAP 8. *Cameroon: number of candidates for the baccalauréat per 1,000 inhabitants, 1969.*

It is obvious that in this case it is not the distance from the coast which differentiates the ethnic groups since, for example, the Guiziga (0.81) and the Moundang (4.20) are neighbours, as are the Choa (0.05) and the Kotoko (1.06), the two most northerly groups. There is therefore an ethnic educational pattern in addition to the regional educational pattern.

## C. The socio-professional origin

The third dimension of these educational disparities concerns the socio-professional origin. The socio-professional categories (S.P.C.) are normally the same ones as those used by INSEE in France. Although these categories are somewhat ambiguous, since they refer to types of occupation and a scale of income which are not necessarily equivalent or applicable to the situation, they do give some useful indication with respect to a certain form of socio-professional stratification whose rural *v*. urban connotations are obvious.

Table 18, derived from the survey carried out in 1969-70 (see footnote on p. 78), gives the socio-professional origin of students in the 3rd grade per region. This table calls for several comments. First, it will be seen that in a country which is four-fifths rural (level of urbanisation = 21 per cent) the farming category only accounts overall for 57.48 per cent.[1] If one adds to this the next category (i.e. craftsmen/shopkeepers), which more or less covers the traditional, non-salaried (which does not mean non-monetarised) rural sector, one obtains a figure of 65 per cent. This sector is therefore under-represented. In the other sector, one notes the importance of Categories 5 and 6 (25.89 per cent), i.e. public and private sector employment requiring at least the primary-school leaving certificate. The specifically urban categories are thus clearly over-represented. Secondly, when one looks at the figures region by region, one notes that there are substantial variations which, aside from the degree of representation for any given region, reveal the extent of socio-professional differentiation in relation to the degree of urbanisation.

The somewhat fragmentary data on higher education reveals even more marked disparities. In 1973/74 the socio-professional origin of students in the Arts Faculty at the University of Cameroon (Yaoundé) was as shown in Table 19. This table cannot be directly compared with Table 18, since the categories used are not identical. None the less, the farmer category accounts for only 32.7 per cent here as against 57.48 per cent on the previous table.

1. Looking at this from another viewpoint, one could regard this percentage as very high, although already indicative of a process of under-representation of the rural community. However, this index of the educational system's 'accessibility' is the sign only of a certain stage in its development—where, mathematically, it can be nothing else but accessible—and in no way denotes its nature.

TABLE 18. Socio-professional origin of students in the third grade in state schools in West Cameroon (1970)

| Socio-professional origin | West | | Central-Southern | | Littoral | | East | | North[1] | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| 1. Farmers-stockbreeders-fishermen | 386 | 73.38 | 265 | 47.48 | 216 | 43.63 | 67 | 60.90 | 200 | 69.67 | 1 134 | 57.48 |
| 2. Craftsmen-shopkeepers | 36 | 6.84 | 48 | 8.59 | 47 | 9.48 | 6 | 5.44 | 14 | 4.87 | 151 | 7.53 |
| 3. Notables | 0 | — | 6 | 1.07 | 8 | 1.61 | 1 | 0.90 | 9 | 3.13 | 24 | 121 |
| 4. Skilled/unskilled workers | 21 | 3.99 | 48 | 8.60 | 52 | 10.52 | 8 | 7.27 | 26 | 9.05 | 155 | 7.84 |
| 5. Salaried employees-Govt. workers | 66 | 12.54 | 126 | 22.58 | 108 | 21.81 | 23 | 20.90 | 28 | 9.75 | 351 | 17.76 |
| 6. Senior executives-Politicians | 17 | 3.23 | 65 | 11.64 | 64 | 12.92 | 5 | 4.53 | 10 | 3.47 | 161 | 8.13 |
| Total | 526 | 100 | 558 | 100 | 495 | 100 | 110 | 100 | 287 | 100 | 1 976 | 100 |
| Non-response | 46 | | 49 | | 60 | | 13 | | 10 | | 178 | |
| Total enrolment | 572 | | 607 | | 555 | | 123 | | 297 | | 2 154 | |
| Degree of urbanisation[2] | | 20% | | 22% | | 58% | | 13% | | 10% | | 21% |

1. A survey of students in the 3rd, 5th and final grades in state and private schools in the North gave the following percentages for the same year: 1—71.77%, 2—7.17%, 3—6.21%, 4—6.01%, 5—5.82%, 6—2.69% (J.-Y. Martin, *Inégalités régionales*, op. cit.).
2. I.e. the percentage of the population living in urban centres (mainly *préfectures* and *sous-préfectures*).

TABLE 19. Socio-professional origin of students in the Arts Faculty, University of Cameroon (Yaoundé), 1973/74

| Socio-professional category of parents | Number | % |
|---|---|---|
| Liberal professions, senior executives | 47 | 3.9 |
| Middle executive grades, technicians | 138 | 11.4 |
| Salaried employees | 151 | 12.5 |
| Shopkeepers, craftsmen | 42 | 3.5 |
| Wage-earners | 258 | 21.4 |
| Farmers | 394 | 32.7 |
| Miscellaneous | 176 | 14.6 |
| Total | 1 206 | 100 |

In the final analysis, despite the incompleteness of the data available with regard to the various aspects of the disparities in the educational system, two major tendencies are however clear: firstly, whatever dimension one takes, it is apparent that these disparities become more marked as one moves from one level of education to the next; secondly, the three aspects of these disparities which we have highlighted are not only complementary but, one might even say, consubstantial. One of them in fact—that which concerns the rural *v.* urban origin—provides an explanation for the other two, since they are coupled to it; the ethnic groups best integrated within the towns are those which have forged the strongest links with the education system, particularly at the secondary- and higher-education levels (e.g. the Basa, the Duala, Bamileke and Beti in the south of the country and the Fulani in the north); the specifically urban-oriented socio-professional categories (i.e. those for which a relatively high level of education is essential) are the ones which benefit most from the development of education. We can thus perceive the different elements of an overall process of social differentiation gradually taking shape: urbanisation necessitates and therefore gives rise to education, the school feeds off the town and produces the different strata of urban society, strata which take on a dominant social position *vis-à-vis* the rural community. The educational confusion in rural areas is essential to the survival of these urban strata in their present form. What then is the relation between this process of social differentiation and the regional educational disparities? This becomes fairly apparent through the two extremes of inequality *vis-à-vis* education, i.e. the most fortunate, as we have seen, are those ethnic groups in the South-West which are well entrenched in the towns; the least fortunate are the rural ethnic groups of the north.

