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July 2011

Transitions Decreed, Transitions Experienced

From Global to Local: Methodological,
Cross-cutting and Critical Approaches

Regional Social Sciences Summer University
"Tam Đảo Summer School Week" (Việt Nam)
July 2010

École française d'Extrême-Orient



NHÀ XUẤT BẢN TRI THỨC



Transitions Decreed, Transitions Experienced

From Global to Local: Methodological,
Cross-cutting and Critical Approaches

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Foreword	5
Acknowledgements	13
Opening Remarks	15
• Nguyễn Xuân Thắng, Vice President of the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences • Yann Martres, Deputy Director, AFD Việt Nam • Jacques Boulègue, University Professor, Representative of IRD in Việt Nam • Yves Perraudeau, University Professor, Head of Việt Nam and Southeast Asia Mission, Nantes University	17 19 21 23
Part 1 - Plenary Sessions	27
1.1. Transition: Epistemological thoughts on the Chinese Example, Nicolas Zufferey	29
1.2. Agrarian Transition, Rodolphe De Koninck	44
1.3. Transitions in the Labor Market: Macro and Micro Readings, Mireille Razafindrakoto, Jean-Pierre Cling, Christophe Gironde, François Roubaud	58
1.4. Transformations of the Family in Europe. What Are its Traits? How should we Analyze and Understand Them? Martine Segalen	84
1.5. A Synthesis of the Plenary Sessions, Olivier Tessier	100
Part 2 - Workshops	109
2.1. Agrarian Transition, Rodolphe De Koninck, Jim Delaney, Danielle Labbé, Bruno Thibert, Phạm Văn Cự, Jean-François Rousseau	111
2.2. Economic Transition Experienced and Perceived by the Population: Analysis of the Complementarity Between Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, Mireille Razafindrakoto, Jean-Pierre Cling, Christian Culas, François Roubaud	173
2.3. Training in Surveying Methods and Fieldwork Practices in Socio-anthropology: "Issues, Tension and Conflict Surrounding Land Appropriation and Use", Pascal Bourdeaux, Emmanuel Pannier, Olivier Tessier	249
2.4. Demographic Transition and Familial Transformation, Philippe Antoine, Bernard Formoso, Martine Segalen	285
Biographies of Teachers	359
Acronyms and Abbreviations	388

Foreword

Regional “Tam Đảo Summer School Week”: A Valuable Training Platform

The first Social Sciences Summer School was held in 2007 as a part of the “Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire en Sciences Sociales” (FSP2S) project “*Support for Research on Economic and Social Transition Issues in Việt Nam*”, implemented by the “École française d’Extrême-Orient” and the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences.^[1] It was established because the Joint Franco-Vietnamese Scientific Council within the FSP2S organization had observed the need for capacity-building for researchers, teaching researchers and Vietnamese doctoral candidates, covering methodology, survey tools and data treatment. Held again in 2008 and 2009, the “Journées de Tam Đảo” (Tam Đảo Summer School Week) – also known as JTD – maintained its objective of introducing future Vietnamese social scientists to the intellectual tools and know-how necessary to gain a rigorous knowledge of social reality and to provide them with the theoretical and methodological basis to draft a scientifically pertinent research project. The sessions were held in Hà Nội and in Tam Đảo, a hill station near the capital, and resulted in the publication of three works published in both French and Vietnamese.^[2]

2010-2013: An Agreement for Partnership, Change on a Regional Scale

Given the success of the first three years, and in order to support the development of the Summer School, the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), the University of Nantes, the École française d’Extrême-Orient (ÉFEO) and the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie^[3] (AUF) decided to confirm their combined commitment in a partnership agreement signed on April 15, 2010 at the AFD headquarters in Paris for four years, 2010-2013.

[1] Project finished May 7, 2009.

[2] S. Lagrée, J-P. Cling, M. Razafindrakoto and F. Roubaud (scientific eds.), *Les Journées de Tam Đảo. Stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté : approches méthodologiques et transversales*, Éditions Tri Thuc, Hanoi, July 2010, 624 p. (French version), 620 p. (Vietnamese version);
S. Lagrée (editor), *Les Journées de Tam Dao. Nouvelles approches méthodologiques appliquées au développement (2)*, Université d’été en sciences sociales, Éditions The Gioi, Hà Nội, September 2009, 401 p. (French version), 398 p. (Vietnamese version);
S. Lagrée (editor), *Les Journées de Tam Dao. Nouvelles approches méthodologiques appliquées au développement (2)*, Université d’été en sciences sociales, Éditions Thê Gioi, Hà Nội, November 2008 (reprinted in May 2009), 348 p. (French version), 350 p. (Vietnamese version).

[3] AUF: Funds « Action innovante » 2010-2012.

This partnership aims to maintain the continuity of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week with previous training sessions with the general objectives of:

- supporting multi-disciplinary training of an excellent standard: improving knowledge, methods and survey tools in the social sciences; reinforcing capacity for the analysis of economic and social changes; consolidating skills in methods for evaluating the impact of development projects;
- constituting a policy discussion platform, as well as developing a pool of researchers open to the Southeast Asia region: the JTD was conceived as a forum for the study of strategies, methods and working practices in development, but also for training and exchanges between researchers and decision makers;
- developing the profile and appeal of the "Tam Đảo Summer School Week:" the JTD aims to attract a wide academic and non-academic audience throughout Southeast Asia.

Building on the evaluations of the three first years, the regional project 2010-2013 also has new ambitions:

- a specific theme of a regional or international nature is set each year, then elaborated and debated according to different methodological and cross-cutting approaches;
- at the VASS, the first two days of training and discussions conclude with a synthesis session which kicks off multi-disciplinary consideration by discussing proposed methodological tools; this part of the program is designed to be an introduction to the thematic workshops;
- in Tam Đảo, the four workshops, each attended by around twenty participants for five days, are followed by a one-day plenary session, for synthesis; in this way, participants and trainers meet at the end of the week to share and present the output of each workshop;
- in order to increase geographic appeal, the Tam Đảo Summer School Week welcomes researchers and participants from Southeast Asia. This regional expansion notably reinforces visibility in the region and allows a larger network for exchange and scientific collaboration. The audience is composed of approximately fifty Vietnamese participants and around thirty from the region (Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and other neighboring countries).

An Annual Trilingual Scientific Production

It is proposed to publish the proceedings in three languages – Vietnamese, French and English – the year following each training session in the AFD series, *Conférences et Séminaires*, co-edited by the EFEO and the Tri Thúc publishing house. Each work is available on CD Rom and as a free download on the site www.tamdaoconf.com as well as on the sites of the partner organizations. To complement this, www.tamdaoconf.com also offers the texts of lectures to expand and deepen understanding of the themes and fields touched upon, an in-depth biography of each trainer as well as a triple evaluation provided by the trainers, participants and reporters.

"Transitions Decreed, Transitions Experienced"

The guiding principle of the 2010 JTD was to question the concept of transition by looking at the wide variety of situations that it covers, according to the teaching model described below:

- July 16 and 17 at the VASS: four presentations introduced and developed the methodological and cross-cutting approaches to the theme of transition; a documentary was shown to complete the training. The sessions were concluded by a synthesis report of the two days;
- four themed workshops took place for five days at the hill station, Tam Đảo, from Monday, July 19 to Friday, July 23. These studied in greater depth the agrarian transition (workshop 1), economic transition through the lenses of quantitative and qualitative analysis (workshop 2), field study methods in development anthropology (workshop 3), demographic transition and familial transformation (workshop 4);
- plenary day for reports from the workshops Saturday, July 24 in Tam Đảo.

The Tam Đảo Summer School Week began with an introductory lecture by Nicolas Zufferey, sinologist, professor at the Chinese Studies Unit at the University of Geneva. The presentation began by comparing an ancient transition period in China – between the 6th and 2nd century B.C. –, with a recent transition – from 1978 – experienced by contemporaries as such. The second part looked at three distinct dimensions of the theme of transition: historical, psychological and ideological.

The morning continued with a presentation by the geographer, Rodolphe De Koninck. The subject of his presentation was the agrarian transition, understood to be the shift from an agrarian society to a society based increasingly on industrial production and services. His intervention was focused on the countries of Southeast Asia, where the process is underway throughout the region, but displays original and specific characteristics in each country, and above all has complex and sometimes unique consequences, as in Thailand for example.

At the beginning of the afternoon, the documentary *"A qui appartient la terre?"* (To Whom Does the Land Belong? – subtitled in French) was shown in the presence of the director, Đoàn Hồng Lê, and shed light on the land problems that exist in Việt Nam today. This theme was a direct link with the training workshop on socio-anthropological field surveys in the foothills of Tam Đảo.

The second day of plenaries started with a thorough examination of the labor market transitions in Việt Nam, using a double macro- and micro-economic interpretation. Given by Jean-Pierre Cling, Christophe Gironde, Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud, the presentation looked at the questions of urbanization and labor market dynamics from the end of the 1990s, comparing the characteristics of employment in urban and peri-urban areas with a special look at the informal sector. The results presented were based partly on representative statistical surveys carried out on a national level and in Việt Nam's political (Hà Nội) and economic (Hồ Chí Minh City) metropolises, and partly on local level studies in two districts of the Red River delta.

The conference cycle ended on the theme of transformations of the institution of family in Europe. Sociologist Martine Segalen highlighted the diversity of family systems in European peasant societies, linked to systems of succession, as well as the effects of industrialization on family relations and the deep-seated transformation of society starting in the 1960s.

Finally, at the beginning of the afternoon, Olivier Tessier, anthropologist and member of the EFEO in Hà Nội, brought the first two days to a close with a critical conclusion.

The training continued with four workshops held in Tam Đảo, 80 km from Hà Nội.

Workshop 1 was an extension and deeper exploration of the ideas brought up in the plenary session by Rodolphe De Koninck. Essentially, the training focused on the different processes of the agrarian transition: agricultural intensification and territorial expansion; urbanization, industrialization and migration; environment, integration into markets and intensification of regulation. These transformations were examined from the point of view of four “conceptual windows” – globalization, actors, subsistence, spatiality – which linked to a large international research project entitled “The Challenges of Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia”.

Workshop 2 examined the economic transition in Việt Nam that started at the end of the 1980s in a particularly innovative way through an inter-disciplinary approach to its different facets in both qualitative and quantitative terms. One of the major objectives here was to use economic and anthropological analysis tools to discover how the population experiences and perceives the changes taking place on an individual level by studying their migratory and professional trajectories. In order to apply this multi-disciplinary approach in the field, qualitative surveys were conducted among small business owners and craftspeople for a half day at the hill station.

Workshop 3 was dedicated to training in survey methods and field practices in socio-anthropology, with a focus on the issues, tensions and conflicts surrounding land appropriation and use. The workshop set a twofold objective of introducing survey tools and methods and applying them in real time in the field. The research centered on land issues emerging from the “top-down” establishment of a tourism project by following up a series of qualitative interviews held since 2008 with local actors: villagers and authorities at the commune, district and province levels.

Workshop 4 consisted of a training session on demographic transition and family transformations. The emphasis was placed on three major lines of study: presentation of the demographic transition theory complemented by an introduction to new approaches using biography analyses (African case studies); possible ways of bringing together demographic approaches most often operating at the macro-scale and ethnological practices operating at micro-sociological levels (Southeast Asian case studies); analysis of family transformations through an ensemble of demographic, sociological and cultural data (European case studies).

Principal characteristics of the themed workshops held during the JTD 2010

Workshops	Scale / Level of Analysis	Fields	Tools / Methods
-1- Agrarian Transition	Multi-scale	Geography	Windows of observation: globalization, conditions and means of subsistence, territoriality, institutions and actors
-2- How is the economic transition experienced and perceived by the population?	National scale, macro and micro approaches. Unit of analysis: individuals	Economics, socio-anthropology	Analyses of statistical surveys, quantitative and qualitative approaches
-3- Training in survey methods and field practices in socio-anthropology	Local scale: communes and villages. Unit of analysis: household and individual surveys	History, socio-anthropology	Qualitative interviews
-4- Demographic Transition and Familial Transformation	Macro, meso and micro scale	Demography, sociology and anthropology, ethnology	Biographies, case studies

The four workshops were designed to be attended by participants from different fields, the priority being to allow everyone to use the most open approaches and tools possible. This intention to bring together points of view in a multi-disciplinary way was fulfilled during the last day of reporting, Saturday, July 24. All of the participants were able to exchange and discuss their conclusions, leading to an extremely rich and animated debate. As is customary in this type of training, a certificate of participation and attendance signed by the VASS, AFD, IRD, EFEO and University of Nantes, was given to each participant at the end of the session.

Finally, to support and accompany their work, in the evening of July 23 the participants watched a 52-minute documentary film made in 2008: *"Rêve d'ouvrière"* (Worker's Dream), presented and commented upon by the director Trần Phương Thảo (with subtitles in French). The documentary was made available by the *Ateliers Varan* and provoked a discussion among all the participants on the difficulties of professional placement for young rural people coming to work in the factories near Hà Nội.

Profile of Interns 2010

Choosing the participants for Tam Đảo Summer School Week becomes more selective each year, and in a way, this is cause for celebration! Nearly two hundred applications were made in 2010, but only 84 candidates were chosen for the entire training, less than one out of two applicants. This selection was deemed necessary in order to preserve a strong group dynamic and to maintain a relevant pedagogical approach during the workshops.

The enrollment forms show a very differentiated set of profiles:

- a higher proportion of women: 64% of the participants;
- a young audience: more than one out of two participants was under 30 years old, 75% under 35 years old;
- diversity in degree status and level of education: holders of Master's degrees (35) including seven teachers; doctorates (12) including two teachers; researchers and/or teaching researchers (31); development practitioners most often with research or teaching activities (6);
- multi-disciplinary: sociology, anthropology and socio-anthropology, economics, statistics, demography, geography, history, legal sciences;
- diversification of geographic origins of the Vietnamese participants: although Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City supplied the majority of the participants (30 and 25 respectively), many Vietnamese interns also came from the provinces of Lào Cai (3), Lai Châu, Thái Nguyên (2) and An Giang, Bình Dương and Bình Thuận (1 from each);
- a wide reach across the Southeast Asian region and beyond: Cambodia (12), Thailand (4), Laos (3), Malaysia (2) and “free auditors” from Canada, France, Switzerland, Cambodia and Việt Nam;
- an institutional pluralism:
 - Việt Nam: Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences, University of Hà Nội, Southern Institute of Sustainable Development, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Ethnology Museum of Hà Nội, Institute of Statistical Science, ONG ENDA Việt Nam, Institute of Population and Society, Institute of Anthropology, Institute of Research on Religions, University of Economics in Hồ Chí Minh City, EFEO, Center for Urban and Development Studies (CEFURDS), National Economics University, An Giang University, Bình Dương University, Thái Nguyên University, Culture, Sports and Tourism Service in Lào Cai, Hoa Sen University, Medical College in Bình Thuận;
 - Cambodia: Royal Academy of Cambodia, Royal University of Law and Economics in Phnom Penh;
 - Laos: National University of Laos, Faculty of Environmental Science, Faculty of Economics and Management;

- Thailand: Mahidol University, Rajabhat University, Thammasat University, EFEO Chiang Mai;
- Malaysia: National Defense University, Institute of the Malay World and Civilization;
- Outside of Asia: University of Provence Aix-Marseille, University of Montréal and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

Stéphane Lagrée

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The institutional synergy sealed by a four-year partnership agreement gives the Tam Đảo Summer School Week a regional reach on the scale of Southeast Asia and beyond, and for this we would like to thank: Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) – Research Department, École française d’Extrême-Orient (ÉFEO), l’Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) – Direction for the Program for Research and Training in the South, Nantes University as well as the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie.

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We extend all of our gratitude to the entire team of trainers for their scientific and pedagogical contributions during the organization, execution and improvement of this year’s Tam Đảo Summer School Week: Philippe Antoine, Pascal Bourdeaux, Jean-Pierre Cling, Christian Culas, Jim Delaney, Bernard Formoso, Christophe Gironde, Rodolphe De Koninck, Danielle Labbé, Emmanuel Pannier, Phạm Văn Cự, Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud, Martine Segalen, Olivier Tessier, Bruno Thibert and Nicolas Zufferey.

The work involved in transcribing the sessions and workshops is a particularly long and arduous task, and our thanks go to those who made the effort to provide such quality texts: Jean Verly, plenary sessions (ESC Rouen and diploma in modern literature at Paris-Sorbonne); Lena Kéravec, workshop 1 (diploma from Rennes University II and from the Institut Régional du Patrimoine-IRPA); Glenn Pian, workshop 2 (diploma from Rennes University I); Emmanuel Pannier, workshop 3 (doctoral student in anthropology, University of Provence); Viviane Ériksen, workshop 4 (doctoral student in anthropology, University of Provence).

Finally, we would like to congratulate the interpreters and translators who have accompanied this 2010 JTD: Anne McElroy-Arnaud, *S&S Translation*; Lê Thanh Mai, Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lê Thu Hương, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; Lý Văn Anh, Diplomatic Academy of Việt Nam; Ngô Thị Hồng Lan, National Economics University; Nguyễn Thị Cúc Phương, Hà Nội University; Nguyễn Việt Tiến, National University of Hà Nội; Phạm Thị Kim Yến, Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trần Thị Phương Thảo, Hà Nội University.

Opening Remarks

Nguyễn Xuân Thắng

Vice President of the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences

Yann Martres

Deputy Director, AFD Việt Nam

Jacques Boulègue

University Professor, Representative of IRD in Việt Nam

Yves Perraudau

*University Professor, Head of Việt Nam and Southeast Asia Mission,
Nantes University*

Speech delivered by Nguyễn Xuân Thắng

Vice President of the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences

Ladies and Gentlemen,

*Dear Participants from Việt Nam, Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia,*

First of all, in the name of the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), I would like to present my warmest wishes to all of the guests, teachers, and participants of the 2010 meeting of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week.

As you may know, our academy has partnered with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the context of the Funds for Priority Solidarity in Social Sciences (FSP2S) project, "Support for Research on Issues of Economic and Social Transition in Việt Nam." The VASS and its French partners multiply their efforts to organize many training sessions linked to research projects. This year, our theme is "Transitions Decreed, Transitions Experienced" which we look at using different scales of observation.

Since the implementation of *Đổi Mới*, Việt Nam pursues its reforms towards a market economy with socialist components and the reinforcement of its international integration. It is actively present in different international situations and in January 2007, it became the 150th member of the World

Trade Organization. This integration imposes various internal reforms that aim to improve the judicial system as well as establish and put into place a new economic framework adapted to the international context. This transition period must allow for the intensification of exports and the exploitation of the domestic market in order to develop strong value added sectors, drivers of growth, without over-exploiting resources.

Today, Việt Nam faces many challenges. It is centering its pursuit of economic modernization on industrialization and the modernization of agriculture. Transition is still a difficult task despite the undeniable progress in poverty reduction, social security or in the development of essential services in rural areas.

We greatly appreciate the experience of our international colleagues. The knowledge acquired from the four corners of the globe will allow us to improve our methodological and multi-disciplinary approaches, thus contributing today to a more practical vision of the concept of transition. We believe that sustainable development must also integrate notions of cultural identity and political stability; we are convinced that the 2010

objectives for this Summer School will be attained in this regard.

We are happy to see this event open up regionally to our friends from Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. This expansion is essential because it strongly underscores our desire to contribute to the development of the Mekong region, in this part of Asia between India and China. It is fundamental that the students take full advantage of these exchanges to question the national and

regional economic transition. Beyond the specifics, our problem is identical: sharing knowledge is a pledge of the reinforcement of policies and of the regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

I would like to extend my best wishes for good health to all of the participants. May the 2010 meeting of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week be crowned with success.

Thank you.



Speech delivered by Yann Martres

Deputy Director, AFD Việt Nam

Mr. Vice President of the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences, Dear Colleagues, Dear Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) to participate in and partner with the Tam Đảo Summer School Week 2010. Support for research, in particular in the social sciences, is one of the Agency's major objectives.

The AFD is a public funding agency which works with the Việt Nam authorities on the issues of development. Of course, our motto is "sustainable development," and the theme of transition is familiar to us. However, absorbed as we are by our daily routine, this type of event is very useful to us. It allows us to take a step back, learn, ask or revisit questions, unceasingly reformulate our ideas, get away from our preconceptions, establish more timely strategies, and accept contradiction and debate. Thanks to the organizers of this event, thanks also to the speakers and participants some of whom have traveled far to be here with us. Welcome to Việt Nam for those of you who are discovering the country for the first time.

It is an extraordinary opportunity to organize a seminar on transition today in Việt Nam. It seems to me to be a vast and complex issue. You will surely not exhaust the subject entirely

during your work. However, you will put a certain number of questions, problems and issues on the table and I do not doubt that your efforts will elicit rich and complementary analyses and will result in publications.

From our viewpoint as a donor, we experience Việt Nam's transition daily. We see it, we accompany it, we cause it, and we follow it. Unfortunately, we don't anticipate it often enough. This is where your work can help us. We try to sketch out some lines, to support change, but it is clear that we are always a bit behind in our knowledge and understanding of the changes that are happening, especially on a social level.

I also think that you will have some debate on the definition of transition. I would not be able to give a complete definition. It seems to me that there is a temporal dimension: comprehension of time, phases, periods, determination of a beginning and an end, long time, short time. In Việt Nam, while we feel that we are experiencing a transition, it is still difficult to define it. There are different rhythms, that of the economy, of society, of collective time, of the individual, of the city, of the country. The policy of renewal initiated in Việt Nam in 1986 provides a date for the beginning of the transition, whether in theory or in reality. It is clear that the country is evolving, with the concept of transition itself,

in a way, held sacred. The country's status has shifted from that of a poor country to a middle-income country, and this is the subject of debate within the donor community (because this means changes in the nature of international aid). The many different aspects of this issue will surely keep you busy long after the Summer School Week 2010!

I would like to go back to the format of your meeting: the wide range of participants, and the rich resources of each, will make sharing your views a very enriching research process. We understand and completely support

this approach because we use it ourselves, employing specialists of all kinds within our Agency so as to have a collective and multi-disciplinary approach which matches our projects. In addition, the networking of researchers on a regional level and beyond offers fascinating prospects. It is a great asset, which will be recognized and built upon over time.

Thanks to you all, enjoy your work and I wish great success to the Tam Đảo Summer School Week 2010.



Speech delivered by Jacques Boulègue

University Professor, Representative of IRD in Việt Nam

*Mr. Vice President of the Vietnam Academy of
Social Sciences,*

Colleagues,

It is always a pleasure for a physicist to address an assembly of researchers in the social sciences. You must think that physics is made up of certainties, whereas the little knowledge that I have of the social sciences leads me to believe that in this domain, certainties are not always well established.

Since transition is a term used frequently in physics, I would like to make some suggestions from the viewpoint of my field of study. My specialism is thermodynamics, which analyzes the final and initial states of a system. Between these two states, there are paths that go from the initial state to the final state: they describe transition. Classical physics does not like transition because it signifies a divergence in behavior away from the equations describing the states of matter.

Take vaporization for example. If you observe a pot of boiling water, you will see bubbles rising from the bottom to the top of the pot. The theory is that boiling happens instantaneously, which is clearly not the case. There is turbulence, there is mixing of liquid

and vapor bubbles. This could possibly be expressed by an equation, but only by using mathematical tools few people have heard of. In short, wide-ranging heterogeneous systems – maybe a bit like societies – experience transitions that are very difficult to study because they can be violent and uncontrollable.

Like you, physicists come up against problems. People talk about climate change; from this point of view, we are in a period of transition. My personal opinion is that we know very little. We know even less because the principal greenhouse gas is not carbon dioxide, nor methane, nor nitrous oxide; it is water. Little is said of this because in models of the future climate, which are supposed to set limits for the economy and societies, we are incapable of describing the role of clouds, *i.e.* the changing of water from gas to liquid – the opposite of boiling. You may find this surprising, but this is the main reason for the uncertainty of climate evolution; the physicist, like all researchers, must remain humble.

I know that there are many uncertainties in the evolution of societies and in the way in which they are observed. Remember that even in a so-called hard science, such as physics, and its

application to large-scale systems, we come across the same uncertainties.

Since 1986, Việt Nam has been able to manage a transition in a way that makes it an example for many developing countries. I hope that results still to come will be such that the Vietnamese government, which was fully aware of its situation in 2009-2010, will achieve the progress envisaged for 2015.

The Institute for Development Research (IRD) is also developing because it is in transition. In fact, on June 3, 2010, the French government slightly changed the status of the IRD, and we hope, before the end of the year, to be able to present what will be the “final state” of the IRD in a strategic plan for 2010 to 2025.

Recently, the president of IRD, Michel Laurent, met with the president of the VASS, and one of the outcomes was to confirm that at the end of the Vietnamese government’s next planning period 2011-2020, the IRD will no longer have any reason to be in Việt Nam. Indeed, the country will be, if we get the results we want, a stable society and no doubt a member of the G20. Let’s hope that we reach that situation. I think that your debates will contribute to this evolution, and I hope that the IRD, which will no doubt act as a coordinator of collaborative research in countries outside of the G20, will also succeed in its transition.

Thank you for your attention.



Speech delivered by Yves PerraudEAU

University Professor, Head of Việt Nam and Southeast Asia Mission, Nantes University

*Presidents, Directors, Ladies and Gentlemen
Doctoral Candidates, Dear Colleagues,*

I am much honored to participate in this opening session of the latest meeting of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week, and I would like to thank you sincerely. I find it particularly touching, both professionally and personally, for five reasons.

Firstly, on behalf of Nantes University and its president, Yves Lecointe, we are very happy to be here for this latest meeting. Our presence signals our cooperation, on which we signed a document recently, and which we consider very important. We hope that it will succeed and bring the expected benefits to all involved – doctoral candidates, teachers, professors, researchers. This cooperation was a particular wish of Yves Lecointe who is very committed to opening Nantes University to international projects. My presence last December at the Doctoral Seminars came a few days before the participation of researchers from Nantes University in a colloquium with Hà Nội University of Science and Technology (HUST). For two days, our seminars and workshops addressed methodologies in science, humanities, social sciences and languages, in order to prepare our upcoming cooperation in the doctoral program. Our university regularly

participates in projects and partnerships as part of its international cooperation policy. In addition, we promote the decentralization of some of our Master's programs.

Many components of Nantes University are present in Việt Nam, thanks particularly to our previous president, François Resche, through agreements with Vietnamese universities, for example in health (Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City), odontology (Hà Nội), science and technology (Đã Nẵng and Cần Thơ), economics and management (Hà Nội and Hải Phòng). Last December, a large delegation led by our vice-presidents Françoise Lejeune and Jacques Girardeau was here as a show of our commitment.

The theme of this Summer School Week is fascinating. As director of the finance-banking-insurance and maritime logistics departments, I wanted to highlight our presence through four Master's programs in economics and management. Therefore, as a teacher and researcher, I am happy to participate in this cooperation. The finance department has "Institut Universitaire Professionnalisé" (IUP) status, delivering courses in theory and professional instruction so as to train future executives to be able to produce diagnoses and strategic solutions,

or even apply operational recommendations. Although the research element is less significant than in other Master's programs, some of our students do go on to obtain doctoral degrees, which was the case for some Vietnamese students who have just received their diplomas with a specialization in banking.

Nantes University's participation has been made possible through the warm welcome extended by the founding parties of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week. I would like to thank them all and in particular, Stéphane Lagrée, who, as a former student of Nantes University, has personally facilitated the implementation of this cooperation.

Finally, I am personally happy about this cooperation on two levels; as a teacher – I have taught for 30 years in higher education and this experience brings me fresh ideas and a renewed interest in learning new things – and as an individual, since I promised myself twelve years ago that I would come back to see your beautiful country.

Thank you. I am happy and honored to be among you and with you in this mutual project. I wish health and success to all the researchers here at this Tam Đảo Summer School Week 2010.



Map of localisation



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Part 1

Plenary Sessions

1.1. Transition: Epistemological thoughts on the Chinese Example

Nicolas Zufferey, University of Geneva

(Re-transcription)

I would like sincerely to thank the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences as well as all of the workshop partners and in particular, Stéphane Lagrée. I am very happy to be in Việt Nam; this is my first visit.

I am new to this area in two ways: first, my field of study does not cover Việt Nam or Southeast Asia; second, I am not a specialist in sociology or economics, fields which seem to me to be more in tune with the concept of transition. I am an historian of China, so I will speak primarily about China, and I will avoid any implicit or explicit comparisons with Việt Nam. Today, many Chinese think that Việt Nam is ten years behind China in development, which is a common perception that is frequently repeated in the Chinese media, even if the subject of Việt Nam in and of itself is rarely brought up. It is obvious that this opinion is simplistic, to say the least. Certainly there are similarities, notably political systems that call themselves

socialist and undertake economic reforms that are sometimes similar, but there are also clear divergences, for example the size of the states. More fundamentally, I hope that Việt Nam will not follow the example of certain recent Chinese reforms or practices, such as the destruction of Chinese cities. Peking has been subjected to much destruction during the last few years, especially before the Olympic Games. I hope that this beautiful city, Hà Nội, will not suffer the same fate.

The structure of my presentation is as follows. I will first give two examples of transition in China: one very ancient transition, and the present one. Then I will address some more conceptual and methodological questions: What is transition? How can we understand it in a larger historical context? Finally, I will emphasize a point that seems to me to be of paramount importance in China today: the ideological dimensions of transition, which are often invoked by politicians as an excuse for inequality or delay.

