

**nopoor**

Towards  
a Decent  
and Fair  
Future

# **nopoor** **Towards** **a Decent** **and Fair** **Future**

## **Imprint**

June 2016, Vienna, Austria

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Printed by: Remaprint Litteradruck, Vienna

Publisher: Bibliothek der Provinz

A-3970 Weitra, [www.bibliothekderprovinz.at](http://www.bibliothekderprovinz.at)

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They do not necessarily reflect the views  
of the European Commission.

**ISBN 978-3-99028-604-3**

Edited by Heidi Dumreicher and Xavier Oudin  
Bibliothek der Provinz

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We dedicate this book to our late friends  
and colleagues who are dearly missed:

- to Mariétou Mbaye Diallo who helped to manage the Nopoor conferences in Dakar with her fullest commitment to disseminate our results;
- to Gero Erdmann who contributed his invaluable knowledge of political sciences to developing and shaping the Nopoor project, particularly with regard to the relationship between regime type and poverty;
- and to Eduardo Oreggia who was working in Nopoor on the impact of local shocks on poverty.

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## Poverty Alleviation

### The role of research

As the new objectives of the sustainable development goals aim at totally eradicating poverty from the planet, research has a great role to play to contribute to the realisation of this goal. Launched in 2012, the Nopoor research project deals with the many dimensions of poverty in a great variety of contexts.

It aims at producing new knowledge on poverty in developing countries to generate more efficient poverty reduction policies. It takes a comprehensive approach to poverty and places the emphasis on its dynamics. Understanding how and why some people fall into poverty, and how and why others break out of poverty is relevant to the efficient design of anti-poverty policies.

The research carried out by Nopoor is grounded in empirical work. Great emphasis is placed on data collection and work on databases. Most of the findings

of Nopoor stem from original surveys on specific and somehow neglected aspects of poverty, such as segregation, political processes, women empowerment, etc.

This volume presents some of the findings of Nopoor showing the diversity of topics and approaches that characterizes the project. Rather than reviewing all the topics covered by the one hundred researchers of Nopoor, I would like to illustrate our approach through three examples. One is about labour, the other one about good governance and the last one about migrations.

### Work and poverty

Nopoor has put an emphasis on labour issues because work is the main driver to get people out of poverty, provided that the jobs are decent. Labour conditions



are scrutinized in some countries or in particular settings such as the special economic zones, where competition between poor countries tends to pull down labour standards. Research shows that when a social policy accompanies investment and fiscal policies aiming at attracting foreign firms, these zones can benefit the poor, as it is the case in Brazil.

We come to the same conclusion concerning work in the informal sector, which provides jobs and income, with no help of formal institutions, to a great share of the poor, thereby participating to the economic growth. The states should extend coverage of social protection to this population, and not simply rely to traditional solidarities.

While globalization tends to deteriorate labour quality, even in emerging countries, our conclusions advocate the need to raise labour standards and widen social protection, as a mean to reduce poverty and ensure social cohesion.

### **Good governance**

The fact that good governance is a prerequisite to successful policies aiming at reducing poverty is widely acknowledged. There is not one issue of good or bad governance, but many levels of analyses from local to global level, with different policy implications. Governance can be enhanced through better and fairer elections where the poor will be the final beneficiaries. The use of electronic voting in Brazil has considerably improved the participation of the poor and reduced fraud. Also in Ghana, a research concludes that better education for the poor about the stakes of elections will make their representatives more accountable. Good governance is also viewed at local level as in India where policies in favour of women's empowerment are positively evaluated.

### **Migrations**

Several researches deal with particular aspects of migrations and bring a new light on how the behaviour of migrants can contribute to poverty alleviation. Remittances by Malian migrants in France who invest in public goods (schools, wells, etc.) in their home village, by the mean of village associations, get spectacular results in improving the quality of life for those left back. In Senegal, finally, remittances contribute to deter children to work and bring them back to school, but the way remittances are channelled matters. However, the remittances do not always have such an impact as in the case study in Mexico where migrants prefer to invest in subsistence agriculture instead of more innovative undertakings.

Research does not only highlight success stories. It also shows how inequalities worsen in some circumstances, how education fails to favour social mobility when access to good quality schools is not guaranteed for the poor, how poor remain segregated in some urban settings and are victims of domestic violence and how globalization can be detrimental to the poor. The evaluation of some famous poverty alleviation programmes such as *Oportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil or the *National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme* in India, despite undeniable successes in reducing poverty, concludes that they fail to eradicate the roots of poverty.

The different angles adopted to analyse similar problems, alternating case studies in different countries and macro-economic studies, views from the grassroots and the effect of globalization, constitute the originality of the *Nopoor* research. This brings an incomparable view on poverty worldwide and can feed the reflexion for renewed policies, as stated in the title of the *Nopoor* project.

## Can International Interventions Secure the Peace?

The international community uses a number of interventions to build peace. How effective are these interventions? What works and what does not? Some interventions are frequently advocated, but we know little about their success. This research reviews existing evidence.

### Why should third parties intervene?

As we receive shocking images of war, the discussion begins about how to stop the killing, maiming, torture, (child) abductions, displacement and sexual violence. Economic studies suggest that wars are costly; the cost of the average civil war is estimated to be around \$120 billion dollars.


The hotspots are easy to identify: poor countries which have suffered growth collapses and have histories of civil war. This knowledge provides a good guide on *where* to use third party interventions; the question

of *how* to intervene is more problematic. Interventions should ideally address the twin challenge of security and development, ending conflicts and preventing new ones by building stronger states and enabling people to lead lives free from poverty.

### Evidence

Since the end of the Cold War, evidence of the effectiveness of interventions is accumulating. This research suggests that aid, peacekeeping operations and arms trade restrictions help secure peace.


— *Development Aid*: Although there is no evidence that aid helps prevent wars, there is evidence that it stabilizes post-war situations and decreases the risk of recurrent conflict by boosting growth and income. However, these results do not hold in violent post-war situations. Aid in violent post-war situations has no growth-enhancing effect.



— *UN Peacekeeping Operations* (UN PKOs): UN PKOs are effective in maintaining peace. Increasing UN PKO expenditure by sixty percent halves the risk of civil war globally.

— *Restrictions on Arms Transfers*: Arms embargoes limit the flow of weapons and are more effective in conjunction with UN PKOs. This suggests that tighter regulation of international arms transfers could reduce violent conflict and there is reason for optimism that the recent UN International Arms Trade Treaty will reduce the supply of arms to countries in conflict.

— *Security Services*: Worldwide there are concerns about the legitimacy, image and professionalism of private security providers. Currently there is no legally binding code of conduct and no independent oversight. Efforts to design and enforce international treaties would increase the accountability of private security services in peace- and state-building efforts.



## Outlook

In the last 50 years, civil wars have been the most common form of large-scale violent conflict. There is nothing «civil» about these conflicts; they impose huge human and economic costs, both on the local populations and with regional and global spill-over effects. Large n-studies show that UN PKOs keep the peace and that aid increases growth in the post-war period. Improving the growth performance of post-conflict countries is important, because economic growth reduces the likelihood of renewed conflict. Concentrating efforts to stabilize post-war situations appears to be an effective use of international resources, because cross-country studies suggest that recurrent conflict is the predominant form of armed conflict today.

There is comparatively little work on interventions during conflict. Many interventions seem to prolong war; it appears to be very difficult to stop a war once it has started. If we could prevent small scale conflicts from escalating into war, enormous human suffering and economic costs could be avoided. However, there is hardly any work on the effectiveness of interventions before a conflict, and it is too early to provide a quantitative assessment of early warning and response efforts such as the African Union's *Continental Early Warning System*.

The discussion suggests that some interventions are more effective when combined with other interventions. However, we know very little about optimal policy design. Fragile countries require a combination of economic and security assistance. Studies either concentrate on the development or the security aspects, but pay insufficient attention to the relationship between them.

This is an important area of future research.

*Hoeffler, Anke. 2014. Can international interventions secure the peace? International Area Studies Review 17(1): 75-94.*



# *Which Factors lead to Entry or Exit from Poverty in Developing Countries? A Meta-Analysis of Studies on the Dynamics of Poverty*

## **Powerful levers**

Research on the dynamics of poverty identifies numerous factors which have an impact on the probability of an individual or household entering into or exiting from a state of major deprivation. Education, demographics (household size, dependency ratio, etc.), agricultural and non-agricultural assets, and the community people live in are the most cited. But are these really the most powerful levers? Could we then conclude that anti-poverty programmes are in fact based on rigorous knowledge of factors which have a proven anti-poverty capacity? Knowing the relevant factors can make it possible to design efficiently targeted programmes. The goal of this Nopoor research project was to respond to this question applying a meta-analytic approach to results from recent quantitative empirical works on poverty dynamics.

## **Towards anti-poverty programmes**

Starting with a sample of 117 studies, we selected 36 studies that met clearly defined criteria. One of these criteria was that the study should focus on the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and should deal with the dynamics of poverty.

## **Four questions were considered:**

1. What is the mean effect of each of the main determinants of the entry into and exit from poverty?
2. Are studies on the dynamics of poverty characterized by a selection bias (publication bias)?
3. After having controlled for publication bias, is there a real impact on poverty dynamics of the most commonly cited poverty determinants in the literature?
4. What is the source of heterogeneity of the effect size of the determinants reported by the studies?

## **Mean effects**

The estimates of the mean effects of the determinants show that education and age decrease the probability of the household or individual entering into poverty. In contrast, the numbers of the dependent, the household size and the unemployment have an inverse effect, and significantly increase the probability of moving into poverty. When considering the movement out of poverty, education and income significantly increase the probability of moving out of poverty, while the number of dependents and the household size decrease the probability of moving out of poverty.

## **Existence of selection bias**

Another question this project looks at is the existence of publication bias. A publication bias may appear when the publication of a study depends on the significance and/or direction of the results obtained. The findings show that, overall, published works on the determinants of the dynamics of poverty are primarily

those reporting facts with statistical significance and an effect which has the expected sign.

### **Determinants of the dynamics of poverty**

Even in the presence of selection bias, we must verify whether, among the determinants of poverty dynamics, there exists a real effect which is not due to either a bias induced by a preference for statistically significant results, nor to the process of obtaining these results. We find authentic effects of most factors (education, age, household size, number of dependents, unemployment, physical assets) on the dynamics of poverty.

### **Sources of heterogeneity of the size effects**

Finally, this work investigated for each determinant of poverty dynamics, the sources of heterogeneity of the effect size reported in the various studies. The results showed that the model used in the study, the number of observations, the survey coverage (countries, national or subnational level, rural or urban level), and the type of report explain the difference of effect size of the determinants on the entry into poverty.

Furthermore, the results highlight that the effects of most poverty dynamics determinants are not statistically different between Africa and the other developing continents, except those of household size, employment, and shocks. The effect of household size in the entry into poverty is significantly higher in Africa than in the other continents. In contrast, the effects of both employment and shocks in the entry into poverty are higher in the other continents than in Africa.

The heterogeneity of the effect size of the factors on exit rate is mainly explained by the survey coverage followed by the type of the document, the publication year, the welfare indicator, and the continent. The results show also that the effect size of education (all levels and secondary education), household size, and

physical assets, is significantly lower in Africa in comparison to the other continents.

Starting with a sample of 36 studies, and having performed a series of robustness tests, we have found that publication bias is relevant for a number of estimators of poverty, but most of the determinants have a real effect on poverty dynamics.

### **Policy recommendations emerging from our results:**

- Physical assets and income are shown to be powerful levers to escape from or not fall into poverty. Targeted programmes would be useful, particularly those that focus on income generation; improvement of equipment for small producers; and protection against the effects of climate change.
- Three drivers of poverty emerge from the literature: a high number of dependants; household size; and whether people in the household are in the labour force or unemployed. These drivers also prevent people's ability to exit from poverty.
- One interesting result is related to primary education which has long been considered as an important factor in poverty reduction. However, the relationship has changed. Even globally, while education remains a powerful driver to lift people out of poverty, primary education no longer has that ability, nor will having a primary education prevent a fall into poverty. While putting an emphasis on quality in primary education remains a priority for education policies, more emphasis must now be placed on offering professional training for young people who could not continue their education in college or high school.
- Research based on a large sample size, with extensive national and international coverage should be encouraged to identify the factors that really affect the dynamics of poverty.

# Migration and Wellbeing in Times of Crisis: The Case of Ecuadorian Immigrants in Spain

The study aims to shed light on the wellbeing of current and return Ecuadorian migrants, the determinants of their return and their socioeconomic integration, and the role of the crisis among these determinants.


## Data and methodology

The innovative methodological design was based on a finding of two »twin« surveys in 2014, conducted with almost 1,500 migrants in Spain and returnees in Ecuador.

Both questionnaires contain a common section dealing with the period prior to migration, the migration episode, and the stay in Spain. Additionally, the survey conducted in Quito includes a specific module on return, while the Madrid survey, conducted on current resident migrants, includes a module of future return expectations.

## Highlights

- From a methodological point of view, our results suggest that empirical studies on migration and return may strongly benefit from using a joint samples approach like the one used in this study.
- Those who migrated to Spain were not among the poorest. Ecuadorian migration to Spain was an opportunity to avoid the worst of the crisis in Ecuador and to improve one’s living conditions.
- Welfare self-assessment is overestimated by migrants when they compare themselves with Spaniards living around them. This suggests a biased nature of subjective perception of welfare/poverty, or limitations of the conventional approach to the measurement of poverty.




Questionnaire design sketch

- Somewhat unexpectedly, our first results suggest that worsening of labor and living conditions do not drive return.
- Expectations, welfare improvement, crisis impact, return decision or expectations and other crucial elements appear to be related with family structure and dynamics.
- The return is not the end of the migratory process. 36% of returnees expressed their willingness to migrate again.

### Policy implications

The priorities for return policies should be:

- The need for the government of Ecuador to support the entrepreneurship and employment of migrants (job offers and loans in order to start projects).



*Agenda, Executive Summary, Surveys and other material at the web page: [www.nopoor.eu](http://www.nopoor.eu)*

- The importance of the coherence between political discourse and reality, with many migrants highlighting the broken promises made to the diaspora wanting to return.
- The need to tackle labor market rigidities, especially in terms of age and qualifications.
- The design of active policies for the employability of middle-age individuals and preparation of returnees to face the local labor market
- The demand for redesigning return assistance policies. A significant share of the sample highlighted the opacity of return assistance programs, lack of adequacy, and implementation issues.

### Stakeholders involvement and dissemination

The results of this study were discussed with various stakeholders concerned, including migration experts, NGOs and representatives of governments at city, regional and national levels.

Based on a stakeholder analysis exercise conducted in the frame of Nopoor, Ecuadorian stakeholders were strongly involved in this process of dissemination and debate — an impressive example of how such dissemination can take form.