It is thus apparent that this inter-regional differentiation, which stratifies the regions, is coupled with an intra-regional differentiation which stratifies the ethnic groups. This second form of differentiation has features which are common to every region, particularly in all that relates to the urban *v.* rural cleavage. The entire national social formation is therefore permeated by a process producing and perpetuating a national bourgeoisie close to the

machinery of government and entrenched in the towns. This is the first conclusion to be drawn.The second is that the socio-regional framework has not disappeared as a result. In the first place, a region's lead or lag in terms of education still remains the decisive factor; secondly, this national bourgeoisie is based on regional substructures; and lastly, the functioning of these intra-regional processes follows a pattern which is independent of the forces at work on a national level. The analysis of attempts to reduce these regional disparities, which will form the subject-matter of the following section, will throw some light on this.

## D. The attempts at reducing regional disparities in education

When the African countries achieved independence or self-government their new leaders were by no means oblivious to the problem of regional disparities. However, this problem was not defined in the same manner in every country, nor therefore was a similar policy adopted to remedy it and lastly, these policies evolved with time. Here again, we shall be concentrating our attention on Cameroon, casting a rapid glance at what was happening in the two neighbouring countries. By analysing the seriousness of the attempts made to remedy this problem and the reasons for their failure, we shall be able to throw further light on the real nature of these disparities.

It is obvious that the situation in Cameroon today is not the same as it was fifteen years ago. Regional conditions have changed, as has the attitude towards them, without however there always being a relation of cause and effect between the two. On the one hand, the machinery of government has succeeded in improving its structures and methods of operation whilst, on the other hand, independent means of action have been created. Furthermore, the global situation has also evolved, not only in terms of internal political relationships but also with respect to the form of Cameroon's economic dependence on the outside world. Lastly, the fundamental ideology and thinking with regard to development have changed, particularly concerning the relationship between economic growth and education. The situation inherited from the colonial period, and especially the coincidence between economic development and educational development, encouraged the belief at one time that one needed only to press the educational button to start the process of economic growth. None the less, attempts were made in Cameroon to reduce regional economic and educational disparities. The best way to assess these is to analyse the content and results of the various five-year plans, positioning them—as far as possible—in the general political context of the period.

In 1960, when it became independent, the new state of Cameroon found itself faced with two major problems: national unity (the Bamileke rebellion was still in the forefront of events) and development *v.* underdevelopment—problems which were directly linked with that of regional disparities. The problem of replacing the Europeans in the various positions of responsibility highlighted

from the outset the difficulty of an equitable distribution of functions on the basis of regional origin, due to the scarcity of European-trained cadres in certain regions—particularly the North. Two of the *leit-motivs* of Cameroonian politics were to become apparent even at this stage, prior to the existence of any real machinery for analysing these problems and taking action: the precedence of politics over economics and its corollary, the regional-ethnic mix. In this situation, educational development found itself facing a four-fold task: firstly, with the whites gone, the new authority needed to gain acceptance; secondly, the construction of a nation state necessitated a vast labour of welding these different elements into one society—to make the country into a genuine national political entity would mean extending education over the entire territory inherited from their colonial predecessors; thirdly, an equitable distribution of educational opportunities was essential in the interest of national harmony; and, fourthly, educational development should precede development *per se*. Moreover, aside from the constraints of an outward-looking economy, what in the last resort determines an investment decision is not its economic profitability but its political profitability measured against the yardstick of national political harmony.

The first Five-Year Plan for economic and social development (1961-1965) was constructed in feverish haste. It was prepared in less than a year by a firm of French consultants and the regional problem was treated as a side-issue.[1] None the less, at a time when everyone was making a fetish of enrolment levels, the educational disparities were so flagrant that measures were recommended for reducing them.[2] But what was contained in this first Plan? Aside from general recommendations concerning the drawing-up of a code for private education, the introduction of an overall plan for education and the winning of popular support for measures taken in the educational area, the following specific objectives were defined:

1. In departments with satisfactory enrolment levels, maintain these at their present level and direct efforts to an improvement in the quality of enrolment (South, Central and Littoral regions).
2. In departments with satisfactory enrolment levels for boys, maintain these at their present level but raise the enrolment level for girls (Central, Littoral, West and East regions).
3. In departments with low enrolment levels such as Bamum and Adamawa, make a special effort to quicken the pace of enrolment within the existing primary education structure.
4. Launch a programme of *mass education* in the five departments in the North where enrolment levels are very low: pop. 1,040,000, with more than two-thirds living in areas with a population density of over 30 inh./km$^2$. The school-age population numbers 229,000 (22 per cent) for an enrolment of

1. Cf. A. Valette, op. cit., p. 48.
2. These measures apply only to the French language system of education.

16,700 (7 per cent). An enrolment level of 66 per cent for boys and 33 per cent for girls would increase the school population by 104,000, which, if the traditional system were maintained, would involve a capital outlay of FCFA 2 billion (2,000 classes × FCFA 1 million) and annual operating costs of FCFA 520 million. In this connection the author of the Plan adds: 'In this case the problem facing Cameroon is identical with the one facing the Republics of Chad and Upper Volta, i.e. the same educational lag, the same lack of financial resources and the same absence of job opportunities'.

5. Include agricultural instruction in first-level schools as rapidly as possible in order to reduce the exodus of youth from country areas to the towns 'where they swell the ranks to the idle and unemployed'.

All these ideas were destined to gain support but, for the time being, in view of the enormous cost involved,[1] the Plan finally adopted was only a watered-down version of this: as a first stage, it was decided to maintain the present 44 per cent level of enrolment in step with population growth; as a second stage, the present level would be increased by 2 per cent in regions where enrolment was inadequate, together with a slight increase in secondary and technical education. Table 20 shows what was achieved by this First Plan. The progress is impressive and growth exceeded forecast, even in the backward regions, but the gap has widened.

TABLE 20. Achievements of the First Plan

| Region | 1959 | | 1965/66 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Enrolment level (%) | Enrolment | Enrolment level (%) | Enrolment |
| North | 10 | 23 754 | 18.5 | 63 581 |
| East | 51 | 22 871 | 67.5 | 42 354 |
| Central-Southern | 78 | 137 533 | 79.4 | 232 665 |
| Littoral | 80 | 51 762 | 75.6 | 116 194[1] |
| West | 63 | 95 063 | 74.2 | 154 670 |
| Total for East Cameroon | 44 | 330 983 | 56.4 | 609 463 |
| Enrolment per 1000 population | | 103 | | 147 |

1. The Department of Nyong and Kelle was transferred from the Littoral to the Central-Southern region and the Department of Mungo from the West to the Littoral region.