1.1.1. Two Examples of Historical Transition in China

The first transition that I will speak about is very ancient, because it started in the VIth century BC and lasted until the IInd century BC, thus four to five centuries long. The second transition I will address starts in 1978-1979, with the beginning of reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, eight years before the beginning of the Vietnamese *đổi mới*; the interval of time between the two is something that the Chinese remember well and which partially explains certain simplistic Chinese ideas about Việt Nam. Despite the modernization resulting from both these transitions, it is clear that the similarities between them are outnumbered by the differences, not the least of which is duration: the transition in China at the end of the first millennium BC was much longer and slower than the current, brutal transition. It could seem paradoxical to use the word “modernization” to describe changes that are so ancient, but in fact, between the VIth and IInd centuries BC, China shifted from a “feudal” state – in the western historical sense, and not the Marxist sense – to an imperial system; from a very segmented system with states joined by loose, Suzerain-vassal type links, to an administration in the modern sense of the word. In the IInd century BC, China had an administration that some would compare to the French *départements* of today: civil servants (prefects, etc.) were nominated by the central imperial court, and held responsible only by this court. I emphasize the fact that this very ancient transition displays eminently modern aspects. The important contrast rests in the fact that this five-century transition was not experienced as such by most of the actors

of the time, even less so by the populations that saw it as an economic or moral crisis or even a decline. To invoke such an ancient transition presupposes the hindsight of an historian, who is capable of distinguishing an anterior and a posterior state, the transition being precisely the unstable phase between the two.

This transition constitutes the first of three great transitions in Chinese history (*cf.* for example Jacques Gernet) the second is what we call the Song Period Renaissance between the Xth and XIIth century, and the third is the modern period.

This first era begins at the time of Confucius (551-479 BC), at the end of the troubled “Spring and Autumn” era, and lasts until the Warring States period, marked by constant wars. These conflicts can be explained not only by economic and demographic changes (strong population growth), but also by changes in production tools (shifting from bronze to iron). For the most part, this transition ended with the Qin dynasty, founded in 221 BC by the first emperor, Qin Shihuang. This sovereign led many reforms, moving to some extent with the direction of transition, which partially explains the success of his kingdom which ended up conquering all others. In current debates on reforms in China, it is possible to find similar ideas on the forces that go along with history, and those that oppose it – and which are thus destined to fail, according to the Marxist dialectic.

The conditions anterior to the Warring States transition typify a feudal type model, with quasi-familial links between the different principalities that pledge allegiance to the Zhou royal dynasty, but for the most part remain autonomous. The beginning of this dynasty is considered to be a golden age,

a vision that is debatable in the eyes of historians, but which left a rather positive image in Chinese posterity. Then comes a period of wars between the principalities, which gradually become independent kingdoms. The feudal state as I have defined it above is in a grave crisis. Little by little, nobles that occupy principal positions in the court are replaced by other personalities that are not all from nobility, but who are selected increasingly for their competence. Therefore, we witness a change in the selection process which spans several centuries, but is nevertheless perceptible from one generation to the next: gradually, selecting civil servants using recruitment systems – some of which are somewhat close to the modern system, such as the start of an exam-based system – replaces a system based on heredity. Let us note the parallel with China of recent times, with consideration here also of the selection of civil servants, and more open mechanisms of promotion, to the detriment of the ancient quasi-hereditary system of the Communist Party.

Transition periods are often synonymous not only with institutional crisis, but also with deep moral crisis with negative, but also positive effects. The crisis of values was extremely brutal during the Warring States period, but at the same time, it was extraordinarily fertile on an intellectual level. Times of crisis can be worrisome, troubling but nevertheless exciting. Once again, we can draw a parallel with the current situation; today in China, we are witnessing a veritable intellectual effervescence in debates, the media, publishing, bookstores and universities. People sometimes speak of a new great era in the history of Chinese thought, and it's worth noting that all great historical moments in

Chinese thought correspond to times of crisis.

Let's revisit some of the principal changes which occur during this first period of transition: moving from the bronze age to the iron age, from a splintered feudal system to a centralized and administrative imperial system. We shift from many "Chinese" States, to a certain Chinese cultural unity. After a state of relative peace and stability under the Zhou royalty, a period of intense military action was then followed by a return to a relatively peaceful stage, a sort of *pax sinica* in the Chinese empire, which lasted four to five centuries – up until the fall of the Han in 220 AD, or until 1911 depending on the different interpretations.

Intellectuals alive during the Warring States period adopt different views on this crisis. I will only mention two principal intellectual movements out of all that we could identify: the Confucianist attitude and the Legalist attitude.

- The Confucianists are conservatives and consider the transition they are experiencing as a moral crisis and decline. Their goal is to block this decline and to return to the order that reigned at the beginning of the Zhou feudal dynasty. Confucianism is, from this point of view, a form of conservatism and is radically opposed to Legalism.
- The Legalists propose a theory of State that will be put into place in the territory of Qin, which unifies "China" by force and creates the empire in 221 BC. The Legalists are therefore the architects of this imperial unification, of paramount importance for the rest of Chinese history. The Legalists are known for having put punitive laws into place – they use capital punishment

very widely for all sorts of crimes, even minor offenses – but they differ from their predecessors by making law universal and public. From this point of view, their idea of the law is much more modern than that of the Confucianists. In fact, Confucianists favor morality and rituals, and mistrust the law. Even though there were rudimentary laws in ancient times, they were considered to be secondary to values such as loyalty, linked to the ethics of nobility. In contrast, the Legalists go as far as rejecting morality in order to put their legal system into place, and by doing so, clash with conservative forces.

As I have pointed out before, this transition is not perceived positively by the majority of its contemporaries, notably by the Confucianists who consider the political crisis of the time above all as a moral crisis. Their objective is to return to an ancient ideal through the education, rituals and institutions of the Zhou era. Several times, Confucius states that he has invented nothing and that his objective is simply to return to the spirit of the golden age that is the feudal state, away from which China is moving.

In contrast, Legalists accept the reality of change. They have a Malthusian vision of society: according to them, the rise in population creates pressure on resources, which in turn causes conflicts and wars. The modern state must react and adapt, since the old system and traditional morality are not suited to new historical conditions. One necessity is to reinforce the government and the army, in order to be able to resist neighboring states, and to be well placed in the struggle for resources to satisfy the population's needs. Reforms are therefore necessary. Legalists point to the old-fashioned

nature of their opponents' ideas and methods. History proves them to be partially right, since all of the states that refuse or fail to adapt are gradually vanquished and dominated by the Qin kingdom.

One Legalist trait that seems to me to be fundamental is their consciousness of change. Although they do not use the term "transition", they have a program of reforms that they energetically attempt to put into place, and a discourse that accompanies these reforms. They start to display an ideology that justifies political measures that favor passing from one state of being to another: state intellectuals and theoreticians make very practical suggestions to adapt the political system to the undeniable facts of social change and the increase of the Chinese population. Historians consider that the Legalists accelerated the transition by intervening in a decided, decisive and sometimes brutal manner.

We therefore have two opposing positions, one that goes along with history – as it has been reconstructed by historians – and the other that goes against it, resisting change. It is telling that the Chinese Maoists have very often considered Legalists as examples, whilst keeping their distance from Confucianism.

From the point of view of its actors, this age is extremely brutal. We have many accounts, notably in the dynastic histories, where the population complains not only of economic changes – such as the lack of employment in the countryside which forces rural people to come to the cities – but also moral changes – the moral failing of a son who abandons his parents, etc. These accounts do not evoke transition or progress but, on the contrary, a crisis. The point of view of the actors is very different from that of historians who have a

tendency to obliterate the negative aspects of these troubled periods.

The current transition in China is omnipresent in public debate, academic conferences, publications and the media. If you type the Chinese word for “transition,” *zhuanxingqi*, into Google, you will find millions of results. It’s a term which is truly part of the discourse and generally has positive connotations, especially when it comes from political decision-makers.

The transition in progress since 1978 has actually been taking place for a much longer period, because China entered a phase of change as early as 1839-1842 with the first Opium War, marking the beginning of the crisis of the ancient imperial order. The century from 1839 to 1949 is sometimes characterized as a century of entry into modernity, but it is also one of the blackest centuries in Chinese history: internal and domestic crises, war with the British and the French, war of resistance against Japan, civil war... all in a context of imperialism and western colonialism. Looking at a shorter time period, the Communist Party sometimes presents the current reforms as the outcome of a process started in 1949 with the founding of the socialist state. Finally, it’s worth noting that the transition since 1978 is a transition entirely accepted, declared, active; it is the object of much debate and reflection, notably regarding the differences between transition in the broad sense of the term and “small” transitions – demographic, social, cultural, economic, etc.

In the academic and conceptual sense of the term, whether in the West or in China, there are numerous theoretical hypotheses which contextualize this transition very broadly, sometimes with contradictory hypotheses.

According to the Marxist *doxa*, China is still in a great transitional phase of capitalism and socialism. And yet, certain speeches by Jiang Zemin, the former Chinese president, intimate that China was already in a socialist phase, and that the transition had been completed. Chinese intellectuals, some of whom voluntarily use the term “post,” sometimes speak of transition from Leninism to post-Leninism, or of a shift from pre-modernity to post-modernity. A certain number of authors, notably in the universities of Beijing, enjoy saying that China has simply bypassed the modern era, as is demonstrated by a large part of the population obtaining portable phones directly, without going through the “intermediary” phase of having land-lines. According to another hypothesis, which we hear more often in the West, China is in the process of going from socialism to capitalism. We cannot deny that this idea is somewhat pertinent, even if the Chinese have a tendency to refute it by referring to the transition itself to justify any excess committed by a sometimes uncontrolled capitalism.

Here are some examples of transition that are not necessarily directly linked to each other, but which are all widely studied by sociologists, economists and political scientists, both Chinese and from the West:

- the institutionalization of political succession: switching from a system where succession takes place from within the party (often as a reward for fidelity to the party) to a more open system founded on competence. In the middle and upper echelons of today’s Chinese government, civil servants are in general very well trained, often in western schools, which is a change from the past. Therefore, there is a distinct transition in the system of succession;

- market liberalization, which is still ongoing, contrary to what we may sometimes believe. More than 50% of the economy is still in State control, sometimes indirectly. The markets are opening up gradually, which has consequences, notably for employment. For many Chinese, transition is synonymous with unemployment, a situation which has lasted for many decades now. Officially, unemployment is between 15% and 20%. In fact, and according to western criteria, it fluctuates between 30% and 40%. Today in Beijing, it is not uncommon to see four people working in one bus – one driver and three controllers. These people could be unemployed tomorrow without any real future opportunities. The authorities take this major problem into account;
- there are interesting changes on the social level, notably in the villages. Formerly, marriages occurred between villages. But because of the splintering of traditional solidarities and the disengagement of the government from local and provincial economies, families are increasingly forced to recreate local solidarity. The single child policy – and thus the importance of boys to the detriment of girls – also plays a role. These combined factors incite certain families to find a son-in-law in a neighboring family in the same village, who will in some ways fulfill the function of son. These situations result in major social changes;
- I also point out questions which are more peripheral, but which are also symptomatic, such as the “resinization” of literature. Chinese literature was very westernized until the 1980s. These days, certain writers try to find more Chinese phrases, tone and themes.

Some of these transitions are accepted and voluntary, others are much more involuntary. The change from employment for all, to unemployment is obviously not a transition that was chosen. The government puts relief measures into place, but these transitions remain extremely problematic. Changes concerning marriage in the villages sometimes have consequences, even medical consequences, and the government has a limited amount of power to act on these issues. In other words, if some transitions seem to be very much under control, others seem to be out of control. We could also note that all transitions are not synchronous: some transitions which appear to be interdependent do not in reality happen together. Market liberalization obviously has an effect on employment, but these effects are not felt immediately. This creates two transitions occurring at two different times, which makes it more difficult for the government to carry out a coherent policy over time.

1.1.2. Issue-based Transition: Between Reality and Ideology

I will first point out the confusion found in the debate on transition in China, among Chinese actors themselves, and even sometimes among researchers. The first confusion is theoretical: the concept of transition is used extremely loosely, as an all-purpose theme, without thinking about the real definition and limits of the idea. In politics, transition is not truly defined either; sometimes it is a real program, but sometimes it is also used as an excuse, a pretext to explain problems and delays. I will also emphasize the ideological dimensions of transition, used as a means of justification.

What is the stable state toward which the Chinese transition is leaning? Transition is omnipresent in official speeches, the press and bibliographies, etc. It seems as though it is used as a consensual synonym for “revolution”, “change”, “progress”, “reform” or “modernization”, words which have strong connotations whereas transition is more neutral. In China, many people feel as if they have been swept up in permanent change, that they have totally lost their bearings, and they do not know toward which social model the government is heading. To what extent is the government managing transition? For certain authors, the central state is in control of everything and is truly master of the transition. For others, the government has largely lost control, especially in the provinces.

In one sense, all periods are transition, because history never stops. It is difficult to imagine a society without change, simply because this would presuppose stable balance, both internally and with the external world, which is simply impossible to imagine in a world where everything is intertwined. Only some primitive societies do not seem to evolve over a long period of time, but even this immobility is relative. Change is written in history. Note also that the idea that everything is constantly changing, and doing so with increasing rapidity, is one of the trademarks of modernity, as opposed to the “traditional” eras where history seemed to evolve slowly.

Because transition is linked to a certain vision of history and progress, this vision seems natural to us, whereas this is not necessarily so. Depending on the period and the civilization, history can be seen very differently: as immobile, as cyclical, or as a decline to be stopped.

In China, history was sometimes experienced as cyclical, for example in Buddhism. The succession of dynasties also encouraged a cyclical vision of history, possibly with crises that ended the cycles.

Descendant generations have a tendency to represent history as a decline, and transition periods are often perceived as an acceleration of this decline, particularly by the people.

Today in China, there is a contradiction between the official discourse that promotes belief in a bright tomorrow, and daily life, especially for older people who are nostalgic for the past, and feel with some confusion that history is a decline.

History as progress is a relatively recent vision, and it largely comes from European Renaissance ideas. In ancient China, there were already intellectuals who presented history as progress: sometimes Legalists, but also intellectuals from the Han dynasty who favored their own time over that of the ancients. In the West, the idea of history as progress was introduced in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, notably thanks to Hegel and Marx, who interpreted historical development in “scientific” terms. The XIXth century assimilates scientific progress with progress in general; progress becomes positive in this discourse, man becomes an actor of progress and of history, he is not happy simply to submit to it. These ideas bring about a legitimization of transition and progress in official vocabulary and ideology.

History has subjective dimensions. There is often conflict between transition and progress as they are conceived by governments and political actors, and the daily human experience of these changes. History is unavoidable in the Marxist discourse. Today in

China, all political speeches promote change and political measures by presenting them as moving in the same direction as progress and history, and have a tendency to stigmatize forces that go against change, for example some dissidents who denounce certain undesirable effects of change, and who are ostracized as reactionaries.

Toward which economic model is the government heading? The views within the Chinese government are not unanimous; some pressure groups propose contradictory models and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party wants to be united, but it is shaken up by various currents, or quarrels between factions. The principal faction tends toward a socialist market economy. One very small faction is more left-leaning and would like to revert to Marxist “fundamentals”. A third faction, sometimes called the New Left, would like to get closer to European models, notably with free unions. Finally, others, closer to the western center, encourage a much more liberalized, American-style system. Between these groups, the debates are extremely interesting, while the economic and social model promoted by official discourse remains extremely fuzzy. The official objective is to achieve a relatively egalitarian system, but in reality the divide between rich and poor, and between cities and rural areas, is becoming wider.

Concerning cultural transitions, I spoke just now about Chinese literature; will the present transition bring China closer to a more Chinese culture, or on the contrary, will it move further away from its traditional roots? Here again, some actors would like China to westernize and adopt western values such as human rights. Others, on the contrary, insist on the necessity of keeping traditional values

like filial piety, or respect for superiors. This brings us to a related question, that of the western model: does the West still represent a model for China? Westerners often have a tendency to be fairly directive, an arrogant or paternalistic attitude which can be counter-productive. More fundamentally, some ask if the western model is best for Asian societies.

Official Chinese propaganda often represents transition, at least implicitly, as a change in the right direction. The modern era is also marked by the efficiency of ideology and of propaganda. The state can use the theme of transition in order to impose sacrifices and unpopular policies, and justify exceptional measures. And the Chinese government doesn't hesitate to do so: numerous sacrifices are asked of the populations who are actors in the transition, but who can also be its victims. Transition is sometimes even presented by the Chinese government as a justification for inequalities, delays or even immobility. In some cases, observers have the impression of stagnation, or regression, notably in certain social practices such as the return of concubinage in southern China. It is difficult to see how the return of these “feudal” practices, in the Marxist sense of the word, can contribute to the implementation of a stable, post-transition system. We also see an opposition between on the one hand the singular ideology of transition, change, progress, and on the other all the little transitions and evolutions, multiple and diverse, which are sometimes very difficult to live with on a daily basis.

Up until the mid-1980s, health care coverage in China was very limited, but relatively universal. Today, this is no longer the case, and without money, many people cannot receive health care. Are we in the midst of a transition

toward a westernized social protection system? But for the victims of change, these phenomena of transition are extremely difficult to live with on a daily basis; these are themes found regularly in the literature. Currently in the major cities, many campaigns are being launched to invite the population to enroll in private insurance. It's possible that in 20 or 30 years' time, all Chinese will have good health insurance coverage, but today there is a disparity between the city and the countryside, between modernity and tradition. In addition, transition can follow different models: a European model (French or Nordic style with universal coverage), or an American model from before the Obama era, with the exclusion of a large minority of the population. But for the moment, let us note that the transition is negatively affecting many people in China.

Some Chinese, including some of those in power, recognize the necessity of "democratization" in the long run, but use the immensity of the country and its lack of democratic culture to justify the present situation. One related question is what nature the democratization process should take. Where to start? From the top, descending through all the hierarchical levels, or on the contrary a bottom-up process, starting from local democracy? Presently, there is voting in Chinese villages, but as we move up the echelons of power, we find nomination and promotion mechanisms that are much less transparent. At the same time, at the very top of the party, we have seen for several years that there have been more candidates than positions to fill, even if the choice remains modest: at the last National Assembly elections, there were 8% more candidates than positions to fill. Are we really

in a transition phase? Is this transition being resisted, by a government that basically wants to keep the *status quo*? Is the system blocked? Official speeches are very ambiguous; on the one hand they appear to encourage democratization and on the other they point to problems linked to democracy in other Asian countries, such as in Taiwan, where the democratic debate sometime borders on fist-fights. Chinese authorities are happy to mock this style of democracy.

I will conclude with the non-linearity of transitions, a well-known problem which has been studied by change theorists. In developing systems or states we observe transitions that are not in line with each other: economic transition, then social transition, for example. According to a current model, economic modernization will firstly benefit a minority, then favor liberating values which will eventually lead to democratization, all at different rates of change.

Let's take corruption as an example. Sociologists and economists sometimes distinguish between white corruption (considered normal in a given society), gray corruption (considered acceptable, and helpful to transition) and black corruption (considered unacceptable). This experience and these conceptions of corruption are changing significantly in China today. Procedures considered to be normal five or ten years ago are no longer acceptable today. Here again, we can see that there are some evolutions that are probably positive and which lead to a modernization of the system.

Is transition a reality, or is it rather a debate that hides changes that are much less accepted and controlled? Is there only one or are there many transitions? How long does a transition

last? Does the concept of transition facilitate forecasts, predictions? Paradoxically, the Chinese government makes many four-year-plans, five-year plans, etc., following the logic of the planned economy which has been standard practice in China for decades, but hesitates to make forecasts and predictions concerning transition. Who are the principal actors of the transition? Is the government an actor of the transition or does it submit to it?

Although it is possible to speak relatively freely with the Chinese on most subjects, the weight of Marxist words and discourse is still heavy in their way of representing things. Behind the appearances of modernity hide ideological obstacles and a conventional vocabulary. In a way, the concept of transition is sufficient in and of itself, without any consideration or action plan. The Chinese government, especially at a local level, has only limited room for maneuver and often intervenes only to correct excesses, not as a true master of transition.

Thank you.

Exchanges...

Stéphane Lagrée

Thank you, Nicolas, for this intervention which gives us a framework, which varies between long and short timescales and reflects on themes as diverse as the employment market, literature, family, marriage. We will now open the floor to questions.

Jean-Pierre Cling, IRD-DIAL

I liked your presentation on the transition in China very much. Obviously, it is very difficult to compare a transition that occurred

more than 2000 years ago with the present transition. For the first transition, you pointed out that it was not considered as such at the time, that instead it was considered to be a period of crisis, of political instability, of war. That being said, we still have the impression that this does not really apply to what is happening now. The current transition is affirmed, promoted, whereas 2000 years ago, it was not experienced as a shift from one state of being to another. Furthermore, the current transition is not really considered as a period of crisis. You spoke about the older generations and their nostalgia, but overall, it has been a period of extremely rapid economic progress. Social difficulties are apparent, but it is also a period of great economic stability and peace – except maybe in 1989 and the events of Tiananmen Square.

Second point. I'm a little surprised by your point of view which does not seem to take sides. Is this the historian's wish to remain distant? Finally, you did not allow yourself to make any comparison with Việt Nam, but we could make numerous comparisons between what you have described and what we are now living through in this country.

Cristina Bellini, URDSE, Cambodia

You seem to say that the state does not really have control of this transition. With a government as centralized as China's, what are the mechanisms that initiate such important social and cultural transitions? When a – sometimes violent – centralized transition is imposed, and then the source of authority potentially eases up, do we witness a regression? Who is active in transition, who starts it, who wants it, can we impose it?

Rodolphe De Koninck, Montreal University

I liked the wide range of your remarks very much. It seems to me that there is one thing you mentioned that merits deeper consideration. Could you discuss the reforms that began in 1978 in relation to the official launch of the modern Chinese agrarian transition, the appearance of new systems of responsibility in agriculture, accompanied in the years that followed by wide openings in economic, territorial and demographic terms?

Yves Perraudau, Nantes University

You evoked the idea that the United States could swing in China's direction. Is this a reference to Braudel's theory, the shifts of the world economy; is it only a confrontation between these two countries, or more generally a swing from the world of the Atlantic to the world of the Pacific?

Nicolas Zufferey

To answer the first question concerning the comparison between the most ancient transition and the most recent, the differences are obvious. In comparing these two periods, I would like to emphasize the position of two types of actors: those who take it upon themselves to promote reforms and changes, and those who lag behind and are victims of these changes. Even if long-term reforms in ancient China were not experienced in the same manner as short-term contemporary reforms, there are still numerous convergences, especially the fact that in both cases contemporaries sense acceleration or even a crisis. Many people are very positive about what is happening in China today and rightly so, but in the rural areas, many problems are appearing and general

discontent is gaining momentum. It doesn't manifest itself in a spectacular way, but since 2006, there have been approximately 100,000 social protests officially recorded each year. We observe a dissatisfaction which is deep, but also paradoxical: most people recognize that their standard of living has improved, even in the countryside, but the disparities, the divides, and the inequalities have grown in an even more spectacular fashion. Since there are other new problems arising as well, this sentiment of crisis remains evident in rural areas. The same is true in urban areas, with migrant workers who represent tens of millions of people. It's this sense of crisis, rather than real analogies, that I wanted to underline in the comparison of these two transitions separated by more than 2 millennia.

Concerning my personal point of view, first of all, very few China specialists would risk imagining what China will be like in 10, 15 or 20 years. We did that in the 2000s, when the Pekingologists predicted the splintering of China. Today, we see a certain political stability: the government is losing control of certain areas, but keeps its hold on politics, the police and army.

Concerning the government's control over transition, it is clear that in the beginning, in 1978, a certain number of policies were decided upon, implemented and controlled. But in the 1990s, we really had the impression that the government was losing its influence, notably in the provinces which are sometimes managed pretty loosely. At one point, we found unofficial tollbooths on the roads, tollbooths which allowed local administrations to finance hospitals or schools because the central government was no longer financing them. Since the 2000s, control has been tightened, but the government sometimes

appears overwhelmed and has difficulty in dealing with many social problems. Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, insists that social divisions, which have worsened out of control, must be bridged. Deng Xiaoping himself affirms that part of the country should increase its wealth more rapidly, in order to pull the rest along in its wake. But “the rest” follow much too slowly, thus the dissatisfaction and even anger. Power can be affirmed with authority in many domains, notably the political domain. However, it is difficult for the state to stop certain practices: the return to patriarchy, important funerary rites, concubinage, etc.

Concerning the relations between China and the United States, the discourse is mostly very political and nationalistic in nature, and marked by a certain spirit of vengeance. The Chinese are very willing to see themselves as the superpower of the XXIst century. This nationalist temptation could become worrisome if Chinese growth peters out and social problems explode. The government could be tempted to find some exterior scapegoats. China could face other serious problems, notably ecological ones. Presently, we consider that 30% to 40% of the population has access to clean drinking water. Will China find itself in the position that it deems rightful, that is, globally pre-eminent? In the XVIIIth century, China produced one quarter of global production; the country is on the verge of reaching this level again and out-producing the United States by a factor of 2 to 1.

Francois Roubaud, IRD-DIAL

Thank you for this fascinating exposé treated with the hindsight of history. You have

mentioned several times, as a positive point, the desire of the Party to draw on better trained elites. This vision is maybe not as simple as that. In Việt Nam, we see that lesser trained members of the elite have made good decisions in the past few years. If you take Latin America as an example, the success of the *políticos demócratas* did not have the expected effect, in particular on corruption.

What I find revealing in the debate between you and Jean-Pierre Cling is the contrast between a rather positive macro-economic vision and a more pessimistic sociological and anthropological vision, focused on conflicts. I think that in the case of China, we are more ready to accept the existence of a problem in that there is a real rise in inequality measured at the macro level. On the other hand, in Việt Nam, the inequalities have not increased as in China. The fact that you base your arguments on social protests does not seem to me to be truly significant: social protest does not only signify that a situation is deteriorating, but that the aspirations of the populations are rising. We see that in a period of real, severe crisis, and of economic decline, people are crushed by the situation and social movements have a tendency to diminish, and the unions shrink.

More broadly on the historical perspective, I am intrigued by the comparison between a transition that took place over four centuries and a transition taking place over only a few decades: do we have an acceleration of history, or is this the short-sightedness of the contemporary period? From your point of view as an historian, are there transitions which were not experienced as such in real time, and which were reconstructed *ex post*

as transitions? On the other hand, are there false transitions, which were experienced as such in real time by contemporaries, and which with historical hindsight were completely forgotten and are not considered as transitions today?

Virginie Diaz, AFD Paris

Since these conferences are dedicated to scientific output but also to the implementation of ideas, I would like to come back to the methodology that you adopted as an historian to support your remarks; notably to know more about how easy it was to gain access to the sources you use (archives, contemporary accounts, etc.).

Didier Orange, IRD

How to describe or recognize a transition? Each actor or person does not have the sense of living through a transition. Does a society have an initial state? At some moment, isn't there a desire to define and to explain a transition? I would prefer to use the terms "movement" or "dynamic", which are terms that we often use in physics; isn't there a notion more religious than political in the concept of transition?

Bernard Formoso, West Paris University - Nanterre

I was wondering about how to put these two transitions into perspective and compare them. In the first transition which took place 2000 years ago, there is a transition in the sense that there is a shift from one political system to another, which was triggered by political and demographic factors. In the present case, does the notion of transition make sense? A political regime takes the initiative towards

economic liberalization, but isn't this a much wider phenomenon integrated in the global evolution of the world economy? So is it possible to end up with a stabilised version of the system; isn't this an open process that will remain open? The same question can be asked of western countries. I think that it is possible there to have a transition of one political system to another, as during the first Chinese transition, but today, this concept of a third transition seems to me to be a rhetorical idea.

Lê Thế Vững, VASS

Two fundamental values in China are unity and discipline. Do you think that there is a link between the desire of the government to iron out ethnic diversity and the victims of this contemporary transition?

Nicolas Zufferey

I agree with most of François's points on the elites, but I would like to add a nuance. Indeed, traditional elites in the Chinese Communist Party had a certain ideal, in which the people recognized themselves fairly well, even if corruption was rampant. In the 1980s, on the contrary, one had the feeling that the elites were also corrupt and that they neglected these values. Today, there is a reaffirmation of values such as social solidarity (sometimes a little rhetorical) in the discourse, and the appearance of officials who are competent in pure economics, finance, etc., even if the population sees them as highly educated technocrats who neglect the public interest.

Concerning potential transitions that were not experienced as such by the population, the second great Chinese transition that I just mentioned – the Song Period, sometimes

called the Chinese Renaissance – is revealing: during this period, large cities emerged and printing was developed, which facilitated the dissemination of culture. The actors of the time did not consider this to be a time of crisis or transition, partially because these changes were not integrated into an overarching debate on economic change. Nevertheless, historians consider this period as a major transition.

Concerning the methodology, in history, we try to combat the idea that there is only one modernity, that of the West. There are forms of pre-modernity and modernity in societies other than western societies, such as in Tokugawa-period Japan which implemented relatively open economic and educational systems. We speak more and more about “pre-modernity” for certain ancient eras, for example to describe the Song dynasty that I just spoke about.

In regards to sources, I mostly used dynastic histories, the writings of ancient thinkers, as well as some fictional texts (still rare at the time). For the contemporary era, popular literature, notably novels about social issues and novels by civil servants, are interesting to me: they reveal some reforms or evolutions in the provinces and villages from the inside. These writings have a sociological value, on the same level as interviews or field studies which are still difficult to carry out in China. Often, sociologists do not read Chinese and therefore cannot use these sources which are rich in material not found in the press, because of a stricter censorship: it seems important to me to decompartmentalize the disciplines and use “literary” material, for example, for sociological study.

How to recognize a transition? Is China going through transition today? The term is often over-used. On the social and economic level, everything is perpetually evolving; we live in open systems which are not very stable. Chinese authorities use the specific term *transition* abundantly in order to show and confirm their dynamic orientation, but this is not necessarily under control.