Activities in Quito included, amongst others, radio live interviews, a meeting with representatives of the Management Unit of Human Mobility of the government of Pichincha Province, a public Nopoor dissemination event and an interview with the President of Pichincha Regional Government Gustavo Baroja, the highest authority of the regional government.

## *Remittances and Development: Do Remittance Transfer Channels Matter?*

To date, we know very little about how remittance transfer channels affect recipient decisions. This research provides the first systematic exploration of the effect of remittance transfer channels on expenditure patterns of recipients' households.

### **Remittances — a tool for development?**

The growing importance of remittances flows to developing countries has drawn attention to their impact in receiving countries. The main question is whether or not remittances have an effect on economic development in origin countries and if they are used in a productive way by the recipients. If so, remittances flows could potentially become an important tool for economic development, especially if they can be channelled into productive investment. From this standpoint, the fundamental issue to know is how are these remittances spent or used? Is the money spent on

newly desired consumer goods, or are they channelled into human and physical investment and do they help to develop productive investments?

Most researches have concluded that remittances impact the expenditure patterns of recipients' households and argue that remittances actually increase investments in human and physical capital at the margin, relative to other forms of household income.

Going beyond this standpoint, we extend the debate by examining how remittances are spent or used and what is their impact on economic development by investigating how remittance transfer channels affect the expenditure patterns of recipients' households.

While it is important to understand how money transfers from migrants affect recipient household spending, it is also useful to ascertain how the way that remittances are sent influences their use. For instance, migrants and recipients' access to financial institution



services may play an important role in encouraging savings. On the one hand, migrants should have access to an efficient and secure transfer channel. On the other hand, recipients should have access to deposit accounts, which would encourage them to save more and then to make productive investments.

### Case study Senegal

In Senegal, more than half of the households have a migrant member. Remittances amounts to 11% of the GDP, more than Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or Official Development Assistance (ODA). About half of the remittances are sent through formal channels (banks, financial institutions) and half through informal channels (friends, middlemen). Knowing how these channels influence the use of remittances is thus a crucial issue in the framework of the Plan Sénégal Emergent where the role of remittances for development is pinpointed.

Category	Examples	All remittance-receiving households (N=927)	Receiving remittances through official channel (N=523)	Receiving remittances through unofficial channel (N=404)
Food	Cereals, pulses, oilseeds, tubers, fruit, vegetable	71%	61%	80%
Consumer goods, durables	Clothing, shoes, stove, refrigerator, furniture, television, bike, car	3%	5%	1%
Housing	Annual use value of housing (rental, mortgage, loan repayment)	1%	0%	2%
Education	Books, school supplies, uniforms, registration fees	4%	5%	3%
Health	Doctor fees, medicine, hospitalization, prescription, laboratory costs	6%	9%	4%
Productive investments	Businesses, farm improvements, equipment	2%	4%	0%
Other goods	Water, gas, electricity, telephone, transport, wedding, funerals, baptism, circumcision	12%	16%	9%

*Remittances uses by category of expenses and by channel of transfer, Senegal, 2009 (percentage of total expenses)*

### Data and methodology

We use a nationally-representative household survey carried out in Senegal by CRES and the World Bank in 2009 to examine how a remittance transfer channel affects the spending behaviour of households. We analyse the link between remittance transfer channels and use of remittances by analysing how additional spending permitted by remittances is spent, and how the channels for receiving remittances affects the spending behaviour of households.

### Main findings

We uncover a key result about the impact of remittances transfer channels on economic development in Senegal. Formal remittances transfer channels lead to significantly increase spending on two investments goods: education and productive goods.

In comparison, households that receive remittances through informal channels use them more on one key consumption good: food.

Moreover, households use remittances received through informal channels 97% less on productive goods than what they would have spent on these goods in receiving remittances through formal channels and 84% less in education. These findings are valid whatever the level of expenditure or living standard.

### Conclusion and policy implication

In the perspective to increase the positive impact of remittances on economic development and the security of money transfers, policies should aim at:

- promoting remittances through formal channels (banks or currency exchanges) which would encourage migrants to save more and then to make productive investments.
- lowering remitting costs to increasing remittance flows, in particular by reducing taxes that may affect the cost of transfers.

## *Sustainable Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities*

After much musing and report-writing about development assistance, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) emerged in 2001, transitioning, in theory, to empowering the poor to help themselves. The MDGs included eight goals, and were thought to have been kept brief to maintain »politically uncontroversial measures of progress« (Kenny, 2015). Putting the progress made on the targets aside for a moment, it can be argued that the MDGs increased the focus of donors on low-income countries and successfully served as a tool to leverage aid and awareness, being easy to communicate, brief, and time-bound. Regarding the impact for which the goals were intended, progress was seen in a number of target areas; however, the extent to which this can be attributed to the MDGs has been debated. In the view of many experts, the strong growth rates of China played a key role, and would have led to a positive trend regardless of the implementation of the MDGs.

The MDGs ended in 2015, giving way to their successor — the SDGs (The Sustainable Development Goals) — which set the development agenda for the next fifteen years. While the success of the MDGs is uncertain, the SDGs call for a new approach to development assistance. Created with a »universal« approach focusing on everyone rather than just poor countries, they proclaim a holistic vision of sufficient livelihoods and sustainability. As far as turning a new leaf, there seem to be areas of both progress and stagnation.

### **From the MDGs to the SDGs**

First, let us examine some positive aspects of the new approach. The formulation of the SDGs has been one of the more participatory processes of its kind to date, with numerous conferences, panels, and even an online poll. This stands in contrast to the MDGs, which were technocratically formulated and handed down





from the global north. Inherent in the SDGs are the acknowledgement of the development community that the elevation of poverty is a multidimensional problem, and the acknowledgement that all parties are equally responsible in the process. The fact that a set of terms implicating all parties has been agreed upon is a success; we now find ourselves with an ambitious set of seventeen goals and 169 targets.

While the aim of a comprehensive set of targets is admirable, the results are equivocal. The universal approach of the SDGs has been criticised for its potential to produce something so grand and disparate that is a less actionable tool to focus aid flows. Adding to this problem is the lack of a »road map« to guide progress towards achieving the targets. Mainstream economists refer to the SDGs as the 169 commandments, framing them as biblical prophecy rather than realistic goals, as being impossible to finance and too broadly formulated to produce tangible results.

Another camp of critics has pointed out that the solution the SDGs put forth to tackle poverty and climate change is, once again, the concept of growth, but dressed in green. The idea of »green growth« is very appealing in theory, but is heavily criticized as having unrealistic assumptions, and as supporting the problematic characteristics of our political-economic system that perpetuate poverty. In this view, the SDGs do not appear quite so innovative.

These critiques are valid, but do not nullify the potential of this new agreement. As stated in a scientific review of the SDGs (ICSU, ISSC 2015), it will be important to envision a world where all seventeen targets have been achieved. This will help in two ways: firstly, it will create a more compelling and tangible picture of the destination, and, secondly, it could spark progress beyond the current quantitative and growth-centric metrics for development. Old in the SDGs are the metrics we continue to use to measure development

of our societies, but new is a common agreement that the direction we are currently heading is not viable for the future. The 193 member states of the United Nations agreed on the goals, demonstrating the acknowledgement that a fundamental change of our economic system is needed to guarantee a »good life« for future generations. Historically, challenges have often been part of human progress, and if implemented the right way, the SDGs may provide the opportunity to open a new chapter.

For those advocating a transition away from growth to a sustainable world, the SDGs might not seem to be »enough«. But the characteristics of this sustainable world, and the transition to get there, have not yet been defined. Collectively we face unprecedented challenges, and we attempt now to make our way towards an unprecedented (but better) state. Assuming we avoid a catastrophic driver that forces us towards sustainability, this transition is likely to be iterative and gradual, with much trial and error. While imperfect, for example in their vestigial emphasis on growth, the SDGs are a step in the right direction. They were inclusively created and emphasize sustainability in ways not yet seen from a document of this scope. However, we must not stop at these small victories, but rather be further fueled to ensure that the Sustainable Development Goals are implemented (to the extent possible), and that the aforementioned criticisms are addressed as the world moves forward.

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## *Decent Work in the Sustainable Development Goals*

Employment and decent work feature prominently in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Goal 8 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) asks to »promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all«. Which employment challenges are addressed by the SDGs and how can they be adequately measured?

### **Aspects of decent work in the SDGs**

Decent work is a multidimensional concept, comprising various characteristics of the available employment opportunities and outcomes. The SDG agenda adequately reflects this multidimensionality by explicitly referencing to the multiple features of decent work. Goal 8 and additional employment-related targets under other goals address the quantitative employment dimension by calling for full employment

and reduced youth unemployment. At the same time, qualitative employment aspects are emphasized, in particular social protection, equal pay, labour rights and occupational health and safety. As such, the SDGs reflect all pillars of decent work, although the aspect of social dialogue is only implicitly acknowledged in the agenda. Furthermore, some targets outline the means envisioned to achieve full employment and decent work: promoting labour-intensive sectors, enhancing entrepreneurship and formalizing micro, small and medium enterprises, as well as creating jobs in sustainable tourism.


### **Measuring decent work**

Conceptual and practical difficulties pose challenges to the formulation of (global) decent work indicators. Cross-country differences in economic development and institutions as well as specific labour market conditions preclude setting global aspiration levels for many indicators. In particular, global indicators for labour market participation, employment rates, contract status or working time will suffer from ambiguity. These ambiguities are reduced if indicators are set at the national level. We therefore argue to limit the global employment-related SDG indicators to those employment characteristics that are internationally comparable and can be clearly and unambiguously interpreted.

One example is the income component of decent work. After all, decent work should enable a person to generate an adequate income. In addition, income is often strongly correlated with the non-monetary dimensions of decent work, particularly those related to occupational safety and health. The importance of analysing individual labour earnings is illustrated in Figure 1. The graphs depict (i) the share of the population living in a household with a per capita income below Int. \$ 1.25 per day (headcount ratio), (ii) the

proportion of employed people living in a household with a per capita income below Int. \$ 1.25 per day (working poverty rate), and (iii) the proportion of employed people receiving a labour income below Int. \$ 1.25 per day in Uganda.

Whereas the first two measures look at the aggregate household income, the last indicator only considers the individual labour income of all persons in employment. The graphs show that this percentage is much higher than the poverty- and working poverty rate. Moreover, the share of workers below Int. \$ 1.25 per day decreases less rapidly between 2005 and 2009 than the poverty- and working poverty rate. An individual may receive low pay but still live in a non-poor household if higher labour earnings of other household members or social transfer payments compensate for his low pay. Thus, focusing only on aggregate household figures can conceal the problem of indecent



labour earnings. Replacing the Int. \$ 1.25 threshold by a relative labour income threshold (e.g. the share of workers earning less than 60% of the median labour income) would additionally provide an equity measure of labour earnings.

Apart from the decency of pay, it would also be desirable to measure progress towards the SDG targets concerning labour rights, forced and child labour, and occupational health and safety. Here, data availability is a major problem. In addition, many proposed indicators do not adequately reflect the situation of the informally self-employed although they constitute the major share of employment in many developing countries. The assumption that informal employment is always related with indecent working conditions does not stand on firm empirical grounds. While good data collection practices can be found, for example in the European Union, there are almost no data available in developing countries for many of the qualitative employment targets mentioned in the SDGs.

#### This leads to the following policy recommendations:

- Countries may identify priorities among the employment-related SDG targets for which selected, but specific, measurable and relevant indicators are formulated.
- All indicators need to reflect the situation of the formally and informally (self-)employed.
- Appropriate data collection tools and sufficient capacities need to be developed to inform these indicators.

## *Measuring the Quality of Employment: A Missing Link in the Development Agenda*

In recent decades, development thinking and policy has made significant progress in recognising the importance of the quality of employment, both as it relates to the situation of individuals (for example, their income levels and general capabilities generated by their work) as well as its relationship with broader policy issues such as whether functioning social security systems can be built on the basis of precarious labour markets.

The ILO, in particular, has contributed significantly to this process by launching its concept »decent work«. More recently, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have included the objective of »promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all« as Goal 8 in their agenda. Yet surprisingly little progress has been made on conceptualising and defining what constitutes »decent work« or a »good job«.

The ILO's definition of decent work includes a plethora of indicators that cover everything from macro employment indicators, employment conditions and opportunities, earnings and productivity levels, the safety of the working environment, and social dialogue.

There are two main problems with such a broad definition: first, there is no internationally comparable data available on these indicators. Particularly in developing countries, data on labour markets tends to be scarce. Beyond basic indicators such as the employment and unemployment rate, definitions of employment concepts are not uniform, and the labour market surveys that produce employment indicators do not ask the same questions. Second, even if we had internationally comparable data on the quality of employment, defining decent work based on 64 individual indicators is not practical. Governments find themselves confronted with a large dashboard of indicators that represent



every perspective of labour markets without knowing how to prioritise them, or being able to compare their own performance with that of other countries. In addition, it is almost impossible to formulate public policies with the specific objective of improving the quality of employment when there is no practical indicator that measures the concept.

As a result, governments continue to focus excessively on the unemployment rate, which in developing countries is an extremely poor indicator of labour market performance as workers from low income families simply cannot afford to be unemployed. Instead, they often work in informal jobs, like Carla in the photos below.

*This is Carla who works from home baking bread rolls in an old oil barrel in her front yard in La Pintana, a low income district of Santiago de Chile. Carla lost her minimum wage job at a shoe factory when the factory closed down.*



*She began breaking bread, and found that it was more profitable to be self-employed than to be formally employed at the minimum wage. However, she has now lost access to all social security systems as a result of the informality of her work.*

*(Picture: Kirsten Sehnbruch)*

## Policy recommendations:

- Development agencies and institutions must focus resources and policy attention on producing reliable and internationally comparable data on employment conditions. In Europe, the European Working Conditions Survey has made significant progress in producing such statistics. The survey now includes 34 countries, including some less-developed countries such as the former Yugoslav Republics, Turkey and Albania. This survey should urgently be rolled out to include other middle income countries, especially in Latin America and Asia. In less-developed countries, such as in Africa, an adapted version of the survey should be carried out that reflects the particularly precarious nature of employment in the world's least developed countries.
- Once this data has been produced, a simple indicator of the quality of employment should be produced that includes its most basic dimensions, such as earnings, job security, access to social security, and basic working conditions. The OECD has recently made progress in this direction through its 2014 employment outlook. However, data on developing countries is not yet available so that this indicator cannot be produced for a significant sample of developed and developing countries.
- Experience with international development indicators has shown that their impact is greater if they:
  - a) combine different dimensions in a composite indicator
  - b) are internationally comparable across countries
  - c) use a simple methodology than can be easily communicated to users and the press

## *Social Policies and Women's Empowerment: an Unfulfilled Commitment*

### **Cash transfer programmes**

Despite many criticisms, conditional cash transfer programs are the main approach for fighting poverty in Latin America, with the alleged capacity to empower women living in poverty. This study examines the claim that conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico further women's empowerment. The main findings of this research contradict the official discourse, suggesting modification of predominant social policies.