1. In 1959 the total operating budget for education in West Cameroon was FCFA 1,699,881,000 (i.e. 14.06% of the total state budget of FCFA 12.85bn.), to which must be added FCFA 10.5 million of capital investment, FCFA 125 million of investment by the French FAC (*Fonds d'aide et de coopération*) and a FAC subsidy of FCFA 145 million to private education, making a grand total of FCFA 2.545 bn., equivalent to 3.2% of GNP in 1959.

The Second Plan (1966-1971) was then put into effect. New aspects of central government policy began to emerge. Regional administrative and supervisory structures were set up—in particular the entire F.I.A. system (Federal Inspectorate of Regional Administration)—but, in true French style, these are only offshoots of the central authority and regional authorities remain very dependent, e.g. deputies and mayors are appointed by the government.[1] These regional bodies (including those in West Cameroon) took part in the preparation of the Second Plan, which resulted in a more equitable distribution of public sector investment but, as will be seen from Table 21, the policy adopted at national level did not take strict account of regional imbalances.

TABLE 21. Second Plan: regional investments (in millions of CFA francs)

| Region | Projects submitted by the regions | | Projects adopted in the Plan | | Per capita average (in francs) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Phase 1 | Phase 2 | Amount | % | |
| North | 20 108 | 20 382 | 17 027 | 16.96 | 11 210 |
| East | 5 683 | 5 627 | 4 501 | 4.48 | 16.550 |
| Central-Southern | 14 480 | 12 774 | 20 263 | 20.18 | 16 400 |
| Littoral | 19 665 | 24 849 | 29 034 | 28.92 | 40 000 |
| West | 10 391 | 12 404 | 11 173 | 11.13 | 14 000 |
| W. Cam. | 21 043 | (21 043) | 18 373 | 18.30 | 16 240 |
| Total | 91 370 | 97 079 | 100 371 | 100 | |

SOURCE A. Valette, op. cit., p. 69.

The authors of the Plan in fact explained the reasons for this: 'Emphasis will be placed on developing the internal economy of the country and inter-regional trade ... but the priority objective of a rapid increase in domestic production so as to ensure greater economic independence will only be achieved if the nation devotes a sufficient proportion of its resources to *productive investment*, in particular by concentrating these available resources in the first instance in those zones and sectors with the greatest potential for development. By the same token, one has to reconcile the need to improve conditions in the backward regions with the rate of progress of the country as a whole. Since resources are limited, they must be allocated carefully so as to obtain the maximum economic return compatible with a reasonable improvement in the different areas of the country. The policy of inter-regional balance will therefore need to be assessed in terms of *equivalent return* on investment as well as in terms of the individual efforts made by persons and groups in each region.'

1. Cf. J.L. Morinière, op. cit., p. 202.

By adopting a policy of this nature, the Republic of Cameroon was following the path traced by its colonial predecessors: efforts were concentrated on the growth areas, i.e. the most highly developed regions, just as the French had done following the example of the Germans.

However, the Second Plan did concentrate more on regional disparities with regard to education, as Table 22 shows.

Under the cover of an overall policy objective which defined the role of education as that of developing the individual and preparing him to take his place as a member of society and for the tasks of economic and social progress, the Second Plan, in the chapter devoted to education, defines the overall objectives as follows:

— adapt education and training to the needs of the economy (for the first time, the term 'ruralised' education is used);
— integrate general education and vocational education;
— apply a policy of quality rather than quantity;
— strengthen the links between state and private education;
— develop bilingual instruction at the secondary- and higher-education levels.

Specific objectives were formulated for primary education:

— gradually eliminate over-age students, i.e. those over 13;
— restrict enrolment to children of school age, i.e. between the ages of 6 and 13—in other words, 8 years for a period of 6 years' education, thus allowing two repeat grades;
— maintain present enrolment levels[1] in the Central-Southern and Coastal regions. Those in the East and West are to be raised to 80 per cent, enrolment in the North will be increased from 19 to 27 per cent, and to 70 per cent in West Cameroon.

By the end of the Second Plan's fifth year (1971/72) the educational situation in the regions had evolved as shown in Table 23. If we base our analysis on these figures, as did the authors of the Plan, it is obvious that the Second Plan has not achieved its objectives with regard to primary education (these regional trends were reviewed in detail in the second chapter): on the one hand, the pace of development in regions with high enrolment levels has not been curbed and, on the other hand, despite some progress, targets have not been achieved in the more backward regions of North and West Cameroon.

1. In fact, the Second Plan refers to the following figures for the year 1964/65: Central-Southern: 92%; Coastal: 80%; West: 77%; East: 69%; North: 19%; W. Cam.: 44.5%. These figures represent solely the number of pupils aged 6-13 as a percentage of the total number of school-age children in that age group—this total figure per region has been estimated.

TABLE 22. Second Plan: education-training: regional allocation of investment (millions of CFA francs)

| Sub-sector | North | East | Central-Southern | Littoral | West | West Cameroon | Not allocated | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary | 625 | 302 | 765 | 248 | 490 | 518 | 400 | 3 348 |
| Secondary | 117 | 35 | 210 | 240 | 365 | 532 | 410 | 1 909 |
| Technical | 304 | 164 | 192 | 154 | 116 | 330 | 40 | 1 300 |
| Higher | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1 411 | 1 411 |
| Vocational | 340 | 98 | 369 | 152 | 205 | 690 | 100 | 1 954 |
| Youth Activities, Sport, Pop. Ed. | 21 | 20 | 207 | 156 | 21 | 30 | 15 | 470 |
| Total | 1 407 | 619 | 1 743 | 950 | 1 197 | 2 100 | 2 376 | 10 392[1] |
| Percentage | 17.55 | 7.72 | 21.74 | 11.85 | 14.93 | 26.19 | | |

1. This figure represents about 9 per cent of the total capital investment in the Second Plan.

TABLE 23. Primary school enrolment rates, 1965/66 and 1971/72

| Region | 1965/66 | 1971/72 |
|---|---|---|
| North | 18.5 | 23.2 |
| East | 67.5 | 81.9 |
| Central-Southern | 79.4 | 94.5 |
| Littoral | 75.6 | 89.1 |
| West | 74.2 | 79.3 |
| East Cameroon | 56.4 | 74.0 |
| West Cameroon | 55.9 | 60.3 |

SOURCE *Primary school statistics 1971-72*, Min. of Ed., Un. Rep. of Cameroon.