Christophe Gironde, Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Développement (IHEID)

I have a question about the reference system, the point of departure. In China, what is the effectiveness, the reality of the reference system that we describe as socialist? My question is inspired by the Vietnamese case: we know today that the reference system – collectivization, cooperatives, production brigades, etc. – was not that robust. Today we talk about “cooperative on paper” or about “incomplete collectivization”. Finally, analyzing the reference situation allows us to understand the transition. In the case of agricultural transition, it was facilitated in that the collectivist system was greatly disturbed and corrupted by an economy that was not collectivist, which led to a pretty “easy” transition.

Martine Segalen, West Paris University - Nanterre

You have used terms such as transition, transformation, crisis or progress. When we consider how important gender equality and improved conditions for women are for Marxist ideologists – I am thinking for example of the first Soviet state laws –, doesn't this economic modernization and relative political democratization represent

a regression for women's conditions in contemporary society?

Nicolas Zufferey

China is still officially in search of a "Chinese Path of Socialism". What are these words hiding? Western interpreters often see, in the notion of "Chinese Socialism", a way of hiding state capitalism. Presently, the model contains many aspects which reveal unofficial capitalism and state capitalism, instead of socialism. Many debates are held on this extremely sensitive subject; some have even wanted to rename a Party that no longer seems very communist.

China is far behind the United States in terms of cultural influence, contrary to Japan or Korea which have a significant influence on the West – which we can see by the example of Japanese mangas. China is conscious of its unattractiveness which can result from the bad impression left by the Chinese government. The Confucius Institutes that are being set up now will certainly not help the situation, given that they are instruments of "soft power" intimately linked to the government.

The Chinese collectivization system was somewhat rigid and generalized. Movements such as the Cultural Revolution succeeded

in effectively eradicating all private property. The Chinese communist party, unlike its Vietnamese counterpart, sometimes took the initiative of very violent movements against the "feudal" system. The resentment of a part of the population toward the party stems from these major movements. From this point of view, the reference system was well in place.

Concerning women, from 1949, there have been considerable advances: within a few years, Chinese women were granted many rights and had new access to professions that were previously reserved for men. Today, in certain regions, we are witnessing a regression, especially in rural areas. In general, less well educated communities will more readily experience a return to more patriarchal forms of family organization, which are less favorable to women.

Reading (tamdaoconf.com)

"China's Fuzzy Transition: Leninism to Post-Leninism", Steven I. Levine, *The China Quarterly*, No. 136, Special Issue: Greater China (Dec., 1993), pp. 972-983, Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

1.2. Agrarian Transition

Rodolphe De Koninck, Montreal University

(Re-transcription)

I am very happy to be here with you for the Summer School Week, but also happy to be in Việt Nam. This is perhaps my fortieth trip to this country in eighteen years! It changes very quickly, but the transformations actually come about at the same speed as in the rest of Southeast Asia.

My objective is to concentrate on one type of transformation: the agrarian transition, in particular the one taking place throughout Southeast Asia.^[4] My presentation is made of three major parts. First, I will make some remarks on the agrarian transition, referring to its accepted definitions and its main elements. I will then describe the characteristics of the Southeast Asian agrarian transition, in particular over the last fifty years. Finally, I will present a research project, for which I have been responsible for nearly six years, which touches on the agrarian transition in Southeast Asia and involves researchers from some twenty universities worldwide, including some eighty PhD students.

1.2.1. What is the Agrarian Transition?

To a large extent, the history of agriculture can be perceived as a reflection of the history of humanity. Since its origins, agriculture has been in constant change in response to multiple human requirements. It has gone through many adaptations concerning the use of seeds, cuttings, fertilizer or irrigation; it has thus been and remains a constant source of innovation and invention. Frequently, the search for solutions to agricultural problems has led to fundamental scientific discoveries. So there is a very close link between invention, innovation and the solving of agricultural problems and challenges. In addition, agriculture has unceasingly been the object of intensification, but also territorial expansion. Consequently, it is possible to conceive of the history of agriculture as that of its expansion.

I will come back to this question since one of the unique features of Southeast Asia's agrarian transition is that it is accompanied by a permanent expansion of agriculture, which is exceptional in the contemporary context, except for the case of Brazil. The idea of agrarian transition, of change, is still vague,

[4] The author would like to thank Jean-François Rousseau for his participation in the preparation of the figures. Jean-François Rousseau and I would also like to thank NUS Press for allowing the reproduction of nearly a dozen figures already appearing in our *Gambling with the Land. Southeast Asia's Agricultures, 1960-2008* (in press).

even if we define it today as the shift from a society characterized by accumulation in agriculture to a society in which accumulation occurs in industry. In the literature, particularly Marxist literature, the industrial revolution is interpreted as resulting from an agrarian transition. Often, terms such as “industrial revolution”, “industrial transition”, “urban transition”, are used to define a phenomenon initiated in the European countryside, which can sometimes lead to confusion. In Marxist ideology, the agrarian transition is defined as a transformation of production relations between those who own land and those who work it. The fundamental idea is to identify where the major form of accumulation in an economy occurs: fields or factories, countryside or city?

It is above all Marx who defined the agrarian transition, and therefore the industrial revolution which first took place in the English countryside. The transition was from a feudal society in which accumulation was based on the appropriation of surplus agricultural production – a visible appropriation by the land owners or landlords, to a capitalist society where the accumulation of an invisible added-value took place within industry. This transition brought about fundamental upheavals in the countryside and the cities, taking on different forms depending on the country. However, fundamentally, the processes were comparable: primary accumulation was no longer based on agriculture but on industry, this evolution having been not linear, but occurring through upheavals, resistance, progress and regression.

What are the phenomena that have generated these changes, this shift from so-called feudal societies to capitalist societies,

from agrarian societies to urban and industrial societies? Is the agrarian transition which is associated with the industrial revolution the result of technical innovations – invention of the wheel, improvement of weaving looms in English industry, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), or the result of social disruptions – appearance of the middle class, enclosure of common pastures which allowed the lords to seize an even greater agricultural surplus, which facilitated industrialization? I am simplifying, of course, but we can summarize this with two predominant hypotheses: the technical and technological hypothesis and the social hypothesis, from Marxist-inspired political economy. Is the shift from agricultural accumulation to industrial accumulation explained by the transformation of social relationships or by the “green revolution”? Throughout the process of agrarian transformation, is agriculture in and of itself an object of industrialization? One thing is certain: the conditions for improving production are defined more and more by industry found both upstream and downstream of agricultural production. The means of production are increasingly defined, perfected, produced and above all given financial backing by industry. Fertilizer, machinery, pesticides and insecticides are provided upstream; distribution, packaging, delivery are provided downstream; both create an unceasing and growing demand for fossil fuels. These processes are very visibly accelerating on a global scale. In highly advanced agriculture – for example American and European –, the conditions for agricultural production are defined more and more by the means of industrial production, while globalization is increasingly a driving force affecting agriculture.

The agrarian transition has taken many forms in different parts of the world. It is a process which began with the history of humanity and which will end with it. However, there is a moment in the history of a society, and I am coming back to the Marxist vision, where accumulation is increasingly organized within industry at the expense or even to the detriment of agriculture. How can this conceptual device be useful to us in deciphering what is happening in Southeast Asia?

1.2.2. The Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia

Starting in the 1950s, most of the region's modern nations were put into place, and fundamental changes were orchestrated by more or less authoritarian decisions. We must remember that after World War II, Southeast Asian agriculture was in a piteous state, although the colonial administrations promoted some forms of investment in agriculture, essentially for export, especially of rubber and rice. During the post-war years, the political situation in the region became more and more problematic: a serious crisis in Indonesia forcing the central government to deal with movements for political autonomy in peripheral islands, social or ethnic tensions in the Philippines and Malaysia, wars in Indochina, the exodus of Indian minorities from Burma, which contributed to the destabilization of its economy, etc. The leaders of various governments then had to make decisions, particularly regarding the rural and agricultural realm, the nexus of the main tensions: should they move forward with technical reforms or social reforms, promote agrarian reforms instead of *"green revolutions"*? How should they stop peasant

revolutions (Philippines, Java, Indochina) in the countryside, which was poorly controlled by the authorities? The governments therefore put in place interventionist policies in agriculture, taking measures to promote a peaceful agrarian transition and, gradually, to generate a surplus while reducing poverty in the countryside and accelerating the integration of their national economies into the global market.

Instead of finding politically difficult solutions to apply to the problems of land ownership and tenure, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines chose to launch a green revolution, whilst establishing technical means for improving production. This depended on output growth, primarily in food production, where growth was based firstly on the use of high-yielding rice varieties, and secondly on the increased use of industrial fertilizer, pesticides and insecticides, all in an effort to increase the twice-yearly harvest of rice, by far the primary staple food crop in the region. However such intensification could not happen without an improvement in irrigation and drainage, the responsibility for which would be increasingly taken over by the state. Because, everywhere in Southeast Asia, irrigation is always necessary for a double harvest.

Despite the existence of ancient village and even State irrigation systems – especially during the golden age of the Angkor Kingdom – no Southeast Asian society had the hydraulic infrastructure necessary to irrigate and drain rice fields sustainably twice a year. This form of intensification, applied more recently in certain countries, such as Vietnam, would create closer ties with the industrial sector, the designated supplier of inputs that had become indispensable.

In this manner, many rural areas were gradually transformed into permanent rice production platforms instead of seasonal ones.

We sometimes forget that intensification has also been increasingly applied to cash crops. Beginning in the 1970s, the output of rubber trees, then, notably, that of coffee bushes and palm oil trees grew rapidly. These increases in output among commercial crops also represent a component of the green revolution. We must keep in mind that this term, apparently apolitical, has in fact highly political connotations. High yielding variety seeds were created in order to provide a technical response to problems of poverty in the countryside – problems officially considered as primarily due to weak crop production – providing a means to counter the red revolution.

Accompanied by vigorous expansion of farmland, crop intensification policies helped avoid having to modify agrarian structures almost everywhere. In fact, although Southeast Asia industrialized and urbanized at least as quickly, if not more so, than the rest of the developing world, agriculture has continued to intensify and expand, leading to exceptional growth in production. However, during the 1930s and 1940s, the capacity of Southeast Asia to feed itself was questioned by eminent geographers, such as Pierre Gourou, René Dumont and Charles Robequain. This debate was taken up by many authors and governments up until at least the mid-1960s. After that, the region's farmers proved that they were capable of increasing not only food but also commercial crops more rapidly than the region's population itself was increasing.

For geopolitical reasons, as well as strictly agrarian reasons, agricultural intensification


and territorial expansion were actively pursued, except in Thailand. This characteristic is fundamental. In Europe as in East Asia, farmland has been decreasing considerably – since the 1960s in the case of China. There, of course, crop cultivation has been intensified, but for multiple reasons linked to urban and industrial expansion as well as environmental problems and land deterioration, its extent is decreasing. Agricultural land is decreasing also in India and on the African continent, with few exceptions. As I have pointed out in many of my publications, the region's peasantries have very often been used as a "territorial spearhead of the state." For several reasons, notably for the State to better control them, frontier territories have been conquered through agricultural land pioneering; such has been the case in the Philippines at the beginning of the XXth, in Indonesia, especially since the 1950s, in Malaysia since its independence and in Việt Nam over the last thirty-five years. This reliance on agriculture as a tool of territorial conquest and for the resolution of territorial management problems has been used in many regions of the world and is often mentioned in historical literature. It is nevertheless exceptionally common in Southeast Asia. The conquest of frontier territory is also used as a tool for diluting the presence of ethnic minorities, as the redistribution of population as a geopolitical tool remains very common today.

It is initially within agriculture and through agriculture that many countries, especially Indonesia and Việt Nam, have succeeded in reducing the problem of poverty, by applying highly interventionist agricultural policies. However, for at least the last decade, agricultural expansion has been increasingly driven by private enterprises, large

plantations especially, in a context where terrestrial ecosystems, notably forest ones, and now increasingly marine ecosystems, have deteriorated and regressed rapidly. Throughout Southeast Asia, agricultural production is growing very rapidly, as is

aquaculture production – land or marine based – as ocean fishing can no longer meet demand. The pressure for productivity is increasingly spreading to all land and marine based territories.

Figure 1 *Global Demographic Growth and Agricultural Expansion, 1700-2007*




Sources: Chenais, 1991; FAOSTAT, 2009; N.I.E.S., 2009; UNPOP, 2009.

Remember that one characteristic of this region is that expansion of agricultural territory has very closely followed intensification of agriculture, to such an

extent that it is expanding faster than the population is increasing, contrary to what has happened elsewhere, especially in Africa.

Figure 2 *Agricultural Expansion in the World's Major Regions, 1700-1990*




Source: N.I.E.S., 2009.

If we compare agricultural expansion throughout the world, we see that it has

slowed down or even been reversed, except in Asia. In Europe agriculture is losing ground.

Figure 3 *Southeast Asia. Demographic Growth and Agricultural Expansion by Region, 1700-2007*




Sources: FAOSTAT, 2009; N.I.E.S., 2009; Neville, 1999; UNPOP, 2009.

Sources: FAOSTAT, 2009; N.I.E.S., 2009.

In Southeast Asia, agricultural expansion is more rapid than demographic growth.

Figure 4 *Proportion of Land Allocated to Agriculture by Country, 1961-2007*




Source: FAOSTAT, 2009.

In the region, Thailand is the only country where agricultural territory has stopped expanding. In Cambodia, the break corresponds to the reign of the Khmer Rouge. In Việt Nam, agricultural expansion was launched on a massive scale after 1975.

In the Philippines, one of the region's two most densely populated countries along with Việt Nam, agriculture is spreading, as in Malaysia which represents the most industrialized nation in the region – except for Singapore.

Figure 5 *Rice Yields by Country, 1961-2007*




Source: FAOSTAT, 2008.

Growth of agriculture depends also on yield increases: rice yields, still very low 20-25 years ago, have practically caught up with

those of East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

Figure 6 *Southeast Asia. Cash Crops (Rubber, Palm Oil, Coffee) versus Food Crops (Rice and Corn), 1961-2007*




Source: FAOSTATS, 2008.

Intensification/expansion of agriculture was first applied to food crops – first rice, but also corn, tapioca, etc. –, then to cash crops such as rubber, palm oil and coffee.


Over the last decade, expansion of commercial crops has been more rapid than that of food crops. Southeast Asian agricultural production, including that of rice, is increasingly turning toward the global market, with Thailand and Việt Nam the world's leading rice exporters.

Figure 7a *Fisheries, 1950-2006*



Source: FAOSTATS, 2008.

Figure 7b *Aquaculture, 1950-2006*




Source: FAOSTATS, 2008.

Regarding aquaculture and fisheries, production is increasing even more rapidly

than population. Aquaculture is increasing more rapidly than the entire sector.

Figure 8 *Proportion of Fish and Seafood Production from Aquaculture, by Country, 1950-2007*



Source: FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2008.

The consumption of fish is vital in some Southeast Asian countries. Việt Nam has the highest *per capita* consumption, and it is also very important in the Indonesian island of Java, as in Japan. This market is increasingly

fed by aquaculture which is oriented toward the export market. The vast majority of shrimp produced in Southeast Asia are destined for the Chinese and Japanese markets.

Table 1 *Exports, Global Rankings*


	Burma		Cambodia		Indonesia		Laos		Malaysia		Philippines		Thailand		Vietnam	
	Exports		Exports		Exports		Exports		Exports		Exports		Exports		Exports	
	1961	2005	1961	2005	1961	2005	1961	2005	1961	2005	1961	2005	1961	2005	1961	2005
Pineapple	-	-	-	-	-	37	-	-	1	16	-	3	-	22	-	55
Coffee	-	88	-	106	9	4	68	30	35	64	-	81	-	28	64	2
Rubber	2	3	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-
Tropical Fruits	-	15	-	-	-	6	-	-	1	3	-	12	3	1	-	-
Palm oil	-	-	-	39	3	2	-	-	4	1	-	50	-	12	-	62
Coconut	-	71	-	38	-	2	-	-	1	8	30	10	8	4	-	1
Rice	1	21	6	59	-	23	-	-	22	43	60	110	2	1	8	2
Tea	41	55	-	-	4	5	-	-	17	37	-	57	34	41	18	6

Source: FAOSTATS, 2008.


This table illustrates the importance of Southeast Asian exports and their omnipresence on the global market. Thailand is the second agro-exporter among so-called Southern countries, after Brazil. Once again, let's point out that many of these crops are

not food crops. For example, among the factors behind the growth in the production of palm oil are its uses in the cosmetics industry and its potential for use in agro-fuels, such as biodiesel.

Figure 9 *Demographic and Urban Growth, Southeast Asia, 1960-2025*



Urbanization rates, 1960-2025




Source: UNPOP, 2008.

The agrarian transition is not only driven by the countryside; it has also arisen from the increasing demographic weight of cities.

The graphs clearly show that urban population is growing much more rapidly than rural population.

1.2.3. The CHATSEA Project

Figure 10 *The Study of Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia: The CHATSEA Project*



Source: *The CHATSEA Project. Authors.*

Agrarian transition involves an increasingly obvious transfer toward the urban sector, whose relative size is growing rapidly: in the number of people, in production – as industry is booming – and above all in employment. In Malaysia, an important agro-exporter, less than 10% of the population is employed in agriculture. This is not surprising when we compare this situation with that in the United States or France – between one

and four per cent of the population working in agriculture. However, Southeast Asian countries are still at the agrarian transition stage, and the hold of industry over the entire agricultural sector is still far from complete. But already, while governments proliferate regulations, multinationals choose the goods that they want to sell on the market, and increasingly impose all the conditions for their production.

The shift from a society in which the relationships of production, accumulation and employment and the residential areas are predominantly rural, towards a society in which all these components become increasingly urban and industrial, is the object of a major research project that I am directing. The project is entitled CHATSEA, which stands for *Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia*. The project began in 2005 and is scheduled to finish officially at the end of 2010, and it is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. When it was devised in 2004, our objective was to attempt to analyze and interpret the characteristics, risks and challenges of the agrarian transition as it was proceeding throughout Southeast Asia. The team of researchers already assembled launched a series of studies on what we have collectively identified as the six fundamental processes of the agrarian transition: 1) agricultural intensification and territorial expansion, 2) urbanization and industrialization, 3) growing integration of production in the market economy, 4) intensification of regulations, 5) increase in population mobility, 6) environmental changes.

Our team, principally made up of researchers and students preparing a doctorate or a Master's and coming from some ten countries, including six in Southeast Asia, has chosen to analyze these processes, either specifically or in combination, through four "windows" of observation: 1) globalization, 2) conditions and means of subsistence, 3) territoriality, 4) institutions and actors. We will say more on this subject during our workshop in Tam Đảo, which will look at the agrarian transition and its great complexity in Southeast Asia.

Thank you.

Exchanges...

Stéphane Lagrée

Thank you, Rodolphe, for this presentation. The participants in this workshop are in good hands, being exposed to conclusions reached after nearly six years of such large-scale research! Now let's take questions.

Bernard Formoso, West Paris University - Nanterre

You have described the agrarian transition in Southeast Asia as a combination of agricultural expansion and intensification processes. In my mind, Thailand is a borderline case, and is first to face the problems that other countries of the region will be experiencing in the coming decades. In fact, this process of territorial expansion, which depends on an extension of agriculture on virgin land, has its limits. In Thailand, for political and ecological reasons, it is no longer possible to pioneer land. Agricultural intensification doesn't follow; there is a problem of transition between expansion and agricultural intensification. This results in social problems, of which we are seeing the measure now with the political crisis in Thailand in May 2010. How do you see the evolution over time of the transition process?

Rodolphe De Koninck

Indeed, the case of Thailand is interesting because it is different: the country was not colonized, did not have an official green revolution, for a long time rice yields remained lower than in most other Southeast Asian countries, its cultural homogeneity is pretty rare for the region. I share your point of view here, but I would point out some unique

features in relation to other countries in the region that show the contradictions and risks of agrarian transition. Although Thailand depends on a largely extroverted economy, and the industrial sector is expanding, the proportion of the population involved in agriculture remains very high in relation to Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines. The case of Thailand is extreme: the agrarian transition is proceeding vigorously, Bangkok is an exceptional example of urban monocephaly, the urban middle class is correspondingly large, agricultural expansion has ceased, farmland has begun to retract – especially in the northern plains. In brief, the case of Thailand is an example of what can make an agrarian transition difficult to control.

**Martine Segalen, West Paris University
- Nanterre**

Are you not being a bit hegemonic by describing all these transformations under the title of agrarian transition? You start with ancient forms of agriculture and you end up with a global system. I am very surprised at the small part that industrialization and urbanization play in your presentation. I would also make a reference to Henri Mendras and his book “La fin des paysans” (The End of Peasants) or the transformation of peasants into industrial workers in the food-processing industry. What do you think?

Concerning the theories elaborated in your project, CHATSEA, do students analyze the impact of public policies on local case studies?

**Christophe Gironde, Institut Universitaire
d’Etudes du Développement (IHEID)**

You hardly mentioned non-agricultural activities, whereas they represent an

increasingly fundamental part both of working hours and of revenue. Isn't pluri-activity a major characteristic of this peasantry in transition?

Yves Perraudau, Nantes University

I spent ten years in the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture in Brussels as an economist. I would just like to confirm your statements and add some details. Global fishing today accounts for almost 90-95 million tons, and has done so pretty consistently since the 1980s. Asia accounts for a large part, around 60% of this production, and nine of its countries are among the fifteen top producing countries. This position is still more hegemonic in aquaculture: since the 1980s, it has gone from five million tons to 60 million tons which effectively shows that the growth of sea products results from aquaculture, equally divided between marine aquaculture and continental aquaculture. Asia occupies a quasi-monopolistic position with 90% of the global aquaculture production, especially China which produces 40 million tons. However, I am more doubtful about your position on the effective control of fishing activity in the world, especially in the Pacific Ocean.

I have another remark: as regards this sharing of added-value which is obviously very important, and the role of the other actors relative to this added-value, you have not mentioned the Physiocrats and François Quesnay concerning sharing between distributors and farmers.

François Roubaud, IRD – DIAL

You have mentioned expansion and intensification linked to the agrarian transition, but what about informalization?

The idea of constructing industrialization and urbanization on the model of developed societies is not what we observe here in Việt Nam or in the Philippines. Isn't industrialization and urbanization in Southeast Asia linked to informalization instead?

Rodolphe De Koninck

During this summary presentation, out of the six fundamental processes we had singled out, I indeed favored two, agricultural intensification and territorial expansion. This does not mean that I underestimate industrialization, urbanization or pluri-activity, which we could discuss at length and which we study very thoroughly in the CHATSEA project.

Concerning fishing and its control, I would just like to point out that the situation has greatly evolved since the time of Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese fishing boats systematically pillaging the aquatic resources of the territorial waters of Southeast Asia. Today, intrusions by foreign fleets are less frequent.

I also find the Physiocrats interesting, but I have favored a Marxist approach for this presentation.

Jean-Pierre Cling, IRD-DIAL

You have presented the increase in agricultural area and output as a very

important component in agrarian transition, by drawing a distinction between the green revolution and agrarian reform in favor of the green revolution in most of the countries influenced by the United States. However, I would say that in Việt Nam there has been an agrarian reform and a green revolution at the same time, which creates a few problems. For example, the agrarian reform may have slowed down agricultural production through the decrease in land cultivated.

I would like to take this opportunity to make a comment on fishing and aquaculture: it is fascinating to see in Việt Nam that there has been an expansion toward the continental frontiers in the west and toward the marine frontiers in the east at the same time.

Rodolphe De Koninck

Thank you for reminding us of these characteristics of the Vietnamese agrarian reform, which can also be partially found in Laos or in Cambodia during the reign of the Khmer Rouge. In addition, in Indonesia, there have been attempts at agrarian reform, essentially in Java. As you point out, these reforms have slowed down the green revolution, except in the very special case of the Philippines, where a capitalist agrarian reform has taken place and hasn't yet finished... But today, governments including those in Indochina are turning towards a market economy solution by favoring the privatization of agriculture and increases in yield.

1.3. Transitions in the Labor Market: Macro and Micro Readings

*Mireille Razafindrakoto – IRD-DIAL, Jean-Pierre Cling – IRD-DIAL,
Christophe Gironde – IHEID, François Roubaud – IRD-DIAL*

(Re-transcription)

1.3.1. Context and Objectives

Mireille Razafindrakoto

First of all, I want to tell you how happy I am to participate for the fourth time in this Summer School. Thanks to Stéphane and to Trang, to the Academy of Social Sciences for having invited us again this year.

This morning we will discuss the concept of transition in an economic perspective and present two complementary approaches: one is based on the macro perspective of the DIAL team in partnership with the General Statistics Office of Việt Nam (GSO); this team is made up of François Roubaud, Jean-Pierre Cling, Nguyễn Hữu Chí and myself. The other is the micro perspective of the socio-economist, Christophe Gironde. This “double entry” study allows us to establish a parallel between our approaches and methods. We will see if it is possible to establish dialogue, to bring out synergies, to perceive divergence and convergence of our respective analyses. This session will also

form an introduction to the workshop “How is Economic Transition Experienced and Perceived by the Population? Analysis of the Complementarity Between Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches”, which will benefit greatly from the presence of the socio-anthropologist, Christian Culas.

This presentation will address economic transition – especially the movement from a planned economy to a liberalised economy, urbanization linked to urban transition (migration from the country to the cities) and their consequences for the labor market (shift from agricultural to non-agricultural activities). The economic transition in Việt Nam is characterized by strong economic growth and a certain reduction of poverty. Nevertheless, parallel to that, we see a rise in inequality, not only between rural and urban areas, but also within these zones themselves. What does the development of these inequalities mean in terms of the integration of the different sections of the population into the labor market? Our objective is to understand the trends in progress and to measure their evolution.

The main initial aspects for analysis were the following:

- impact of economic growth and of urbanization in terms of restructuring and diversification of revenue sources;
- specific dynamics of different types of environments - urban, rural etc.;
- influence of the proximity of major urban centers;
- role and place of the informal sector;
- characteristics of the informal sector, in terms of working conditions and its links to the rest of the economy.

To address these themes, two methodological approaches were adopted. First, we took a macro approach to studying the evolution over time of four types of environments:

- urban communes of two large cities, Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City;
- peri-urban zones around Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City;
- urban communes other than Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City;
- rural communes.

Christophe Gironde will then present a study undertaken in two districts of the province of Hưng Yên, rural districts which nevertheless have similarities with peri-urban areas. This time, the focus is more micro-level and socio-economic.

These distinctions between areas bring up questions, especially about the relevance of the definition of urban and rural in Việt Nam. We have, nevertheless, chosen to adopt the administrative (official) definition for urban and rural communes. This definition is open to question, and sometimes may not correspond to field realities. But our plan was to use this definition to analyze the

observable phenomena in each zone, and their specific characteristics in terms of the dynamics of the labor market. Three criteria are used to define an urban commune:

- over 65% of the active population employed outside agriculture;
- total population of over 4,000;
- demographic density of over 2,000 inhabitants/km².

Using the study led at the national level and the micro study in the Khoái Châu and Văn Giang districts, we will present several snapshots, on different scales, according to different analyses, and we will show you their complementarity. We need to set local situations in a wider context in order to analyze the dynamics at the national level and the opportunities that the population has when it migrates. Similarly, when working with observations at the macro or global scale, it is useful to have a more precise view so as to shed light on regional mechanisms, the specific characteristics of provinces, the internal logic of communes, households, etc.

I will first present the principal significant facts that characterize the current restructuring of the labor market – in particular the size of the informal sector. This macro reading will be followed by an intermediary interpretation, with a comparison of the characteristics of the informal sector in urban and peri-urban areas. We will look at the different types of activity in the informal sector; working conditions, integration with the formal economy and prospects for evolution. Christophe will then set out a micro-level interpretation, addressing the agrarian transition and the development of non-agricultural activities. We did not necessarily ask ourselves the same questions initially,

but in the end we have many themes and issues in common. Our colleague has taken the agrarian transition as his starting point, while we have chosen the phenomenon of urbanization. Ultimately, we discover the importance of informal micro-units within the economy.


1.3.2. Urbanization and Recent Dynamics in the Labor Market

Principal Determining Facts affecting the Labor Market 1998-2006

Four significant facts should be recognized:

- employment in the agricultural sector is diminishing;
- this favors the growth of the private non-agricultural sector;
- individual non-agricultural enterprises are playing a greater part in the labor market;
- salaried employment is growing.

Figure 11 *Evolution of Employment by Sector in Việt Nam*



IE: Individual Enterprises.

Sources: VLSS 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006; authors' calculations.

Restructuring of the Labor Market

We will concentrate particularly on these groups: individual enterprises and salaried employees in these enterprises, as well as informal self-employment and formal self-employment.


Our first observation is the decrease in agricultural employment and the stability of the public sector. There is a gradual increase in the non-agricultural private sector, which includes all private and individual enterprises. In terms of self-employment, we do not see any particular trend on a national scale. However, a clear rise in the rate of salaried employment in individual enterprises and

therefore, a rise in the number of small business employees, is perceptible. The domestic private sector (with national capital) is growing as well.

What exactly is happening in the urban communes of Hồ Chí Minh City and Hà Nội?:

- agriculture represents an almost negligible share of employment;
- public sector employment is stagnating;
- foreign companies have a tendency to increase in importance;
- domestic private enterprises are growing strongly and the share of each of the three groups of enterprises remains stable.

Figure 12 *Evolution of proportion of employment, by sector*



IE: Individual Enterprises.

Sources: VLSS 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006; authors' calculations.

For other urban zones, excluding Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City:


- the proportion of employment in agriculture remains important;
- the proportion of employment in the public sector is not really evolving;
- the proportion of employment in foreign and domestic private companies is rising less markedly than in the two metropolises;

- the proportion of employment in individual enterprises (self-employment or wage labor) is stagnating.