### **Main positive impact on women's empowerment:**

- Beneficiary women assume empowerment discourse, perceiving that, as the subjects of credit, their statuses in the community and their economic autonomy have improved.
- Beneficiary women see a better future for their daughters. They appreciate the training opportunities, though they demand more job training.

- Access to a stable income has resulted in more women abandoning abusive relationships. Negative impacts feared initially, like increasing domestic violence and men's alcoholism, have not been noted.
- Women recognize that they have more autonomy in deciding what the money they receive is used for.
- Training spaces and communitarian tasks offer women chances to leave their homes, creating new solidarity networks and discussion spaces.
- There are positive short-term impacts on school enrollment extension to secondary and high school levels, which is also associated with a decrease in teenage fertility rates.

### **On the negative side:**

- Conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico have been ineffective in breaking the inter-generational cycle of poverty.



- Women face the inactivity trap; obligations that women must assume to receive benefits handicap their chances in the formal labor market.
- The co-responsibility tasks imposed on women reinforce traditional gender roles. At the same time, they increase women's workloads and stress.
- Even if co-responsibilities are not established as an exclusive obligation of women, in reality they are seen this way. Family care is a role traditionally filled by women; as such, funds are given to them, and they are responsible for demonstrating the fulfillment of conditional requirements.
- The empowerment potential is handicapped by the design of conditional cash transfer programs, which assumes that people living in poverty need government guidance. Specific expectations about desired behaviors are stipulated (attending school, workshops, participation in community work), and compliance control mechanisms are established with inclusion of participants in the decision-making processes.
- The extended school enrollment of girls leads to decreases in their unpaid domestic labor. Their work is mostly assumed by their mothers and grandmothers. This does not result in an impact on the renegotiation of the sexual division of labor, which is a fundamental precondition for women's empowerment.

### **Policy implications**

Considering the levels of poverty in Mexico and the implications for human development, targeted policies are needed in the medium term. Conditional cash transfer programs can have a bigger impact on women's empowerment if this objective is undertaken with the same importance as overcoming extreme poverty.

For this to occur, it is necessary that the design of the programs:

1. modifies the link between money allocation and the fulfillment of co-responsibility tasks. Mechanisms that promote and demand the active participation of men in the fulfillment of co-responsibilities must be created. This would improve the distribution of time and have a positive impact on the social imagination of traditional roles of men and women. The programs must not be designed thinking of women, but of power relationships between men and women;
2. diversifies workshops' design. The current narrow focus on reproductive health considers the biological differences between the sexes, but not the social differences. If these spaces exist, and participation is mandatory for young men and women, gender equality must be discussed;
3. expands the role of coordination mechanisms, which currently have the sole objective of ensuring the functioning of the program. Meeting spaces must turn into spaces of reflection on the situation of women, and of awareness of how power is used in society and in households. Women should have the opportunity to exchange experiences, share narratives and create support networks that are sustainable over time.

In long term, the Mexican government should invest in universal social policy programs that allow for:

1. Redistribution of caretaking tasks between the family and the State in a more equitable way.
2. Improvement of the quality of public services.
3. Overcoming of occupational segmentation and promotion of formal and decent employment for women.

### **Added value and impact of the research**

The resulting policy recommendations focus on empowerment strategies for any social policy, which means that they are transferable to policies and programs focusing on women living in poverty.


## *Eradicating Women-Hurting Customs: What Role for Social Engineering?*

### **The social engineering approach**

We discuss existing approaches to fight women-hurting customs (such as female genital cutting, domestic violence and early marriage) and how they can be conceptualized from the standpoint of economic theory. A popular approach to change harmful customs is what we call the »social engineering approach«. It consists of two types of interventions: on the one hand, legal bans which criminalize the practice and sensitization campaigns and, on the other hand, community-based programs aimed at changing people's perception of the customs. Social engineering is commonly justified on the grounds of human rights principles. In this study, we focus on the theoretical models underpinning this approach.

### **Methodology**

We build on existing theoretical models of harmful customs to identify the assumptions under which currently popular interventions such as legal bans and community-based empowering programs can be effective. We differentiate between bargaining games and coordination games, games involving agents with homogenous preferences from those involving agents with heterogeneous preferences. Preferences reflect the way people value the custom; a strong preference indicates that they value it highly. We compare the possible effects of the social engineering approach with those of interventions which affect customs through a change in economic conditions. Existing empirical evidence on the impact of both approaches are reviewed.





## Highlights

Harmful customs are often defined as social norms and conceptualized as coordination problems; individuals want to stop the practice but they cannot individually abandon it if others are not doing the same. In such a framework, a legal ban on the custom can work as a focal point; it can change individual expectations of what the others are going to do and it can lead to the abandonment of the custom. We show that a crucial assumption in such a framework concerns the shape of initial distribution of preferences with respect to the custom. Depending on it, the impact of policies aiming at coordinating individuals will vary greatly. The best-case scenario is given by a population with homogenous preferences, which is however not a good depiction of reality.

Coordination is not the only way to define customs. Other models, such as bargaining frameworks, prove useful to understand the mechanisms through which interventions affect harmful customs. In such a framework, the law can increase the bargaining power of the victim by making the threat of appealing to the court real. In practice, however, there are material and psychological costs of appealing to a court that can hinder the effectiveness of the approach.

Grass-root interventions can be conceptualized as a way to change individual preferences within a coordination game. Who to target will depend on the initial distribution of preferences in the population.

## Policy implications

— Legal bans of harmful practices might work only if the threat they represent is credible. If the role of the law is to coordinate people so that they abandon a harmful custom, its impact will depend on the distribution of preferences towards the custom. A very homogenous society will not react in the same way to a legal ban as a society where a variety of opinions

exist. Sudden demise of a custom should not be automatically expected.

- Grass-root interventions have potentially one advantage with respect to legal bans: they can succeed in modifying individual preferences for the custom. Their purpose is to make people aware that they are the victims of a discriminatory treatment and that they are entitled to be in a better situation. It is not clear, however, who should be targeted. Theoretically, the answer to that question depends on the underlying distribution of preferences.
- Some of the results obtained through legal and other interventions against harmful customs could be equally reached through a change in economic conditions. There is indeed evidence that changes in economic and demographic factors impact son's preferences, age at marriage and the level of domestic violence.
- An advantage of reforms aiming at changing economic conditions with respect to the social engineering approach is that they first are perceived as less intrusive and they are more readily accepted by the targeted population. Indeed, there is a risk that people feel threatened in their »identity« if the custom is addressed directly.
- The role of awareness-building campaigns and grassroots activities is justified when economic forces or strategies take a rather long time to produce their effects. When the disappearance of a practice is slow to materialize, the struggle to achieve its demise must be supported by reforms and institutional interventions that directly tackle the problem.



## *Governance Matters for the Allocation of Foreign Aid*


A core finding of aid allocation literature is that the volume of foreign aid received does not depend on the quality of governance. Donor countries may still give aid to poorly governed countries, but those countries most in need typically also lack good institutions. We argue that donors resolve this dilemma by bypassing weak state institutions and delivering more aid through NGOs and multilateral organizations.

### **Data and Methodology**

Our analysis uses data on the channel of delivery from the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS). We calculate the share of foreign aid delivered to recipient countries based on the bilateral aid commitments of DAC member countries. For bilateral aid transactions where the channel of delivery is not readily coded, we code them by determining whether the implementing organization

was a state or non-state actor, thereby distinguishing between state-to-state aid and state-to-non-state aid. On average, 25 percent of aid was delivered through non-state actors.

Our main measure of the quality of governance is the control of corruption index from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators. As corruption increases the risk of a recipient government's capture of aid, more corrupt countries should receive less state-to-state aid. While suggestive, a simple correlation between corruption and the share of state-to-state aid could be misleading. Perhaps poorly governed countries differ from better governed countries in other dimensions and this is what drives the difference in aid delivery. We therefore run a multivariate analysis to control for other potential determinants of the channel of aid delivery.



*Control of corruption  
in recipient countries and  
share of state-to-state aid in 2008*

## Main results

- There is a strong, positive relationship between the share of state-to-state aid and control of corruption (see Figure p. 49). As hypothesized, countries with lower control of corruption receive more aid through non-state channels. The basic result also holds for other dimensions of poor governance including human rights violations, lacking representativeness of the government, and high levels of military expenditures.
- For countries such as Somalia or Sudan with low levels of control of corruption, the share of state-to-state aid received was only 4 and 16 percent respectively. In countries such as Bhutan or Namibia with relatively high levels of control of corruption, the share of state-to-state aid was 90 percent.



- The bypassing effect is stronger in aid sectors such as health where donors can more easily switch between aid channels than, for example, in infrastructure, and weaker for higher levels of economic self-interest among donors.
- Donors who bypass recipient governments are likely to be driven by developmental concerns because political and economic self-interests could be pursued much more easily through direct government-to-government contact.

## Implications for aid effectiveness

Donors who bypass recipient governments to raise the impact of their efforts can rely on two lines of reasoning:

- In a setting of already weak governance, large amounts of aid inflows will likely have detrimental effects on institutional quality, for instance by giving rise to rent-seeking behavior. This points to a higher effectiveness of foreign aid allocated through non-state channels.
- The case for bypassing recipient governments is reinforced by the poor record of past efforts to use policy conditionality as a means of initiating reforms that are deemed necessary for aid to be effective. While many aid projects run by NGOs may be locally successful, they are unlikely to contribute to broader development in settings of weak governance. Therefore, we advocate for staying engaged with local administrations to raise democratic accountability and strengthen administrative capacities, avoiding past mistakes by focusing on local ownership of reforms rather than relying on externally-imposed conditions.

## *A New Approach to the Role of Development Aid for Poverty Reduction: Trading-off Needs against Governance*

A frequent criticism raised about aid allocation is the existence of ›aid darlings‹ and ›aid orphans‹ among recipient countries. This is analyzed in a context where aid effectiveness has gained major attention, and donors are trading off between needs and governance quality of the recipient countries. We propose a new approach, a ›need-adjusted aid effectiveness‹ formula, for inter-country aid allocation. The formula is based on a theoretical model: donors care about the amount of aid that actually reaches the poor (needs), which depends on the quality of domestic institutions (governance). In our approach, the donor can rely on disciplining instruments for monitoring and punishment of the aid's (mis-)use. Strikingly, no straightforward result can be drawn; an increase in the likelihood that the poorer country will receive aid depends on the disparity in initial governance levels between the two countries being not too large, and on the cost of moni-

toring being not too sensitive to changes in external disciplining.

### **Policy implications**

- The formula we propose for optimal aid allocation is easy to implement in regards to the first component: one can rely on existing international datasets for measures of poverty and quality of governance.
- The difficulty is measuring the cost of monitoring. In absence of appropriate data, policy makers should simulate different scenarios by varying assumptions regarding such costs.
- This new approach is close in spirit to the Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) formula currently used by some multilateral donors to allocate aid. The key difference is that our formula is determined by an explicit trade-off that allows conditionality and disciplining to improve governance, thus increasing the odds of a poor country being helped.



## *Development Projects and Empowerment in Three Continents: The View of the Beneficiaries*

*»We lighten the burden for each other  
by helping one another to find solutions.«*  
Quote from a grandmother in Botswana

The hypothesis of this qualitative case study: the impact of public aid is greater when empowerment and participation are included in aid projects. We selected informal self-organized groups, SME/CSOs or independent NGOs as well as cooperatives. By implementing a participatory research methodology, the team studied how beneficiaries of empowerment projects perceive their situation and how their potential and capacities are influenced by their projects. Results: The interviewed women describe unexpected topics and approaches to poverty alleviation such as self-organization, future concepts and strategic potential.

Empowerment, inclusive capacity-building, is an open process. Our research shows that empowerment

leads to the perception of spaces of possibilities for the poor. They go beyond their individual perspective, having the community as a whole in mind — a geographical community, a community of traders, a community of informal workers. Empowerment projects offer an enabling environment for struggles for social change, changing relations of social inequality and of gender inequality.

### **Methodology**

We chose six case studies in urban or peri-urban settings in Vietnam, Mexico and Botswana, thereby selecting countries with highly different socioeconomic background: In 2014, the World Bank classifies Vietnam as »lower middle income«, Botswana as »middle income« and Mexico as »upper middle income« country. We applied the method of visual sociology which follows four phases:


1. Creating confidence: ongoing contacts between local and European researchers on the one hand, the interviewees on the other
2. Active photo shooting: local participants take photos of their daily lives and personal surroundings
3. Interpretation by photographers: verbal interview with the researcher about the photographed sites and situations
4. Interpretation of researchers: In each country, we included local research experts sharing the interpretation loops, combining the »view from outside« and the »view from inside« related to the resulting narratives.

### **Case studies from January 2013 to December 2015**

In Vietnam, research focused on women migrants living in the urban area of Ha Noi, in the frame of the initiative »We are the women«. In Mexico, we studied projects in different organisations and countries, amongst others the Cooperativa de Mujeres Ecologistas de la Huizach-

era in Guadalajara, supported by the Instituto Mexicano para el Desarrollo Comunitario. This women's group was preparing the terrain for their future public organic garden — el terreno donde pondrán su huerto orgánico demostrativo. In Mineral de Pozos, we learned about the community project supported by Fundación Comunitaria Del Bajío: a common future scenario process for the development of the whole community.

In Botswana, we have done research with a) women who are members of the self-organized Botswana Informal Sector Association (BOISA) and the Southern Africa Cross Border Traders' Association (SACBTA), both standing up for the rights of vendors and cross border traders and engaged in policy advocacy; and b) female beneficiaries of Stepping Stones International (ssi) that supports vulnerable children, youth and their caregivers, and works in community mobilization and advocacy, in particular in the field of GBV and child abuse.



### Theses resulting from our research:

Women see themselves as agents, not as victims. The women's experiences cannot be understood as singularities, but as embedded in social power relations.

1. Empowerment projects are opening spaces of possibilities for the participants. They become aware of their present and future potentials.
2. Local participants take part in an open process where they develop capacities to decide their own activities and futures.
3. The women's views of their states of living show an ever-growing complexity — from direct needs like garbage collection to health problems and improved working conditions, up to decent life approaches, including happiness («alegria»).
4. Our interviewees see themselves as part of a larger environment, and are involved in projects with the family, the neighbourhood, the city and/or rural settlement, the country, the region (Southeast Asia, SADC, Mesoamerica, etc.).
5. Women find in the context of daily life and labor:
  - self-empowerment processes on individual and collective levels, based on mutual support and non-competitive networks.
  - transformative empowerment processes: mobilization, political self-organization on local, national and supranational level and policy advocacy.
6. Placing and Localization: Empowerment and the appropriation of diverse physical spaces — individually or as «common goods» — foster each other. With the background of a space — for work, for leisure, for future activities — the women describe how space is a source for action.
7. The empowerment projects influence the individual and collective learning; speaking about common experiences provides the chance to understand and change one's own perspective, by understanding legal experiences and providing further knowledge.