By the time the stage had been reached for preparing and putting into operation the Third Plan (1971-1976), i.e. some ten years after independence, several other aspects in the national situation had become more apparent. First of all, the machinery of state, after ten years' experience of government, had refined and extended its means of intervention in the political, economic and social areas[1] to the extent where theoretically it was now able to enforce specific policies, particularly with regard to reducing disparities. However, at the same time, the application of such policies was proving increasingly difficult. With regard to finance, the enormous increase in the school population was resulting in increasingly heavy operating costs. A study covering the period 1964-70[2] revealed the following facts:

— public expenditure on education had grown at an increasingly rapid rate;
— there was a growing imbalance between expenditure on salaries and expenditure on equipment;
— expenditure on education had increased faster than total national expenditure;
— education accounted for a large part of total national expenditure (20 per cent).

This increase in expenditure on education has been paralleled by an increase in the cost of public administration as a whole which, being downstream of the educational system, is in one sense the product of it. Since the country's own resources are limited it has to resort to outside governmental aid, which increases not only the cost but also the country's dependence. Such dependence is even greater when such foreign aid is supplied by private sources which are not concerned with political criteria—with the result that Cameroon is no longer

1. Technical Ministries (e.g. Plan, Industrial and Commercial Development, Agriculture), five-year planning, separate budget for infrastructures, state-owned companies and mixed-economy enterprises, improvement and development offices etc. Cf. J. Morinière, p. 196.
2. A. Labrousse, *Les dépenses publiques d'enseignement et de formation.*

master of its own economic policy.[1] This dependence on the outside world is also reflected in the fact that close on 60 per cent of the country's revenue is derived from export. What is more, wages and salaries in the public sector absorb 50 per cent of the operating budget and are increasing at a rate of 10 per cent per year. In these circumstances, is it realistic to think in terms of restructuring the economy in favour of the rural areas and under-developed regions?

Furthermore, as far as 'incentives' are concerned, the results of the Second Plan showed that it was not possible to control the spontaneous trends within the educational system, i.e. it proved impossible either to curb educational demand where it was considered excessive or stimulate it where it was lacking. These spontaneous trends are evident primarily in the area of private education which, by definition, is outside public control. Wherever demand is strong, private education—particularly the non-denominational variety—automatically makes up for a cut-back in the state supply. The state *v.* private breakdown for primary education has already been given (Table 6). The breakdown for secondary education is even more illuminating and significant (Table 24).

TABLE 24. Enrolment in general secondary education per province in 1972/73 broken down between state and private schools (in percentages)

| Province | State | Private | Private education broken down between | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Catholic | Protestant | Non-denom.[1] |
| Central-Southern | 36.73 | 63.27 | 40.80 | 17.20 | 42 (26.56) |
| East | 56.92 | 43.08 | 73.83 | 26.17 | — |
| Littoral | 36.90 | 63.10 | 37.36 | 14.71 | 47.93 (30.23) |
| North | 78.35 | 21.65 | 60.85 | 39.15 | — |
| North-West | 13.70 | 86.30 | 60.72 | 39.28 | — |
| West | 32.91 | 67.09 | 28.06 | 13.08 | 58.86 (39.47) |
| South-West | 19.83 | 80.17 | 30.23 | 42.85 | 26.92 (21.56) |
| Total | 36.67 | 63.33 | 38.84 | 19.28 | 41.88 (26.51) |

1. The figures in brackets show enrolment in private non-denominational schools as a percentage of the total secondary school population in the region.

This table clearly indicates those regions where there is strong pressure on secondary education (i.e. the Littoral regions plus the Central-Southern and above all the West) and those regions where such pressure is much less apparent—this pressure being indicated by the importance of private non-denominational education.

This then was the context in which the Third Plan was brought into operation. Regionalisation was more marked than in the previous two, in so far as the process of preparing and carrying out certain projects was decentralised and

1. Cf. P. Hugon, *Analyse du sous-développement en Afrique noire: l'économie du Cameroun.*

provisional budget limits were set for each province. However, the reduction of regional disparities no longer figures as a specific objective. The planners were counting on an economic 'take-off' (their term) as the result of an improved utilisation of available human and material resources, but with no attempt to change their regional distribution. What this to a certain extent implied therefore was tacit acceptance of the *regional division of labour and resources* in the form in which this had gradually emerged. The government was of course anxious to tackle some of its regional problems, but in the major projects in this area and on which development studies and resources were concentrated, the regions as we know them no longer appear. The four major projects deal in terms of 'zones', i.e. the Littoral zone with Douala; the forest zone in the East; the territories along the path of the Trans-Cameroon railway (currently semi-desert areas) and, lastly, in the North, the Upper Benoue valley where a dam is planned at Lagdo. What is more, 'regional development organisations', with their headquarters in Yaoundé, have been put in charge of these development programmes.

The Third Plan's objectives with regard to education echo the overall objectives: 'Education and training will be expected to make an effective contribution to this "take-off" '. Several guidelines have been laid down by the central authority in the interests of 'adapting the educational system to national needs':

> 'The task of education is to train the middle and senior executive personnel needed by the economy.
>
> Above all, education must direct its efforts to training a dynamic and progressively-minded labour force. For this reason emphasis must be put on:
>
> — the ruralisation of primary education,
> — post-primary vocational training and elementary, middle and higher technical education...
> — the training of qualified teachers and instructors'.[1]

Where primary education is concerned, the Third Plan takes as its basic assumption a *spontaneous growth in enrolment*[2] and basically provides for two things:

— the training of a sufficient number of qualified teachers (at present less than 15 per cent);
— a reform of curricula and teaching methods, i.e. emphasis will be put on adapting the educational system to the country's real needs and on the study of the geographic, social and economic environment.

Although the underlying principle of this reform is excellent, it has tended to create a situation in which the education dispensed by the primary school is geared essentially to the child's own environment. Since Cameroon is 80 per cent rural, this reform has been termed the 'ruralisation of education'. However, nothing has as yet been finalised in this respect and so far nothing has been

1. Extract from Presidential Memorandum No. 2/CAB/PR dated 15 April 1970.
2. Its figures are based on projected trends.

planned with regard to the provision of 'bridges' linking up the different environments and, in particular, to ensure that the town does not become the sole preserve of the town-dwellers, since the explicit objective of this reform was to reduce the rural exodus by encouraging children in rural areas to stay on the land. It would seem however that after a spectacular start this experiment has gradually ground to a halt in favour of a return to traditional forms of education. Over the course of time several major snags became apparent: the cost of applying it to the entire country and to all the primary grades would have been far greater than the cost of continuing to use the already proved methods; the second and most important reason was that, at this particular stage in the development of the national social formation, where the process of welding this into a nation depended primarily on action by the state, this reform would in fact have proved contrary to this fundamental goal of national unity.