Thus, the proportion of informal self-employment is considerable – around 20%. If we add all those who work in these non-agricultural production micro-units, the proportion is 50%, as it is in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City.

Figure 13 *Evolution of proportion of employment, by sector*

*Peri-urban Hà Nội
and Hồ Chí Minh City*



Rest of Rural Environment



IE: Individual Enterprises.

Sources: VLSS 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006; authors' calculations.

In rural environments, apart from the usual stability of the public sector, we note:

- a decrease in agricultural employment;
- a significant increase in people who work in domestic private enterprises;
- above all, a sharp rise in salaried employment in individual companies.

In the peri-urban zones there is a particularly pronounced dynamic, with rapid transformation in the agricultural sector, and a rise in the number of foreign and domestic private enterprises. The individual micro-units

are increasing as well, from 25% in 1998 to nearly 50% in 2006.

Are peri-urban zones undergoing a transformation from rural to urban? Will the structure of the labor market in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City remain stable or will it continue to evolve?

At the political and economic level, when we mention industrialization little importance is given to small individual units – which are for the most part informal – even though they represent around 30-40% of the labor market in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City.

Table 2 *Rate of Pluri-activity; Economically Active People Combining Agricultural Work with Another Type of Activity*

	1998	2002	2004	2006
Urban HN HCMC	3.3%	0.8%	1.7%	1.0%
Other Urban	14.9%	15.4%	16.0%	12.7%
Rural HN HCMC	32.7%	20.1%	25.5%	19.2%
Other Rural	33.3%	32.5%	35.6%	34.8%
Total	28.9%	27.7%	29.7%	28.1%

* HN: Hà Nội; HCMC: Hồ Chí Minh City.

Sources: VLSS 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006; authors' calculations.

Does the shift of people from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural sector result in multi-activity, by which I mean the pursuit of agricultural activities accompanied by the development of non-agricultural activities? The analysis often shows a total abandonment of agricultural activities. Indeed, in peri-urban zones, the number of economically active people who combine agricultural and non-agricultural activities decreases sharply over a short period of time (from 1998-2006) – from 33% to 19%.

Size of the Informal Sector

The development of informal employment is particularly important between 1998 and 2006, whether in terms of the number of

companies (55% growth) or the number of jobs (73% growth). Informalization accompanies urbanization. These calculations were based on the "Việt Nam Household Living Standard Survey," which was not primarily intended to quantify the informal sector.

In 2007 and 2009 we carried out a specific study to measure the informal sector – comprising all activities that are non-agricultural and non-registered – which confirmed its major significance in all zones: in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, other cities, rural areas, but above all in the peri-urban zone (up to 37% of employment). On the national level, the informal sector constitutes the primary source of non-agricultural employment.

Table 3 *Size of the Informal Sector*

N° of enterprises and jobs in the informal sector

	N° of enterprises			N° of jobs		
	Level 2006	Growth 1998-2006	Growth 2004-2006	Level 2006	Growth 1998-2006	Growth 2004-2006
Urban Hanoi HCMC	637 096	-6%	-6%	940 511	-21%	-2%
Other Urban	1 770 922	17%	7%	2 694 674	11%	8%
Rural HN HCMC	218 045	55%	16%	407 200	73%	61%
Other Rural	4 677 396	-6%	-5%	6 855 213	-18%	-6%
Total	7 303 459	0%	-2%	10 897 598	-11%	-1%

⇒ **Strong growth of IS in the urban centers besides HN and HCMC**
 ⇒ **and above all in peri-urban zones**

Sources: VLSS 1998, VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006; authors' calculations.

Table 4 *Size of the Informal Sector*

Employment by Sector in Việt Nam

Institutional Sector	Urban Hanoi HCMC	Other Urban	Rural Hanoi HCMC	Other Rural	Total
Public	25.5%	23.7%	13.5%	6.0%	10.7%
Foreign Enterprise	5.5%	2.5%	7.6%	1.3%	2.0%
Domestic Private Enterprise	19.4%	8.2%	10.7%	3.5%	5.7%
Formal Individual Enterprise	16.9%	16.8%	6.9%	4.7%	7.8%
Informal Sector	30.3%	31.9%	36.9%	20.4%	23.5%
Agriculture	1.3%	16.5%	24.1%	64.0%	50.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

➔ **Informal Sector (IS): Primary source of non-agricultural employment**

➔ **23% of total employment**

➔ **50% of non-agricultural employment**

Source: LFS2007, GSO; our own calculations.

1.3.3. Comparison of Characteristics of Urban and Peri-urban Area Informal Sectors. The Case of Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City

What are the characteristics of the informal sector in urban and peri-urban zones? Are there significant differences between the big cities of Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City and the peri-urban zones?

Type of Activities, Working Conditions and Performance

We note that informal activities are generally made up of services and commercial activities, especially in the urban areas. We also note a differentiation between urban and peri-

urban zones: in urban areas, services are more prevalent; in peri-urban zones, commercial and manufacturing work is predominant.

Why are we so interested in the informal sector? Not only because of its size, but also because this informalization can be problematic, in terms of integration, inequality, instability and working conditions. It involves micro-units, where self-employment is the rule – 73% of production units include only one person. Most jobs are not contractual, and there is a general absence of social protection. Earnings are for the most part very low despite a certain heterogeneity. Informal sector earnings are clearly inferior in peri-urban areas.

Table 5 *Type of Activities*

Sector of Activity	Urban Zone		Peri-urban Zone	
	N°. IPU's %	N°. Jobs %	N°. IPU's %	N°. Jobs %
Hanoi	100	100	100	100
Industry	14.5	21.7	23.2	35.2
Commerce	27.8	24.3	50.1	42.5
Services	57.7	54.0	26.7	22.3
HCMV	100	100	100	100
Industry	20.0	28.5	30.0	34.5
Commerce	31.7	27.7	34.6	32.7
Services	48.3	43.7	35.3	32.7

⇒ **Predominant Services in Urban Zone**
(small restaurants, repair and transportation services)

⇒ **Industry in Peri-urban Zone**
(transformation activities for common consumption goods)

Source: Study of households and informal sector enterprises (HB&ISS),
Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS / IRD-DIAL. IPU – Informal Production Unit.

Table 6 *Principal Outlets: household consumption*

Economic Activities	Urban Zone					Peri-urban Zone				
	Public or para-public	Formal Enterprises	Individual Enterprises	Households	Auto-consumption	Public or para-public	Formal Enterprises	Individual Enterprises	Households	Auto-consumption
Hà Nội	0.7	1.2	7.5	90.4	0.1	0	6.8	40.3	39.4	0
Manufacturing	2.0	0	2.4	95.4	0.2	0	11.8	36.9	35.0	0
Commerce	0	0	6.9	92.5	0.2	0	0	0	0	0
Services	0.5	3.9	12.4	83.1	0	0	0.0	47.6	47.0	0
Hồ Chí Minh City	0.1	10.8	12.3	76.8	0.1	0.2	1.6	36.0	61.4	0.7
Manufacturing	0.2	10.7	23.4	65.4	0.3	0.0	8.4	24.5	64.0	3.1
Commerce	0	16.7	9.8	73.6	0	0	0	41.8	58.2	0
Services	0	2.2	5.8	91.9	0	0.3	0	38.8	60.8	0.1

Only the industrial IE sell a part of their production to large formal enterprises

Source: Study of households and informal sector enterprises (HB&ISS),
Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS / IRD-DIAL.

I have already pointed out the importance of the manufacturing sector in peri-urban areas. Can the informal sector keep up with national economic growth? Is it integrated with this economy, or does it remain at the margins of the current growth dynamic? When we analyze the sales outlets of these informal production units, we see that these

units address household consumption and not that of large companies. Here again, we should distinguish between urban and peri-urban areas: in the latter, a large part of production is for other individual companies. Also, it is generally manufacturing activity that is integrated with other companies.

Table 7 *Subcontracting and Custom Work*

Economic Activities	Urban		Peri-urban	
	Sub-contracting	Custom	Sub-contracting	Custom
Hà Nội	0.7	4.4	3.4	12.7
Manufacturing	2.8	27.5	7.6	31.9
Commerce	0.0	0	1.6	5.0
Services	0.2	0.3	0.0	13.9
Hồ Chí Minh City	0.9	8.4	0.7	13.6
Manufacturing	3.1	40.9	2.1	45.2
Commerce	0	0	0	0
Services	0	0.3	0	0

⇒ **Sub-contracting is marginal (only exception is industrial activity in Hà Nội: 8%)**

⇒ **Custom work: much more, especially in the industrial sector in the peri-urban zone.**

Source: Study of households and informal sector enterprises (HB&ISS), Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS / IRD-DIAL.

Integration of Activities with the Rest of the Economy

There is a well-known dynamic in the peri-urban areas, with craft villages where there is a chain of activities and production that involves small enterprises supplying other small enterprises, who then in turn supply other small enterprises. Ultimately, the last link in the chain can send its product to large companies, sometimes

for export. Here, the size of the informal sector, its integration with the rest of the economy and its use of sub-contracting are at their most meaningful. Contrary to preconceptions concerning informal sector integration in the Asian economy, i.e. that it profits from formal sector growth through sub-contracting, this mechanism actually remains extremely limited, especially in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City.

It is also common to hear that migrants constitute the majority of those in informal employment, such as street merchants. According to the figures, this interpretation

is erroneous: informal employment is mainly composed of non-migrants, people who live locally.

Table 8 *Proportion of Migrants Employed in the Informal Sector*

	Migrant %	Urban			Migrant %	Peri-urban		
		Residential registration				Residential registration		
		Temp. Card - 6 mo +	Temp. Card 6 mo less	Not registered		Temp. Card - 6 mo +	Temp. Card 6 mo less	Not registered
Hà Nội	8.7	53.5	35.0	11.5	2.6	68.2	7.4	24.4
1 Industry	21.9	41.0	45.5	13.5	4.3	87.6	12.4	0.0
2 Commerce	3.7	38.2	61.8	0.0	1.3	50.2	0.0	49.8
3 Services	5.6	77.7	10.6	11.7	2.7	32.0	0.0	68.0
HC MC	17.4	46.6	38.5	14.8	18.2	62.0	37.1	0.9
1 Industry	30.0	35.4	47.4	17.2	21.2	69.6	30.4	0.0
2 Commerce	7.8	63.0	30.5	6.5	24.0	37.0	63.0	0.0
3 Services	15.0	57.7	27.9	14.5	10.6	89.9	6.0	4.0

Source: Study of households and informal sector enterprises (HB&ISS),
Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL.

Perspectives of the Informal Sector

Finally, what do people employed in the informal sector experience and feel about integration? We have conducted a few qualitative interviews. Thus, the questions “would you like your children to take over your activity?” and “do you think your activity has a future?” received a majority of negative answers, which illustrates the precariousness

of the sector, although pessimism is less prevalent in the peri-urban areas. The informal sector is envied by the peasantry, but is not perceived as an acceptable aspiration for the majority of those who wish to join the formal sector of the economy, by occupying salaried positions with the government or with large companies, considered as a sign of modernity.

Table 9 Perspectives of the Informal Sector

Activity Sector	Urban		Peri-urban	
	PU head considering future exists for activity (%)	PU head wanting children to continue activity (%)	PU head considering future exists for activity (%)	PU head wanting children to continue activity (%)
Hà Nội				
Formal	70.4	34.8	88.6	46.5
Informal (IPU)	30.8	13.3	56.5	27.8
HCMV				
Formal	61.8	41.8	84.7	47.6
Informal (IPU)	28.2	16.1	42.6	23.2

⇒ **The heads of IPU are systematically more optimistic in peri-urban zones than in urban zones concerning their future**

Source: Study of households and informal sector enterprises (HB&ISS),
Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL.

1.3.4. Agrarian Transition and Integration in the Labor Market

[Christophe Gironde]

Before presenting the transformation in integration with labor markets for the inhabitants of Tân Dân, I would like to make a few remarks on the categorization of zones and populations. First, rural migrants, who are a component of the economic and urban transition which was just presented – in China called a “floating population” – are not always counted when in the city. These populations are categorized as rural, in reference to their communities of origin (birth or home after marriage) although they spend part of their time in urban and peri-urban areas. Still, we should note that commune administrations now distinguish a category of “people registered in the commune, but who do

not live there”. It would be useful to create new categories, corresponding to changes in systems of activities of the population. Secondly, the criteria of categorization could justifiably be reconsidered: in fact, we can classify the Tân Dân community in the “urban” category because of its population – 13,447 inhabitants – and the importance of its non-agricultural activities, because 66% of households are involved in these. Given the accessibility of Hà Nội, Tân Dân could be qualified as peri-urban. However, if we look at the evolution of employment, the case of Tân Dân is more similar to the rural communities analyzed by Mireille Razafindrakoto.

The community of Tân Dân is situated in the Khoái Châu district in the Hưng Yên province, 40 km southeast of Hà Nội or 40 minutes away by motorized vehicle. The community is well

linked to the capital and other cities of the delta by a dense network of roads practicable all year long. Also, the seven villages in the community have been linked to each other since the 1990s by cemented roads.

My research consisted for the most part in semi-structured interviews with households, focusing on changes to their systems of productive activity, aiming to find out about (1) access to productive resources, (2) planting and livestock raising systems, non-agricultural activities and activities outside of the village, (3) the productive and economic output of the

households. This study addresses the period from the mid-1980s to today. The starting point, the years 1985-87, corresponds to the time when all households were given land and taken out of the production brigades and the cooperative system. Most of the research was carried out between 1996 and 1998, then in 2009. At that time, I asked the same questions of a panel of households which I had interviewed 12 years before. Apart from the question “*what do you do today?*” I studied the productive activities of their children in order to see if the Red River Delta population is reproducing itself as a peasantry.

Table 10 *2009 Sample - Demographic Benchmarks*

- 83 households interviewed – 153 adults registered (>18 yrs)
- Average age of household head: 40 yrs – Average age: 35 yrs

Age Category	Number	Distribution
> 55 yrs	14	17%
46-55 yrs	13	16%
36-45 yrs	11	13%
26-35 yrs	29	35%
18-25 yrs	16	19%
Total	83	100%

Source: Author.

In 1997-1998, 37 households were surveyed in two villages of Tân Dân (Dương Trạch and Thoa Bình); 35 of them were studied in 2009; to these 35 households we added the study of their children's activity – some in households of their own, others not – to reach a total sample of 83 households and 153 adults (>18 years) for whom productive activity was

recorded. In 2009, the mean age of the head of the household was 40 years, the median age 35 years.

In this presentation, I will concentrate on the second period studied (1998-2009), but I must first recall the great transformation observed in the period 1986-1998.

First Phase of Agrarian Transition, mid-1980s to the End of the 1990s

The first phase of agrarian transition for Tân Dân and its inhabitants is marked by:

- labor and capital intensification (inputs and mechanization of certain agricultural operations and transportation) for agricultural production systems;
- diversification of agricultural and livestock systems away from a production system based on rice production and pig farming;
- increase in non-agricultural activities in the commune – commercial and service activities mostly linked to the agricultural transformation: sale of inputs, initial processing of the harvest, sale of common consumption goods, trading of agricultural surplus, services and salaried employment in transportation and construction (private housing);
- increase in salaried activities outside the commune, which is the case for poorer households.

At the end of the 1990s:

- three-quarters of the sampled households undertook both agricultural and non-agricultural activities;
- 17% of the households undertook only agricultural activities. This was in general the more socially established households, who had already started to accumulate land: rice fields at auction, acquisition of parcels of gardens around the house, etc. This phenomenon was also found among the older households, which lived off “comfortably” large gardens, developed into very lucrative plantations (peppers, decorative plants);
- 8% of the households practiced only non-agricultural activities: this is the case for wholesale merchants and the larger service (repairs and assembly of vehicles) or craft (wood and metal for the home) workshops. These households were forming family enterprises which could pay a few regular employees.

Box 1 *Importance of Non-agricultural Activities in 1997*

A pluri-active familial economy (1997)

- Households having agricultural and non-agricultural activities: **75%**
- Households having agricultural activities only: 17%
- Households having non-agricultural activities only: 8%

Non-agricultural Activities

- **34% of household revenue in 1997**
- > 40% of revenue for half of households

Activities Outside of Residence Community

- **15.6 % of total household revenue in 1997**
- > 40% for temporary migrants

Source: Author.

Thus, non-agricultural activities represent one-third of total household revenue, and more than 40% of total revenue for half the households. Activities outside the commune make up 15.6% of total household revenue, and more than 40% for temporary migrants; for example, workers who remain for several months on construction sites in Hà Nội.

Besides the transformation of systems for productive activity by the household, the first phase of the agrarian transition is distinguished by an intensification of city-country inter-relations:

- peasants “go to town” to get supplies, sell, work, train, get information, and live temporarily;
- urban actors invest in the countryside – especially suppliers of industrial products (agricultural inputs, construction materials, consumption products, etc.), and the buyers of agricultural products who come to Tân Dân, sign contracts, make down payments in cash or in kind.

Thus the agrarian transition of the end of the 1990s depends on the development of rural people’s pluri-activity (agricultural and non-agricultural) and mobility, synonymous with pluri-locality for some of them. It also depends on the opening and integration of village economies with markets and networks on a

regional, national or even international scale (i.e. trade with China).

However, the agricultural progress of the commune is limited – concerning diversification of crops – and in any case is insufficient to meet the growing economic and social needs of the population. There was less development of non-agricultural activities locally than in the neighboring communities of Minh Châu (commerce and services) and Bình Minh (transformation and commerce of agricultural products). To supplement, the inhabitants of Tân Dân had to look for outside work, notably in the ceramic workshops of Bát Tràng, 15 km away, and on the construction sites of individual houses in the capital. These were the specialties of the inhabitants of Tân Dân.

Second Phase of Agrarian Transition, End 1990s to 2009

Where are we in 2009 with the same households and with the activities of their children? I will mainly focus on two age categories: 18-25 year olds and 26-35 year olds (age of the heads of household), who are the principal actors in the agrarian transition and who represent around 55% of the economically active population sample that I studied.

Decline of the Agricultural Sector

Box 2 Figure Cultivated Areas

- Decrease of one third (-34%) of the average cultivated area by household

1997: 6.9 sao
2009: 5.6 sao
- Reasons for this evolution
 - Demographic growth
 - Conversion of agricultural land for industrial zone (0.4 sao / household sold to the city)
 - But decrease in proportion of households that plant
- 2009: 4 households out of 10 (38.6%) had never cultivated land of their own.
 - 68% for 26-35 year olds
 - 86% for 18-25 year olds
- End of “young peasants”
- Farms are pluri-active, and pluri-local

Source: Author.

We first observe a decline in the agricultural sector in terms of the area cultivated: it has shrunk by one fifth – 2,480m² in 1997, 2,020m² in 2009. This decline is more noticeable than during the period 1986-1998, which may be due to demographic

growth and the conversion of arable land for the construction of an industrial zone (one third of the decrease). However, the proportion of households that cultivate the land has also decreased.

Table 11 *The “Decline” of the Agricultural Sector: Arable Areas*

1997: all households have arable land

2009: nearly one household out of two (44.6%) does not have arable land
1 out of 5 for households of those under 35 years old

2009	Households without arable land	Households with arable land
Total	44.6%	55.4%
> 55 yrs	0.0%	100.0%
46-55 yrs	7.7%	92.3%
36-45 yrs	0.0%	100.0%
26-35 yrs	68.2%	31.8%
18-25 yrs	85.7%	14.3%

Source: Author.

In 1997, all households had arable land. In 2009, one out of two did not have arable land – with the exception of a garden plot next to their house. This tendency is even more prevalent among those under 35 years old:

- for the 26-35 year old category, 68% of households do not have arable land;
- among the 18-25 year olds, 85% do not have arable land.

In 2009, four out of ten households had never cultivated land other than small gardens on their parents' land before establishing their own household. This proportion rises to nearly 7 out of 10 (68%) among 26-35 year olds and almost 9 out of 10 (86%) among 18-25 year olds. We are seeing, at least provisionally, the beginning of the end of young peasants.

Besides the demographic factor (increase in population and population/arable land ratio), this phenomenon can be explained by the flattening out of agricultural revenue of “ordinary” peasants, the growing gap between agricultural and non-agricultural revenues and the differential in opportunities between the villages and the city. The phenomenon is reinforced by the growing economic and social needs of the populations. As a consequence of rural people looking for work, *labor markets* – it is more pertinent to call them hiring networks in my opinion – develop.

Increase and Transformation of Non-agricultural Activities


Figure 14 *Increase of Non-agricultural Activities 1997-2009*

In 2009

1 out of 2 actives
(51.3%) is occupied full-
time with non-
agricultural activities

Two thirds of 26-35 and
36-45 yrs

Three fourths of under
26 yrs



Source: Author.

In 2009 in Tân Dân, one economically active person out of two was employed full-time in non-agricultural activities, a proportion which rises among the “youth” to two-thirds of 26-45 year olds and three-quarters of the under 26 year old age group. Unlike the preceding period, characterized by pluri-activity in three-quarters of households, the difference is now clearer between non-agricultural households (if agricultural activities subsist, they are only residual or occasional) and agricultural households, the latter benefitting from areas left (on loan or rental) by the former.

How do non-agricultural activities evolve? First, we observe a rise in salaried employment – 53% of economically active people have salaries – as opposed to self-employment

which accounts for 46% of the active population. The employment transitions for the inhabitants of Tân Dân provide an illustration of what we see at a national level. The proportion of self-employment activities and commerce decline: the supply to rural merchants of drinks, detergents, fertilizer, etc. is done more and more by industrial enterprises; motorcycle maintenance is not very lucrative because of the large number of “stations”; street commerce on bicycles only brings in a small amount of revenue. These activities, characteristic of the years that followed the restoration of family farms, suffer from market saturation in rural communities and competition from industrial enterprises. The gulf between local and external job opportunities is growing just

as much. Factory work is more lucrative than many non-agricultural commercial activities, services and craft making; the inhabitants are unanimous on this point. The phenomenon

is particularly noticeable in a community like Tân Dân, which is near the urban centers and now 15 minutes by bicycle from an industrial center (Yên Mỹ).

Box

3

Evolution of Non-Agricultural Activities 2009 / 1997

- **New Activities**
 - KCBT, independent or as an employee, ‘specialty’ of the community
 - Development of industrial wage labor
 - Sectors of Activity in 2009
 - Construction: 29% of active population
 - Industry: 27%
 - Services and commerce: 44%
- **Places/Poles of Employment Change**
 - 1990s: surrounding communities, Bat Trang, Hà Nội
 - 2009: Yên Mỹ (F), Hai Phong and Quang Ninh (H), Hà Nội, abroad

Source: Author.

Among salaried activities, we observe an increase in the proportion of industrial employment, almost inexistent for the inhabitants of Tân Dân at the end of the 1990s. Among the active population counted in 2009, 27% worked in industry, 29% in construction and 44% in service and commerce. Women are the principal workers in shoe and parts manufacturing (electronics, transportation vehicles). Employment hubs change, especially with the factories built in 2000-2005 along route 39 surrounding the agglomeration of Yên Mỹ and the industrial zones around Hà Nội. Industrial employment was consolidated, meaning that it became more sustainable over the years: in 2006, women reported going to the factory doors

each morning to see if there was work “that day”. The opportunity to work was therefore erratic: one day, several days, rarely more than two or three weeks in a row. The length of the job corresponded then to contracts received by the companies. The work was sometimes only paid after the delivery of the products by the company. The activity of industrial enterprises, and with it employment, was regularized; workers could now think about opportunities for overtime.

In Việt Nam, specialties can evolve quickly: in 2009, the inhabitants of Tân Dân no longer work in Bát Tràng. Many men are still in construction; as a proportion of all male workers they are even more numerous.

A new specialty was formed: cement cutting – often indicated by its initials *KCBT* – on construction sites, to make openings for doors and windows. At least one active person in 70% of the households interviewed in 2009 practiced this activity. *KCBT* is an independent activity – workers are recruited for the length of each project –, as salaried employees, or as apprentices, which is a way to get into a hiring

network and learn a trade – not for cutting the cement itself, but for managing the worksite. This trade is therefore one for men, but women play an important role because they often help on the worksites managed by their husbands, namely by cooking for the workers. Hải Phòng and Quảng Ninh provinces are the principal destinations for workers from Tân Dân.

Box

4

More Stable, More Sustainable Non-agricultural Activities

- 1990s: non-agricultural activity (still) occasional
 - Pluri-activity (except the forming of familial non-agricultural enterprises)
 - Majority of households: 3-4 month stays as workers on construction sites in Hà Nội, then return
- Years 2000: development of industrial salaried employment
 - Daily search for work in Yên Mỹ
 - Not working every day, salaries paid late
- 2009: more regular hiring in factories of Yên Mỹ, overtime

Source: Author.

Workers from Tân Dân will therefore go beyond the neighboring communities to find work. They also leave more often “as a family”, meaning with the spouse, children and sometimes the grandmother who looks

after the children because the two parents work full time. Work in a factory or on outside construction sites does not offer the same organizational flexibility as agricultural work in the village.

Box 5 More Sustainable Migration... Urbanization

- In 2009, 1 adult out of 3 lives mainly outside of Tân Dân
 - 1997: 1 out of 20
- Proportion reversed for the youngest: 2 actives out of 3 (18-25 and 26-35 yrs) live outside of Tân Dân
 - contrast with 1997: young households are formed by independent agricultural activities (cultivated areas other than that of their parents)
- Nevertheless, some return: from 45-50 years old, people 'retire'
 - Return to the community about long term migration
 - Gradual transfer of agricultural land to children (according to their material comfort)

Source: Author.

With non-agricultural activities, migration evolves: it concerns the whole household and not only the economically active person, for longer periods of time and for more distant

destinations. This transformation is linked to the relaxation of the residential permit system.

Table 12 Where Do They Live?

Principal place of residence of parents in 2009 and in 1997

	2009		1997	
	Tân Dân	Outside Tân Dân	Tân Dân	Outside Tân Dân
Total	65 %	35 %	95 %	5 %
> 55 yrs	96%	4%	90 %	10 %
46-55 yrs	77%	23%	100 %	0
36-45 yrs	68%	32%	89 %	11 %
26-35 yrs	54%	46%	100 %	0
18-25 yrs	36%	64%	100 %	0

(Average age of 2009 sample: 40 yrs; from 1997: 44.4 yrs)

Source: Author.

In 2009, one adult out of three lived principally outside of Tân Dân, as opposed to one out of twenty in 1997. Among the younger active populations, 18-25 and 26-35 year-olds, two out of three lived outside of Tân Dân during the 2009 study. Another census is needed in order to understand this phenomenon. The contrast is marked in relation to the end of the 1990s, when young households set up their own independent agricultural activity on land other than that of their parents. Finally, if migration intensifies (in number and duration), it would also be necessary to consider the return of migrants who “retire”, after periods of five, six or fifteen years spent outside of the community.

Conclusion

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

The presentations have shown the wealth of information provided by the combination of macro and micro readings and the numerous convergences that emerge from it. We observe the development of non-agricultural activities, a specific dynamic in the zones close to the large cities and a particular relationship which is formed between these two zones.

The micro aspect shows the opportunities open to the inhabitants of the Khoái Châu and Văn Giang districts with the development of salaried employment and industrial zones. From the macro point of view, the size of these large enterprises or industries remains very limited on a global level. Eventually, should individuals move toward informal activities? Will this phenomenon last despite the development of formal enterprises? How will this dynamic

of peri-urban zones toward urban zones and toward industrial enterprises continue?

The significance of migrations must be underlined. On the macro level, migrants are not numerous, particularly in the informal sector. However, on the local scale, in the zones near the large cities, migration toward these zones is very sizable. We could be tempted to link informalization to migrants, who add to the number of people looking for work. However, we observe at the macro level that the migrants do not constitute the principal component of the labor force in the informal sector; this is formed more by locals. Thus, the informalization phenomenon may last, because it's not just an accompaniment to urbanization. Migrations are nevertheless very significant around the large cities – namely Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City. Links between sectors and between zones should be strengthened.

Thank you.

Exchanges...

Rodolphe De Koninck

I have two questions after this very interesting and rich presentation. What proportion of agricultural workers are women? One of the characteristics of Southeast Asia is the feminization of agricultural work. Do women retain their share of employment as agricultural work declines? You spoke little about land issues which are fundamental in peri-urban regions. Is there speculation? Are the price and sale of land linked to the decline of agriculture and agricultural employment in these communities?

François Roubaud

On the national level, 50% of the labor force is female if we consider all categories of employment; they make up 52% in agriculture. Most of the growth of the female labor force is because of hiring by foreign companies, much more than in agriculture; two out of three jobs in foreign companies are held by women.

Christophe Gironde

I wouldn't say feminization of agricultural labor; the situation can be very different from one commune to the next according to professional specialization. Women are present in non-agricultural activities, notably in commerce, even doing manual labor on construction sites; the husbands are left to carry out the agricultural tasks. The industrial wage labor in Yên Mỹ for example is composed mainly of young women, their husbands working in agriculture. Certain commercial activities are often exclusively reserved for women: for example, in the commune neighboring Tân Dân, Minh Châu, women have long ago developed a triangular commerce – Minh Châu - Hà Nội - Lạng Sơn (trading Chinese products). The reason is fairly trivial and simple: if the men went to Lạng Sơn, they would spend more money than they would bring back!

Concerning land, there was a very sharp rise in land prices, especially plots for habitation and plots along the principal axes of communication which are good venues for commercial, craft or service activities. The price of agricultural land is rising as well, in line with the value of its product; the greatest price increases are for rice fields, which can be converted into orchards. The rise in land prices also surely reveals speculation,

especially for areas close to or along roads which will be widened or opened or near future industrial zones.

Đào Bích Hà, Social Sciences and Humanities University - Hồ Chí Minh City

Can you quantify the migratory aspects? The male/female ratio?