## *The Politics of Pro-Poor Policies*

Redistribution and poverty alleviation policies are not always chosen for equity and efficiency reasons. Our research focuses on how politics may distort the adoption and implementation of pro-poor policies. In addition, we explore whether social policies influence the citizens' political behaviour. This could explain why political leaders use or prefer certain pro-poor policies. It is critical to consider these questions as they may reduce the effectiveness of pro-poor policies.

### **Data and methodology**

We first examine whether poverty reduction policies differ between political regimes in a cross-country analysis. We encode a unique quantitative panel data-set that includes 183 social transfer programs for 1960-2014. As illustrated in Figure 1, since the beginning of the 1990s the number of anti-poverty transfer programs has increased considerably. In 2014, more than

65% of all developing countries had at least one social transfer program (see Figure 2). Furthermore, certain policies, in particular conditional cash transfers, seem to expand faster than others, especially in democracies. In an extensive panel data analysis we contrast pure transfers with transfers conditioned on education and health behavior to reveal the incentives of decision makers in democracies versus autocracies.

Second, in order to demonstrate why the choice of transfer programs may be politically driven, we present evidence how social transfers may change political behaviour, in particular of the poor. We examine the impacts of the introduction of social support programs in Mali and Ghana using quantitative methods. Specifically, we extract public survey data (Afrobarometer, <http://www.afrobarometer.org>) purposefully before and after the introduction of conditional transfer programs to compare the changes in the respondents' political behaviour between regions where a program has been implemented and regions without a program.

Finally, we study the potential inefficiencies of social policies caused by political motives. In a case study of Kenya, we exploit a panel data set on the exact location and budget of social projects initiated by the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) between 2003 and 2014. A sudden change in mapping constituencies in 2010 due to changes in the Kenyan constitution leads to a variation of term limits for local members of parliament. As the MPs are those who finally approve the projects, we can study whether the changes in the social fund distribution before and after 2010 are driven by their electoral incentives.

### **Basic insights and evidence**

— Democracies redistribute more than autocracies through pro-poor transfers. This is especially important in view of previous inconclusive empirical findings based on usual proxies such as government

expenditure, tax revenue or social spending.

- Conditional transfer programs are more likely to be chosen under more democratic regimes. They are hardly caused by political motives and rather defined by interests of long-run economic development. There is some evidence that autocracies tend to approve more specific and targeted schemes of transfers than democracies. This lends support to the hypothesis that these transfers are used to buy-off opposition and prevent social unrest.
- Pro-poor policies may act as a tool to please the voters and buy public support. There is evidence that in addition to higher incumbents' support in elections, conditional cash transfers in countries such as Mali and Ghana can lead to a decrease in non-electoral political participation of citizens, e.g. engagement in demonstrations or party affiliation.
- Social policy implementation may also be affected

by political motives. The analysis of the distribution of social funds in Kenya supports the hypothesis that pro-poor policy is based not only on neediness criteria but also tries to manipulate voters.

### Policy implications

- Social transfer programs are likely to be misused in certain situations. Our evidence should be added to the list of arguments against considering such programs as panaceas to end poverty.
- Policy-makers should try to anticipate and offset distortive political effects by using the elements of the policy design such as program type, selection basis, targeting mechanisms and others.
- International donors might provide more support in favour of conditional cash transfers implying investments in education and health. These programs may be somewhat less susceptible to political misuse.




Figure 1: Political Regimes and Transfer Programs

■ conditional cash transfer  
■ pension/cash transfer  
■ others




Figure 2: Coverage of transfer programs in 2014.

Note: Countries with at least one transfer program are marked by blue (100 countries in total or 65% of all developing countries).

■ [0,1]  
■ [0,0]  
■ no data



# Assessment of the Different Measures of Poverty in México: Relevance, Feasibility and Limits

Since 1997, the Mexican government has made many efforts to manage poverty by setting up social programmes. These efforts use rigorous methods to calculate poverty indicators in order to reflect accurately the impact of these programmes in decreasing poverty. The current analysis presents the different measures of poverty that have been used in Mexico, their relevance, and how they affect the perception of the impact of public policies. This research is based on expertise in poverty measurement gained over 30 years in Mexico.

## Four generations of social programmes

After the Mexican Revolution that promised land and equality to all Mexicans, food poverty was increasing, reaching levels above 60% from 1950 to 1958 (Ortega-Díaz & Székely, 2014), and started declining to 45% and 23% in the 1960s. In this period, the first generation of social programmes emerged related to the provision

of health and primary education services, fostering labour unions assuring that minimum wage and legal hours of work were respected, together with labour security, hygiene and transfers in goods.

From the 1970s to the 80s a second generation of social programmes started, providing basic needs like food and sewage services; connections between cities and markets and improved communications through the construction of highways and roads; irrigation for crops; providing funds for microenterprise development in order to build integrated farms and a credit market for agro-production.

During the 1970s and 80s poverty started to decline to 25%–22.5%. In the 1980s, Mexico signed its incorporation to the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Poverty remained static around 22%.

In the 1990's, SOLIDARIDAD turned into PROGRESA. The cash transfer programme started by providing

## Generation of social programmes in Mexico

First generation of programmes (1940s—70s)	• Health services • Labor Union • Free and compulsory primary education • Minimum wage and legal hours • Labour security, hygiene and transfers in goods
Second generation (1970s—80s)	• Food provision • Sewage service provision • Interventions in production (highways, roads, water) • Funds / assessment in microenterprises development, integral farms, agroproduction
Third generation (1990s)	• Cash transfers • Transfer to disabled people • Social and household infrastructure improvement • Food pensions for the elderly • Single mother scholarships
Fourth generation (currently)	• Private and social inclusion • Social housing

Source: Ortega-Díaz, A., & Vilalta, C. (2012). The Challenge of Inequality and Poverty. In T. d. Monterrey (Ed.), Building a Future for Mexico (Vol. 1). Mexico.



improvements to social and household infrastructure and switched to health, education and nutrition.

PROGRESA turned into OPORTUNIDADES between 2000 and 2010. This increased the number of beneficiaries but little else changed. Some energy (electricity and gas) components were added to the original programme, but these did not work and were cancelled in 2012. The government extended the programmes related to private and social inclusion, and social housing. Poverty started declining and reached 13.8%, but the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent food basket inflation had an impact, increasing poverty above 18%.

From 2014, OPORTUNIDADES became PROSPERA, and extended the education component to higher education and entry into the labour market.

During all these stages of social programme development there was a steady increase in knowledge that lead to improvements in selecting beneficiaries more carefully. For example, programmes switched from using income indicators, to using indicators that include many other dimensions according to the General Law of Social Development.

### Comparison among measures

In the research we compared the presence and absence of different measures of well-being. For the time being the following enlisted dimensions are used to select beneficiaries of social programmes: Education, health, food, social security, basic services in the household, house materials, social cohesion, household members, labour income, non-labour income, population distribution, labour rights, and family care. In relation to these dimensions, six parameters showing the multidimensional character of poverty were compared: social lag, marginalization, income poverty, labour poverty, non-decent work. In the research we observed that the following dimensions are present most of the time: income, education, social security

(including access to health services), and services in the household.

### Public policy example: How to use this measure

This section highlights the importance of having at least two measures of wellbeing that indicate the level of poverty viewed from different perspectives, because the objective of the measurement is to help policy makers target poverty accurately. One example where a single measure is not enough is when we are looking at poverty geographically. For example, using a measure (index) of marginalization at state level to tackle extreme poverty may be misleading because the data may not reveal inequality within the state, and the fact that some municipalities are living in extreme poverty will go unnoticed. Going deeper into the data, we can use the marginalization index by locality. This will reveal the importance of the unit of measurement, and acknowledges that the density of households in a region must be investigated further. Then we must decide which household in a particular area should be selected, and we require another index. Assessing which dimension of deprivation is the most relevant to tackle is better done by using a multidimensional index where dimensions can be analysed in isolation, one by one, and by household, rather than with a marginalization index that is an aggregated measure of the geographical area.

The research showed that we need different tools to select the household and the deprivation measures and to determine whether it is a priority to set a) a social programme that fights access to health services; or b) a social programme that provides access to education. One single index will not provide us with all the information we need to take a policy decision.

*Ortega-Díaz, A. and Székely, M. (2014). Pobreza Alimentaria y Desarrollo en México. El Trimestre Económico, Vol. LXXXI(321), 43–105.*

## *Minimum Wage, Income Distribution and Poverty in Brazil*

The minimum wage (mw) was established in Brazil in the early 1940s. Initially there were different values for the mw according to the level of development and the cost of living in different regions. Not until the 1980s was there the national unification of mw; however, some more developed states, like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, have slightly higher levels than the national mw. Since the 2000s, minimum wage has been going through an intense process of growth in Brazil. Although no well-defined rule for its adjustment existed until recently, the political and economic situation of the country favored the granting of real increases. The result is that mw grew 74% in real terms between 2003 and 2013.

Currently, mw annually receives the correction of inflation by the national index of consumer prices (INPC), as well as real increase according to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate recorded two

years earlier. This rule should remain so until 2019.

Brazil is known for its great social inequalities, which are reflected in the unequal distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, the main income distribution indicators experienced great improvement. The Gini index of household per capita income distribution, for example, fell from 0.583 in 2003 to 0.527 in 2013. Similarly, poverty rates also fell sharply. The proportion of poor households was reduced from 28% to 12% over the same period.

The role of mw in Brazil is not limited to the labor market, in that it also represents the floor of the benefits of the official social security system. Therefore, its potential for improving income distribution is very large. The Nopoor research estimates that about half of the improvement on income distribution in this period may be attributed to the increase in mw.

The mw's policy has provoked discussions among ex-



perts in the country. There is general recognition that it played an important role in improving the distribution of income, but there are authors who place more emphasis on targeted programs of income transfers, such as the Bolsa Família Program, whose effect on poverty reduction is unquestionable. In general, such criticisms are related to the fact that people who receive MW in the labor market or as pensions are not the poorest ones, and that MW increase has an unfavorable effect on public accounts.

Brazil was able to implement the policy to increase MW in the last years to that extent because its real value had suffered great losses due to the high inflation rates before the implementation of the Real Plan to combat inflation in 1994. Therefore, part of its increase in recent years is just the recovery of past losses. At the same time, its growth contributed to increasing the purchase power of the population, helping to boost

GDP from the demand side of the economy.


To be implemented, such a MW policy must take into account the level of labor productivity. Therefore, it should be complemented with measures to increase labor productivity so that the legislation can be respected and there is no increase in informality in the labor market.

In 2014 Brazil started an economic recessive process that is already in its third year. Thus the continuity of MW growth was threatened. Regardless, the existence of a policy such as the one currently acting in the country ensures that at least the inflation rate is passed on to the MW value in order to avoid real losses.

The MW elevation policy practiced in Brazil could serve as inspiration for other countries where income distribution is very uneven, but would have to be adapted to each situation according to the economic and social reality of the country. Otherwise, there would be serious difficulties in its implementation. In conclusion, MW policy in Brazil is an example of success in social and economic terms, contributing to an increase of GDP, improvement of income distribution and decrease in poverty in the last years.

### Policy recommendations:

- The increase in the MW has great potential for improving income distribution and reducing poverty.
- To achieve better results in terms of combating poverty, MW increase policies should be complemented with targeted income transfer programs such as Bolsa Família.
- The MW increase policy should not only be proactive but also appropriate for the labor market characteristics and productivity level of the country.



Minimum Wage (R\$ of 2013), GINI Index and Poverty Rate – 2003/2008/2013.  
The value of MW in 2013 corresponds to US\$ 377 ppp.  
(Source: IPEADATA)

## *The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India*

The recognition of employment creation as the cornerstone of inclusive growth was instrumental in the enactment of the NREGS ACT in 2006, with an average annual outlay of around 5 billion € per year, making it one of the largest employment programs in the world.

The basic feature which separates NREGS from other employment generation programmes is the fact that it is backed by legislative authority and is closer to a right to employment than a scheme for public employment. It essentially entitles every household in rural areas to a maximum of 100 days of employment for adults willing to do unskilled manual work on public works. The demand-driven nature of NREGS is an essential differentiating feature compared to previous schemes, which were dependent on the willingness of the state to provide employment. Secondly, it imposes the bonus of implementation of the programme on the households, by registration for the scheme and also through

participation in village councils and social audits. The third distinguishing feature is the nature of transparency and monitoring safeguards that have been built in the programme. The fourth feature is the provision of unemployment allowance, including penalty and fines in case the government fails to provide employment within a stipulated period of time (fifteen days). And last, but not least, is the fact that wages paid for NREGS employment are official minimum wages (which are generally higher than the private casual wages in the agricultural labour market).

The act came into force in February 2006, covering only the 200 poorest districts of the country, and has been expanded to cover all rural areas of the country since April 2008. After it was renamed as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in 2009, it was implemented in three phases. In its first phase, the act was introduced in 200 of the most backward districts. Under the second phase, which was initiated in 2007, another 185 districts were brought under its ambit. The third phase, which occurred in quick succession, spread to the remaining 285 rural districts.

The statistics of the Indian Ministry of Rural Development for the period between the launch of the NREGS in February 2006 and March 2014 show that over 16.5 billion person days have been provided under the Scheme. While this may be, in isolation, a staggering figure, it hides what observers of the programme have known for a few years — the Scheme may be losing steam. This is evidenced by the fact that the budget outlay for the NREGS at the centre has been declining since peaking around 2010–11, even though minimum wages under the Scheme have gone up. This has been mirrored by a commensurate reduction in households employed and person days generated.

While various explanations have emerged, there is some consensus within the establishment that the

demand for NREGS has become satiated. Given that the years of relative decline in NREGS performance also coincide with years of significant wage increase and sharp reduction in rural poverty, there is some merit to arguments in favour of demand saturation. Nonetheless, there is also ample evidence, based on secondary data as well as primary field studies, to suggest that the decline in person days generated is not entirely attributable to increasing prosperity in rural areas. In particular, supply-side factors, such as flow of finances, administrative bottlenecks, corruption and leakage, minimum wage policy as well as flaws in the program, have also contributed to a relative decline in the functioning of the programme.