Where secondary education is concerned, the Third Plan devotes its attention, amongst other things, to the heavy concentration of students in the south of the country and states its intention to 'support efforts to increase enrolment in the least favoured regions'. In order to give impetus to this attempt to achieve a balanced regional structure, the plan is to set up a general secondary school (G.S.S.) in at least every chief departmental town throughout the country. In the North, for example, six new G.S.S. (compared with four at present) and two new *lycées* (compared with one at present) will be built. In the meantime, as in the past, various methods have been adopted to facilitate the promotion of a maximum number of cadres from the North, despite the educational lag, e.g. the relaxing of age criteria for entry into the 6th grade, scholarships for higher education, relaxation of the conditions governing the award of a degree and the introduction of quotas for entry to the *Grandes Ecoles* (colleges of university level).

Cameroon does therefore have a policy for reducing regional disparities in education. It can in fact claim to have achieved some success, in particular with regard to the start of a genuine process of school enrolment in the North. One has, however, to admit that the overall situation has changed very little. This policy has in fact run into difficulties of two kinds.

The first is due to the functioning of the education system *per se* and its penetration within each region: on the one hand, the existence of a supply does not automatically create a demand in regions with low enrolment levels where it is affected by various other factors, whereas in other regions the demand creates the supply; on the other hand, even in those cases where demand and supply in regions with low enrolment levels coincide and result in a certain degree of improvement, this still occurs at a slower rate than in those regions where the system is firmly installed.

The second kind of difficulty is the result of economic and financial constraints. The economic development of backward regions is an essential pre-requisite to their educational development and this economic progress is handicapped by the meagre resources of such regions, the slenderness of the country's means and the harsh logic of immediate profitability.

In the two countries bordering on Cameroon, although the situation is different, the problem is similar. In Chad the reduction of the regional disparities in education was, from the time of independence, considered as one of the ways to strengthen national unity. Recent history has shown that this has become not only increasingly vital, but also increasingly difficult. In Nigeria the whole political scene since independence has been dominated by the question of national unity, the balance between the different regions and the division of federal power. As the result of drastic military and political action, the existence of substantial oil deposits (45.1 per cent of GNP in 1975) and a system of educational planning as part of development planning (a system which allows a certain degree of regional freedom with respect to school curricula), Nigeria's Federal Government now has the means to implement a policy aimed at reducing regional disparities in education.

# Conclusions: regional disparities in education and their reproduction

This analysis of regional educational disparities in Cameroon has enabled us to highlight a certain number of features relating to their origin and their nature. First of all, we observed that their origin was related to the type of interaction which took place between colonisers and native social groups, within a socio-regional framework. Secondly, we saw how, as a result of internal processes, these disparities were more marked the higher one went up the educational ladder and that, generally speaking, there was a tendency for these educational disparities to persist. Lastly, we saw how the intra-regional differences bore the imprint of the rural *v.* urban division and that the national pattern of educational inequalities coincided on the whole with socio-economic inequalities. In addition to the case of Cameroon, the examples of Chad and Nigeria have enabled us to point up the relationships between education and the development of a trading economy, an urban life style and system of values (in other words, all that constitutes a rupture with a subsistence economy and traditional ideology). This has also enabled us to underline the political importance of regional imbalances in education. Our analysis of the attempts to reduce these disparities has shown that the educational development of backward regions had not really hindered the reproduction of inter-regional differences. Our present task is to seek some explanation for the persistence and current accentuation of such disparities. To do this, we have to distinguish between factors operating at various levels.

*1. International relationships of domination*

It would appear that the same type of relationship exists between backward and advanced regions as between developing and developed countries, in the sense that the latter exercise a similar form of domination and exploitation over the former. From the macro-economic viewpoint, the elimination of inter-regional or international disparities encounters the same type of obstacles. We have no intention here of embarking upon an analysis of such obstacles, which stem from an established imbalance. One simply needs to point out the fact that the nature of a country's integration within the international economic order conditions its internal development. An economy geared to the outside world cannot provide the conditions necessary to a balanced internal development. The priority given

to supplying agricultural products for export markets and the difficulties involved in financing industrialisation implies siphoning off the wealth of the regions in the interior and according a particular form of development to the Coastal areas, which cannot help but accentuate regional imbalances. However, 'to attempt to reduce these disparities by means of a policy of redressment may well endanger the development of the growth centres and conflict with the fundamental decision in favour of a maximum overall growth rate'.[1] The problem therefore centres around the fundamental choice of a development policy. The relationships of domination at an international level are such that the subject countries have little or no choice as to whether their economy should be geared to the outside world or not. To enable such countries to exercise some form of choice regarding the nature of their own development would necessitate a restructuring of international economic relationships.

However, the relationships within a given country are not all conditioned by its relationships with other countries. The development/under-development dialectic operates between nations. It explains why countries which are subject to the domination of others do not exercise control over their economic policy and find themselves dropping even further behind. This dialectic also operates between the regions within a country but, although the international dialectic has a definite influence on the inter-regional dialectic, it does not explain everything, as some writers would have us believe. It is obvious that there is a functional linkage between developed and under-developed regions: the advanced regions drain off the backward regions' human and material resources, with the result that the gap between them widens, just as it had done during the colonial period. However, these countries have gained their political independence and cannot be reduced to mere cogs in the machinery of international capitalism; some even possess vast oil deposits, and simple macro-economic linkages do not suffice to explain all of the different regional situations. Since independence another factor has begun to operate, particularly in the area of education, and this is the internal dynamic of the national social formations; and here the influence shaping this is the nation state. This is the second factor at work.

*2. The social structure of a nation and its education system*

Regional disparities in education persist because the conditions which produce them not only still exist but have become so firmly ingrained that they now form part of the social structure. The countries continue to be the victims of a colonial-style exploitation and siphoning-off of their resources, but today this employs the nation states as its intermediary whilst they pursue their own policy objectives with regard to the country's social structure.

The elements which make up the national social formations have emerged as part of an historical process, in particular during the colonial period. It was the

1. J.L. Lierdeman, in *Disparités régionales et régionalisation dans une économie dominée de faible dimension: analyse de l'expérience ivoirienne*, p. 101.

colonial powers which carved out the countries. It was their multi-faceted and phased action which produced changes of different kinds and varying degrees within the social groups they encountered. By multiplying the means of communication and the number of towns, by exercising a certain ideological influence via the schools and missions, and by introducing a particular form of administrative organisation, they helped disrupt the traditional system of cultural, legal and political relationships between the traditional groups and began the process of broader contact and intercourse between the ethnic groups. By setting up the basis of a trading economy and by introducing money, they stretched traditional links, undermined group solidarity, individualised relationships, freed labour from the family patterns of subsistence and gradually transformed it into a commodity. With the help of the school and the new administrative and economic structures, individuals were promoted and given positions of privileged intermediaries. In other words, colonisation created a new socio-economic structure within which the various socio-regional groups no longer had the same status; even as early as the pre-colonial period, ethnic groups were beginning to assume a rank based on their relationship with the coast and the European traders. As a result of all these changes, the former master/subject relationships underwent various changes. Some were replaced by new relationships, others were inverted whilst some reappeared but in another form.