Yves Perraudau, Nantes University

You're touching on the problem of abrupt changes. In economics and economic history, there are two major schools of thought: one is brutal, with the notion of revolution, industrial revolution, where we find the Rostovian model; the other proposes transitions, more gentle and gradual changes, and here we find the work of Asselin and the phenomenon of proto-industrialization with Mendels or Doyon. Do you think that we are in an example of proto-industrialization which will lead us not to an industrial revolution and a brutal rupture, but more toward gentle change?

Lê Hồ Phong Linh, Economic Research Institute, Hồ Chí Minh City

It seems to me that the proportion of immigrant workers in the informal sector is slight. How have you done your sampling?

Mireille Razafindrakoto

I will answer the question about migration which highlights the limitations of the different approaches and the complementarity of a macro and micro reading. What do we manage to get from the figures from the official surveys of the GSO? This will depend on the definition of the sample. Whereas, when we study Hà Nội or Hồ Chí Minh City, the sample is composed of people who are already counted as residents

in these cities. Some of these people slip through the cracks; part of the labor force is not identified as being local. What is the real significance of this migrant labor force? Therein lies the question.

Jean-Pierre Cling

If we limit ourselves to the question of employment, the transformation of employment in Việt Nam is very rapid. We find ourselves in the first type of abrupt change. Look at the numbers: 65% of jobs were agricultural in 1998, less than 50% in 2006. The decrease in agricultural employment is marked and it continues. Also, industrial employment is growing by around 20% per year. These are indicators of a rapidity of change that is almost unique in the world, with the exception of maybe China.

François Roubaud

I think that there is no ambiguity about the agrarian transition's starting point, which is the decline of agricultural employment. The big question is to understand where this transition is leading. In the aggregated statistics presented yesterday, industrialization was evident, but which kind? We see here that it principally involves an informal industrialization. The formal industries like the large factories that you can see on the road to the airport in Hà Nội – Canon or Panasonic, for example – remain a minority. Foreign companies represent fewer than two million jobs for a total of 50 million. So, is this shift to the informal sector transitory (an ante-chamber) or is it meant to last? For the majority of the Latin-American countries, for example, or for a certain number of emerging countries in Asia, such as Indonesia or Thailand, it is the latter – a sort of trap for countries with

intermediary revenue. For Vietnam, therein lies the question. The first movement from agriculture toward something that resembles industry is done. However, the transition of these informal industrial jobs toward modern, formal industry is absolutely not guaranteed. In the short and medium term, it is very clear that these industrial jobs will remain informal for a long time.

Christophe Gironde

A short word on the proto-industrialization that we could look for in familial non-agricultural enterprises. In the first phase, these enterprises have grown, with for example the development of metal working or the improvement and perfection of product quality. However, as early as the 1990s, there were some companies that were manufacturing plastic bags or cardboard containers. In 2009, I did not observe a noticeable evolution in the production process: only the revenue or the volume of activity had evolved. Despite imitation and competition, I did not see the emergence of bigger units, nor did I see the accumulation of machines that performed better or allowed for the production of different products.

Rodolphe De Koninck

I would like to come back to the nature of industrialization. How do we measure it? What is its process? If we consider the case of South Korea, Taiwan or Japan, which benefitted from a very rapid agrarian transition – which depended on a specific state policy and on American financial support –, a characteristic of this small industry is that it was mostly developed with strong links to agriculture which was both client and supplier. Is Southeast Asia in the same situation? It is possible in Malaysia,

for example. How can we measure this interweaving theme?

Lê Xuân Thọ, University of Hà Nội

Is it possible to extend your results to the entire country? What are the official data for Việt Nam? Finally, can you explain why you have made a division into four zones and not into two – urban and rural?

Nguyễn Thị Thanh An, AFD

The informal sector is a major component of the economy in Việt Nam. However, this domain is neglected by the government. In the context of your work, have you made recommendations in terms of public policy to the local and national authorities?

Lê Thị Hồng Hải, Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences

Mr. Gironde, could you describe in detail the methods used to carry out your field work: duration, number and classification of the samples?

Christophe Gironde

I conducted my study for three weeks in the fall of 2009. My sample was composed of thirty or so households, which were part of my sample of 37 households in 1997. The construction of the sample was not intended for a “national coverage survey”; it was rather a purposive sample. It is a mode of sampling we can use when we spend a long time in a commune. As always in such a case, the authorities choose the first households to be interviewed. After that, the construction of a purposive sample is veritable research work; it involves an iterative process, a search for differences and similarities among the households selected.

Concerning the seasonality of activities, the most important fact to note is the transition from a system of productive activities based on the agricultural calendar to a regular system of activities “directed” by its most important component, industrial wage labor. Workers stay at the factory, like other non-agricultural workers who do not want to stop work to go back to the village to plant or harvest rice. Seasonality is no longer a major characteristic of non-agricultural employment of rural people.

Mireille Razafindrakoto

Public policies ignore the informal sector. It was neither identified nor quantified before our studies. We are now in contact with officials from different ministries who now realize its importance. Several questions have come up: how to encourage this sector to modernize and formalize without disrupting its dynamic? How can we improve its integration with the rest of the growing economy? How to protect jobs in this sector, which has precarious working conditions?

Concerning migrants; just a reminder that the official studies do not necessarily register all migrants because of the definition of survey basis in official studies done in Việt Nam. Nevertheless, changes have begun recently.

Why did we choose to create four zones: urban communes of Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, peri-urban zones surrounding Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, urban and rural communes? We were interested in the urbanization phenomenon and the process of economic transition. We noticed that there were dynamics surrounding the large cities; some ancient, such as the craft village phenomenon, others more recent. This choice of division allows us to shine a light

on very specific dynamics, totally obscured by the traditional urban / rural division. It is nevertheless imperfect – for example, peri-urban areas exist in the country's other large cities –, and the methodology should be revised so that we can address more satisfactorily the questions brought up here.

François Roubaud

The authorities have until now placed little importance on the informal sector. They consider it as a transitory state in the shift from the dominance of countryside-based agriculture to an industrial modernization. Judging from the historical experience of countries more advanced in the transition from rural to urban, this vision is naive. As of today, we have had little response to our work in terms of any drafting of policies specially designed for the informal sector. It will surely take time, as the subject is very new in this country. In the meantime, we imagine that the recommendations to implement will come initially not from the government, but rather from NGOs, such as Oxfam; they are closer to the field and have started to show a strong interest in this sector.

Reading (tamdaoconf.com)

Cling Jean-Pierre (IRD – DIAL), Nguyễn Hữu Chí (NEU-ISS-DIAL), Razafindrakoto Mireille (IRD-DIAL) and Roubaud François (IRD-DIAL), *Urbanisation et insertion sur le marché du travail au Vietnam : Poids et caractéristiques du secteur informel*, March 2010, to be published in the work of CEFURDS (Centre de Recherche des Etudes Urbaines et du Développement) *Les tendances de l'urbanisation et de la périurbanisation en Asie du Sud-Est*, Ho Chi Minh City, 2010.

1.4. Transformations of the Family in Europe. What Are its Traits? How should we Analyze and Understand Them?

Martine Segalen, University of West Paris - Nanterre

When we take a quick look at changes in the institution of family, we can see that the “theory” of transition, if indeed it exists, is inapplicable, and that we are dealing with a very complex model which includes very complex economic, cultural and religious data.

One needs multiple approaches to study complex situations such as family structures and values in different socio-economic contexts. Before getting to the heart of the presentation, I should point out that more than any other aspect of society, the institution of family is the place for ideologies: is it a societal microcosm? What are the links between it and the state?

This presentation will begin by examining the exceptional nature of European marriage in the world's cultures, followed by a look at the diversity of modes of organization of European peasant societies, then it will address the development of the social

classes after industrialization, and finish with a discussion of theories on the transformation of family.

1.4.1. European Marriage: an exception among the world's cultures

It is important to realise that, as far as we can see from sources starting in the XVIIth century, western marriage presents very distinctive characteristics in relation to what we know about societies outside of Europe.

Marriage appears to be a powerful demographic regulator. In a society without contraception, the number of people entering into marriage and having access to sexuality (thus procreation), and the age at which these people start to reproduce, in correlation with the mortality and emigration rate determine demographic changes. For a long time, demographers have neglected issues around marriage because marriage, in

and of itself, does not influence population levels. But, because of its consequences, it is a determining factor in population balance.

Marriage in historic European populations (starting from the XVIIth century) is characterized by the advanced age of marrying couples, which not only has consequences for demographics (limiting births), but also for the organization of society, questions of inheritance, and the way in which couples function. This was a surprising discovery for demographers who studied the issue because, before their research, one of the misconceptions about the family was that people married at a young age, at the age of Romeo and Juliet. From the end of the XVIth century, when parish records begin to give us precise information, we can see that the average marrying age for working class people from rural and urban areas was 27-28 years old for boys and 25-26 for girls. Late marriage appears to be a characteristic of western society, a unique model in the panoply of cultures (John Hajnal, 1965). In most non-European societies, and up until the 1980s, couples were composed of adolescent, or even pre-pubescent spouses, who were taken care of by the family into which they married. Late marriage, in contrast, could be a sign of a certain individualization of couples who must wait for the death of their parents and their part of the inheritance before setting up their own home. In reality, as research on succession systems shows, peasant couples are provided for by their parents as much as in non-European societies. It's the scarcity of land, the limitation of rural resources that most limits the marriage rate. As proof, we see that the age decreases when industrial employment allows young people to earn a living.

The noteworthy consequence of this "delay" in marrying is the shortening of the child-bearing period for women. Instead of procreating from the age of 20 up to 45 years old, they will not start child-bearing until the age of 25 or 26, which reduces the number of children by at least 3, as we know now that the fertility model historically was one child every 18 or 24 months, not every year.

Sociologists have long believed that this model was the result of industrialization. However, this western cultural invention seems much more ancient. From the XIIth century, with the influence of the Christian church, marriage becomes a sacrament, which reinforces the importance of the couple to the detriment of the institution of lineage. This new doctrine of filiation, inheritance and marriage ends up by separating individuals from their kin, in reducing the notion of "heir" to its most simple biological form. Adoption allowed lineages to ensure they had descendants, if couples were sterile or if their children died, and therefore to maintain the ancestor cult: then it becomes forbidden; ecclesiastic communities take over responsibility for the souls of those who die childless. The imposition of exogamy leads to the fluidity of inheritance, "divergent" devolution disperses the inheritance among the different branches of the family.

Thus, late marriage has consequences for this historic western characteristic, the development of individualism, and the relative detachment of the couple from its extended family.

1.4.2. Residence and Social Organization in European Peasant Societies: Diversity of Family Structures

As far back as historical documents go, and set in the context of research on forms and functions of family and kinship, several models of families can be found among the working classes, for the most part peasants and craftspeople. Here, many demographic, historic and ethnological considerations intersect.

What are the residential configurations?

Historians from the *Cambridge Group for the study of population and Social Structure*, under the direction of Peter Laslett (1972) proposed a typology that tries to put the data into some kind of order. This classification distinguishes four categories:

- domestic groups “without family structure” which we cannot define as anything other than old friends sharing the same household. This category is most often made up of lone individuals;
- “simple” domestic groups which correspond to a household, a family unit: these are composed of either the father, mother and children, or a widow or widower with children, excluding all other relatives;
- “extended” domestic groups which, in addition to the members of a simple family unit, are composed of ascending, descending or collateral relatives, meaning the father or the mother of the head of the household, a grandson, or granddaughter of the head of the household or of his wife, or a brother, sister, nephew or grandnephew. The extension basically means the

addition of a fairly close relative, a kind of satellite relative, to a central conjugal core;

- “multiple” domestic groups where several related households live together, thus the name “poly-nuclear”.

One of the criteria of classification is based on who leads the domestic group, which introduces distinctions sometimes more formal than real. Moreover, the *family life cycle* and the *family life course* must be taken into account in the analysis.

Without getting into the detail of discussions on family life cycles, we can say that a couple forms by marriage, has children, can go on to share a farm with the parents of one partner, which they will later leave or, on the contrary, take full responsibility for, while keeping under their protection an elderly father or single sister. During this cycle, different forms of the domestic group have appeared: simple, complex, extended or poly-nuclear. Thus all domestic groups are like processes; a census fixes the image of a type of household that can actually be temporary. Bringing back a longer timescale can allow us to understand whether the configurations of domestic groups are structural or cyclical. Are households always multiple or always conjugal? Do they experience a typical succession of phases, and if so, what is its model? How can we explain the gap between the norm and the average once a determined model has been recognized as such?

The introduction of a dynamic dimension in the study of domestic groups is therefore a major advance, revealing their extraordinary plasticity. The analysis of certain crucial moments in the cycle – such as the period of fission of a domestic group – thus allows us to understand the relationship between

the sexes and generations. Nevertheless, the faults of the concept of the cycle of family life turned out to be serious in that these stages were modeled on those of contemporary American families, and referred to stages of parenthood – birth of children, widowhood and family dissolution – rather than transitions such as the departure of young adults, marriage, etc.

This is why sociologists and social historians, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, have forged the concept of *family life course*. Glen Elder (1978) and Tamara Hareven (1978) launched a series of parallel studies on the social changes affecting individuals and the domestic groups in which they live. How do major changes, like entering school, or the work force, or marriage occur? Consequently, the study focuses on the strategies of the individual regarding these issues, and on the domestic group and the other social resources to which he/she may have access. The advantage of this approach is better to link the socio-historical context with the changes observed in domestic groups. Thus the rhythm and definition of the transitions of life seem to be linked to historical and social contexts. Because in the past individual lives were closely tied into the collective family, many decisions that we consider to be individual decisions today were integrated into communal strategies of domestic groups.

Three types of domestic groups emerge from this classification

We see these groups throughout Europe, in relation to the laws and regulations concerning property and its development. Residential configurations are associated with types of inheritance, which can be classified

according to several models in Europe. They are interlinked in complex ways with the different modes of land development (ownership, tenant farming, even serfdom) (cf. Burguière *et al*, talique 1994).

– In Russia, Serbia, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia, in Slavic countries but also in certain regions of Italy (Tuscan smallholdings, for example), we very commonly see extended domestic group configurations, like in the “communautés taisesibles” in central France, associating several generations and married brothers and their wives, under the responsibility of the father of the family. In these communities, property, work and meals are shared. Their founding ideology is the continuity of the lineage through that of the house, an entity that is physical and symbolic at the same time. Here also, the architecture of the houses is intimately linked to the familial and social organization: *e.g.* duplexes, houses with a central hearth surrounded by sleeping chambers, or long houses – a model that is common among the minorities that live in Việt Nam, such as the Bahnar or the Ede.

Of all the models of the extended family in Central and Southern Europe, the Yugoslavian *Zadruga* is the object of particular study. Shared residences and meals were fundamental. However, small structures for each young couple, annexes to the main house but neither heated nor furnished with a cooking space, demonstrated the beginning of the individualization of the conjugal couple. Goods were the indivisible property of men; women were excluded according to the common law of exheredation of girls, who only received a personal sum at the time of their marriage, without being able to acquire goods.

- The stem-family or “house system” and unequal system.

This is a model which is very common in different peasant societies in France (and elsewhere in Europe). Initially, we thought that it was a familial configuration specific to the Southwest, and notably the regions on each side of the Pyrenees mountain range; then examples were found in the Central West, the Southeast and in the Alps region; some cases were even found in the Lorraine region, where in the XIXth century, social structures still exhibited traces of the turbulence of the Dukedom. The geography of the stem-family is complex. Although we find it most often in countries of the North Mediterranean region (Italian Alps, Catalonia, Basque Country, North Portugal) etc., it is not a Mediterranean-wide model; on the contrary, the emphasis has always been on the nuclear nature of the domestic group in certain regions of Spain, Italy or Portugal. The stem-family has three characteristics. First, it is made up of a domestic group which gathers three generations under the same roof; the father and mother, one of the married sons and his wife and their children, to which could be added other children who remain single, plus domestic help. In his work, *Organisation de la famille*, Frédéric Le Play (1855) describes the Lavedan family which includes 18 people: a grandparent, the mother and father, the heir and his wife, nine children, two single relatives and two domestic employees.

Second principle: the domestic group is closely identified with the house (called *oustal* in Occitan). This is the institution which encompasses, as well as the residential farm and its dependent structures, buildings and land, the rights to common goods which count significantly toward the property's

prosperity. The rights to use water, forests and communal pasture resources, and an area in the cemetery, were attributed to each *oustal*. From one generation to the next, this complex ensemble of material and immaterial assets had to be handed down in its entirety. The honor of each of its owners depended on handing it down intact to his heir, while maintaining the area of farmland included in it as well as its reputation among the other houses that made up the village community.

Two consequences flow from this principle: the house bestows upon all of its members its reputation and prestige. There is no individual social position. This explains the surname that is attached to the civil name of each member of the stem-family, corresponding to the house where they live.

Finally, the house cannot be divided and only one child will inherit it. Although in certain regions girls may inherit, the general rule is that boys inherit from their fathers, a kind of succession that we will later call patrilinear filiation. The residence of the heir is also patrilocal because he must live with his father. As in the Yugoslavian *Zadruga*, the wife of the heir is always an outsider, subject to the authority of her mother-in-law. The other children, who are not heirs, have dowries and in this way are excluded from the inheritance: a small sum of money deprives them of any right to this main inheritance; the youngest children generally try to marry an heir from another house and “faire gendre” (become an in-law). Children who remain single stay in the house and tacitly relinquish their part of the inheritance to the heir. Their status is between that of a servant and a relative.

This system, of which the internal coherence is obvious, is now called a “house system”

in ethnological literature. In this domestic group uniting three, sometimes four generations, it is the older parent that has the authority. Nevertheless, we know that family development is not always uni-linear; the stem-family, latched onto its *oustal*, exists as much in its form as in its ideology and is even strengthened by modernity and integration in the national and international world.

– Finally, there is a much more egalitarian form, as in Brittany or in Normandy, where all the children inherit a share, not of the property itself but of tenant farms. Domestic groups are generally simple in form, and are mobile within a certain territory.

This is a rapid summary of the family structures in Europe on the eve of the industrial revolution; in addition there are the filiation systems of the nobility, and the middle-class family which will gradually assert itself with industrial development.

1.4.3. The XIXth Century, Creation of Social Classes with Industrialization

The question of the transformation of familial systems comes to the fore at the start of the XIXth century in France, and 50 years earlier in England. What is happening with the onset of industrialization and with it, the development of a class of salaried workers?

First, we must note that industry did not begin with the industrial revolution. In European countries, old-fashioned, piecemeal rural industries existed for a long time, situated near sources of energy, bodies of water or mines. Households are partly working in industry, but are still rural, and still belong to their original environment; they are part of the local community, participate in its

traditional culture. The typical family working in the fields did not disappear with the development of large industry, to which it is a necessary complement. Even in England, up until the 1840s, a large quantity of industrial production came from family workshops. Towns like Manchester and Liverpool were not large industrial cities, but commercial crossroads that united a network of villages dominated by manufacturing production. In this economy, all family members were put to work. For example, in the Meuse Valley, several artisan households each had a small forge that employed the entire family. Contrary to poor peasant households which often placed their children in the service of other households at a young age, young children and adolescents were kept at home to help supplement the family's meager earnings. The maintenance of this wider family was a way of distributing poverty among a larger number of people.

Worker Families: Proleterized or Resistant?

When a domestic group ceases to be a production group, does it necessarily become nuclear? The evolutionary outline which links industrialization with "nuclearization" of the domestic group is unfounded. Extended domestic groups were numerous in villages with a pre-industrial system, where rural craftsmen worked in the home; their production was sold in a market dominated by a capitalist economy. In towns in the process of industrialization, we do not see a nuclearization of the domestic group. In Preston (Lancashire), which industrialized very rapidly during the XIXth century with the development of the textile industry, the census of 1851 showed 23% of domestic groups were "extended" or "multiple". And so, in this industrial city, the structure of the

domestic group was more complex than that of the English parishes two centuries earlier. The urban-industrial revolution seems to have been associated with a considerable increase in co-residence between parents and married children. Moreover, as Michael Anderson explains in *Household and Family in Past Time* (1971), a large number of elderly lived with their children, in larger proportions than today. The development of the multiple or extended domestic group was justified by the economic constraints of industrial work: lack of housing, obligation for the mother to work, and difficulties of minding small children indicate that cohabitation was probably a necessity rather than a choice. In the absence of truly effective social protection in the case of sickness or poverty, the individual had no other solution than to turn toward his closest relatives, by forming enlarged domestic groups within which developed a reciprocal aid network.

In a way, the two domains – industrial life and family life – seemed far removed from one another for a long period, and authors tend to agree with the dramatic description of Edward Thompson (1958), describing the effects of the industrial revolution:

"Each stage in industrial differentiation and specialization struck also at the family economy, disturbing customary relations between man and wife, parents and children, and differentiating more sharply between "work" and "life". Meanwhile, the family was roughly torn apart each morning by the factory bell" (p. 416)

But contrary to what the sociologists of the 1960s supposed, historic examples show the role that family and kinship institutions played in the implementation of the complex

phenomenon that we call industrialization, and the strength and endurance of these institutions. Even in the worst conditions imposed by economic and social upheavals, people tried to use strategies to protect their own interests: and these involved kinship organization.

The impact of family influence on industrial organization shows in many ways: facilitating the adaptation of its members by finding them work and lodging; providing moral support in critical situations; encouraging the rotation of personnel; contributing to the placement of its members and exerting a certain control over the daily routine of work.

The family absorbed the shocks of industrial society by providing a framework for adaptation.

In single-industry cities, which now belong to the past, kinship and industry provided mutual support. Groups of domestic workers were veritable production units employing all members (father, mother, children). For a century, from 1870 to 1970, the textile industry in the city of Elbeuf functioned this way. The enterprises favored a great stability of personnel, employing several generations of families. In fact, one could only be hired on the recommendation of someone known as a good worker, and similarly, as a child, one "learned" the factory, the world of textiles, in the bosom of the family. If the destinies of the factory and the families were linked, it was because the arrangement was of mutual benefit: the families were assured of stable employment and easy job placement and the bosses were assured of docile and capable workers, all within a framework of a paternalistic association of love of one's work and family spirit.

Salaried employment allowed individuals to free themselves from paternal support, which explains the fall in the age of marriage observed in Europe in the XIXth century. If they weren't going to inherit, young people could do without their parents' approval.

Appearance of the Middle Class Family Model

In the XIXth century the middle class family, which develops alongside noble families in towns and cities, has a major impact. No matter how wealthy they are, they all share an ideology that unifies them despite their differences in status: they place the institution of family – whether that is a married couple or the kinship network with which it is integrated – at the center of their values.

In dynamic capitalism, the middle class family is defined as the social order in which all deviation is banished. In this melting pot are forged the values necessary for individual accomplishment, fruit of the moral virtues instilled over a long period of socialization. Thus, over the course of one century, the middle class gave birth to a model that would end up destroying itself: the conjugal couple would be undermined by the rise of individualism and various social, economic and cultural factors.

The capitalist middle class of the XIXth century is built on the family, and the stakes of matrimony are of utmost importance, given the capital investments necessary. But even more than this, family values of solidarity – which also imply tension and crises – become enshrined in economic logic. This is strange given that family values are not mercantile values and family relations are not used for maximizing profits. Whether in the textile families of the north, east or center of France,

one sees two family names associated in the name of the company.

The middle class produces an extremely standardized set of family morals which is imposed upon all society. These ethno-historical facts should be seen alongside theories on family change, which propose the idea of the “traditional family” – which existed for barely 100 years between 1870 and 1960 – within which the roles of men and women are differentiated and the couple benefitted from the support of the welfare state. The myth of the traditional family is invented in the 1960s-70s, reflecting the social disarray resulting from profound changes to the institution, which have raised fears and led to the development of a debate on the “crisis” of the family.

1.4.4. Some Theories on the Transformation of the Family

The transformation of the family is often qualified as modernization. There are several models.

Democratic Modernity

First of all, democratic modernity as it is defined by Tocqueville who observes in the example of the young United States the effects of the establishment of democratic societies on the institution of family.

This democratic system, characterized by instability, is marked above all by the weakening of two aspects of paternal and patriarchal authority: the relationship between generations and the links created by inheritance.

The disappearance of the right of the oldest to inherit – established by the Napoleonic

Code – renders society more mobile and “each one can expect to be treated the same as all the others in his relations with public power. No longer can any fatality, any decree from a superior order hold an individual indefinitely at the summit or at the bottom of the social ladder. No longer can any link of personal dependence screen this individual from the political authority over him. This type of society favors individualism; each individual destiny can be the object of legitimate hopes. It also favors the blossoming of a sense of equality: the acquisitions of one can easily become the hopes of another”.

“In countries which are aristocratically constituted with all the gradations of rank, the government never makes a direct appeal to the mass of the governed: as men are united together, it is enough to lead the foremost, the rest will follow. This is equally applicable to the family, as to all aristocracies which have a head. Amongst aristocratic nations, social institutions recognize, in truth, no one in the family but the father; children are received by society at his hands; society governs him, he governs them. Thus the parent has not only a natural right, but he acquires a political right, to command them: he is the author and the support of his family; but he is also its constituted ruler. In democracies, where the government picks out every individual singly from the mass, to make him subservient to the general laws of the community, no such intermediate person is required: a father is there, in the eye of the law, only a member of the community, older and richer than his sons (...).”

“Perhaps the subdivision of estates – writes Tocqueville (1835) – which democracy brings about –, contributes more than anything else to change the relations existing between a father and his children. When the property of the

father of a family is scanty, his son and himself constantly live in the same place, and share the same occupations. Habit and necessity bring them together, and force them to hold constant communication, the inevitable consequence is a sort of familiar intimacy, which renders authority less absolute, and which can ill be reconciled with the external forms of respect. Now, in democratic countries, the class of those who are possessed of small fortunes is precisely that which gives strength to the notions and a particular direction to the manners of the community. That class makes its opinions preponderate as universally as its will, and even those who are most inclined to resist its commands are carried away in the end by its example. I have known eager opponents of democracy who allowed their children to address them with perfect colloquial equality. Thus, at the same time that the power of aristocracy is declining, the austere, the conventional, and the legal part of parental authority vanishes, and a species of equality prevails around the domestic hearth.”

Tocqueville thus observes the rise of individualism and of sentiments felt by the couple, like the sentiments of affection and proximity felt notably between father and son. Having been raised according to the strict rules of aristocratic respect between father and son, he is struck by the liberty of tone that reigns between the generations in the United States.

Changes in Family Structure

The second theme of modernity we find particularly in Durkheim, who highlights the changes in the family structure: “The contraction of the family is correlative to the ‘extension of the social environment’, from the village to the city, from the city to the state; it

manifests itself by the 'gradual weakening of family communism'; things that are owned in common which constitute a familial cement which are gradually appropriated individually. Not only does the family's power of coercion (for example in the choice of a spouse) disappear, but with the rise of the salaried working class, family members are no longer assigned to the management of the family inheritance."

Modern family ties are no longer founded on inheritance. What links the generations is an elective affection, which is much more fragile. With the weakening of the sentiment of "family communism", defined as the "identity, the fusion of all the consciences within one common conscience which embraces them" (1975, p. 42), the modern family gives way to individuality.

As a counterpoint, these transformations occur under the eye of the state. *"The state has become a factor in domestic life"* (1975, p. 38). Durkheim observes the emergence of public policies on childhood, debates on social protection (retirement, health-care insurance); he is a contemporary of the law that abolished paternal power. With clear foresight, he predicts the growing role of the state in the private realm of the conjugal family.

The Modernity of Feelings and the Rise of Privacy

Philippe Ariès (1960) considers that the "modern" family is associated with the invention of new feelings, those of childhood and privacy. Up until the XVIIth century, the conjugal family hardly existed; it was under the control of the local community and the kinship network that sanctioned any variations. The idea of childhood was equally unheard of in the sense that the specific

characteristics of this age group were barely recognized. Infant mortality was considered to be natural and the infant that survived the perilous first months and years of life became a small adult, dressed like his elders and involved in their tasks as an apprentice. According to Philippe Ariès, the child would be gradually separated from the adult world and the family would develop its role as educator. During this process, the family would form a wall between itself and society, the wall of privacy. For Ariès, family modernity is found there: instead of being attached to an inheritance or a name, the family turns toward the conjugal cell which will be the place where the child is socialized. Thus, the ideas of childhood and conjugality go hand in hand. And let us point out that the rise of these ideas is linked to the introduction of birth control and the voluntary decrease in family size.

The Invention of the Traditional Family by Sociology in the 1950s and 1960s

When the sociologists of the 1950s and 1960s studied the family, for them, "modernity" went together with the industrial society, associated or even confused with urbanization. They did a great deal of work on the opposition between "traditional" society and "industrial" (and urban) society which signified for them a completed model, in every sense of the word.

According to Talcott Parsons (1955), the process of industrialization segmented the family, first by isolating it from its kinship network, then by decreasing the size of the domestic group to that of a conjugal household with a small number of children. This group is now only a unit of consumption and residence; it has lost

its functions of production, its political and religious functions; it shares its financial and educational responsibilities with other institutions. This domestic group, isolated from its kin, is founded on a marriage that associates partners who have chosen each other freely; it is oriented toward values of rationality and efficiency; specialized roles for men and women contributing to the maintenance of a familial sub-system in the heart of the social system. The father occupies an “instrumental” role, ensuring a link with society and provider of material goods; the woman has the “expressive” role within the family. This thesis was functionalist in that it affirmed the appropriateness of this family model with the economic characteristics of contemporary society of the time. Social mobility, a cause and condition of economic development, happened with the rupture of kinship links. Moreover, this thesis revealed some social psychology. According to Parsons, in a society of autonomous individuals, the “raison d’être” of the family – comprising a structure of differentiated roles – resides above all in the socialization of the children and the stabilization of the adult person.