NREGS has played a much larger role in revitalising the labour market in rural areas. It has led to the creation of a class of workers who are using the scheme as a safety net, and these workers are also able to use



it as a bargaining tool for extraction of higher wages. Although the evidence is so far limited to infer that the general upturn in rural wages has been led by the scheme, there is at least acceptance that it may have played a role, directly through upward pressure on wages and tightening of the supply of casual labour to the market, and indirectly through the pressure on the state governments to increase minimum wages. The fact that the success of NREGS has also led to a large section of farmers organizing politically against the act is an additional proof of the ability of the programme to generate pressure on private wages. Similar evidence of a slow-down in rural-urban migration and its impact on urban wages is yet to be clearly established.

Could the finances allocated to NREGS have had a greater effect on poverty if they had been allocated to the public goods that enhance human capabilities in a durable way, by expanding their opportunities through education, training and greater social mobility, as some critics of the program have argued? NREGS has served the purpose of mitigating short term vulnerability of the poor through employment provision; it enables the creation of a framework of rights. This does not pre-empt a larger debate on the institutional and policy instruments needed for impacting the causes of long term poverty. We would argue that the short and long term objectives are not mutually exclusive. While investment in human and physical infrastructure will take time to create opportunities, NREGS is like a social safety net which does not only take care of the immediate vulnerabilities; the jobs provided are manual, and generally done by people who are excluded and marginalised, like women and scheduled casts/scheduled tribes (SC/ST). There is no inevitable conflict between the two objectives. Both should continue and, as and when there is no need for such a social safety net, the programme will automatically close down.

## *Segregation in Metropolitan Lima*

### **Economic residential segregation in Lima**

In Perú it is well known that poverty levels have reduced from around 55% in 2005 to 22% in 2014. Research conducted by Nopoor researchers using census data shows that residential segregation diminished between 1993 and 2007. However, despite a period of economic growth and poverty reduction, there are neighbourhoods in metropolitan Lima that are still economically segregated. The global spatial socioeconomic dissimilarity segregation index for two groups in 1993 was 0.75 whereas it was 0.65 in 2007, whilst the a-spatial version of the index doesn't show similar changes. However using the global spatial index we obtain a moderate change whilst if we had considered the a-spatial version of the index. It's worthwhile to note that the segregation level is still very high for international standards of developing countries. Segregation may involve not only socio-economic status but may

include other, non-economic, dimensions. Our findings reveal that (not surprisingly) the socio-economic status is the dimension where segregation levels are the highest, followed by occupational class.

### **New faces of poverty: Segregation and its consequences for violence against women**

With this background of persistent economical residential segregation our Nopoor project used quantitative and qualitative surveys to understand the links between segregation and violence against women in poor contexts. In Peru, there is currently a high rate of women experiencing violence by their intimate partners. According to the 2012 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 45.4% of Peruvian women have been subjected at least once to some type of violence — psychological, physical or sexual — by their spouses or intimate partners.

According to the Nopoor survey, approximately 55% of women report they have been mistreated by their partners. Our results show also that women whose mothers were subjected to violence by their spouse or partner, who experienced violence as children, and whose spouses have controlling behavior, are the most likely to experience psychological or physical violence.

Finally, at the neighbourhood level, higher educational and socioeconomic segregation is associated with a higher rate of domestic violence, either psychological or physical, controlling for all the other factors. Why is segregation related to more violence towards women in poor contexts? We found that in those settings there are a number of institutions that become increasingly isolated from the standards of conduct and other »normal« patterns of behaviour which prevail in the cities. Domestic violence has a form of social validation, and both a social acceptance of violence and the victims' fear of stigmatization drive people to accept and hide personal cases of violence. We found



also that in more segregated areas men exert more control over women's decisions and this factor increases the likelihood of violence towards women.

### **How it is possible to change this situation?**

In a situation of domestic violence, women may go to a number of protective institutions, be it to make a report or file a complaint, or to receive social and psychological support. However the ENDES Demographic and Health Survey (INEI, 2012) shows that only 25.7% of women victims of physical violence asked for help from an institution. Why? There are some individual explanations, such as the fear for children's safety, lack of confidence in the possible outcomes, and economic dependence on the perpetrator. Also at this level, we found that any legal complaint had a greater chance of being lodged if the woman had more education or if the violence was extremely severe. The more institutional-



»Lomo de Corvina« in Villa el Salvador, Lima, where Nopoor fieldwork was carried out.  
(Picture: Manuel Etesse)

ized violence which was less severe was less reported.

At the institutional level, change will come from increasing the reputation of protective institutions, and building the trust women have in them. Studies have found that women's expectations regarding the legal system also influence their decision whether to report the violence or not (Lewis, Dobash, Dobash and Cavanagh, 2000).

Other studies have found that the prevalence of prejudice and oppression in police and judicial institutions is another factor that prevents women from accessing them (Akers and Kaukinen, 2009). In our case we found barriers and constraints to the actual process of reporting, which include confusion regarding the legal framework; delays in legal proceedings; and a lack of coordination among various agencies. All of these factors contribute to women's frustration and their decision not to proceed with a formal complaint.

Given that people living in segregated spaces are more physically isolated from public institutions, creating more local institutions or having more public specialist spaces will help people to gain trust and confidence. But also we have evidence that looking for help from neighbours can reduce the rates of domestic violence. In the absence of local institutions, those personal networks can help both to reduce the social acceptance of violence and also can act as informal protective institutions for women.

*Dobash, R. P., Dobash, R. E., Cavanagh, K. and Lewis, R. (2000). Changing Violent Men. Thousand Oaks: Sage.*

*Akers C. and Kaukinen C. (2009). The police reporting behaviour of intimate partner violence victims. Journal of Family Violence, Vol. 24, No. 3: 159–171.*

## *Social Protection: What about Young People not in Employment, nor in Education, nor in Training?*

### **The labour market seen through the eyes of youth**

In 2013, about 73.8 million young people between the age of 15 and 24 worldwide were unemployed, representing an unemployment rate of 12.6% (ILO, 2013). According to ILO forecasts, this percentage will increase until 2018, at which point it is anticipated to stabilize with around 12.9%. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 43.3% of unemployed people are between 15–24 years old. Between 2000 and 2011, the region has recorded 4.9% annual economic growth according to World Bank Development Indicators, while the ILO statistics record a 4% drop in the proportion of young people with a job over the same time period. One of the main reported characteristics of the youth labour market in Sub-Saharan Africa is the inadequacy of training. This, against the growing demand for labour across all sectors, is highly problematic.

The labour market's usual indicators are unemployment, the employment rate, and the rate of participation in the labour market. However, these indicators do not help us to measure accurately how vulnerable young people are in the labour market. Hence, it is important to find other indicators that take into account the complexity of the youth's situation in the context of the labour market.

### **The NEET approach**

The term NEET is being widely used to refer to young people who are not in education, employment or training. In its 2011 report, the ILO stated that counting NEETs gave a much more accurate measure of the potential youth labour force supply. According to the OECD, NEET is a performance measurement of the youth labour market to the extent that it represents the number of young people at the threshold of marginalization or social exclusion (Quintini&Martin, 2006).

The purpose of this research is to assess the phenomenon of NEET, identify the key factors that contribute to the likelihood of young people ending up in this sector, and explore meaningful ways of targeting this part of the population. Interest in the NEET population is growing due to the large numbers of youth in this situation.

### **The case of Senegal**

The Senegalese youth population is marked by the predominance of individuals with no school education at all, despite a general decrease in the proportion of uneducated youth over the 1995–2011 period.

Table 1 (see next page) shows the NEET rate based on ILO data. In this case, it appears that 40.35% of the youth population in Senegal belongs to the NEET category. Those who are 20–24 years old are more affected (41.42% of this age belongs to NEET category), followed by the age groups of 25–29 and 30–34 years. How-




ever, when the definition of NEET status is extended to include >under-employment<, then one young person in two is affected. Those who are between 25–29 years old suffer more from this phenomenon than the others.

The key factors which significantly affect the probability of being in the NEET group are:

1. the existence of a physical and/or mental disability;
2. residence in a rural area;
3. gender;
4. education; and
5. the activity of the head of household.

With no disability, the risk of being a NEET decreases by 38.5%. Being a resident in a rural area increases the risk of being a NEET — the likelihood is 21% higher for a young man in a rural area than in an urban area. This risk increases relatively more among women.



*Table 1:  
NEET rates  
based on the  
ILO approach*

Age	NEET rate under ILO approach	NEET rate extended to underemployment
15–19	29.21	37.54
20–24	41.42	50.25
25–29	40.08	51.94
20–34	35.53	50.13
15–34	40.35	43.77

However, even though young women are relatively more exposed to the risk, our results reveal that young people who belong to households headed by women are less vulnerable.

Furthermore, the probability of being a NEET decreases with age. A higher level of education of the head of the household also significantly reduces the probability of belonging to the NEET category. Vulnerability decreases when the head of the household is part of the active labour force, compared to those who are unemployed. The gender and education of the head of household are not significant to explain this phenomenon. If elders, women and children are covered by a social protection system, this is not the case for the youth category.

As the NEET category is of major concern for policy makers in developing economies, targeting the youth population that belongs to households stuck in poverty can be a strong tool for social protection policies aimed at young people.

The measurement of the depth of poverty at the scale of households in Senegal show that there is need for FCFA 95,985, FCFA 212,415 and FCFA 257,053 respectively for each household affected by poverty in Dakar, in the other urban centres and in rural areas in order to get away from the poverty line.

For households including at least one NEET, the poverty headcount is equal to 49.5% while it is equal to 44.7% for households without a young with NEET status.

For 173.33 working days at a rate of FCFA 209.1, an hour for non-farming activities and FCFA 179.91 an hour for farming activities, the guaranteed minimum inter-professional salary (SMIG) is FCFA 36,243/month (which makes FCFA 1,812 and CFA 31,184/month (which makes FCFA 1,559/day) respectively in the farming and non-farming sectors. In a perspective of guaranteeing for the Government respectively a SMIG level of FCFA

36,243 FCFA/month in urban areas and FCFA 31,184/month in rural areas, this amount represents 53 days or two months of job per annum for a young person belonging to a poor household in Dakar, 117 days, or four months of job for a young person belonging to a poor household in the other urban centres, and 165 days or five months of job to a young person belonging to a poor household in the rural areas.

### Policy lessons

High labour intensity programmes must be put in place in order to reduce the NEET population. Targeting of the young NEET population and the development of a high labour intensity approach will mean for the Government and its institutions such as local communities, ministries, agencies, etc., creating a significant amount of public job opportunities and general interest work. This policy which would enable the government to in-

tervene directly in the labour market in order to stimulate job creation, could drive a significant reduction of poverty and would be a significant social protection policy aimed at the youth population.

*Our acknowledgment to Alhassane Camara for his assistance.*

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*International Labour office (2014): »Global Employment Trends 2014: Risk of a jobless recovery?«, Geneva.*

*Quintini, G. and Martin S. (2006). Starting well or losing their way? The position of Youth in the Labour Market in OECD Countries. OECD Social Employment and migration working papers, no. 39. Paris: OECD Publishing.*

Determinants of NEET: results of the regression							
Pr(Y)	Odds Ratio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Area of residence	0,792	-0,233	0,044	-5,330	0,000	-0,318	-0,147
Sex	3,871	1,354	0,041	32,660	0,000	1,272	1,435
Age	0,996	-0,004	0,002	-2,600	0,009	-0,007	-0,001
Education level							
Primary school	5,842	1,765	0,155	11,420	0,000	1,462	2,068
Lower secondary school	6,281	1,837	0,158	11,620	0,000	1,527	2,147
Higehr secondary school	5,032	1,616	0,169	9,540	0,000	1,284	1,948
Higher education	4,798	1,568	0,214	7,330	0,000	1,149	1,987
Disability	0,615	-0,486	0,107	-4,570	0,000	-0,695	-0,277
Head of household activity							
occupied	1,070	0,067	0,187	0,360	0,718	-0,298	0,433
inactive	1,333	0,287	0,044	6,510	0,000	0,201	0,374
Head of household sex	1,011	0,011	0,051	0,220	0,827	-0,088	0,111

Determinants of NEET: results of the regression							
Education level of the head of household							
Primary school	0,931	-0,072	0,050	-1,430	0,153	-0,170	0,027
Lower secondary school	0,891	-0,116	0,067	-1,740	0,082	-0,246	0,015
Higehr secondary school	0,958	-0,042	0,082	-0,520	0,605	-0,203	0,118
Higher education	0,861	-0,149	0,104	-1,430	0,153	-0,354	0,055
Matrimonial status of the head of household							
polygamous	0,904	-0,101	0,043	-2,360	0,018	-0,185	-0,017
single	1,038	0,037	0,151	0,250	0,806	-0,259	0,333
widower	0,946	-0,055	0,072	-0,770	0,442	-0,195	0,085
divorced	1,248	0,221	0,122	1,810	0,070	-0,018	0,460
_cons	0,031	-3,480	0,191	-18,220	0,000	-3,854	-3,105
Number of obs = 21698							
LR chi2(23) = 1632.98							
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000							
PseudoR2 = 0.0814							

Sources: ILO, Diagnostic Study on youth employment in Senegal, 2013; Calculations.

## *Free Trade Agreements and Labour Standards*

Over the last two decades, the number of regional and preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) has dramatically increased. In many cases, this growing economic integration among countries has been paired with the introduction of provisions concerning social issues and labour rights.

### **The main goals behind labour provision are diverse:**

- Defending a »fair trade« and combating the so-called »social dumping«
- Avoiding the undesirable effects of FTAs on jobs and sustainable development
- Upholding universal, internationally recognized values
- Promoting decent work and sustainable development

Provisions also differ by the coverage of different issues, the juridical form (preamble, chapter, annex, ...), by procedures for consultation and dispute settlement. We can notice that sanctions are rarely used even when they are provided in the trade agreement.

The relationship between international trade agreements and labour rights is still a controversial issue. While some consider the inclusion of these provisions as an effective mechanism for raising labour standards, improving working conditions and reducing poverty in developing countries, others judge them as ineffective, unenforceable or even as a form of disguised protectionism.

This research, led by Jean-Marc Siroën and David Andrade, suggests that labour provisions fail to play a significant role in the improvement of labour practices, and that their effect has been somewhat limited to institutional measures such as the ratification of ILO conventions concerned by fundamental labour rights. This gap between formal involvement and the actual protection of labour rights highlights the importance of the enforceability of these labour rights provisions.

From our empirical estimations, countries that ratify trade agreements with labour provisions tend to have a higher number of ILO conventions included in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), which concerns forced labour, collective bargaining, child labour and discrimination at work. In contrast, trade agreements without labour provisions do not have any effect on ratification.

Countries may use the ratification of ILO conventions as a more visible way to signal their commitments regarding the protection of workers' rights. Nevertheless, ratification does not always reflect the real compliance of workers' rights. Trade agreements without labour clauses exert a positive effect on real workers' right for developing countries, whereas trade in PTAs has no effect in developed nations, regardless

of whether labour provisions are included. Labour provisions in trade agreements do not directly and automatically translate into improvements of workers' rights, which highlights the importance of the enforcement mechanisms.