But, for all these elements to form a truly structured entity, what was lacking was an ideological framework; and it is essentially in this connection that independence has produced the greatest changes. The role of the former colonial powers has now been taken over by a machinery of government which has taken on the task of building a global society in the shape of a nation within the geographical boundaries inherited from colonial partitions. All these social groups throughout the land are now, or are in the process of becoming, linked together within a single political society and it is now possible to speak in terms of national social formations. These national social formations are made up of social structures whose age and nature differ but which are integrated as the result of a deliberate policy on the part of the state. The state, which organises the national territory by co-ordinating the various regions and which acts as the initiator of development strategies, the inspiration behind institutions set up to serve as models and standards, and the guardian of ideological systems, is in advance of economic and social conditions. It directs society to the extent that, viewed from the outside, there appears to be confusion between the state and society as a whole: as far as political structures and ideological functions are concerned, it acts as the global society which is still in embryo. The machinery of state is permeated by a national bourgeoisie, the only social class created and which derives from a mixed middle stratum—made up both of officials and holders of traditional authority—to control, via the various regional echelons, the rural populations themselves strongly marked by regional and ethnic differences. The ruling class is aware that these rural populations are being bled, but its prime concern is with political and economic matters.

The process of structuring these national social formations is carried a stage further by the uneven penetration of a market economy and the spread of new knowledge within the framework of the ideology of development and national construction. The consolidation of regional disparities, above and beyond the specific results of colonial penetration, is the outcome of a gradual introduction of a regional division of labour, a differentiation of socio-economic functions and an unequal relationship with the central authority. The national bourgeoisie reproduces itself in reproducing the entire social pyramid of which it forms the summit.

The school system plays a major role in the maintenance of the state's power through its twin function of shaping ideology and selecting an élite. With regard to shaping ideology, the major themes are the authority of the state and its justification, development and national pride. The most obvious result of the educational procedures employed at the primary level is the freeing of children from the ideological influences of their environment and making them more receptive to the political doctrines put out by the new state authority.[1] From the establishment's point of view therefore it is important to put the maximum number of children through school, even if the majority leave without a certificate. This brings us to the élitist function: the high wastage rate, which we mentioned in connection with primary education in Cameroon, can be interpreted as one of the elements in a process of hyper-selection. The school system makes a rigorous selection of the future members of the national bourgeoisie from amongst the mass of those enrolled and by so doing helps to perpetuate it. The graduate hierarchy can be considered as the matrix for the bureaucratic hierarchy.

The pyramid shown in Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of the system of education in Cameroon since independence, whilst at the same time reflecting the evolution of the national social formation. In 1962/63, i.e. shortly after independence, the enrolment rate in French-speaking Cameroon was 128 per thousand (for all levels of education combined) and the school population was distributed as follows: for every 1000 pupils, 963 were in the primary level, 33 in the first cycle of the secondary level and 3 in the second cycle. Ten years later (1972/73), when the enrolment level had risen to 175 per thousand, one notes that the system has basically changed very little, with the school population being distributed in a similar manner: for every 1000 pupils, 922 are now in the primary level, 65 in the first cycle of the secondary level and 12 in the second cycle. This thus highlights the maintenance of a very broad base (i.e. the first primary grade), a similar pattern of wastage within the primary level and a substantial shrinkage on transition from the primary to the secondary level. There are however changes which are indicative of pressures brought to bear on the system by social groups, e.g. the growth in the numbers in the final primary grade, indicating an increase in the demand for certification and admission into the subsequent level; and the relatively larger proportion of pupils in the

1. Cf. J.-Y. Martin, *Appareil scolaire et reproduction des milieux ruraux.*




FIGURE 8. *Cameroon: evolution of the French-language system of education.*

secondary level. This last fact can be attributed to the rivalry between the various groups within society as a whole rather than to a genuine widening of the system,[1] particularly when one knows that the development of secondary education has above all benefited the already privileged social classes. This development of secondary education is also known to be due partly to the growth in private, non-denominational education, the main impetus for which came from the groups in the South-Western zone.

The relationships of domination therefore operate as a global influence and the school system acts as part of this. However, we have noticed different features which demonstrate that the establishment is unable to exercise complete control over the educational system, where independent trends have been known to occur, thus revealing the existence of different strategies within the national social formation. This is the third factor at work.

*3. Social strategies and educational inequalities*

The way in which the structuring of a national social formation occurs is for there to be a progressive transition from a multi-ethnic aggregate to a global society within which social classes begin to emerge. The cornerstone of this global society is the state bourgeoisie, which reproduces itself as such in its regional-urban distribution. All the ethnic groups are not represented to an equal degree in this state bourgeoisie, since they were not subjected to an equal extent to the 'colonial influence'. There has been a revival of the pre-colonial movements but these now operate—from an unequal social position—within the context of struggles about and for power and for that which gives access to it: knowledge, wealth and backing. The social groups formulate individual strategies, in accordance with their different socio-historical status, and these provide the basis for their attitude towards education.

It could therefore be said that a group's attitude toward education is the result of its overall strategies. It forms part of a politico-economic logic which in turn depends on the historical orientation of the group's reproduction. The explanation of this orientation should be sought not solely within the group itself but also, and above all, in the system of regional social relationships. It is apparent that the so-called 'backward' regions are the ones where these strategies are dominated by the influences of the pre-colonial past. In Cameroon, for example, structures of an ethnic nature are more pronounced in the North than in the South, where several centuries of change have gradually produced a class structure which cuts across all the ethnic groups. It could be said that, in the North, there tends to be direct transition between ethnic group and social class in so far as the pre-colonial ethnic hierarchy in fact decides the class hierarchy within the social stratification of the nation as a whole, with the former relationships of domination and exploitation thereby reappearing against a new background. In the context of a centralised state and an increasingly

1. Despite the cadres' desire for Africanization.

monetarised trading economy, where labour tends to be regarded as a commodity, the dominant ethnic group now plays the role of the dominant social class. The paradox is that this 'class' hierarchy is maintained by processes of 'ethnic' reproduction. Some ethnic groups in the North have integrated education within their process of survival, whilst others have not. This provides the explanation for the phenomenon described earlier (p. 63): the increase in the retention rate at the end of the first grade demonstrates that the educational system has improved its efficiency, but the societies which have benefited are those which have accepted education (the Moundang in particular, the Toupouri and the urban elements within the Moslem groups); there has not been an even growth in the system because those tribes which were hesitant with regard to education still lag behind (the highland tribes in particular and the rural elements within the Moslem groups). This backwardness, however, needs some explanation: although originally the hostility of these highland tribes towards education (and indeed towards every single measure introduced by the colonial powers—which was to mean that the position they would occupy in the post-colonial social hierarchy would be both marginal and inferior) was their own decision, it is obvious that today they are no longer being encouraged to educate their children—and for this there are several reasons. If the level of school enrolment amongst these groups were on a par with that for the Moundang, for example, this would disrupt the present balance within the region. What is more, in the context of the present development policy, favouring an aggregate level of progress and based on the exploitation of available resources and a certain division of labour, these highlanders as such constitute both a tourist attraction and a reserve of manpower. And this is the point where the various factors we have described come together: the overall strategies of a trading economy, carried on in those of the nation state, combine with the social strategies of the regional groups to perpetuate educational inequalities.