Modernity, here incarnated by the industrial society, would have overturned the old-style family in terms of its structure, its functioning and its relationships with society. Talcott Parsons characterized the family thus as a social group organized around an ensemble of values opposed, or even contradictory to those that structured modern post-war society. Modern (industrial) society was dominated by economy and rationality. In the family, tradition ruled; it belongs to social forms that were survivors, archaisms, or even anachronisms in a world dominated by the

values of rationality. Family relations and economic relations were considered to be incompatible structural principles. Industrial production could not have established itself without destroying the kinship structures and more generally the local social structures. For Parsons, industrialization demanded the dissolution of family ties and the reduction of the domestic group to a nuclear form, made up of only one economically active member (the husband). And, of course, this new model was the expression of progress.

Another sociologist from this period went even further and predicted, in the post-war euphoria, that this model of the “modern family”, founded on the free choice of spouse and valuing love, would spread over the world progressively as the world modernized. William Goode (1963) prophesied that the “modern” conjugal system would succeed in developing societies. Young people would establish neolocal residences, would free themselves from family constraints in choosing a spouse; the number of children would be limited; the conjugal relationship, based on reciprocal attraction, would be reinforced. *“The ideology of the conjugal family is a radical ideology, which destroys the ancient traditions of societies.”*

This thesis did not survive and its brutal dualist opposition died with it: it did not survive criticism by historians, or the reality of sociological and cultural change.

To Conclude: Diversity of Family Models in Europe in 2010

Today Europe is witness to a diversity of family models. Great demographic transformations have taken place since 1965, but social turbulence continues.

The characteristics are the following:

- nuclear couples, single-parent families, recomposed families, widespread divorce all co-exist;
- the marriage rate is decreasing in a number of countries; the birth rate holds steady thanks, in France in any case, to vigorous public policies to protect women's jobs;
- we have come full circle in some ways, in that families are now founded, *via* the birth of a child, by couples older than they were 20 years ago;
- inter-generational relationships are very important in contemporary society; grandparents look after grandchildren in order to help their own children, both of whom are engaged in the labor market;
- Europe generally offers families the security of the welfare state.

Women's rights were the initiator of these changes; the relationship of domination between the sexes was displaced by the search for equality between the sexes. Today, new values are at the foundation of society, the values of liberty and individualism.

Some see the end of the family in these new familial forms; others see a new modality in which the strength of filial relationships compensates for conjugal instability, without putting the entire institution in question. In 2010, these transformations are accepted in that they are matched by changes to the laws in most European countries stating that women are equal to men, and by public policies that support the desire of women to work as well as have children.

As for the issue of "transition", it is obvious that this term does not apply to the family, because there is no beginning and

no end. Families exist as long as there is a human society.

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Exchanges...

Nicolas Zufferey, University of Geneva

The one child policy in China has provoked some abrupt and radical changes in the family structure. Presently, the nuclear family is most common, one household with two parents and their child. Nevertheless, concerning this classification, I would like to point out the importance of the grandparents: for example, in the large cities, they often bring their grandchildren to school and after-school activities, as the parents do not have enough time to do it. Also, there is still a real difference between family structures in the country and those in the city in China today.

Doesn't the image of the couple and family that you have presented correspond more specifically to France than to Europe in general? Aren't there nuances according to the regions or are we talking about a homogenous model?

Bernard Formoso, University of West Paris - Nanterre

The elements of modernity mentioned by Martine Ségalen function in Europe, but are more nuanced in Confucian societies. This family model maintains a close dialectical relationship with the state, so much so that in Europe, we are citizens before we are "someone's son". In a Confucian model, we can be a citizen as well as "someone's son", at least in the metaphorical meaning of the word: the state is like a collective father. This relationship with the state is not necessarily different in the Vietnamese context, where we have seen that in the communist era, the state arranged marriages based on ideological criteria, which is analogous to what happened in the past. In some cases, the party functioned as a marriage agency in order to find husbands for young women who found it difficult to get married. The modern government took over modes of operation which had functioned previously.

Philippe Antoine, IRD

I very much appreciated this presentation which treats the evolution and transformation of the family over a very long period of time. I have one question about contemporary demographic ageing. What are the prospects, the possible evolutions ahead with the ageing of the European population? Won't grandparents be torn between taking care of their grandchildren and their own parents?

Yves Perraudau, Nantes University

When you speak about strongly family-based financing in the French case, it is true that we have not seen a development of the banking system as in England or Germany for historic

reasons, among others the unfortunate experience of John Law. However, was the family more important in financing in France than in other European countries? This is uncertain, because of the network of lawyers which acted, in a way, as the local banks which were starting to appear in other European countries.

The other nuance is the regional aspect of the evolution of inheritance; I refer to the work of sociologist Hervé Lebras who differentiated various “dispositions”: a very “catholic” familial disposition which characterized the west of France; for the area from Bordeaux to Lyon, and all of the South, a farming disposition, and finally, the central Parisian region characterized by mobility and flexibility. It is thus possible to distinguish a regionalization of inheritance in France.

Hem Sokly, URDSE Cambodia

How do you define family? Do concubinage and homosexual marriage enter into your definition?

Martine Segalen

As regards the importance of grandparents in China, it is possible to find this trait in France as well; and to answer Philippe Antoine’s question, this remains closely tied to the issue of residential proximity and the residential market strategy. Some very interesting work by Catherine Bonvalet from the INED shows that despite the difficulties in the housing market, couples make real efforts to stay close to grandparents. We note that contemporary grandparents are much more involved in the care of their grandchildren than before. At the time of geographic mobility, 50 or 70 years ago, two models emerged: the grandparents were in the country and families did not see

them often; or when the parents worked and did not have any help at home, they sent their children to the country to be raised by their grandparents. This model was common up until the 1960s. The phenomenon disappeared, but this did not decrease the strong interaction with the grandparents.

To go back to the very pertinent remarks of Yves Perraudau, the model that I presented seemed slightly linear because of time constraints, but there is obviously a complexity of models in the country, and this reflects the comments of Hervé Lebras on the forms of inheritance and their ideology, which are very different in the East, Brittany, the Southwest, etc. There is a lot of diversity in Europe, which I did not have time to discuss during this presentation.

To come to Bernard Formoso’s remarks, it is interesting to see that the world of kinship is taken over by the political world: Uncle Hồ, Stalin the “little father of the people”, Uncle Mitterrand, Uncle Sam, etc. Kinship vocabulary is appropriated by the political world but also that of consumerism: Uncle Ben for rice, “Bonne Maman” jams, etc.

Concerning the ageing demographic, we will see an entire generation of women that are between 50 and 60 years old and in good health, but are torn between caring for their grandchildren and supporting their parents. This demographic ageing brings significant challenges.

To answer Hem Sokly, I do not define family. If we define the family, we create exclusions. For example in France, there was a period where the number of households headed by single women with children rose; from the moment that the term single-parent family was invented, these marginalized women

were included in the panoply of families. I would not put concubinage on the same footing as same-sex marriage. Concubinage is a very old practice; between the XVIth and XVIIth century the Church started to require couples to be married religiously. For a long time, couples did not know if they were really married or not. When they had a child, girls dragged their fiancé to the ecclesiastic court which forced the father to take responsibility if they were not married. Paradoxically, when the Church imposed its doctrine, women were less protected: if you were not married, you were not considered to be a family.

Today, the term concubinage has a common, working-class, slightly pejorative connotation. The term couple is used more often. In 1998, France implemented a sort of light marriage contract, the PACS (Civil Solidarity Pact). It is interesting to note that currently in France, the number of marriages is declining and the number of PACS, which was initially designed for same-sex couples, is rapidly increasing: 250,000 marriages, 180,000 PACS. We can expect an equal number of the two models in a few years. Nowadays, concubinage – under another name – is perfectly accepted. With same-sex marriages, we can see a considerable evolution in French society, which will no doubt end up recognizing same-sex parents. The PACS is a first step toward the recognition of same-sex couples, since it was above all designed for homosexuals. Pressure exists, nevertheless, for the right to adopt and the right of homosexuals to have access to medically assisted procreation. A rapid and important shift in values, supported by the law, has taken place and is linked in part to phenomena such as the AIDS epidemic and the visibility of homosexuals.

Rodolphe De Koninck, Montreal University

In your presentation, I appreciated your treatment of the presence and management of work in society through the family. The terms *sweating system* and *sweat shops* allude to work carried out to some extent unofficially in developing countries. You are very careful and do not employ the economic function of the family in society on the subject of work and education. Is there an erosion or disappearance of the function of education and teaching in the family?

Francois Roubaud, IRD – DIAL

You mentioned Hervé Lebras, and not Emmanuel Todd, who also outlined family structures in France, Europe and the world. What is your point of view on these ideas?

My second question is about policies which have been implemented. We have spoken much about the single child policy in China which has led to rapid upheavals, accompanied by an increasing imbalance of the sex-ratio to the detriment of girls. Do you have any intuitions or observations on the possible consequences of these policies?

Martine Segalen

In France, home schooling was never very common. Two things: parents attach a great importance to the academic results of their children in the context of an economic and moral crisis, and support them as much as they can, and also the relationship with the child has changed greatly. I spoke about Tocqueville's family democracy, but there exists a true family democracy today: we ask children their opinion. The Convention on the Rights of the Child was signed internationally; children are practically equal to their parents.

Parents have a much more difficult role because they must continue to guide their children without authoritarianism. The rapid changes that we see are also explained by the development of means of communication like the portable telephone, Internet, etc. which destabilize parents. There are real cultural breakdowns that go far beyond the generation gap invoked by Margaret Mead.

As much as the work of Hervé Lebras has always interested me, the work of Emmanuel Todd has irritated me since he puts Brittany, the focus of my studies, into the category of “egalitarian system” without any distinction. Having carried out interviews in this region, I know that there is indeed an egalitarian system, but it functions very differently.

Regarding the consequences of public policies, it is obvious that the decrease in the number of children, economic development, and the fact of women working will completely change the relationships within families, especially in the peri-urban areas. Thank you.

Reading (tamdaoconf.com)

Les liens de parenté en Europe. Aux temps de l'individualisme, comment peut-on encore parler de relations inter-générationnelles? Familles et générations en Europe au XX^{ème} siècle. Un nouvel esprit de famille, Martine Ségalen.



1.5. A Synthesis of the Plenary Sessions

Olivier Tessier - EFEO

(Re-transcription)

Dear Colleagues and Friends,

Before getting into the heart of the subject, I would like to thank Stéphane Lagrée and Bùi Thu Trang for the perfect organization of the fourth “Journées de Tam Dao”, (“JTD”) an event which, over the years, has become a highlight in the calendar of meetings and exchanges between national and international social science specialists. This year’s meeting is characterized by a regional expansion which emphasizes, if it were necessary, the growing interest in Việt Nam and in the region generated by this unique event. I have a special relationship with the “JTD” because I have participated in all its previous meetings either as a speaker in the plenary sessions (2007, 2008) or as a co-organizer of the field workshops, which I will also lead next week for the third year in a row. However, this is the first time that I will attempt the perilous exercise of trying to synthesize the presentations of the last two days. Thank you, Stéphane, for putting your trust in me, even if I am not sure you have made such a good investment!

As a preamble, let’s briefly recall the central problem of this year’s “JTD”. In 1986, the year of the 6th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, the government declared that the country was entering a phase

of transition and opening. For more than 20 years now, this transition has been the object of many studies, but the premise for its beginning has never really been questioned. Often, universities consider transition as a given state; they adopt it and adapt it to their discipline and their field of research. The objective of these “JTD” is to give participants and speakers the chance to question the premise itself, to sift through it with a critical filter and deconstruct it in order to evaluate its potential operative value according to different fields of study. I have to say that, since yesterday morning, the work is already well under way. For this synthesis, I will simply describe each presentation chronologically, while highlighting elements and questions that seemed essential to me. Therefore, I will present only some parceled, “real-time” impressions, which are in no way meant to reconstitute the wealth and pertinence of the presentations given.

Let us pause for a moment on the opening speeches.

The vice-president of the VASS, Mr. Nguyễn Xuân Thắng, presented a concept of transition “seen from above”, decreed and somewhat ideological, wherein it is the state that initiates and controls the movement, notably by integrating the country politically and economically into large international institutions (ASEAN, WTO).

Yann Martres was more nuanced in his approach to the notion. As deputy director of the AFD, he set out the classic triptych of conditions necessary for a successful transition to unfold without a hitch: political stability, sustainable development, good governance. But he did not hesitate to revisit the foundations of a concept of transition which could, at first glance, appear to be unilateral and monolithic. Transition can follow different rhythms and be analyzed from various perspectives depending on whether we consider it to be economic or social, whether we are trying to define it in relation to collective or individual phenomena, etc. When Yann Martres pointed out that Việt Nam has gone from being a “poor country” to being a “middle income country,” I thought that this gave economists a concrete and objective indicator for identifying and therefore declaring the end of the transition period. In which case, the country should logically enter into a second phase of transition leading it fairly rapidly from being a “middle income country” to being a “rich” or developed country, if all goes well. The question is whether it is satisfactory to adopt this linear vision of transition based only on the characterization of economic dynamism evaluated on a macro scale, a vision which inevitably standardizes extremely diverse and contrasted realities.

Also, I very much appreciated the view of a “hard science” specialist, Jacques Boulègue, physicist and representative of the IRD, on the concept of transition. He reminded us that in physics, the transition from one state to another is frequently synonymous with imbalance, disorder and instability, a process which could lead to brutal and irreversible changes. Although he prudently

avoided establishing a parallel with the properties of economic and social transition, his presentation offered us an original interpretation. Indeed, his reading suggests that any transition dynamic has intrinsic risks and uncertainties that can generate divergence and conflicts which in turn can lead to a final state that is more unstructured, or even chaotic, than its previous state. In other words, it is better to be careful with the positivist approach, given that transition is not automatically associated with the idea of social progress and economic development.

The historical perspective afforded by Nicolas Zufferey on the subject of China was fascinating to me. Philippe Papin carried out the same exercise on the subject of Việt Nam during a conference in Geneva in 2006, in which he pointed out that over a long period of its history, the country had known a succession of transition phases. Thus, in the XVth century, the emperor Lê Thái Tổ, after having liberated Việt Nam from Chinese rule, undertook a profound reform of the country’s administration by imposing a centralized mandarin system over the entire national territory.

In his presentation, Nicolas Zufferey took a look at a very ancient period of transformation of Chinese society which took place before the Christian era, qualified for the occasion as a transition toward a form of modernity, as well as a contemporary transition period which began in China in 1978, and may still be happening.

During his presentation, it seemed to me that this ancient transformation period could be described as isolationist. The Chinese empire transforms itself, but by an internal evolution of its own cultural referents, social and

political: modernization results more from the emergence of divergent and sometimes contradictory currents of thought among Chinese society and especially among its elite, than from the influence and the penetration of external models.

By comparison, the contemporary transition links in with globalization and a homogenization of values, and in this sense it is fed by the adoption of standardized individual and collective behavior, principally in the cultural and economic fields. In other words, the present Chinese and Vietnamese transitions are imposed on all actors, a tidal wave of a hegemonic process encouraged and supported by large international investors who attempt to associate with it the criteria of good government and sustainable development (for appearance's sake?). Without going so far as to evoke "the end of history", we could ask if it is still possible for a given country to generate its own modernity without adhering, voluntarily or not, to the model of globalization and standardization of values.

To approach the notion of transition, you have distinguished, on the one hand, an underlying movement implying political (regime) and global cultural changes, and on the other hand, the transformation of economic and social components. In fact, these large underlying movements do not necessarily lead to the simultaneous transformation of the ensemble of components according to a unique rhythm: there can be a time lapse between economic development and cultural or social evolution. I think that a particularly interesting interpretation is the idea of a global movement that does not automatically lead to internal changes, the latter having a certain autonomy (inertia)

and the ability to dissociate themselves from the movement of the ensemble.

Finally, you have pointed out that if we consider the concept of transition over an extended period of time, history becomes a story of a transition or many transitions. From this perspective, the agrarian transition started in the Neolithic period and will end with the disappearance of humanity. The underlying question seems essential to me. Are we capable of identifying major changes over long periods of time and then delineating and extracting periods where history accelerates, or evolution radically upends the life and future of a human group? This introspective view of the historian, which questions the notion by asking if the history of humanity is not ultimately that of a never-ending transition, brings us to question the merit and pertinence of this notion and ask what conditions are necessary to render the analysis operative.

Rodolphe De Koninck's presentation on the agrarian transition fascinated the entire audience: the multi-scale approach placed Việt Nam in the larger context of the entire region of Southeast Asia. And indeed, it is surely in the light of the region's dynamic that we can better understand the present evolutions in Việt Nam.

You first emphasized the pivotal point consisting of the transfer of the accumulation of agriculture toward industry, which caused a radical upheaval in the relationships of production.

You then painted a broad-stroke picture of the particular features of the agrarian transition in Southeast Asia, features which make it a unique model in the world: the intensification of production systems and

the expansion of agricultural areas were simultaneously imposed with a double process of industrialization and urbanization.

One of the essential aspects of the agrarian transition in Southeast Asia is the ever-growing dependence of agriculture on industry. This dependence is two-fold: upstream from production, for the supply of chemical input (fertilizer, pesticide) and seeds selected for increased productivity, but which must be renewed after almost every harvest; downstream of production, for the use and distribution of the agricultural products through the powerful networks regulated exclusively by capitalist market laws and an unquenchable thirst for profits, networks over which peasants have no control.

This vertical integration, endured rather than experienced by the vast majority of producers, leads to abhorrent and terrifying situations. When you consider that 44% of the national territory is dedicated exclusively to palm oil in Malaysia, we are no longer talking about agriculture, but about industrial agricultural production.

To paraphrase Henri Mendras, is this not an irrefutable sign of "the end of peasantry", of the programmed disappearance of the peasantry as a human, social and economic network developing specific forms of territorial organization and promotion of the rural environment? Even if there is still land, relegated to the rank of substrata, which contains plants, now industrial monoculture, there is nothing agricultural in such exploitation of resources, nothing rural in these forms of organization of space. Can we resist these powerful agro-industrial models and is there a will to do so? The case of Malaysia is a new demonstration of the

existence of an implacable globalization process that standardizes production modes, considerably weakens biodiversity and robs the peasantry of its capacity to control and intervene in its own production systems.

This hyper-specialization of territories reminds us of the political decision of Việt Nam during the collectivization period, to earmark certain regions for monocultures that were considered to be a priority for the self-sufficiency of the country. For example, this was the case in the province now called Phú Thọ, where the hills were first reserved for growing tea, then industrial plantations of eucalyptus in order to feed the paper mill in Bãi Bằng; planning that led to the results we are all aware of today. The irony of the story is that where ideology and directive politics have failed, global demand and market deregulation for speculative means succeed beyond people's wildest dreams!

The documentary, "À qui appartient la terre?" touched me deeply as it did most of the participants. I think we were all the more exasperated and revolted that the expropriations were carried out in order to build the most futile of developments: a golf course! But what if the peasants had been expropriated in order to build an industrial zone, government housing, a school or a hospital? Isn't it inevitable that the use of some agricultural land will be transformed because of land development and the decisions made by the Vietnamese government in the framework of its economic diversification and industrialization policies? Nevertheless, I have reservations about an emotional discourse and a symbolic interpretation that ascribes this conflictual situation to the peasants' visceral attachment to their land and moreover to the land of their ancestors.

It seems to me that the population's profound discontent is equally (and maybe more) due to the government's failure to address the legitimate concerns of the peasants, the latter having the impression of being purely and simply dispossessed, if not robbed. In other words, more than expropriation in and of itself, it seems to me that it is the unacceptable level of compensation, the absence of any help to convert or relocate, and the incompetence and cynicism of the local governmental representatives that are the principal sources of tension and conflict.

The economic approach of the DIAL team and Christophe Gironde based on the cross-study of macro and micro analysis shows the value of a procedure that tries to understand the different facets of a single phenomenon which are revealed at different scales of observation. For this synthesis, I wanted to point out two important trends from Christophe Gironde's presentation: 50% of the rural population is no longer involved in agricultural activity and this trend should continue in the years to come, indicating that in the near future, a minority of Vietnamese will be living directly from agricultural activity. This is a slightly paradoxical situation when we consider that the country has become the second largest exporter of rice and Robusta coffee in the world, and the largest exporter of pepper, etc. This apparent contradiction fits perfectly with the particularities of the agrarian transition in the region, exposed by Rodolphe De Koninck. It also highlights the fact that the country cannot be considered to be a homogenous entity.

Large-scale cash crops like coffee and pepper are principally located in the center of Việt Nam where the limits of cultivation by the first waves of migration initiated and

directed by the government, beginning in 1975, left room for spontaneous movements of colonization which have escaped all administrative control for the last fifteen years. The flow is such that the government has been trying for years to limit the migration from the north to the center of the country, which is causing increasingly serious inter-ethnic tensions between indigenous and migratory populations. For the most part, rice exports come from the Mekong Delta and have been increasing steadily for the last ten years (six million tons last year). This is despite the forced transformation of tens of thousands of acres of rice fields into fish and shrimp farms, which implies that rice production systems are being continually intensified and this compensates for the reduction in rice farming areas. As for the Red River, it is still dominated by a regime of small landowners, which makes the conversion to non-agricultural activity more rapid in the north than in the south since the possible agricultural alternatives are reduced. In the light of these three elements, should we believe that the development and intensification of plantations in the center of the country prefigures an evolution similar, or at least comparable, to that of the Malaysian agro-industrial model?

Studies on the informal sector carried out by the DIAL team bring to light a new central facet of the transition which remains one of the most difficult to understand. First of all, as a neophyte, I logically thought that the informal economy was a transitory stage characteristic of labor market evolution, and that it constituted a sort of intermediate phase between an agricultural economy and a formal industrial economy. However, you have destroyed this preconception by showing that the situation was going to last, that it

was an economic mode in its own right, even though the majority of the actors that you interviewed in the informal market believed that their small production units or services did not have a future, and moreover, that they did not want their children to follow in their footsteps. A new paradox calling our premise into question: if a transition lasts a long time, perhaps the term itself used to characterize the phenomenon is inappropriate.

Regarding the relationships between the government and the informal sector, we can reasonably ask ourselves if small family entrepreneurs would appreciate government intervention given that this would surely mean a right to control their activities (product and service quality, employee conditions), fiscal measures, etc.

The presentation on migrations was particularly interesting for me because it suggested an important change that took place in approximately ten years. The results of my field work on this subject from the 1990s show that the migrants made a clear distinction between “resource space” and “occupied space”. Practically speaking, in the context of migrations that were almost exclusively temporary or reversible, the arrival point was considered as a resource space where the migrant sold his/her labor, but the revenue was invested in their native village, the point of departure. This distinction no longer seems pertinent because now, the majority of households settle or would like to settle in the place to which they have migrated.

Finally, the question of migrations has brought to light important divergences between the results obtained at the macro and micro levels; this supports the argument

for bringing together multi-scale and multi-disciplined approaches in order to understand a single phenomenon. On this subject, one of the speakers remarked that “the evolution in progress goes faster than the model,” a reality that requires a constant adjustment of the analysis criteria, such as dividing a country into four distinct zones (urban agglomerations of Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, peri-urban areas, urban communities, rural communities); according to whether we adopt this zoning or not, the interpretations are significantly different.

Further to Martine Segalen's presentation, we recall that the family institution in Việt Nam historically played, and still plays, an active role in structuring society in rural as well as urban environments. In recent history, meaning the periods of collectivization then renewal – *đổi mới* –, it acted as a veritable buffer between the government and individuals because it was one of the rare elements of social hierarchy and real solidarity that was not shaken by the succession of changes in ideological direction that had occurred since independence. This capacity to absorb the shocks coming from one's immediate or more distant environment is both cause and consequence of the cohesion and stability of the elementary familial network that is comprised of the domestic group and which does not recognize any independent individual economic capacity.

It must be pointed out that peasants attribute a meaning that is close to “domestic group”, as it is currently seen in ethnology, to the notion of family (*gia đình*): economic independence takes precedence over the community of residence, so two or three elementary family units (*i.e.* conjugal cores) can live together under the same roof if they make up an

autonomous production and consumption unit. Moreover, production and consumption activities are principally carried out by the members of the domestic group who only spend a little time on wider production and consumption activities. Based on this, we can identify three large types of domestic groups in rural areas:

- Nuclear family: the conjugal core made up of parents and children;
- Extended family: the parents of the husband are taken in by the conjugal unit formed by one of the sons;
- The multi-nuclear family: in the context of a kinship system where virilocality prevails, one of the married sons settles permanently in his parents' home; the production and consumption unit is then composed of two nuclear families.

The coexistence of these three types of domestic groups should be seen from a dynamic point of view, putting the domestic group back in the "cycle" of constitution and evolution. We can identify three successive stages corresponding to the most common three residential modalities. Theoretically, during the course of their evolution, all domestic units go through these three states, but in a different order or relationship depending on two principal trajectories: the majority start off with a temporary cohabitation phase (six months to one year) with the parental conjugal core, called "eating separately" because this cohabitation is characterized by the gradual acquisition of an economic autonomy, followed by an independent household; for a minority, they start with a long and stable phase of residential and economic cohabitation with the parental conjugal unit, which does not end until the two parents die.

This second trajectory has greatly evolved since the end of the collectivization period, as a consequence of the evolution of inheritance practices that affect residential arrangements. Practically speaking, we are talking about a shift from inheritance in an agnatic line to inheritance favoring the youngest; according to a process where the sons leave the parental residence as they each get married, the youngest is generally the last to get married. This evolution contradicts the premise that the continuity of the lineage, which is expressed through ancestor-worship and the respect of their tombs, is guaranteed by the simultaneous transmission of status and worship responsibilities and material inheritance, for which the house and land are symbols, in an agnatic line. Also, even if the transmission is an act which in essence demonstrates continuity, the goods transmitted do not seem to be intrinsically invested with any other dimension than that of their usage value. The image of a peasant tied to the land of his/her ancestors is put to the test: this evolution reflects the ongoing quest for an empirical compromise between fairly restrictive social norms and the reality of the daily lives of peasants.

Concerning the Vietnamese policy of limiting births to two children, it was above all adhered to by city dwellers, civil servants and employees in government enterprises because they could risk heavy penalties such as the loss of their job and house. Peasants took more liberties with the law, as the government is more limited in the ways it can exert pressure on them; expropriation and raising taxes are extreme measures that are rarely used and which in any case, were not very effective during the period of collectivization. In the end, birth control

policies in rural areas were not applied with as much rigor as in China, as can be seen in civil records that show many cases of nuclear families with three or four children.

As you have pointed out, the Vietnamese socialist state, very attentive to the equality of the sexes, was proactive in the promotion of women, professionally as well as socially and in the family. In the last fifty years, Vietnamese women have acquired more liberty and power than ever before.

Despite the undeniable gains, we cannot help but notice a marked tendency, which started around ten years ago, towards the privatization of public services, beginning with the two fundamental ones, health and education, in the framework of a policy prudishly named "socialization". What will be the effects of this gradual disappearance of public policies, which weakens the central position occupied by the family in social and economic networks, especially in the informal sector? In other words, in a context of accrued socio-economic differentiation with increasing inequality between urbanites and rural populations, between Viet and ethnic minorities, etc., isn't there a risk of splitting up the family institution and, through a chain reaction, destabilizing society as a whole if the social safety net,

which guarantees equal or at least equitable access to basic public services, is repealed?

As a conclusion to this slightly disjointed synthesis, I would like to call the attention of the participants to a notion consubstantial with transition. It is the notion of norms, understood to be the ensemble of social, economic, political and cultural rules and values which define the framework (legal, behavioral, hierarchical, spiritual...) within which an organized and recognizable human group develops most of its activities. If we project this universal reality onto the notion of transition, it seems logical that the dimension of change which characterizes and differentiates it from other historical periods, materializes in a series of transgressions and reformulations of these norms that are characteristic of a society in movement. Also, and this seems pertinent for the four workshops, the identification of norms and the reconstitution *a posteriori* of their processes of transformation (abandonment, conflict, transgression, production of new referents) should provide indicators allowing us to approach the nature and extent of the phenomenon named transition.

Thank you for listening.

Part 2

Workshops

2.1. Agrarian Transition

*Rodolphe De Koninck – Montreal University, Jim Delaney – University of Toronto, Danielle Labbé – University of British Colombia (UBC),
Bruno Thibert – Montreal University, Phạm Văn Cự – ICARGC,
Jean-François Rousseau – McGill University*

(Re-transcription)

Day 1, Monday, July 19, Morning

Integrated Theoretical Approach to the Agrarian Transition

[Danielle Labbé]^[5]

We will start by introducing the participants because we want them to be at the heart of this workshop. I would like just briefly to talk about the organization of the training session. Today, we will have an introductory session on the agrarian transition, and then, at the end of the day, we will ask you to tell us what information and/or themes you would like to cover and discuss.

*Presentation of Teachers and Participants
(cf. biographies of teachers, list of participants
at the end of the chapter)*

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

Thank you, everyone, for this presentation. I am a geography professor at the University of Montreal where I also hold the Canada Research Chair in Asian Studies. This twofold status comes after forty years of involvement in research and teaching on Southeast Asia.

I studied for my Ph.D. at the University of Singapore from 1967 to 1970, and since then I never really left this region of the world. My doctorate thesis was on the market gardening suburbs of Singapore. At the time, I was confronted with people living below the poverty level, but also with Chinese gardeners who did very well for themselves back then. The question of poverty has always been at the center of my preoccupations. The first project I directed, at the beginning of the 1970s, was a comparative study on the impact of the green revolution in Malaysia and Indonesia, in 64 villages.

[5] Names in square brackets are those of the trainers.

I am presenting this overview in order briefly to explain why we are discussing the agrarian transition in the framework of this workshop.