The EU General System of Preference applies a system of »positive« sanction (GSP+), giving more preference to countries accepting deeper commitments in compliance with human and labour rights. This principle of positive sanction has also been successfully experimented by the former US-Cambodia agreement on textiles.

### Policy recommendations

- Labour provisions should contain clauses in which the parties expressly recognize the core conventions as the benchmark for acceptable working conditions and the legitimacy of ILO.
- Monitoring of the implementation of labour clauses and its follow up procedures should be strengthened and more systematically applied.
- For new RTAs, EU might schedule an enlargement of preferences, bound to improvements in workers' rights and eventually targeted on sectors or firms.
- The close involvement of civil society should continue to be considered as fundamental for successful implementation of the provisions. Civil society's role should not be limited to denouncing violations of labour rights, but rather extended to giving advice and monitoring, which will provide more credibility if it is carried out by experts that are independent from states. Here, the ILO could play a crucial role as well.

### Final remarks

In comparison with USA or Canada, the EU is not the most activist trade power for including provisions concerning fundamental labour rights (chapter or annex) in RTAs. Although the efficiency of such inclusion is debatable, these provisions reinforce and legitimise the domestic pressure of civil society and give a lever to governments for acting in favour of more respectful labour rights applied in partner countries where they are clearly violated.

The disappointment in the world towards the social benefits of trade openness and the political pressure — including the ratification process by the European parliament — will imply that all new steps to a more open world should drive more attention to labour rights and, more broadly, to sustainable development.



## *Free Trade Zones and Poverty: the Case of Manaus*

The study contributes to the literature on the social impacts of Special Economic Zones by analyzing the dynamics of poverty and inequality in the Brazilian state of Amazonas, where the Free Trade Zone of Manaus (FTZM) is located.

### **Data and Methodology**

This research uses Brazilian census data and micro-decomposition methods to identify and quantify the relevant factors that account for observed changes in income poverty and inequality from 2000 to 2010 in the municipality of Manaus (where the Free Trade Zone is established) and in the rest of the Amazonas state. Using average estimations in order to avoid decomposition path dependency, two methods are implemented:

1. an assessment of the relationship between poverty, economic growth and inequality by breaking down changes in poverty into growth and redistribution components;
2. a quantification of the contributions of changes in demographics, employment, labor income and non-labor income to distributional changes.

These accounting methods are applied separately to the municipality of Manaus and the rest of the state of Amazonas, but also to total and urban Brazil samples to view our results from a country perspective.

### **Highlights**

- The 2000 — 2010 decade was a period of significant, widespread improvements in poverty and inequality indicators in Brazil. The state of Amazonas, where the FTZM is located, was no exception to this trend.
- During this time frame, the FTZM output and employment soared, while Brazil as a whole was hit by a relative decline in the industrial sector.
- Striking differences are still observed between the Manaus capital and the rest of the state, both in income measures and living conditions.  
For example,
- if over half of the population in the rest of Amazonas had a monthly income below the R\$140 threshold in 2010, no more than 20% of the municipality of Manaus had such a low income level.
- if over 75% of the population of Manaus had access to a municipal water supply in 2010, this was true for less than 50% of the population in the rest of the state.
- Our first decomposition methods shows that income growth was the most important factor behind observed poverty changes in Amazonas state (not solely in the municipal area of Manaus). The role of redistribution, though very similar to the growth

component in Brazil, seems to have counted less in Manaus and especially in the rest of the state of Amazonas.

- Our second decomposition shows that, among the poverty and inequality reduction drivers, labor income plays a major role in Manaus, whereas the contribution of non-labor income is far more important in the rest of Amazonas.
- These contrasting results between the Manaus capital and the rest of the state of Amazonas illustrate both the benefits and limitations of the FTZM's good economic performance over the last decade.
- However, without the FTZM, the situation would probably have been worse, not only in terms of social outcomes, but also possibly from an ecological point of view (comparisons of deforestation and predatory vegetal extraction rates with other Amazonian states in Brazil rank the state of Amazonas among the lowest). In addition to ecological arguments, the creation of the FTZM is also regarded as a successful regional development strategy, contributing to the spatial decentralization of Brazilian industrial activities.

### Policy Implications


- While the FTZM's spillover effects may still be limited, it is also rather bothersome to find that non-labor income appears to contribute less to poverty reduction in the rest of the state of Amazonas than in Brazil as a whole. We interpret this result as probable evidence of social transfer targeting problems in remote areas of the state.
- Training programs for the poor, enhancing their »employability«, and better targeting of social policies is recommended to improve social outcomes in poorer areas of the Amazon region.

### Stakeholders


This research represents a partnership between Université Paris-Dauphine and Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Dissemination seminars were held at Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), Universidade Federal do Amazonas (UFAM), with participation of SUFRAMA executives at the 2015 DIAL Development Conference and at the Nopoor Workshop »Poverty, Inequality and Redistribution« (CSAE Oxford St Catherine's College).

The table below is based on:

- Azevedo, J. P., Inchauste G., Olivieri S, Saavedra J. and H. Winkler (2013). »Is Labor Income Responsible for Poverty Reduction? A Decomposition Approach«. Policy Research Working Paper 6414, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Barros, R.P., Carvalho, M., Franco, A. and R. Mendonça (2006). »Uma Análise das Principais Causas da Queda Recente na Desigualdade de Renda Brasileira«. Revista Econômica, 8 (1).



*Average contribution of size and redistribution effects to poverty changes. The ceteris paribus strategy is implemented by comparing observed outcomes with counterfactual distributions (where either mean income or distribution are kept constant).*



*Determinants of household income changes, following Azevedo et al. (2012), which builds on previous work by Barros et al. (2006).*

## *How to Generate a Pool of Specialized Technicians to Fulfill the Jobs Created through Free Trade*

### **Integral vocational training**

After two decades, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) continues to be an effective tool to attract foreign direct investment to Mexico, especially in the automobile and aerospace industries. The issue now is how to train skilled technicians to keep up with the future demand for jobs (over 42,000 in the automobile sector alone by 2018). In order to solve the problem of a scarcity of skilled technicians, firms have developed a diverse range of vocational training programs: in-house training, programs linked to local technical schools, and even the creation of specialized universities. However, these efforts have remained firm-specific, dispersed, and uncoordinated.

Integral vocational training only became an issue recently when German firms started to demand »certifications« from the German-Mexican Business Chamber (CAMEXA) for their trained technicians. In Germany,

such certifications are granted by business chambers after apprentices have followed integral vocational mixed programs (partly at school and partly at the firms) called Dual Systems. The certifications help firms ensure the quality required for their needs, as well as to provide quality assurance to their customers.

Experience on how to conduct Dual Systems in the Mexican context had already been acquired for years by a German specialist who teamed up with technical schools (CONALEP) and started offering dual training programs to firms in the State of Mexico. However, it was not until later that the Employer Confederation of Mexico (COPARMEX) helped to set up a Core Group to come up with a unique model for Mexico and put the topic on the national political agenda. The Core Group was formed by CAMEXA, CONALEP, COPARMEX and the Ministry of Education. They met regularly to develop a pilot program of the Mexican Model of Dual Formation



*Educandos in the dual system receiving training on aerospace manufacturing equipment at CECATI 84 Technical School in Mexicali, Baja California, Mexico (Picture: Edgar Aragón)*



or MMFD (see Table). It ran from 2013 to 2015, managing to train over 1,000 apprentices, or educandos as they are called in Mexico.

The key feature of the MMFD is that dual systems provide integral training in several competences attributed to a technical specialization. This takes place mainly at the firm level by rotating educandos within the diversity of the manufacturing operations and by providing them with practical knowledge at competence centers and technical schools to meet the standards. The technical certification granted in Mexico will also be valid in Germany, recognition appealing to multinationals and Mexican firms, increasing the employability of educandos.

There is some evidence that graduated educandos have better job opportunities. In Baja California and Sonora, educandos who have finished their pilot dual training have been hired more quickly by firms manu-

#### The 10 features of the Mexican Model of Dual Formation (MMFD)

1. Competence standards guide the students in dual training.
2. Rotation plan at the firm level guarantees the acquisition of different skillsets to meet the standards.
3. Certified instructors oversee students at the firm level.
4. Suitable work space allows students gradual inclusion in company operations.
5. Weekly evaluations to monitor progress (through an online platform, for example)
6. Competence center support when certain skills cannot be acquired at the firm.
7. Institutional follow up by private associations, e.g., by COPARMEX and CAMEXA.
8. Legal status for the educandos at the firm as trainees with a scholarship, not as workers.
9. 2-year program as minimum; during the last years of high-school. Age: 16 years old.
10. Technical evaluation, external certification valid in Germany.

facturing parts for planes. In the later state even at double the entrance salary, making the program attractive for students from low income regions. Thus, people from poor communities have the opportunity to choose whether they would like to pursue these types of jobs, or to do something different, such as fishing or agriculture. Having a stable source of income with an income higher than the average manufacturing job, plus social security benefits for their family, seems to be attractive enough for students to pursue dual training.

Now that the dual pilot phase has ended, the program is being upscaled at the national level, to all states and all technical education systems with the goal to generate 10,000 educandos by 2018. There are many challenges ahead, including creating the standards for each competence, further developing the institutional framework, maintaining the quality of the model during the expansion phase, and keeping up with the demand. In sum, dual systems seem to be helping both, students from low-income neighborhoods to find jobs, and firms to increase the pool of specialized technicians in Mexico.

#### Policy recommendations to generate pools of specialized technicians

1. Start the process by setting up a Core Group of leaders who coordinate efforts among private firms, technical school, public education officials and German stakeholders.
2. Build knowledge about Dual Systems by creating links between the stakeholders and their respective parallel institutions in Germany.
3. Provide public incentives (scholarships to educandos) to facilitate the participation of the private sector, as there is no commitment by educandos to stay with the firm afterwards.
4. Give priority to technical schools in low-income neighborhoods.



## *Is Inequality Inevitable? A Survey Experiment on Demand for Redistribution in South Africa*

### **Inequality traps**

With inequality rising in many countries around the world in recent decades, theory leads us to expect that this will stimulate a higher demand for redistribution and, ultimately, more observed redistribution. However, evidence of this is conspicuously lacking. Indeed, citizens in countries with higher levels of inequality do not appear to demand higher levels of redistribution. This speaks to the concept of »inequality traps« whereby high levels of inequality may to some degree persist because redistribution does not occur to a meaningful extent.

Our work examines the role that perceptions about the inevitability of the status quo with regards to South Africa's income distribution play in the demand for redistribution. If citizens believe that high inequality is inevitable and cannot be changed, they may become resigned and demobilized and demand little redistribu-

tion as a result. This type of mechanism is likely to be particularly important in high-inequality settings. As such, South Africa is particularly well suited to address our question because it displays very high and persistent inequality but only average levels of demand for redistribution.

### **The survey project**


A survey experiment was carried out in three low-income townships in the Cape Town metropolitan area. The experiment took place in two waves, the first just before the general elections in 2014 and the second a year later. Respondents came from townships which included both formal and informal settlements.

Respondents were randomly allocated to one of two survey groups:

- International information survey group: Respondents were provided with information demonstrating that South African income inequality is unusually high in comparison with other countries. It showed the rich-poor ratio in South Africa, as well as in some other developing and developed nations. Importantly, it included some of South Africa's neighbouring countries and showed that South Africa's rich-poor ratio is by far the worst of the group. The provision of lower inequality benchmarks was intended to increase respondents' perception that South Africa's inequality is exceptional and not a »fact of life«.
- Local information survey group: In order to control for other responses that the international comparison might elicit, this group of respondents was provided with information on the high levels of inequality in South Africa alone. This treatment mainly involved showing differences in income and asset ownership across various neighbourhoods of Cape Town.

The survey also included an additional section showing video messages of South African leaders talking about the need to fight inequality, with the intention of further reducing the sense of inevitability of inequality. However, this section affected neither the beliefs that South African politicians care about decreasing inequality nor the beliefs about inequality, and therefore is not included in this discussion.

After each survey group received the information (either the international information or the placebo), respondents answered questions regarding their preference for redistribution, including opinions about changing taxes for the rich; introducing a basic income grant; and increasing general taxation in order to provide public services. Finally, they were offered the chance to sign a petition or send a text message in favour of or against two redistributive policies.



## Attitudes

It was found that information on inequality in both local and international contexts increases the degree to which respondents view inequality as a serious problem. In contrast, neither the international information nor the local placebo information affects the attitudes on whether the government should take more responsibility to care for the poor. In line with expectations, the local information on inequality does not affect perceptions of inevitability but the international information does, very strongly.

## Policy preferences

Providing the international information leads to an increase in support for redistributive policies (both in terms of opinion and willingness to sign a petition), while providing the local information does not. Our findings are consistent across race and age groups.

## Implications for policy

- Our results indicate that the very persistence of inequality may induce pervasive perceptions of inevitability, which can lead to low demand for redistribution and, ultimately, perpetuate the status quo.
- Policies aiming to reduce inequality may thus be more effective if they can interrupt this vicious cycle of long-term high inequality related to perceptions of inevitability.
- Information campaigns emphasizing the exceptionally high levels of inequality and the possibility of reducing it can affect people's demand for redistribution and, consequently, enlarge the set of policy options.

## *Activation of Food Markets and Food Security: Impacts of Cereal Banks in Northern Burkina Faso*

The NGO program of community-based food security interventions in rural Northern Burkina Faso provides credit and technical assistance to village-level organizations — called Food Security Granaries (FSGs) — that buy, store and sell food grain in isolated, thin local food markets. Relying on a randomization at the community level and data points before and after treatment, we find that FSGs have a large positive impact on nutritional outcomes of adults and children. They enable beneficiaries to avoid deterioration of their nutritional status in a drought year. The effects of the intervention are especially strong for people living in remote communities. Households bought food closer to their dwellings, at lower prices and more according to their needs. Surprisingly, treated households did not consume more or better food than control households over the agricultural cycle. The timing of purchases is critical to understand this puzzle. By purchasing food

later in the cycle, households manage the allocation of consumption better over the year. They can increase food consumption when heavy work is required in the field and rely less on costly body fat storage. Limiting storage in the dwellings allows treated households to avoid redistributive pressures exerted by close relatives and neighbours.

### **Policy implications**

- If market fails, food security can be improved through increased food market integration, supported by a network of village-level organisations.
- When proper incentives and close supervision are provided, community food storages perform well from both economic and social perspectives.
- Redistributive pressures can act as a driving factor for food security and should be taken into account when designing similar interventions in the future.