These facts lead us to an important conclusion: there is no such thing as an ethnic group achieving a greater measure of success than others in the educational system by virtue of some kind of superior gift, affinity or cultural heritage. To assert the opposite would amount to an acceptance of racist ideology. There are groups which have, and those which have not, integrated education within their process of survival and history; nature and regional social relationships have not provided them with equal resources with which to sustain these strategies or change them if need be.

*4. Educational supply and demand*

The foregoing analysis of the three factors determining educational disparities, i.e. international relationships, the national-state context and social strategies, has shown us that these factors can be at one and the same time complementary and contradictory. In other words, they can also be regarded as independent factors. If we pursue the analysis further in this direction we shall be better able to understand the place and role of educational supply and demand and, on a

more general level, the true functions of the educational system and the position of education in relation to politics and economics.

In our introduction we stressed that the fundamental nature of education—whilst reflecting the major thrust of society as a whole—was political and ideological since its prime function in any society is 'socialisation', i.e. social and political integration through the operation of processes of ideological acceptance. Thus, in industrialised countries, where one can consider the main impulsion to be economic, the educational system serves as a means for justifying the economic system and all the social relationships which this creates, including political relationships and the role of the state. These industrialised or 'developed' countries, as they are termed, are the dominant force in world economic relations. In particular, they dominate the economies of the so-called 'under-developed' countries, whose main feature is their dependence on the outside world. However, for this external dependence to persist, it is not necessary that the internal economic relationships within these dominated countries should be similar to those in the dominant countries. Thus, in the dominated countries of tropical Africa, the existence of capitalist economic relationships is not essential to the process of capitalist domination. It is enough if these countries keep their alloted place in the system of international trade. However, for this, certain political and ideological conditions have to be fulfilled and it is at this stage in the process that the state intervenes.

In the first instance it was the colonial state which provided the political framework for an exploitation which took many forms and only much later concerned itself with the need for some kind of justification. Today, the political and ideological conditions for capitalist exploitation are provided by the nation states. Thus, in the so-called under-developed countries, the main impulsion is political and ideological and the function of the educational system in these countries is to justify the political system. The ideology produced by the school is designed to sanction the authority of the state. Although these nation states are currently relays for economic imperialism, they none the less pursue their own objectives which, sooner or later, will become the origin of conflicts between dominant and dominated countries. The schools in these countries produce not only a national bourgeoisie and 'citizens' but also a nationalist bourgeoisie which will be able to maintain its position *vis-à-vis* the 'citizens' only by launching a genuine anti-imperialist drive. All this is inherent in the logic of educational development. To say, as H. Levin does,[1] that in developing countries 'the aim of expansion in the educational area is to keep the labour market ticking over so that the cost of labour is kept low and so that workers can be exploited because of the lack of choice', stems from what is both an economic and mechanistic interpretation of the workings of society. If such were really the aim of educational expansion, there would be no reason for it to slow down. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that tropical African countries are no longer encouraging such expansion. We have already seen that in

1. In *The limits of educational planning*, p. 30.

Cameroon the Third Plan, as far as primary education was concerned, provides for nothing more than a spontaneous growth in enrolment. This means in fact that there is no deliberate attempt to extend education to sectors where enrolment is non-existent or to increase it where it is insufficient. There are at least two reasons for this: firstly, the cost of education is becoming excessive and secondly, since the school does not have the monopoly for the production of ideology, the same functions can be performed by all the political and technological structures, as well as by the radio.

Of course, by disseminating new knowledge, the school plays an important role *vis-à-vis* the job market. One might even say that the roles have been reversed to the extent that, in a certain number of African countries, it became a political necessity to create jobs of an administrative kind in order to absorb part of the output from the school system. However, what has to be emphasised most of all is the fact that formal education is now an indispensable qualification for any position of authority whatsoever. The school is thus the means of integration within the new social structures and this explains why it is becoming increasingly the focus of social rivalry with regard to access to these structures and why intra-regional inequalities are beginning to assume greater political importance than inter-regional inequalities. This is the background against which the concepts of educational supply and demand have to be viewed.

From the analysis we have made in terms of social construction and levels of autonomy it follows that the demand for education should be viewed as a global social strategy within a system of multi-dimensional relationships. This strategy, whether it leads to an acceptance or to a rejection of education, operates in fact at the meeting-point between pre-colonial stimuli, colonial influences and present opportunities. The same is true for the supply, which is *governed* by the dominant groups within the state apparatus. Supply is a social command. Social strategies and mass trends (e.g. demographic, economic and financial) may combine to give a reciprocal boost to supply and demand. In Cameroon this is what is happening in the case of the tribes in the South-West zone, and in particular the Bamileke, where there is such social pressure behind the demand that it automatically creates the supply. We have already seen (p. 92) the importance of private non-denominational education in the various regions. In the zones integrated within the market economy, the populations themselves are beginning to take over the role of the public authorities in financing education. Such spontaneous developments are an indication of the problems confronting any policy aimed at reducing disparities. By contrast, social strategies and mass trends (e.g. demographic and political) can also combine to produce a refusal-rejection dialectic. This is the case of the Highland tribes in the North (cf. p. 102). Between 1962 and 1967 a vast effort was made to increase the level of education in the North. This effort was successful amongst the non-Moslem tribes living in the plain along the Chad border (the Moundang, Toupouri etc.) where education has genuinely been accepted as part of social life. It was a conspicuous failure amongst the Highlanders, whose resistance was unshaken.[1]

1. They regard education as a threat to their economic and social survival.

The only real increase in enrolment levels was in small urban centres, and some schools which had been opened with the aid of the military had finally to be closed. Government pressure has now been relaxed: between 1962 and 1967 in the Margui-Wandala Department, which contains all the mountain tribes, the number of schools rose from 44 to 90; between 1967 and 1974 it rose only from 90 to 94. In 1972 the enrolment rate for this Department was 35.50 per 1000. It is the lowest for all Cameroon.