The research started in this region led my students and I to look into a series of problems, particularly those related with what I call the “problem of the forest”: how are forests managed and transformed into farmland? I will explain later why we now call this the agrarian transition. What is happening to the forests of Southeast Asia, and why have they disappeared so quickly, in the space of thirty or forty years?

In 2003, several researchers and academics met in order to share our thoughts and our research intentions. The debate centered on questions such as: how is the transformation in Southeast Asia specific to the region? How can this transformation be understood in the light of what we know about the agrarian transition and the substantial body of literature concerning transformation of societies? What are the mechanisms at work when a society shifts from agricultural to urban? And what problems result from this transition?

The ChATSEA project, *The Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia*, has been mentioned several times over the last few days, and we will have the opportunity to return to this subject as we will borrow some definitions from it. What is the agrarian transition? How does the transformation of the region’s countries subscribe, or not, to the theories of agrarian transition? Are these useful or not? In the light of what is happening in Southeast Asia, how can we contribute to the theory of agrarian transition?

During the round table discussion, you spoke about poverty reduction – how can the agrarian transition contribute to this

reduction, and in what ways does it not do so? You have also spoken about the important question of the role of the State. I remind you that on a historical scale, during the transformation of European agricultural society into industrial society, the role of the State was not at all comparable to what it is today. No one mentioned globalization, which is surprising. I point out that the phenomenon is certainly not new, but its intensity is obvious. We will also debate the role of globalization, and the perspective that we must take in order to study the agrarian transition when we face the intensity of the globalization process in which we are all implicated. Many of you also mentioned the question of land. I point out that the first definitions of the agrarian transition, the one put forth by Marx in particular, dealt primarily with land ownership. The definition of the agrarian transition is very much linked to this first definition, which sometimes leads to confusion, notably with translations into Vietnamese of the terms “agrarian transition” and “land transition”.

Yves Perraudau

I would like to make a comment on the notion of time and the acceleration of processes. For economists, it is important to bring this in, time is often an active factor. I remind you simply of the notion of interest rates. Time is fundamental; I refer to the work of Thierry Godin on the metamorphosis of the future. Thierry Godin is working on the prospect of France in 2050; his work shows how the unit of time shrinks.

In general, from Antiquity to the time of Charlemagne, the unit of time was the day. We lived by the rising and setting of the sun, work or travel time was calculated

in days, thus the notion of “daily work”, of jobs given by the day. Then, afterward, with the discovery of the hour, the rhythm was dictated by churches that would divide up the day into different periods with breaks in between, including in the fields. Drawings and paintings from the 18th and 19th centuries show this time dictated by church bells. In the 19th century and above all last century, the reference was the clock, with the scientific organization of work; with Taylor, the reference became the second. Since the 1970s-1980s, the reference point has by and large been an electronic pulse, the reaction time for computers.

This acceleration of time, as often mentioned by Rodolphe De Koninck, must be taken into consideration in transitions and in the process of transition. This seems essential to me.

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

I will now review the great debates on the agrarian transition, by using what you have said this morning during the presentations. This brings me back to my plenary presentation and to the principal processes that we study in the ChATSEA project and to the “windows of observation” we use. We will therefore talk about the characteristics of the agrarian transition, which I call the processes, and then we will address the methods for understanding it, taking into account your fields of interest. I have grouped these using various terms: poverty, land, role of the State, urbanization and peri-urbanization, specificity (rapidity and pace of change), work methods.

Our team had prepared some priority subjects. But we will try to adapt our approach to the questions that you have identified as priorities.

Today, I will speak for much of the time. I will be the one to try and address these questions in more detail.

What is poverty, and above all why is there poverty? The great agrarian transition theorists, those who were the first to identify this concept and to speak of agrarian transition, Karl Marx, Karl Kautsky and Alexandre Chayanov – whose works are widely referenced in the *Journal of Peasant Studies* –, have asked themselves this question. I will therefore try briefly to summarize the essence of the agrarian transition theory in Marxist literature. There is a very close link between the theory of social classes and the theory of agrarian transition. The essential questions brought up by Marx, and those alongside him, were: why are there inequalities? why are there rich and poor? how do the rich become rich?

In simple terms, according to Marxist political economy, the source of wealth in a pre-capitalist system lies in capturing surplus; while in a capitalist system the source of wealth relies on capturing value, also known as surplus value. In pre-modern or feudal societies, surplus was visible: it involved agricultural production in the countryside. Peasants had to hand over a large proportion of their harvest to the landlord of the land they cultivated. Thus, for example, the peasant who produced two tons of rice had to pay one or one and a half tons to the landowner. This is what we call the appropriation of surplus. This was a system where the relations of production were first and foremost agricultural. How is it that in this type of society, this appropriation was accepted by the population? It was clearly through coercion, even violence, but also through the construction of an ideological device, a discursive justification through the

social discourse of the lord, the land owner: his reaping of taxes was by right. Obviously, in almost all societies that have gone through this mode of production, religion played a determining role in justifying the difference between the rich and the poor.

So-called capitalist society is characterized by a fundamentally different mode of accumulation. The mode of appropriation is evident enough but the mode of accumulation has become invisible. Take a simple example that we all know: the relations of production that characterize capitalist society, between those who own the means of production and the workers who only have, in the language of Marx, their labor to sell.

Let's take the example of a shoe factory. Its owner cannot greatly influence his production costs – except the wages he pays his workers, in this case 30 workers who produce 900 pairs of shoes per day, or 30 pairs per worker. Each pair is sold for 100 dollars, which signifies a daily production per worker valued at \$3,000 and a total daily production valued at \$90,000. Let's say that the owner pays each worker 100 dollars per day, which means total daily outgoings of \$3000. But the factory owner has many other expenses to cover: raw materials (particularly leather), land rent, buildings, machinery, energy, wages of additional (including administrative) employees, capital investment, etc. The total for these other daily expenses comes to \$80,000. The resulting equation is: 90,000 dollars of gross revenue, minus \$83,000 [3,000 + 80,000] in production costs. On a daily basis, the factory owner can therefore reap a profit of \$7,000, the so-called surplus value, which in this case is invisible to those responsible for it, the factory workers.

In pre-capitalist agriculture, the surplus that the landowner accumulates and that allows him to build a castle and to hire staff, notably soldiers, is visible. Those who are subjected to taxes see what happens but are compelled to accept it for ideological reasons, and also because they are threatened with physical violence if they revolt. In the capitalist system, what Marx calls the extortion of the surplus-value is invisible. Historically, the question of agrarian transition is: how does a society go from a system where the extortion and the appropriation are visible to a system where they are invisible?

We started on the theme of poverty, and then moved on to inequality. How can we reduce the poverty that is characteristic of agrarian societies, where an enormous divide exists between a class of very rich people and a majority of poor people, moving to a society where the place and the mode of surplus appropriation are primarily urban and industrial? In the transition from the agricultural and rural mode of production to an industrial and urban mode of production, the role of the State and the question of land are fundamental.

The principal source of wealth for the great feudal landowners is land ownership. Historically and in the interpretation of the agrarian transition, particularly in the European and initially English context, one stage is particularly important: the "enclosure movement". It is an English term, but we use it also in French: the fencing of communal pastures or communal land in England starting in the 16th century. So what characterizes European feudal society – but this also existed in many Asian societies – is that, in addition to large private domains, the lords also controlled communal land.

This was often forest land on which the poor peasants, who had to pay, let's say, half of their agricultural production to the landlord, could look for wood for heating or cooking, could hunt or even let their livestock graze. The enclosures characterized a process according to which the great landlords decided to take possession of the communal land and forests and fence them off: *"It's over; you can no longer come onto this land! From now on, we will use it ourselves!"* On these communal lands, the lords, particularly in England, would mostly raise sheep for wool production. Why sheep and wool? At the time wool was becoming increasingly important; thanks to the new textile industries gradually establishing themselves in the cities, the raw material could be transformed in a more efficient way for the clothes manufacturing industry. The wool obtained could be sold in the cities to the growing numbers of factories which were often owned by the same landowners. Who worked in these factories? Often peasants who had been ruined by the fencing of the communal pastures. These pastures were in fact indispensable to the survival of the peasants.^[6] They had very little revenue and were very poor since they gave at least half of their harvest to the landowners. As already mentioned, communal lands represented a reserve for wood, small game and grazing opportunities for what few sheep, cows or goats the peasants may have had. The peasants were therefore increasingly forced to go and work in the cities, in the wool textile factories.

It must be understood that the agrarian transition is a long historical process, involving innovation, social transformation and new legislation. The legislation that finally enshrined the practice of "enclosures" in England was passed as late as the 19th century. It brought about an acceleration of the transformation of the wool industry which became the driver of the industrial revolution at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century in England. After wool, it was cotton's turn.

Increasingly close ties were established between the city and the countryside, where the use of land itself evolved rapidly, while accumulation was increasingly achieved in the urban world. The implications are phenomenal! I will not mention all of them now, but I would like to go back to cotton for a moment. The scale of accumulation based on sheep rearing, practiced on additional land requisitioned by large farm owners, who gradually became the industrial middle class, greatly expanded with the colonial period, particularly during the 19th century: from then on the dominant raw material for the textile industry was cotton. However cotton does not grow in England nor in France nor anywhere else in Europe; it can only be cultivated in intermediate climates, more or less of the Mediterranean type, as in Egypt, India or in America, notably in the lower Mississippi valley. At the time that accumulation became more and more global, cotton from the colonies would be used in European factories in England, France, Portugal or Spain. I remind you that the United States was a British colony, and that the cotton industry became an

[6] See also: Patrick Verley, *La révolution industrielle*, MA Éditions, 1985, 270 p.; Jean-Pierre Rioux, *La révolution industrielle: 1780-1880*, Éditions du Seuil, 1989, 273 p – *additions by the editor*.

enormous business in the Mississippi valley, north India and the Nile valley.

Two elements then became crucial: the role of the State and the double process of urbanization and industrialization. It was in the cities that the transformation of raw materials first occurred. Urbanization and the concentration of populations in the cities brought new problems: housing, urban development, health, etc. At the beginning, the State intervened very little; management was in the hands of capitalists: there was much poverty, workers were paid very little, and they worked up to twelve hours per day. In addition, the colonies became an essential element of the transformation in Europe; they were the source of raw materials – cotton, later on rubber for the automobile, etc. –, and provided market opportunities for exports. Indeed, European textiles, and in particular English textiles, were largely exported to cotton producing countries.


I underline the dynamic link that was created between the countryside and the cities. Through migrations, the former supplied the latter with a good part of the labor force, as well as raw materials. Gradually, the scale of the phenomenon became global. Above all, there is a direct link between the creation of wealth and the creation of poverty on a world scale.

Let's take a concrete example. Cotton was produced in British colonies: Egypt, the United

States and India. Remember that, in the case of India, in particular in Bengal, the traditional textile industry had been very prosperous before the colonial period. When the British cotton textile production industry became increasingly productive – improvement of machines, growth in cotton imports –, the European markets could not absorb all of the fabric produced. The surplus was then exported, especially to India, which had a high population. How could textiles be exported to a country where textiles were being produced at a cheaper price? By enforcing the purchase of foreign textiles, while destroying the local textile industry. It is a very important episode in colonial history to remember. In the context of the development of European industrial prosperity, violence was used to damage production as well as people: in Calcutta, the colonial masters ordered the mutilation of local weavers by having their index finger amputated. The Indian textile industry was thus destroyed, through both economic methods – *dumping* – and violence: not only were the weaving looms destroyed, but thousands of weavers were mutilated in the large cities.

We must understand that, in the history of the agrarian transition, whether in Europe or in Japan starting at the end of the 19th century, access to global markets – whatever it took – became essential.

Figure 15 CHATSEA Structure



Source: "Challenge of the Agrarian Transition on Southeast Asia" (CHATSEA).

In making links between the fundamental processes of the agrarian transition, which for the purposes of our research is the intensification and the expansion of agriculture, I remind you that the elements previously mentioned concerning the transformation of the English countryside – such as intensive sheep farming – represent a form of agricultural intensification. As for expansion, its history is also associated with colonial history, with the opening of new farm areas in order to produce raw materials such as cotton. We could also mention coffee and cocoa, grown in tropical countries but largely exported to industrialized countries, where

most of the coffee and chocolate is processed into finished products; much like rubber, which is cultivated in several Southeast Asian countries. During the colonial period, this was exemplified by the Michelin plantations in Cochinchina, which exported to the French automobile industry.

We will see, from a very contemporary point of view, the importance of this double phenomenon of intensification and expansion. We will also examine each of the processes mentioned in this graph, which are linked to what I just presented: urbanization, industrialization, market integration, in other words, processing of agricultural products

for the market. Production is no longer simply for food; even food production is increasingly conditioned by market mechanisms. This agrarian evolution also implies population displacement, migrations: from the countryside to the cities, but also international migrations, with new farmland and centers for industrial and urban development being created. Throughout history, and even more so today, new forms of agricultural or industrial production associated with the agrarian transition have required regulations. For example, industrial production must abide by a certain number of standards requiring that farm production does not destroy the natural environment – at least not totally. Agricultural intensification more and more systematically depends on fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides, while agricultural expansion generally brings about deforestation. Urbanization and industrialization depend increasingly on raw materials and energy, and so does agriculture. This has obvious consequences for the destruction of nature, as Marx had already pointed out in his criticism of industrial development. In Southeast Asia, urban and agricultural development pose considerable problems in terms of water management, transportation flows and energy production.

Day 1 - Monday, July 19, Afternoon

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

I would like to summarize in simple, even basic terms what I already presented on the agrarian transition. I would also like to add that I have in the past offered a forty-five hour course on the agrarian transition, while this morning's presentation only lasted one hour!

So there are many examples and above all many nuances that could not be mentioned. Since this morning, I spoke with one of you and it seems important to revisit certain elements of my presentation.

I remind you that the industrialization of textile production started with wool then turned to cotton. Why cotton? Cotton thread can be weaved much more rapidly, it is stronger and breaks less; by using cotton, more clothing can be produced, more efficiently. Today, cotton is infinitely more important than wool. The problem is that this plant does not grow in temperate climates: it cannot be grown in England, France, and Germany or in Europe in general. Cotton is a crop of inter-tropical countries; it grows in warm regions that have a true dry season: Central Asia, northern India, lower Nile Valley, south-central United States. Cotton is also produced in China (today's largest world producer), Pakistan and Brazil, etc. Demand for cotton grew when it was discovered that this material could be woven more efficiently than wool. In the 17th century, the English settled in India, and progressively took control. Intensification and expansion of this crop were favored in the colonies, including latterly in colonial India under British control. The production of cotton fabric by a growing British industry found itself in competition, via international markets, with local Indian craft production.

Remember the fundamental principal that agriculture gradually gives way to industry as the principal source of accumulation. In all the forms of agrarian transition, there is a so-called class relationship that characterizes the mode of production. In feudal times, the dominant relationship was established between the landlord and the peasants; in the capitalist mode, which was the

production mode that followed almost everywhere, the principal relationship was between the capitalists and the proletariat or, if you prefer, the workers. This is the model. I would add that agrarian transition theorists have all predicted that this model would evolve towards "large-scale capitalist agriculture", and that small production units would disappear. In other words, that agriculture would be made up only of large units and large properties, and would rely on collective labor. Based on this idea, one of the greatest errors in history was committed: communism tried to apply the principle of collective farming. And what was the principal source of economic failure in all the communist regimes? Whether it was the Soviet, Chinese, or Vietnamese regimes, collective agriculture never succeeded in attaining productivity or ensuring growth comparable to that attained in many so-called capitalist countries, including Việt Nam since the reform of 1986 and the de-collectivism of agriculture. This failure is attributable to the very nature of work and to the principle according to which, in agriculture, collective work is never as productive as individual work (there would be much more to say on this question). Another example is Cuban agriculture, which was never very productive.

The question of the role of agriculture in the agrarian transition brings us to the specificity of Southeast Asia. Does the agrarian transition in Southeast Asia display these main features: accumulation increasingly toward and in the cities, transfer of population, and essential role of the State? What is the specific nature of the agrarian transition and its consequences in Southeast Asia? These questions bring us to the ChATSEA project and the processes that we mentioned earlier.

But I would like to pause for a moment on the "windows of observation" – globalization, actors, living conditions, and territoriality.

Let's ask a concrete question: what part does globalization play in agricultural expansion and intensification in Southeast Asia? This involves examining the characteristic process of agrarian transition, already mentioned, from the point of view of globalization: agricultural intensification and expansion, urbanization and industrialization, market integration, migrations, regulation, environmental transformation. This also acts as a form of methodological structuring. How can we study processes from the point of view of globalization? What is the link, for example, between globalization and regulation? Take the example of Việt Nam investing more and more in production for the global market, notably in aquaculture, or fish farming. This activity has become an important source of exports, but to take part in it Vietnamese producers are required to abide by the regulations, *i.e.* submit to a set of environmental and health rules, etc. If they do not, the United States, the main importer of Vietnamese production, will stop buying their products. Obviously, regulations also apply to industrial production. The "scene" of agrarian transition also involves non-governmental actors that are not directly involved, those that we call *stakeholders*, in particular non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

By bringing together these six processes and four windows, including that of actors, this analytical device proves to be very rich and allows us to observe several of the dynamics of the agrarian transition. In the case of the ChATSEA project, we gave priority to longitudinal or diachronic studies of villages, meaning over a long

period of time. We generally used this method, and several of our researchers, including myself, have returned to the villages that we had studied twenty or thirty years ago. It is also the process presented in the plenary session by Christophe Gironde, who returned to his research field after about ten years, and took a comparative approach to the changes in land ownership, level of employment, and migrations.

This morning, we spoke about the problems of poverty. Why is it that people who produce food are poor? Why are people in Africa poor, and why do they not have enough to eat even though they are farmers themselves? It is because of living conditions – *livelihood*. This point of view can be examined in the context of a longitudinal study: how have subsistence conditions evolved in given villages? Actors of change in every village community include not only villagers, with a range of strategies – to pursue farming or not, work in the city, emigrate –, but also the State. In Việt Nam, in particular, the State's role is considerable. It intervenes indirectly through its policies, the aid it provides, training, education, infrastructure, etc. The State is a major actor, but it is not alone: there are also private actors, companies, including multinationals. Globalization thus plays a determining role in the transformations occurring in all Southeast Asian rural communities.

Village coffee producers in the Highlands of Việt Nam, in Đắk Lắk province for example, provide a very concrete example. In this region, the producers' fortune or misfortune is directly linked to the price of coffee on the global market. The Vietnamese government, like Vietnamese peasants, can do nothing.

The prices are set on the coffee Exchange Board in San Paulo, Brazil!

Spatiality must be taken into account, as change in scale is fundamental. Let me return to my example in the Highlands of Việt Nam. We must take into account the price of coffee, but also the actors involved: the producers, the ethnic minorities (that have in general been displaced and who often work for small Kinh planters), the State and its policies. An analysis that only considers what happens in the village, as anthropologists often do, is excellent, but in the end, it is also necessary to keep in mind what happens on a much larger scale: relationships between communities, relationships with the cities, migration, displacement of population, infrastructures. Spatial elements, territoriality, are plural and must be taken into consideration, necessitating what is termed in geography a "multi-scale" analysis. Thus, when we examine a village from above, we see that it seems to be well organized, with a well positioned temple, a waterway along which the houses are located. If we examine aerial photographs, we see that all the villages are along the same waterway, that a specific spatial organization illustrates how the coffee that is produced is brought to market. At an even broader scale, on satellite images showing a large portion of Việt Nam's Central Highlands, one can perceive how coffee cultivation has spread at the expense of the forest, that ethnic minority villages have been displaced, etc.

We could multiply examples of how these processes join together, and angles of analysis allowing observation and interpretation of a considerable number of elements of the agrarian transition. Are the processes and windows of observation mentioned easily comprehensible to you? We could start a

debate. According to you, is there anything missing? Can ethnicity be defined as a window of observation?

[Danielle Labbé]

As a Ph.D. student myself, I have some questions in relation to the model that ChATSEA used. If we take the case of Việt Nam, which seems to be a good example, I think that we must ask where the role of the State starts and ends. The old cooperatives have been semi-privatized; are these now part of the State or do we mean only central government? Are research institutes under the tutelage of the government included in the State? What about the old State enterprises that are now privatized but that have kept very close ties with the State? Also, the word “culture” was never mentioned. Are the current transformations the result of processes that are applicable everywhere, independently of local cultures?

[Jean-François Rousseau]

The issues that we are addressing are often seen as projects of capitalist expansion influenced by globalization. Could modernization have been a window in the same way as globalization? To what extent can we distinguish between these two concepts?

[Danielle Labbé]

Identifying the actors appears to be a problem. Can we name the agents of change by sticking only to State actors? For example, let's examine the question of land. Are land laws at the heart of the dynamic or do local practices enter into it?

Didier Orange

I have a question on method and another on the world of agriculture. Does this method allow the separation of the role of the State from individual decisions? Are social networks included in the conceptual window of actors? We have spoken a great deal about poverty in the agricultural world, but what about urban poverty? Finally, you said that collective work, especially in agriculture, is not very effective; can we say the same about other sectors of activity?

The themes are written on the board: modernization; State, individual decision; culture; social network; actors; urban poverty; collective work, effectiveness (sectors).

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

In the context of the ChATSEA project, researchers and students define social networks as actors. The question of rural/urban poverty makes me realize that we should be conscious that, for analytical purposes, we talk of the city “opposed to” the countryside, and likewise the State opposed to individuals, agriculture opposed to industry. These analytical dichotomies sometimes fail to represent reality, as there can be continuums. If we take the example of city/country, in Việt Nam or in Java, where the situation is even more striking, the city doesn't stop, the country doesn't start; the aggregation of rural and urban is particularly marked. That being said, you are right to ask the question. Urban poverty exists and it is being studied. I remind you that for analytical and didactic reasons, I am addressing the preoccupations that many among you have mentioned this morning concerning

poverty and the role of the State in poverty reduction. The creation of wealth creates poverty especially through the appropriation of surplus.

At what level do we speak about the State? Of course there is a Vietnamese government, policies put into place, but their implementation, much like the local repercussions of the policies, decisions and investments involve individuals, contradictions and decisions. Individuals will use the decisions of the State for their own profit, so we speak then of corruption. Do they represent the State in this context?

The term “modernization” is a very vague one that can designate agrarian transition as well as development or urbanization. I try to avoid using it. How do we define modernization? I admit that I find it more difficult to define this term than agrarian transition.

You have mentioned the role of culture whereas myself, I mentioned the question of ethnicity. Of course, there are specific Vietnamese characteristics which are sometimes significant. Nevertheless I believe we should avoid the universal trap of saying “*the Vietnamese are not like the Lao, or the Khmers*” or “*the French are not like the Germans or the English*”. We should be wary of cultural or environmental determinism.

There is one more important point: the question of collective work. I will try to summarize this. I took the three most important examples: Russia, China and Việt Nam. I stated that the principal driver of the economic failure of these so-called communist revolutions was agriculture, because of its incapacity to render collective work as productive as individual work. Work is at the center of the organization of society and appropriation. When we spoke

about surplus, and surplus-value, it was of course in relation to the appropriated fruit of labor. The so-called communist revolutions are characterized by the quest for the collectivization of labor, in industrial as well as agricultural production. Many analysts have shown that the collectivization of work in industry is inspired by Fordism or Taylorism, that was practiced in capitalist industry, namely on automobile assembly lines. The industrial assembly line is equally effective in a capitalist or socialist economy, as long as it is properly launched technically. Think about Soviet military industry *versus* the American military industry during the arms race. You could say perhaps: “*But the Lada was not as well made as the Buick!*” The reason was simple. For the Soviets, arms production was a priority and they succeeded just as well as on the capitalist industrial assembly lines. The production of major pieces of equipment, e.g. turbines, or the manufacturing of steel was just as effective in the communist system. Why? Because the alienation of labor, whether under the tutelage of capitalism or the State, remains the same. The workers’ relation to work in a Ford or General Electric factory in Boulogne-Billancourt or in Detroit is the same as that of a worker who is working in Rostov in Russia on an industrial assembly line. That the owner is John Ford or the State, or in the communist lingo “the workers”, the process of work is expropriated in the same way. The worker on the assembly line does his job, and he doesn’t have the choice of performing better or worse than his neighbor because everything is conditioned by the procedures and the rhythm of automated work.

In agriculture, the process of work takes place over three dimensions, not two. In a factory, it happens in a precise place; in

agriculture, it involves space, territory. Let's characterize somewhat the great socialist agriculture. When work is collectivized, we say for example, *"Here are one thousand hectares of wheat, and you are two hundred workers. You will work the fields today and you will produce that great socialist harvest, then at the end of the day you will receive your part of the yield"*. History shows that yields fell in all the great collectivized agricultural systems, whether they were the kolkhozy, the sovkhhozy, the people's communes in China or even the cooperatives in Việt Nam. Yields were inferior to those that existed before collectivization and above all they were greatly inferior to those obtained in capitalist agriculture or in the countries with so-called market economies. What is the reason for this? Autonomy of work can be totally ironed out in industrial work; on the assembly line, the factory manager can supervise and ensure that the workers all perform at the same rhythm. Surveillance of those working in the fields, three kilometers from the work station, is impossible; moreover what reasons are there for intensive individual investment in labor? Take one thousand workers on one thousand hectares, whatever the production, the portion will be one thousandth. On the other hand, a peasant who works on his own farm plot – as Marx points out, the peasant is the most ego-centric person in the world – wants to get as much as possible in return. History gives concrete examples that the repeated failures and setbacks of the USSR and China first took place in agriculture. The same goes for the failure of the Vietnamese economy, except that the Vietnamese were somehow quicker to understand. I remind you that the USSR became extremely dependent

on agricultural imports and all attempts to accelerate large-scale agricultural production ended in failure. We cannot alienate, mechanize, robotize, expropriate farm work in the same way that we can with industrial work. One of the essential consequences in the history of humanity was therefore the restoration of individual land ownership. I add that this restoration is not necessarily a panacea; capitalism found other ways to take total control of agriculture and farmers. But that is another debate that we cannot have here.

I add that we must not, however, confuse collective work and community work – the tradition of community work in Southeast Asian societies (especially in Việt Nam) in so-called agrarian societies where several farming tasks, in the rice fields for example, are performed collectively. For example, peasants harvest together and share many tasks. Agreements do not involve the State, but are made between families or within the village community. But this has little to do with collectivization.

Savath Souksakhone

I have understood that notion of agrarian transition has a very broad meaning that is accompanied by specific processes. Can we evaluate a process of agrarian transition?

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

The question can be asked differently. Can urbanization and industrialization be good or bad? Can agricultural expansion and intensification be good or bad? In the context of Southeast Asia for example, it is more pertinent to identify the foundations and the consequences of the intensification of agriculture and its territorial expansion.

I hope that you understand the logic that I am establishing here. We have identified the characteristic processes of the agrarian transition and we are trying to examine how, in the context of Southeast Asia, they function.

The participants get organized into four groups and define the points that they wish to see covered in more detail, the issues to address and questions to ask.

Nguyễn Thị Hà Nhung

The presentation on the analysis of the agrarian transition through “windows of observation” was very clear. Can we talk about the reciprocal link between poverty and agrarian transition?

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

Poverty is not at the origin of the agrarian transition, but let's agree that poverty is a state that the agrarian transition, theoretically at least, can help to resolve. Your question was: “Doesn't the agrarian transition, in fact, accentuate or create new forms of poverty?” Excellent question, we will talk about this in detail tomorrow.

Nguyễn Thị Hà Nhung

Among the six processes of the agrarian transition, you have talked about intensification and expansion of the area of farmland. In Việt Nam, we observe the reverse phenomenon: the shrinking of farmland for other uses. How can we interpret this phenomenon? In some countries like Thailand or China, we notice a return to traditional agriculture. The peasants refuse to use insecticides and chemical fertilizers in favor of organic products for a fairly limited market. How can we link this phenomenon

to the windows that you have presented? My last question is on the transfer of ownership of farmland. It is divided among the State, communities and individuals. Could you discuss the fundamental theories on this point, and current trends, taking concrete examples in the Southeast Asian region?

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

Concerning the land question, there is a trend toward privatization but also sometimes towards keeping the State as owner. I would add that we can increasingly include multinationals among landowners. In Việt Nam, the problem does not yet exist, but elsewhere there are large landowners such as Malaysian consortiums taking control of very large areas of farmland, especially in Indonesia. For some time, these same multinational companies have also been acquiring land in Cambodia, in order to grow crops in the eastern part of the country.

Đặng Thị Thanh Thảo

We would like to have more details on the link between the four components of the “windows of observation”. The globalization process has a very strong impact on the transition in general, and also on the agrarian transition; could you develop this last point?

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

The two questions intersect, but it is good to ask them because confusion is entirely possible – it even exists in my own mind, between the six processes and the four windows, in particular that of globalization.

Hoàng Thị Hà

Where does urbanization and industrialization fit into the agrarian transition? What are

the changes in terms of employment for the peasants during a process of agrarian transition?

Than Thanaren

What are the new problems created by the agrarian transition?

Didier Orange

How can the new relationship between the industrial and agricultural worlds – we talk about large-scale industrial farming, represent a crisis in the agrarian transition?

[Rodolphe De Koninck]

It is a good question because we have a tendency almost by default to talk about agrarian transition as a linear process, whereas there are exchanges back and forth. There are dialectical processes within the agrarian transition. Aren't there also agricultural contradictions even within the agrarian transition? We will address these issues tomorrow morning and during the entire week, as we keep in mind all of your questions.

Danielle Labbé wrote on the board the questions asked by each group: agrarian transition and questions linked to poverty; shrinkage of cultivated areas and modification of land use; return to more traditional (organic) agriculture; theories, trends and examples of transfer of land ownership; links between the four “windows of observation” and the agrarian transition (example of globalization); the place and role of urbanization; impacts in terms of employment for peasants; crises and new problems linked to the agrarian transition; is the agrarian transition a linear process?