# Election as an Instrument of Accountability: The Case of Ghana

## Commitment to the ballot box

Ghana has, since the return to democracy in 1993, organized six successive elections, two of which, the 2000 and 2008 elections, resulted in a change in government. Without a doubt, Ghanaians’ preference and commitment to the ballot box as the sole legitimate means for installing and removing governments has been established in Ghana’s 4<sup>th</sup> Republic. Trend data from Afrobarometer surveys, for example, show that, on average, 8 in 10 Ghanaians have supported the selection of leaders through the ballot box since 2002.<sup>1</sup>

In this study, our aim was to examine the extent to which elections provide the means of exacting accountability from Ghanaian elected leaders, particularly members of parliament. We look at how Ghanaian citizens use elections as a mechanism to punish elected officials by way of demanding accountability for bad policy choices, corruption, and non-fulfillment

or inadequate fulfillment of political and campaign promises and/or their constitutional mandate.

## 1200 Respondents


The study collected quantitative data from 1200 adult respondents (18 years and above), randomly selected, from ten constituencies (empirically identified as having high incidence of poverty). The survey was conducted in November 2012, ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections in December.

## Highlights from the study

Findings from the study suggested the following:

- Ghanaians generally expressed interest in public affairs/politics and governance as 44% and 29% of respondents indicated that they were »very interested« and »somewhat interested« in public affairs respectively;

## Contacting and holding members of parliament accountable



- 51% disclosed that radio was their primary source of receiving news from a formal source; a sizeable number of respondents (86%) said they did not use the internet to receive news;
- 59% of respondents indicated getting involved in a community meeting; and 47% have proactively done so at least once to raise pertinent issues;
- Very few Ghanaians engage their MPs on public/ political issues. Only about 3 out of every 10 Ghanaians (26%) said they never contact their MP;
- However, 51% of the respondents said they will contact and engage with their MPs if they get the chance;
- Only a small percentage of respondents (7%) would choose formal modes of interactions such as writing letters or presenting petitions to their MPs (see Figure on previous page);
- Ghanaians expressed very limited knowledge of the three core responsibilities of their MPs. Only 19% were able to indicate that law-making was a core function of MPs;
- Respondents (28%) thought that their MPs had a direct responsibility to support individuals financially in making donations in support of paying loans, fees and given gifts;
- A majority of respondents (77%) claimed to be highly influenced by the extent to which a candidate could directly provide development projects; and 62% were highly influenced by whether a person had helped many people or not;
- Notwithstanding the above, a significant proportion of respondents (58%) were supportive of a candidate who has the ability to check executive abuse of power; 65% favoured someone who was vocal in speaking for the constituency in Parliament; and 53% preferred someone to be good at law making.

## Policy implications and recommendations

Given these findings, there appears to be problems as well as opportunities for using elections as an instrument to strengthen vertical accountability.

- First, the findings suggest either Ghanaians are not aware of both formal and informal channels open to them to engage with and demand accountability from their elected MPs, or they don't apply them. There is therefore the need to strengthen civic/ voter education on accountability mechanisms that exist and to foster stronger relationships between citizens and their MPs. Findings appear to indicate an underlying desire to hold representatives to account, given the opportunity;
- Second, while Ghanaians exhibit a strong interest in public affairs, it seems their understanding and expectations of their MPs, especially when it comes to MP's core functions, is weak. Given the public space available to Ghanaians, it is imperative that Parliament designs an appropriate strategy to educate citizens of their core mandate so as to place public expectations of the performance of parliament in proper context; and
- Finally, a deep seated mentality of dependency of citizens on their MPs creates room for clientelistic tendencies. Such dependent clientelism undermines democratic resilience which in the end results in wide spread poverty. Ghanaian civil society organisations and other relevant anti-corruption bodies must advocate about the inappropriateness of a patron-client relationship in a democracy, and take the necessary steps to confront the situation.

<sup>1</sup> Daniel Armah-Attoh, E. Ampratwum and J. Paller, »Political Accountability in Ghana: Evidence from Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey«, *Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 136, March 2014*

## *Opportunities of the Demographic Dividend on Poverty Reduction in Africa*

This research analyses how the different periods of the demographic transition can help in understanding, anticipating, and identifying plausible scenarios that can be either threats or windows of opportunity. The premise is that changes in the age structure of a population can have a positive economic impact when the share of working age people increases. Thus, a »demographic window of opportunity« opens due to the diversion of both public and household level expenditure (initially concentrated in the dependent children and elderly, i.e. health and education) towards investment in productive sectors, infrastructure, and the increase of savings. In particular, East Asia has had the fastest and most pronounced demographic transitions, whereas Sub-Saharan Africa — especially the Western, Eastern and Middle areas — are displaying an opposite trend to the rest of the world, remaining as an outlier due to their late and slow fertility transitions.

### **Methodology**

In order to identify which policy areas are more relevant for capitalizing a demographic dividend in Africa, a simulation panel data model has been constructed: a Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation has been applied for a sample of 132 countries (years 1960–2014 aggregated into 5-year periods). Additionally, alternative regressions that include an interaction term for various relevant policy proxies have been carried out so as to detect appropriate and specific policy strategies.

### **Highlights**

- During 1960–2014 the demographic dividend has contributed in 0.7 percentage points (pp), every year, to the change in the growth of GDP per capita world-wide.
- However, in Africa this contribution has been less than 0.1 pp due to the following reasons: the reduction of its child dependency ratio over this period has been much smaller (from 79.51 in 1960 to 74.92 in 2014 in Africa vs. from 70.45 to 37.61 for Asia in the same years); and the capitalization of this reduction has been less significant than in other geographic areas given its socio-economic characteristics.
- Asia can be regarded as an example of success, faring well in both the demographic and socio-economic policy fronts, especially in terms of total unemployment, human capital, and female education. Africa could benefit from learning from the Asian experience and thus obtain greater returns from its demographic transition. However, in order to do so, the region's heterogeneity cannot be omitted. Hence, the results of the analysis has allowed to identify for each individual country those specific policies that ought to be implemented, as well as the approximate time frame that these countries have for enacting their appropriate policy action.

## Policy implications for Africa


- The high fertility in the region is a serious question, markedly because the equally high infant mortality demands more children so as to guarantee a major number of survivors; thus, policies oriented towards the acceleration of the demographic transition (particularly the fertility decline) are required;
- The region needs to improve its human capital and employment necessities, given its shortage in terms of qualified and skilled labour; so increasing the educational level of African citizens and favouring job creation on a massive scale is rather urgent;
- A positive advantage is the role of women in Africa since the female labour force participation is relatively high, therefore, strengthening and maximizing women's participation in more qualified and better jobs, as well as keeping girls in schools, becomes imperative in order to avoid their inclusion in the dependent group,

alongside children and the elderly;

- All previous policy accomplishments could become futile if no action is done in the battle against HIV/AIDS, especially in the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, as it mostly threatens the working age population; additional efforts in reducing adult mortality are a prerequisite, mainly for its three big killers (malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis), and avoiding as much as possible debilitating wars that destroy the foundation that the demographic gift offers;
- Finally, it is crucial to recognize the heterogeneity in Africa, which calls for strategic policy action through resources allocation adapted to each country's context and characteristics. In this sense, all countries have been classified into four groups based on their shared similarity in terms of their general performance in key policy proxies — see graphic below.

## Total Dependency Ratio (Group average)

### Estimates Medium Fertility




Legend 115 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35

- 1 Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland
- 2 Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Egypt Morocco, Djibouti, Seychelles, Mauritius, Cap Verde
- 3 Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- 4 Benin, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Maritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan

## Who should focus on what?

- 1 Success on the near horizon, but faces two problems: HIV/AIDS and Total Unemployment
- 2 Very limited timing, focus on the Labour Market and employ your Female population immediately.
- 3 Speed up the timing of the window, you have good Socio-Economic tools in place.
- 4 Watch out! Urgent action is required in three spheres: Fertility, Infant Mortality and Education.
- No Data.



Data sources: United Nations World Population Prospects 2015 (Population); Penn World Tables 8.1 (real GDP); Barro & Lee 2013 (Education); Freedom House 2015 (Political Rights); World Bank's WDI 2015 (Socio-economic and Policy proxies).



# Defining Future Scenarios of Poverty Alleviation: A Prospective Assessment

Many of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals are implicated: »end poverty in all its forms everywhere« (SDG 1), »ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning-opportunities« (SDG 4), »ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all« (SDG 6), »protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems« (SDG 15), »promote peaceful and inclusive societies« (SDG 16).

Nopoor is looking at the long term by considering major societal challenges that may impact poverty and poverty reduction. Our research and recommendations aim to promote sustainable development and the reduction of poverty in the next 15–20 years.

In order to design possible scenarios of poverty, several rounds of expert consultations and a careful technical process combining qualitative and quantitative methods have been used. Five pivotal topics have

been identified as the main factors which will have an impact on poverty for the next 15–20 years (Figure 1). Based on this information, a complex analysis was performed, leading to three scenarios of the future of poverty (Figure 2).

## Crying, waiting and hoping

This is a status quo projection in which the situation does not change that much from the current state of affairs. Primary education is finally universal world-wide. Nevertheless, secondary education accessibility, quality and affordability still face great challenges. There are a number of interrelated limitations. Important areas are jeopardised by illegitimate governments with corrupt policies. The management of water resources and sanitation is unsustainable as there is no budget allocated for it. Politicians prefer to be photographed in front of other, more photogenic projects

Topics	Global	North Africa	Subsaharan Africa	South East Asia and Pacific	South Asia	Latam	Region's Average
Increase in natural disaster	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Improve opportunities with a better education system	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Increase in governance	●	●	●	●		●	●
Availability and sustainable management of water, sanitation	●	●	●		●	●	●
Emergence and propagation of military conflicts	●	●	●	●	●		●

Figure 1: The pivotal topics



Figure 2: Imagine the future

than next to latrines or simple wells. Similarly, work to alleviate the effects of global warming has reduced the impact on human lives, but these events still wreak devastating damage on physical assets. The extent to which measures and resources are put to work to quickly rebuild the damage caused by these extreme natural events depends on the willingness of these governments. Armed conflicts still have a moderate effect and are long-lasting, destroying years of development in many cases.

### **Help!**

This is a dramatic scenario where the population has to overcome much adversity. Natural disasters are still a growing problem claiming slightly fewer human casualties, but causing devastating damage to infrastructures and the physical environment and hence placing an even greater burden on already-degraded land.

Access to clean water and sanitation remains poor, with some countries still lagging far behind. These countries are also the hardest hit by extreme natural events. The situation is serious, especially in those areas where illegitimate, corrupt governments wreak havoc. Armed conflicts show no sign of abating and their negative impacts are neither fully averted nor properly sanctioned. Moreover, what might have been a glimmer of hope, that is, the education of the growing generations, is dashed as access to quality schooling and secondary education faces huge challenges.

### **Here comes the sun**

In this scenario, »the poor« are not seen as victims, but as empowered actors to form their own destiny, embedded in the larger geopolitical context. The glimmer of hope comes in the form of better educated citizens who are able to overcome adversity in a more confident manner. Nonetheless, various issues still need to be addressed. Natural disasters are still a growing prob-

lem with less of an impact on human lives, but devastating effects on the physical environment. Although progress has been made with access to clean water and sanitation, some countries still lag far behind with very little access. These latter countries are the hardest hit by the repercussions of extreme natural events. Despite decisive progress with establishing legitimate governments worldwide, governments in some areas continue to be plagued by corruption. A number of these regimes are associated with certain ongoing and new armed conflicts. However, growing generations of well-informed, innovative, skilled young adults have the tools they need to address these hardships and difficulties. Not only are they able to rewrite history by closing the chapter on these old conflicts, but they are also able to raise public awareness to encourage social change that can revolutionise and guide humankind towards a brighter future.

There is widespread concern expressed by experts involved in the study (almost 20%) over climate change and its connection with poverty. Climate change will have a strong impact on poverty and poverty alleviation in the next 15–20 years.

### **Some strategic recommendations:**

- East Asia: improve education and infrastructures in order to reduce disaster risks;
- South Asia: urgently reduce fertility rates, prevent malnutrition and hunger, formalise labour and improve working conditions, and reduce the inequality gap;
- Sub-Saharan Africa: strategies should aim primarily to meet basic needs such as water access and supply and to improve farming methods;
- Latin America: improve the education system and health services and reduce extreme hunger.

## *Impact of the Nopoor Project*

### **Five years of research, four continents, one vision**

At the time of writing, the Nopoor project is amongst the largest research programmes of the European Union focussing on poverty in developing countries. Poverty is a highly complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Nopoor explores aspects of society which may have an impact on or influence poverty, such as governance, education, empowerment, environment, inequality and sustainability, in order to provide new insights and knowledge in the medium and long term.

Nopoor encompasses 20 institutions on four continents, including Europe and the Global South, and has established a strong network of research cooperation. More than 100 researchers are working on Nopoor projects to provide evidence to support policy making in all the countries involved in the project.

### **Stakeholder conferences**

Nopoor worked hard to bring together a variety of actors in academia, civil society, and international organizations. Multi-stakeholder conferences have been organized in developing countries (Africa, Europe, Asia) in order to disseminate the results to the relevant stakeholders as widely as possible and discuss them. The policy conference organized in Senegal (Dakar, June 2014) brought together international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Commission, Nopoor researchers, members of Senegal's scientific community, and local NGOs. All the stakeholders agreed on the main areas of concern related to unresolved poverty challenges: governance, education, economy, employment, and healthcare services.

At the invitation of the European Commission, the Consortium participated for the first time in the European Development Days in June 2015. A brainstorming session entitled »Research for change: New knowledge for poverty eradication« gathered many stakeholders from the development field.

Papers have also been presented at the World Social Science Forum in South Africa, where Nopoor was invited by UNESCO.

### **Collaboration with National Institutes of Statistics**

An important issue for which we constantly advocate is the collection of data. Statistical surveys and academic support to National Institutes of Statistics (NIS) are usually neglected in large programmes. As part of its capacity building remit, Nopoor is putting emphasis on the cooperation with NIS, aiming to support professionals to use the new knowledge generated by the project. We are working in particular with NIS in Senegal, Mali, Madagascar, Vietnam, Haiti, and Peru. By engaging in this way, we participate in building national capacity in poverty measurement and contribute to

improving the knowledge base by running surveys that can be considered as public goods in each country. The 17 research partners in Nopoor are using a wide range of methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, and are adopting a multi-disciplinary approach. Hence, we are taking advantage of the diversity of experiences in research on poverty and focussing on comparative analysis in order to assess the political effects and consequences of policies.

### **Sustainable Development Goals**

The new UN document »Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development« contains 17 Goals and 169 targets that seek to build on the Millennium Development Goals and complete what these did not achieve. Nopoor researchers have provided input to the Sustainable Development Goal 16, related to global governance.

Our research on the population's perception of governance in different African countries has consolidated the survey instruments used to monitor governance indicators. The findings have been disseminated in the countries concerned (Burundi, Mali, Uganda), and among the different stakeholders involved in the ongoing process to define targets and indicators for SDG 16 on peace, justice, and accountable institutions. This work demonstrates the key role of household surveys in measuring SDG 16 targets.