The concepts of supply and demand for education must therefore be seen as shedding light on one another and not maintained in a dualism or rigid relationship which the facts show to be artificial. In the context of reducing regional disparities in education, in the last analysis, supply—just like demand—does not simply imply a classroom, or a certain type of programme, but a social position.

# Appendix

Regional statistics on education and population, Cameroon, 1954-75

TABLE A.1. 1954/55

| Region | Total population (1) | %I (2) | Enrolment in primary education (3) | %II (4) | Index II/I (5) | Pupils per 1000 inh. (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central-Southern | 724 017 | 18.17 | 95 119 | 36.50 | 2.00 | 131 |
| East | 209 594 | 5.25 | 12 031 | 4.61 | 0.87 | 57 |
| Littoral | 400 070 | 10.03 | 55 057 | 21 12 | 2.10 | 137 |
| West | 536 670 | 13.47 | 44 845 | 17.20 | 1.27 | 83 |
| North | 1 208 793 | 30.35 | 9 029 | 3.47 | 0.11 | 7 |
| W. Cameroon | 906 000 | 22.73 | 44 566 | 17.10 | 0.75 | 49 |
| Total | 3 985 144 | 100 | 260 647 | 100 | | |

SOURCES (1) and (3): *Annual Abstract of Educational Statistics—Cameroon*, 1.1.1955, for French-speaking Cameroon; C. and G. Courade for English-speaking Cameroon.

TABLE A.2. 1957/58

| Region | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central-Southern | 754 205 | 18.21 | 122 603 | 34.94 | 1.91 | 162 |
| East | 209 567 | 5.07 | 20 076 | 5.72 | 1.13 | 95 |
| Littoral | 422 177 | 10.20 | 69 797 | 19.90 | 1.95 | 165 |
| West | 553 599 | 13.37 | 60 611 | 17.27 | 1.29 | 109 |
| North | 1 231 558 | 29.73 | 20 934 | 5.97 | 0.20 | 16 |
| W. Cameroon | 970 000 | 23.42 | 56 810 | 16.20 | 0.69 | 56 |
| Total | 4 141 106 | 100 | 350 831 | 100 | | |

SOURCE (1) and (3): *Annual Abstract of Educational Statistics—Cameroon*, 1.1.1958.

TABLE A.3. 1961/62

| Region | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central-Southern | 924 162 | 20.24 | 191 452 | 36.65 | 1.81 | 207 |
| East | 233 230 | 5.10 | 23 428 | 4.48 | 0.87 | 100 |
| Littoral | 380 309 | 8.33 | 83 393 | 15.97 | 1.91 | 219 |
| West | 625 899 | 13.72 | 92 962 | 17.80 | 1.29 | 148 |
| North | 1 338 847 | 29.34 | 35 883 | 6.88 | 0.23 | 26 |
| W. Cameroon | 1 062 000 | 23.27 | 95 159 | 18.22 | 0.78 | 89 |
| Total | 4 564 447 | 100 | 522 277 | 100 | | 114 |

SOURCES (1) Official government figures (French-speaking Cameroon) for 31.12.1961; for West Cameroon: estimate by C. and G. Courade.
(3) *Statistical Abstract 1962* — Secretary of State for Education.

TABLE A.4. 1964/65

| Region | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central-Southern | 1 060 663 | 20.68 | 208 141 | 30.67 | 1.48 | 196 |
| East | 257 352 | 5.01 | 42 174 | 6.21 | 1.23 | 163 |
| Littoral | 547 059 | 10.67 | 107 701 | 15.86 | 1.48 | 196 |
| West | 727 688 | 14.20 | 140 430 | 20.70 | 1.45 | 192 |
| North | 1 397 048 | 27.25 | 55.967 | 8.25 | 0.30 | 40 |
| W. Cam. | 1 137 200 | 22.19 | 124 254 | 18.31 | 0.82 | 109 |
| Total | 5 127 010 | 100 | 678 667 | 100 | | 132 |

SOURCES (1) and (3)— *Statistical Abstract 1964-1965*, Secretary of State for Primary Education. in French-speaking Cameroon.
— For English-speaking Cameroon: (1) estimate by C. and G. Courade
(3) official figure.

TABLE A.5. 1967/68

| Region | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central-Southern | 1 120 000 | 20.0 | 240 984 | 29.51 | 1.47 | 215 |
| East | 275 000 | 4.92 | 45 232 | 5.53 | 1.12 | 164 |
| Littoral | 625 000 | 11.20 | 124 769 | 15.27 | 1.36 | 199 |
| West | 830 000 | 14.84 | 161 908 | 19.83 | 1.33 | 195 |
| North | 1 540 000 | 27.56 | 70 556 | 8.63 | 0.31 | 45 |
| W. Cameroon | 1 200 000 | 21.48 | 173 412 | 21.23 | 0.98 | 144 |
| Total | 5 590 000 | 100 | 816 861 | 100 | | 146 |

SOURCES (1) — Estimates based on sample population surveys in *Tableau de la population du Cameroun* — Yaoundé, ORSTOM, 1971.
(3) — *Statistical Abstract 1967-1968* of the Cameroonian Ministry of Education

TABLE A.6. 1975/76

| Region | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central-Southern | 1 492 945 | 19.49 | 303 051 | 27.23 | 1.39 | 202 |
| East | 366 235 | 4.78 | 58 854 | 5.29 | 1.10 | 160 |
| Littoral | 935 166 | 12.20 | 167 736 | 15.08 | 1.23 | 179 |
| West | 1 035 597 | 13.51 | 221 285 | 19.89 | 1.47 | 213 |
| North | 2 232 257 | 29.13 | 115 114 | 10.35 | 0.35 | 51 |
| W. Cameroon[1] | 1 601 046 | 20.90 | 246 713 | 22.17 | 1.06 | 154 |
| Total | 7 663 246 | 100 | 1 112 753 | 100 | | 145 |
| [1] of which | | | | | | |
| North-West | 980 531 | 12.80 | 127 565 | 11.46 | 0.89 | 130 |
| South-West | 620 515 | 8.10 | 119 148 | 10.70 | 1.32 | 192 |

SOURCES (1) — Population census April 1976.
(3) — Estimate arrived at by taking the latest available figures (1973/74) and applying the average annual growth rate in enrolment over the preceding 5 years.




FIGURE A.1. *Growth in enrolment in primary education, Cameroon, 1954-75.*

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