### **Training**

Nopoor provides an ideal working environment for young researchers interested in poverty issues and in particular, those wanting to achieve a European Master's degree. A Masters Students' network has been created, aiming at providing training. Students are given the opportunity to take part in summer schools, academic workshops, and policy workshops. These activities allow the students to discuss their research

work in seminars led by top academics in their field. A roundtable was organised jointly with UNESCO around the theme Measuring poverty and beyond. Researchers from the Nopoor project also provide statistical training for government officials in South-Africa and in-depth training on data collection methodology in developing countries (Senegal, Burkina Faso, India).

### **Policy Perspectives**

An essential component of the project is to produce evidence-based policy advice — in the form of policy briefs, face-to-face meetings, flash reports and feedback loops with stakeholders — and deliver expertise to the relevant EU departments.

*For all Nopoor policy briefs and other related publications, please go to [www.nopoor.eu](http://www.nopoor.eu)*



*Nopoor General Assembly,  
June 2014, Dakar, Senegal  
(Picture: Amadou Deme)*

## *Training and Capacity Building in the Context of Nopoor*

In addition to its scientific objectives, the Nopoor programme has a pedagogical ambition. The gathering of top academics with various backgrounds provides opportunities to diffuse new knowledge to young researchers to build capacity. The creation of a training network between partners seems a natural extension of the Nopoor research programme, which is a suitable engine of inclusion for young researchers and professionals. Special attention is given to the involvement of Southern partners.

### **A quick overview**

The first mid-term assessment of training and capacity building activities in the context of Nopoor showed that around 60 young researchers have been hosted and mentored. Almost all Nopoor research programmes are involved, and most of the young researchers are Master's students involved in various tasks such as

cleaning databases, conducting surveys, or writing reports. Some of them made very significant contributions to Nopoor research while writing their Master's or PhD dissertations in Nopoor research subjects. They had numerous opportunities to present and discuss their research during Nopoor meetings and workshops.

Capacity-building activities during Nopoor took a variety of forms: statistical training for government officials (UTC-Saldrú); in-depth training on data collection methodology (UNAMUR in Senegal and Burkina Faso); training of research assistants in India (CNRS-India); and training of students from the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy (Erfurt, Germany) on dissemination (ITSEM-EGAP Brussels).

These are just a few highlights of the training and capacity-building activities conducted in Nopoor.

### **The Nopoor master students**

Special attention is given to students from the South who are interested in poverty issues and wish to acquire a European Master's degree. In order to organize the different possibilities offered through Nopoor, students were selected and brought together through a Master's student network.

During their second year of study in Paris-Dauphine, they were given opportunities to participate in Nopoor events (meetings and trainings for young researchers). They were mentored by senior Nopoor researchers while writing their Master's dissertation, and are offered Nopoor internships.

Laza Razafimbelo, Research Associate with Innovations for Poverty Actions Uganda:

*»I knew the Nopoor project from one of my professors at IEDES Paris 1 when I did my Masters degree. For six months I did an internship funded by a Nopoor project at IRD DIAL Paris. I worked on a project called »Survey among the Malagasy Elites«. I did*



some analysis to rank elites and their powers according to the position that she or he had or is currently having within the elite group. During this internship I had the opportunity to attend a Nopoor training event about Panel Data Econometrics in June 2014 in Dakar, Senegal. I am really glad I got to know the Nopoor project, the project management team, and the circle of international researchers. It is for me an invaluable opportunity and platform for exchange and learning.«

Louisiana Teixeira, Nopoor PhD student in DIAL-Dauphine:

»As a student in UFRJ, Brazil interested in poverty, international economics and development-related subjects, I had the opportunity to attend the Nopoor General Assembly in Rio de Janeiro in June 2013. Then, I applied to a Masters in International Eco-

nomics and Development at the University of Paris Dauphine to become a Nopoor Masters student. I participated in the Nopoor training in Madrid (2014) and the Summer School in Dauphine (2015), and I also did a five-month internship during which I wrote a dissertation on the social impacts of the Manaus free trade zone for Nopoor, financed by ANR. I'm currently pursuing this research for Nopoor with my PhD dissertation on the social impacts of trade liberalization in Brazil.«

### **Trainings and summer school for young researchers and professionals**

Training events are organized on a regular basis in the context of Nopoor. UAM (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid) hosted a research seminar on the use of computable general equilibrium models (CGE) for poverty and income distribution analysis from 21<sup>st</sup> to 23<sup>rd</sup> October, 2013, co-financed by Nopoor.

A training workshop on panel data econometrics was held in Dakar from May 30 to June 3, 2014, the objective of which was to introduce students to panel data econometrics while highlighting the importance of non-observed individual heterogeneity.

A summer school on the topic of »Measuring Poverty on a Multidisciplinary Basis« was organized in Paris-Dauphine in June-July, 2015, with the aim of providing students with the most current information on the subject, with seminars led by top academics in the field.

The Nopoor research programme provided many life-enhancing experiences for young researchers and we hope it will prove a stepping stone for their promising future careers.



*A student receiving a certificate for the Nopoor training in Dakar*

## *Make Change Happen: Encompassing the Research Realm*

Science as a driver for change: with this mandate, the Nopoor project is taking the results from five years of research into practice. The book you hold in your hands is only one of many items that talk to audiences beyond the purely scientific community. Researchers took on board the importance of communicating their results with decision makers and other social groups. The variety of tools and products going beyond purely academic information and scientific conference contributions, include films, policy briefs, flash reports, and press texts.

Nopoor has been working during a vibrant period in the global poverty alleviation agenda, when the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This transition has enabled the Nopoor dissemination effort to include and invite diverse stakeholders into genuine participatory discussions. The Nopoor communication process

as a whole aims to present science in a transparent and non-intimidating way, to summarize findings without losing their complexity, freeing results from scientific jargon while keeping the precision, and translating research-based evidence into recommendations that a non-scientific, well informed audience will find useful.

Transforming research results into policy recommendations is not a straightforward exercise. There are little incentives for researchers to disseminate their results to a non-scientific audience, and this is accompanied by a sometimes profound institutional reluctance to address the question of what research is for. Policy makers need to make decisions about current policy dilemmas which might not match easily with the research agenda of scientists.

The way that research is often taught, sold and presented by the scientific establishment has brought about a deep gap between the academic world and





other communities. Researchers' engagement with stakeholders and policy makers helps to identify new fields of scientific enquiry and provides solid networks useful for future research.

Communication behaviour has significantly changed during the course of the project. At the time when the Nopoor project was being developed (2010/2011), many dissemination and communication tools that are commonplace today — such as Twitter and ResearchGate — were not at all well established. The team has monitored these changes closely, setting the path for future tools of policy dissemination. Digital dissemination and communication tools can offer great new chances for sharing knowledge within the programme and with an external audience. New communication technologies become increasingly important especially in the Global South, where smartphones have already become an instrument for communication,

voting, and tax or bill-paying. One upcoming fascinating tool is still in its fledgling stage: the gamification of acquired knowledge, where scientific results are fed into online games with the aim of supporting agenda setting and raising awareness on the discussed topic.

To make adequate use of web-based information and communication technologies (ICT) for large scale research projects — particularly in the area of development studies and poverty research — will allow for another main aim of engaged research: to ensure that scientific research results are able to have a direct impact on the communities where the research has taken place.

Nevertheless it has also become clear that face-to-face meetings and personal contact will continue to have a very important role when change is the topic. Therefore in every continent where Nopoor research was taking place, researchers organized conferences that respected the stakeholder mapping model which could be applied to many different local situations. In round table discussions between policy makers, scientists, and interested individuals from a wide range of civil society groups, the exchange of views and visions for the future was a tool for dissemination, but also inspired the research agenda itself. These collective efforts give space for unspoken assumptions to be aired, and for even greater philosophical perspectives to be gained.

The Nopoor experience shows that poverty issues are not primarily located in the individual. It makes a step towards a shared transformation process with its dissemination efforts. The researchers anticipate solutions that open possible pathways towards the future encompassing problem-solving approaches. Including diverse groups of people into research is what dissemination aims for in the creation of a common future.



*Nopoor at the  
European Development Days 2015  
(Picture: Ina Ivanceanu)*

## *The Nopoor Diaries: A Series of Films to Accompany the Project*

### **A visual world**

From a parliamentary session in Accra, Ghana, to the halls of Oxford University, UK; from the night market in Hanoi, Vietnam, to the largest European think tank on development in Brussels, Belgium: the film series »The Nopoor Diaries« breaks down the complexity of the project into a moving visual world. Film topics range from the potential of the informal sector to questions of political stability and dynamics of international migrations. Blending voices from people who are affected by poverty and interviews with researchers, commentary, animation, and imagery from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, these films present insights and discuss new questions embedded in the key poverty debates of our time.

The films look for a textual and visual language beyond the usual widespread images of poverty. They are produced in different formats and lengths, tailored to

a variety of target groups and occasions — workshops with practitioners, scientific and policy conferences, exhibition stands, and public sessions. The collection includes a three minute image clip film introducing Nopoor through real animation; short films on cross-thematic topics; interview clips summarising results of the various Nopoor programmes; and a documentary that takes the viewer right into the heart of the reality of researching ways out of poverty on four different continents.

All Nopoor films are available at [www.nopoor.eu](http://www.nopoor.eu) and [www.youtube.com](http://www.youtube.com) and in hard copy on DVD.

*Film Series »The Nopoor diaries«. Length: between 1' and 35'  
Languages: Vietnamese, Spanish, French, German, Twi, Ewe,  
all with English subtitles/English voice-over  
Directed by Ina Ivanceanu, Camera and Editing: Elke Groen,  
Production: Amour Fou Vienna in collaboration with Oikodrom  
For further information and screening requests, please contact  
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*Nopoor Film Shooting  
in the streets of in Hanoi, Vietnam, 2015  
(Picture: Ina Ivanceanu)*

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# Partner Institutions

## **CDD**

The Ghana Center for  
Democratic Development  
Accra, Ghana  
[www.cddgh.org](http://www.cddgh.org)

## **CDE**

Centre for  
Development Economics  
Delhi, India  
[www.cdeds.org](http://www.cdeds.org)

## **CNRS (India unit)**

Centre de Sciences Humaines  
New Delhi, India  
[www.cnrs.fr](http://www.cnrs.fr)

## **CRES**

Consortium pour la Recherche  
Économique et Sociale  
Dakar, Senegal  
[www.cres-sn.org](http://www.cres-sn.org)

## **DIAL**

Institut de Recherche pour le  
Développement – Université  
Paris Dauphine  
Paris, France  
[www.dial.ird.fr](http://www.dial.ird.fr)



*Nopoor researchers  
at the launch of the project  
in Paris, June 2012*

## **GIGA**

German Institute  
of Global and Area Studies  
Hamburg, Germany  
[www.giga-hamburg.de](http://www.giga-hamburg.de)

## **GRADE**

Grupo de Análisis para  
el Desarrollo  
Lima, Peru  
[www.grade.org.pe](http://www.grade.org.pe)

## **IfW**

Kiel Institute for  
the World Economy  
Kiel, Germany  
[www.ifw-kiel.de](http://www.ifw-kiel.de)

## **IRD**

Institut de Recherche  
pour le Développement  
Paris, France  
[www.ird.fr](http://www.ird.fr)

## **ITESM**

Instituto Tecnológico  
y de Estudios Superiores  
de Monterrey  
Monterrey, Mexico  
[www.itesm.mx](http://www.itesm.mx)

## **LISER**

Luxembourg Institute  
of Socio-Economic Research  
Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg  
[www.liser.lu](http://www.liser.lu)

## **OIKO**

Oikodrom —  
the Vienna Institute for  
Urban Sustainability  
Vienna, Austria  
[www.oikodrom.org](http://www.oikodrom.org)

## **UA-CEE**

Université d'Antananarivo  
Antananarivo, Madagascar  
[www.univ-antananarivo.mg](http://www.univ-antananarivo.mg)

## **UAM**

Universidad Autónoma  
de Madrid  
Madrid, Spain  
[www.uam.es](http://www.uam.es)

## **UCHILE**

Universidad de Chile  
Santiago de Chile, Chile  
[www.uchile.cl](http://www.uchile.cl)

## **UCT-SALDRU**

University of Cape Town  
Cape Town, South Africa  
[www.uct.ac.za](http://www.uct.ac.za)

## **UFRJ**

Universidade Federal  
do Rio de Janeiro  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
[www.ie.ufrj.br](http://www.ie.ufrj.br)

## **UNAMUR**

Facultés Universitaires Notre-  
Dame de la Paix de Namur  
Namur, Belgium  
[www.fundp.ac.be/en](http://www.fundp.ac.be/en)

## **UOXF-CSAE**

University of Oxford,  
Centre for the Study  
of African Economies  
Oxford, United Kingdom  
[www.csaef.ox.ac.uk](http://www.csaef.ox.ac.uk)


## **VASS**

Vietnamese Academy  
of Social Sciences  
Hanoi, Vietnam  
[www.vass.gov.vn](http://www.vass.gov.vn)

Nopoor produces policy briefs that offer condensed information and evidence based advice. These and more are available for download at [www.nopoor.eu](http://www.nopoor.eu)

1. A new approach to the role of development aid for poverty reduction: Trading-off needs against governance. By Jean-Philippe Plateau and François Bourguignon.
2. The new European Agenda on Migration: what can be learnt from recent academic research? By Flore Gubert.
3. Governance, peace and security in Burundi, Mali and Uganda. Comparative nso data for measuring Goal 16 of the SDGs. By Mark Orkin, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud.
4. La situation socio-politique au Burundi vue d'en bas: état des lieux et aspirations citoyennes pour éclairer les stratégies de sortie de crise. By Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud.
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8. An Empirical Study into the Expectations, Preferences and Behaviour of Ghanaian Voters towards their MPs in Constituencies with High Incidence of Poverty. By Franklin Oduro and Regina Oforiwa Amanfo-Tetteh.
9. Governance does matter for the Allocation of Foreign Aid. By Thomas Barsbai and Rainer Thiele.
10. Minimum Wage, Income Distribution and Poverty in Brazil. By João Saboia.



## **Nopoor — Enhancing Knowledge for Renewed Policies against Poverty**

[www.nopoor.eu](http://www.nopoor.eu)

[www.facebook.com/nopoorproject](https://www.facebook.com/nopoorproject)

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### **Project Type:**

EU-funded Research Project

### **Budget:**

8 000 000 €

### **Duration:**

5 Years, April 2012 – March 2017

### **Research Fields:**

Poverty Dimensions

Impact of Foreign Aid

Globalization and International Migrations

Inclusion/Exclusion in Social Networks, Work and Cities

Education and Social Protection

States and Political Systems

Future Scenarios