Day 2, Morning of Tuesday, July 20

Rodolphe De Koninck had to leave the training workshop on the second day to go to Canada.

[Danielle Labbé]

Due to the sudden departure of Rodolphe De Koninck, we have made a few adjustments to our schedule. This morning, we will look at urbanization and then, this afternoon, we will talk about what geographical information systems can bring to the debate.

2.1.2. The Challenges of Research on the Urban Transition in Southeast Asia

We will answer the questions noted yesterday during the week's presentations. For my part, I will address the question of urbanization in Southeast Asia, but also in developed countries and within the development process in general. How do we define “urban, urban center, urban population, urban activities, urban lifestyle”? How do we define a town?

Chữ Đình Phúc

A town is an agglomeration in which the inhabitants make a living essentially from non-agricultural activities.

Didier Orange

It is a concentration of inhabitants and an administrative center.

Savath Souksakhone

In Laos, the first criterion is the number of inhabitants, from two to three thousand inhabitants. The second criterion is the type of professional activities: 50% non-agricultural activities. The third criterion is the density of the population: 200 inhabitants per km².

Nguyễn Thị Hà Nhung

In Việt Nam, the definition is based on the number of inhabitants and the administrative functions.

Quách Thị Thu Cúc

Shouldn't we add infrastructure and water distribution systems? Schools, hospitals?


[Danielle Labbé]

Urban populations and the number of cities in the world are increasing. However,

international comparisons are based on very loose definitions. Countries define their populations in order to produce their own national statistics; some according to the urban population within certain administrative limits – municipality, county or village; other countries establish urban classifications based on the size and/or density of the population. The line between urban and rural is defined nationally; it results from cultural viewpoint.

This causes problems for comparisons. In Benin, a locality with ten thousand or more inhabitants is automatically classified as urban. All localities that have fewer than ten thousand people are rural. In Angola, Argentina and Ethiopia, all localities with more than two thousand people are classified as urban. Other countries use more complicated definitions compounding size, population density and socio-economic indicators. In Botswana, an agglomeration of

Figure 16 *Estimated and Projected Rural and Urban World Populations for 1950-2030 (in millions)*




Source: United Nations 2002.

five thousand people or more, where 75% of the economic activities are non-agricultural, is classified as urban. People speak about cities, localities, capitals, projects, urban zones and metropolitan areas. There are a number of terms used to identify the city that can differ from statistical definitions. Benin and Angola both have a rate of urbanization

of 20% and an urban population of about 50%, but the situations are very different in each of these countries. Central Jakarta in Indonesia is estimated at 8.7 million people, but the metropolitan region encompasses 24 million people; the urbanized corridor of 200 km between Jakarta and Johor is home to 37 million people.

Figure 17 *Estimated and Projected Urbanization Rate in China*



Source: UN Common Database (UN Population Division Estimate).

We must pay attention to the changes in definitions in certain countries. China is a good example to illustrate this. In the beginning of the 1980s, statistics indicated a massive increase in the number of cities and urban population growth. The city of Zibo in Shandong province had 2.4 million residents in 1987, and 66% of the active population worked mainly in agriculture. The same observation can be made in Hà Nội as a result of the extension of the city in 2008 and the absorption of the neighboring

province of Hà Tây, and of districts of Vĩnh Phúc and Hòa Bình. The city now covers a territory of 3000 km² and has a population of 6.2 million inhabitants. The opposite can happen: in India, the majority of the rural population lives in villages of 1000 to 5000 inhabitants. Using certain definitions, the majority of India would be urban.

Didier Orange

I have worked in the agricultural sphere for 20 years and I am always careful in using the

terms “agricultural world” and “rural world.” In fact, someone can work in the agricultural world and live in the city; the rural world is also defined by cities.

[Danielle Labbé]

I think that the city/country and urban/rural distinctions are analytical and cultural. They are conceptual categories.

Table 13 *Rural and Urban World Populations, 1950-2030*

Region	Mid-year population (millions)				Growth rate (%)		
	1950	1975	2000	2030	1950–75	1975–2000	2000–30
<i>Urban</i>							
Total	751	1,543	2,862	4,981	2.9	2.4	1.8
High-income countries ^a	359	562	697	825	1.8	0.9	0.6
Middle and low income	392	981	2,165	4,156	3.7	3.2	2.2
Europe	287	455	534	540	1.8	0.6	0.04
Latin America and the Caribbean	70	198	391	608	4.2	2.7	1.5
Northern America	110	180	243	335	2.0	1.2	1.0
East Asia and Pacific	103	258	703	1,358	3.7	4	2.2
East Asia and Pacific without China	33	96	246	474	4.3	3.8	2.2
South Asia	72	164	372	849	3.3	3.3	2.7
Central Asia	14	40	77	118	4.3	2.6	1.4
Middle East and North Africa	22	70	177	360	4.6	3.7	2.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	20	67	219	648	4.9	4.7	3.6
<i>Rural</i>							
Total	1,769	2,523	3,195	3,289	1.4	0.9	0.1
High-income countries ^a	219	187	184	139	–0.6	–0.07	–0.9
Middle and low income	1,550	2,336	3,011	3,151	1.6	1.0	0.2
Europe	261	221	193	131	–0.7	–0.5	–1.3
Latin America and the Caribbean	97	124	127	116	1.0	0.1	–0.3
Northern America	62	64	71	61	0.1	0.4	–0.5
East Asia and Pacific	639	1,008	1,113	870	1.8	0.4	–0.8
East Asia and Pacific without China	153	242	294	268	1.8	0.8	–0.3
South Asia	392	645	982	1,176	2	1.7	0.6
Central Asia	32	51	63	63	1.8	0.9	–0.04
Middle East and North Africa	59	85	130	160	1.4	1.7	0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	156	255	426	622	2	2	1.3

^a High-income countries have Gross National Income per capita (GNI p.c.) of \$9,266 or more based on World Bank estimates.


Source: United Nations (2002), World Bank (2002).

We differentiate urban and rural populations in the world by region. In the first half of the 20th century, the urban transition was concentrated in Europe and in the United States, then, since the 1950s-60s, the

phenomenon has spread. Projections for 2000-2030 show a phenomenal growth in the absolute number of new urban populations: more than 3 billion people from 1975 to 2000, more than 5 billion people in

2030. Rural population growth is minimal, demographic growth concerns mostly from 3.2 to 3.29 billion people. Therefore, urban zones.

Figure 18 *Distribution of Worldwide Rural and Urban Population Growth by Level of Income per Capita*



Source: United Nations (2002) and World Bank (2002).

Megalopolises are now more numerous and often exceed 10 million people.

Table 14 *Number of Urban Agglomerations by Size (1950-2015)*

Size of urban area	Number of cities				Urban population (in thousands)			
	1950	1975	2000	2015	1950	1975	2000	2015
<i>Global</i>								
10 million or more	1	5	16	21	12,339	68,118	224,988	340,497
5 to 10 million	7	16	23	37	42,121	122,107	169,164	263,870
1 to 5 million	75	174	348	496	144,335	331,576	674,571	960,329
500,000 to 1 million	106	248	417	507	75,134	176,414	290,113	354,448
Fewer than 500,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	481,455	844,296	1,502,920	1,950,323
<i>High-income countries</i>								
10 million or more	1	2	4	4	12,339	35,651	67,403	70,641
5 to 10 million	4	7	5	6	26,389	54,550	37,650	45,359
1 to 5 million	38	64	81	95	76,504	n.a.	183,635	211,578
500,000 to 1 million	32	28	n.a.	n.a.	24,138	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Fewer than 500,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Middle- and low-income countries</i>								
10 million or more	0	3	12	17	0	32,467	157,585	269,856
5 to 10 million	3	9	18	31	15,732	67,557	131,514	218,511
1 to 5 million	40	110	267	401	67,831	n.a.	490,936	748,751
500,000 to 1 million	74	220	n.a.	n.a.	50,996	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Fewer than 500,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.


n.a. = Not available.

Source: United Nations (2002).

In the near future, city dwellers will essentially live in small to medium size cities. We estimate that in 2015, only 4% of the worldwide population will reside in cities of more than 10 million inhabitants; in low or middle-income countries around 21% of the population will reside in cities of 1 to 2 million. 80% of the

urban population will live in relatively small cities, with fewer than 1 million inhabitants. These cities receive very little research attention. They are often spread about in more agricultural regions, their dynamics are specific; they are linked to distinct economic, social and environmental networks.

Figure 19 *New Urban Areas by Size of City and Level of Country Income (2000-2010)*



Source: Author.

Didier Orange

Are suburbs included in large cities?

[Danielle Labbé]

That depends on the definitions used. In some cases, we include very wide population areas in the national statistics; in other instances, the "city" is limited to its center.


Contrary to popular belief, the rate of urbanization in developing countries is not

accelerating. The urban population in these countries grew by 2% between 2005 and 2010 – this same growth was 2.7% between the 1980s and 2005. Between 1975 and 2000, the percentage of the population in urban zones of developing countries went from 27 to 40%; this increase is similar to that observed in the most developed regions during the first quarter of the 20th century. It is essential to differentiate between the rate of urbanization and the absolute number of new urban dwellers, in particular in highly

populated countries. An increase of 1% of the urban population in China represents millions of people; in Canada, only a few hundred thousand. The most important difference

between the current urban transition and the one that occurred during the first half of the 20th century is the shift of this phenomenon toward the countries in the South.

Figure 20 *Urban Growth by Level of Income per Capita*



Source: United Nations (2002), World Bank (2002).

Urbanization has moved from countries that had the highest revenues *per capita* to countries with intermediate to low revenue. Likewise, the distribution of large cities profoundly changed during the last 50 years. Today, London and Paris are small cities compared to Bombay, Sao Paulo, Karachi or Mexico City. Between 2000 and 2015, we expect 19 new cities with populations exceeding 5 million. Only one of these will be in a high-income country. The current urban transition may or may not be accompanied by an expansion of economic activity. Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia have comparable urbanization rates, but here in

Southeast Asia urbanization is accompanied by strong economic growth.

The nature and the degree of urban growth have become more dependent on the global economy than they were at the beginning of last century. Globalization repositioned cities in national and international economies; cities play a key role in the economy and finance. Some cities have become detached from their national context and interact with other cities on an international level. These cities are seen as decision centers for the world economy or world financial centers, but also as places for specialized services as well as centers for production and innovation

that influence the rest of the economy. It is interesting to understand the relationships that these cities maintain with the global economy. Research on these themes has developed significantly over the last twenty years, raising new problems:

- difficulties in ranking world cities according to specific sets of criteria;
- the label "World Cities" was coined by political leaders who seek to apply it to their own city as a branding strategy. As a result, less attention is given to "ordinary cities": the decision makers in charge of the development of Hà Nội, for example, justified the recent urban expansion (new commercial centers, large satellite cities, new university center in Hòa Lạc, large highways, big transport infrastructures) by indicating it would increase the city's status;
- sustainable development and the quality of urban life is sacrificed in the quest for "World Cities" status.

The transformation of East and Southeast Asian economies has created new urban forms in the region, especially transnational growth triangles where economic growth and urbanization are closely related – e.g. the 1500 km corridor linking Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo connects 77 cities of at least 200,000 inhabitants.

One last characteristic of the current urbanization is the convergence of the rural and urban lifestyles. Large zones of intense economic activity have emerged around the cities of Southeast Asia. The New Zealand geographer Terry McGee proposes the term "Desakota"^[7] or "Extended Metropolitan Region"^[8] to designate these mixed spaces where processes and lifestyles mingle. One of the principal results of the "Desakotas" model is that Southeast Asia presents historical and physical characteristics such that urbanization leads to a de-concentration of the industrial economy over vast areas. This fact has two major implications: a new school of thought and a new questioning of the opposition of "urban" versus "rural".

[Phạm Văn Cự]

Before the extension of the city toward Hà Tây, Hà Nội had approximately 50,000 poor households (90,000 in Hồ Chí Minh City). After the extension, there are 265,000 poor households: has Hà Nội become the city with the largest number of poor households in the country? The answer is tricky because it depends on the definition of poverty, but it would certainly be more appropriate to talk about social differentiation.

[7] The term is a mix of the Indonesian word for village and city in Bahasa language.

[8] McGee, T. G. and C. Greenberg (1992). The emergence of extended metropolitan regions in ASEAN, *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* 9(1): 22-44.

Day 2 - Tuesday, July 20, Afternoon

2.1.3. Change in Land Use and Applications of Geographical Information Systems in Research on the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia

[Bruno Thibert]

We will present some applications of geographical information systems – GIS – to research conducted on the agrarian transition. GIS are a collection of geographically located digital data. The data is structured inside of a computerized system. A GIS includes functional modules that can 1) create and modify, 2) interrogate and analyze, and 3) represent with the use of maps, a geographical database, according to semantic and spatial criteria.

Two categories of data are used to model territorial entities: rasters and vectors. A raster is a series of lines and columns of pixels much like a digital photo. Each pixel contains its own information. Vectors are represented by points, lines and polygons (surfaces). The raster databases are in the form of bands, meaning a series of layers of rasters where each pixel of each raster (or band) contains its own information. The vector databases are tables like Excel spreadsheets. Each entity, represented in space by a point, a line or a polygon, corresponds to a line in the spreadsheet that can contain descriptive elements in its columns.

A GIS can superimpose several sets of raster and/or vector data in order to model and analyze the interactions between different entities found on a given territory.

[Phạm Văn Cự]

Does the change in land use, in particular farmland, make up an indicator of the agrarian transition? How should we analyze this process? Several approaches are possible. I use the “space” window in order to examine the dynamics of land use according to several scales of observation.

What is the relationship between “space” and “resources?” What relationships can we define between land use and life style? Does a change in lifestyle have an impact on land use? Let’s take the concrete example of the periphery of Hà Nội.

For the construction of a new conference center and soccer stadium for the city, the peasant families in the Mễ Trì – “Rice pond” – community were expropriated. Large sums of money were spent and the peasants were relocated in new sky scrapers. Many became motorbike or taxi drivers, or construction site guards; others live off of small businesses or built houses that are now rented out to students and workers.

Figure 21 *CHATSEA Windows of Observation on Changes in Land Use*

Spatiality

How are spaces classified and regulated in association with the resources?

How to grasp these changes in land use in a multi-scaled approach? (household *versus* territory)?

Lifestyle


What is the relationship between land use and lifestyle?

Actor

What are the relationships between land use and actors?

Globalization


What is the impact?



Source: Author.

Figure 22 *"4 Step" Methodology*

1. Earth observation and data acquisition - Pixel and reality –
2. View of society in image mode
3. Classification of land use (FAO)
4. Interdisciplinary Interpretation




Source: Author.

The methodology that I propose depends on observation – land use and analysis of pixels –, cartographical representation – categorization of land

use –, the transformation of areas – what are the causes of this dynamism? All the information is brought together in a GIS database.^[9]

Figure 23 *Remote Sensing System*



Source: Author.


Color maps of the dynamics of the countryside are projected and commented on: transformation of forests in the north of Việt Nam 1983-1998; urbanization of the city of Hà Nội 1995-2003

[9] This thought process was developed as part of the Summer School 2008. See the publication: Phạm Văn Cự, Systèmes d'information géographique et possibilités d'application en sciences sociales au Viet Nam : états des lieux et enjeux, in Lagrée, S. (editor), *Les Journées de Tam Đảo Tam Đảo Summer School Week. Nouvelles approches méthodologiques appliquées au développement* (2), Université d'été en sciences sociales, Éditions The Gioi, Hà Nội, September 2009, pp. 90-111. Also available on: www.tamdaoconf.com.

[Bruno Thibert]


Let's examine the demographic dynamics, as
an indicator of the analysis.

Figure 24 *Population Densities - 1990*



Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University;
and Centro internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT).

Figure 25 *Population Densities - 2005*




Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University; and Centro internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT).

The initial data are two rasters of population density for the years 1990 and 2005. These rasters were represented by maps where the levels of population density were separated into categories. We see high densities in the deltas of the Red and Mekong rivers, on the island of Java in general, as well as around

Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru and the Manila Bay. But when we compare the two maps, it is difficult to observe the changes. Therefore, we proceed with a simple equation: the subtraction of the raster 1990 from that of 2005.

Figure 26 *Evolution of Population Density – 1990-2005*




Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University; and Centro internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT).

The areas where density has accumulated become obvious: the deltas of the Red and Mekong rivers in Việt Nam, Manila Bay in the Philippines, Bangkok in Thailand, Jakarta and Bandung in Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru in Malaysia, and Singapore. The increase reaches 1000 inhabitants per km² in some regions. We also see a decrease in density especially in Thailand and Malaysia. This map illustrates more clearly the predominance of population growth around urban centers.

One of the main problems is the availability of past censuses and the insertion of data within the diverse administrative units – province or states, districts, sub-districts, municipalities, communes and villages. The territorial boundaries have undergone some changes since 1960, either by border movement, administrative fusions or even the creation of new units. The digitizing of historical district boundaries on the scale of Southeast Asia requires a phenomenal amount of work.

Figure 27 *Protected Areas in Southeast Asia*




Source: World Database on Protected Areas.

We are working with vectors: polygons that are – practically speaking – surface areas. On this map, the surfaces represent protected areas: national parks, wildlife and aquatic reserves, and other types of

protected areas. Each polygon contains a set of information such as the year of designation, types of protected flora or fauna and the source for the digitization.

Figure 28 *Evolution of Protected Areas in Southeast Asia*




Source: World Database on Protected Areas.

Given that the polygons are geometric entities, it is possible to determine the area of each one with the help of a mathematical operation carried out by software included in the GIS. Then, by using a classification by decade based on the dates of designation, we can observe the evolution of the protected areas. We can then clearly see the rate of growth of these areas: nearly

300,000 km² from 1991 to 2000. Two problems arise during the analysis: a significant number of protected areas do not have a designation date, which makes supplementary documentation necessary if we are to analyze the evolution with more precision; the wide diversity of the digital data sources brings their reliability into question.

Figure 29 *Malaysia.*
Cities and the main transport networks




Source: De Konink, 2005.

The starting data are again vectors: lines to represent roads and railways, and dots for inhabited areas – major cities and their respective populations.

Part of the GIS process brings together all lines in the transportation networks. This lets us determine the intersections between the different modes of transportation in order to make a best estimate of the distances travelled and the cost of a given trip from point A to point B.

Figure 30 *Production sites of biodiesel (June 2006)*




Source: De Konink, 2005 – mapping: S. Bernard.

We also integrate data from biodiesel plants in this system of line networks. It is thus possible to establish access from a plant to a city and other areas. This whole picture can be put alongside the evolution of the

transportation networks in order to examine how the markets have become accessible over time. A complete analysis would require other important data to be added to this system, like maritime and airline networks.

Figure 31 *Agriculture Expansion in Pahang 1972-2002*




Source: Forest inventory and Land Use maps of West Malaysia – Mapping S. Bernard.

The initial data are the rasters of land use in 1972, 1992, and 2002, as well as the vectorial data for territorial planning. We can see that the forest has receded significantly between 1972 and 1992 because of the increase in white areas on the 1992 map. Territorial planning is the responsibility of the FELDA – *Federal Land Authority* – a federal agency which aims to relocate poor populations within a policy framework of small cash crop plantations. In the 2002 image, we notice an extension of cultivated areas to the detriment of the forest.

By superimposing the territorial planning data and the receding forest data, it is possible to analyze the correlation between the planned expansion of farm land and deforestation.


Figure 32 *Jakarta, 1976 - Landsat 2 MSS*
Population: 6 000 000



Source: NASA, Earth Observatory.

This is a Landsat image of Jakarta in 1976. The infrared band differentiates the vegetation from constructed areas. At this time, the boundary of the urban zone is in the center of the image.


Figure 33 *Jakarta, 1989 - Landsat 5 MSS*
Population: 9 000 000



Source: NASA, Earth Observatory.

The same region was surveyed in 1989.
The image shows the expansion of the urban
perimeter.

Figure 34 *Jakarta, 2004 - ASTER*
Population: 13 000 000



Source: NASA, Earth Observatory.

In 2004, the vegetation is limited to the edges of the image. The inhabited space now occupies the majority of the territory.

The raster data – satellite images – allows us to identify the composition of a territory. With electromagnetic wave detectors, the satellite records the waves emitted and reflected from the photographed area on a series of rasters

commonly called bands. Each band contains data corresponding to a specific range of waves, either colors of visible light (from violet to red) or infrared. By knowing the spectral signature of entities found on a given territory, *i.e.* the type and quantity of electromagnetic waves that they emit and reflect, it is possible to use one or several bands to determine what elements make up the analyzed space.

We can then create another dataset explicitly to attribute the types of land use, according to the needs of the analysis to be carried out.

Hà Nhung

Can the GIS be used to make predictions?

[Bruno Thibert]

GIS are not an end in and of themselves. They cannot always explain everything that happens in a particular analysis of the agrarian transition. They are a tool, like field questionnaires, to understand a process further. It is possible to integrate data on territorial planning with GIS. Another example would be mapping areas susceptible to flooding following a rise in sea levels.

[Danielle Labbé]

We have to differentiate between the notions of predictions and trends. I think that the GIS are very good tools for examining the trends within a change. Have you used this tool in your own research?

Nguyễn Thị Hoài Hương

Some colleagues have used the GIS for mapping in the field of archaeology in An Giang province; for this they had the help of geographers.

[Phạm Văn Cự]

The GIS is not software but a system; the software is a part of the system. The function of the GIS is to transform data into information and knowledge – this knowledge goes through a political filter in order to be translated concretely into action. What is important for researchers is to build a database.

The knowledge base is made up of research questions and specific knowledge in each field. I was asked if the GIS could represent immigration. I answered with another question: what is immigration? It is fundamental to define your field clearly then turn to database specialists in order to identify indicators on the different aspects of immigration. The next step is to integrate these data within the geographic boundaries.

[Bruno Thibert]

The software user interfaces used by GIS analysts are often complex and require a certain amount of training. The interfaces allow the user to define queries or requests. Answers are produced and can be edited so as to organize the information and illustrate the analysis in a coherent way.

Bruno Thibert suggests organizing an evening session to show how a GIS works. Discussions on the data sources (Internet, databases, statistics, etc.) and group work to prepare for Saturday's synthesis session.

Day 3, Wednesday, July 21, Morning

[Danielle Labbé]

Let's get back to our initial synthesis results. We will let each working group speak and then Jim Delaney will present market integration and the intensification of regulation. Jean-François Rousseau and Bruno Thibert will also hand out work to be done for Thursday.

Than Thanaren

Our main questions concern the agrarian transition. What is currently the best agrarian transition? What is the role of urbanization in this process? How can we define “poverty” in relation to agrarian transition?

[Danielle Labbé]

Is the agrarian transition good or bad? This is a very difficult question to answer! We are trying to discuss tools, concepts and methods that allow us to study agrarian transition phenomena by country, region and village. However, it seems interesting to me to keep in mind the effects that these processes have on the populations. Who wins, who loses? Who gets richer, who gets poorer?

[Jim Delaney]

Each researcher works in a particular discipline with different methodologies, so the answers are therefore different. In my mind, agrarian transition is the transition from an agricultural production model to an industrial production model. One essential question is to know who holds the power in this process of transition and how the profits are distributed. For several years, in Việt Nam, three economists have debated the agrarian transition. Martin Ravallion and Dominique Van de Walle, economists at the World Bank, argue that the land transition associated with the policy of Renewal benefitted a large majority of the peasantry. In the Mekong Delta, the rise of landless peasants is due to the sale of land because new opportunities are being created for the peasants; *i.e.* agriculture is less competitive in terms of potential profits than industry. The professor Haroon Akram-Lodhi, a Canadian researcher who has been working on this country for several years, uses the same

statistical sources and the same methodology. While his observations are identical, he points to different causes: the peasants are obliged to sell their land; the search for wealth outside agriculture is an artifice.

Ma Thị Điệp

Can we associate the definition of the agrarian transition with the shift from small production to a merchant economy? The sale of land leads to the loss of the means of production and a transformation of lifestyle. Is this phenomenon the reason for the widening inequality gap?

[Jim Delaney]

Rodolphe De Koninck said much about the path taken by the agrarian transition, but little about the history of transition. Each country has its own experience: transition from small producers to large plantations, transition from small producer to small producer who works for the market (such as in the Vietnamese case). The agrarian transition theorists have much to say about the different trajectories of transition: the American trajectory, *i.e.* capital injected by small producers; the German trajectory, *i.e.* large owners forcing the market. In Asia, transition operates from below, American style, but with the intervention of the State (Taiwan, South Korea). In Việt Nam, two models are apparent: transition from below in the North, transition from above in the South.

Three working groups (globalization, urbanization and State) present a first draft of a synthesis linked to the agrarian transition.

2.1.4. Market Integration and Regulation

[Jim Delaney]

I will look at the following themes in relation to market integration: market and agrarian transition; the question of regulation – both State and private sector; and I will offer a methodological presentation on networks and value chains.

In order to prepare for tomorrow, I will ask you to think about the following points:

- the importance of the quality of food and means of quality control in terms of food safety;
- what means of control does the consumer have?;
- actors responsible for food quality and safety;
- consumer choice: quality and price.

[Bruno Thibert]

Along with Jean-François Rousseau, we have chosen to give you various series of indicators. Each working group has two series: the first deals with the intensification and the diversification of agriculture, and the second with environmental changes. Each group of indicators has a set of questions, with two main instructions: avoid simply enumerating the data in your reporting, and think about the trends – do the indicators highlight differences, breaks or consistent growth? We ask you to identify the processes that determine these changes. What ties them into the four “windows” of the ChATSEA: 1) globalization, 2) territoriality, 3) institutions and actors, and 4) livelihoods. For the environmental series, we ask you

to also identify three possible impacts of environmental changes from this data.

Day 4, Monday, July 21, Morning

[Jim Delaney]

Let's get back to the questions asked during Wednesday's session.

Trần Thanh Thuỷ

Food quality is particularly important because it is related to public health. Three criteria are considered in order to evaluate quality: experience, reliability of the brand, product information (origin, expiry date, technical indications). *“Who is responsible?”*: we think that those primarily responsible, in order of importance, are the producers, the distributors, then the State and the institutions in charge of controlling food quality and safety. We also emphasize the role of the consumer.

[Jim Delaney]

In your opinion, who are the producers? The farmers, the companies?

Trần Thanh Thuỷ

We think producers are peasants, those who raise livestock, and those who process agricultural raw materials.

Đỗ Hương Giang

Our group reformulated the second question: *“How do you buy safe food of good quality?”* In our opinion, the criteria for selection are the following: personal experience, product origin, place of sale, indications on the packaging. We think

that the public authorities are primarily responsible, then the producer, the distributors and consumers. This list follows the cycle of the product. The state must promulgate regulations in order to ensure the quality and safety of food products.

Savath Souksakhone

For the choice and control of food, we have selected three criteria: brand, information provided, personal experience. As regards responsibility, we list: producer, public institutions, distributor, consumer.

Diệp Quý Ngân

The consumer places more and more importance on the quality of products. He is ready to accept a higher price if the quality of the product is certain.

[Jim Delaney]

The 1970s and 1980s were marked by a very important role for the State. For the last twenty years, more or less, we have witnessed the private sector regaining control, in the context of vertical coordination of the farming sector.

You have all identified the same actors. However, your rankings and your analyses are different. We can find these actors in the view presented by ChATSEA.

Didier Orange

I have looked at marketing studies on an international level, and the first criterion is the packaging and the color. I would like to add

the psychological dimension to the group discussion. This psychological dimension exists at the time of purchase, but also during discussions with the actors that intervene in the definition of social policies, rural and development policies.

Nguyễn Thị Hà Nhung

Gender is important. A female consumer will think about value for money, a man will consider pleasure first.

[Jim Delaney]

We must bear in mind the importance of marketing in current agricultural production; let's take the coffee paradox as an example:


- for the last twenty years, the price of coffee at the point of consumption has risen while farm prices have fallen. The economists Benoît Daviron and Stefano Ponte^[10] explain that since the 1970s, large-scale market agreements gave States the power to manage the coffee market. Each state in South America could decide how many tons to export each year. The market is increasingly controlled vertically by large enterprises. Currently, six or seven companies in the whole world buy coffee. Management has become government-controlled and no longer private. The price of coffee is extremely low, but the consumers pay for marketing, design, ambiance. The pleasure does not come from the product itself, but from a consumer experience. This experience is fabricated by the big companies.

[10] Benoît Daviron, Stefano Ponte, Le paradoxe du café, Ed. Quae (with Cirad and CTA), 2007.

Important changes have been made concerning the management of the farming market – cf. World Bank and WTO policies.

Many developing countries had to change their regulations: less support for producers, less control on exports, more open markets.

Figure 35 *Developing country: Agricultural Exports in Proportion to the Agricultural Production, 1986-2007*



Source: World Bank, 2009.

Many countries have seen their food exports rise. In 1986, the percentage of food exported was 17%, now it is close to 40%. This graph shows all the “capitalist” developing countries, including Việt Nam – Cuba and North Korea are not included. During the 1980s, the financial crises led many developing countries to export food for dollars. Governments opened their markets. This led to tighter controls on all stages of production by the large companies – i.e. vertical integration. In 1995 for example, IKEA chose to buy bamboo in Việt Nam. A production and marketing chain was created from the farmers to the consumers; private enterprises were funded to produce wood. A collaborative approach to forest

management was also initiated *via* the French NGO, GRET.

Although the agrarian transition is a transition from a peasant society to a capitalist market economy society, we nevertheless note significant land appropriation. We can see this in Laos and Cambodia with large Chinese, Korean or Middle-Eastern companies buying farmland suitable for cultivation of exports.

Vin Pheakdey

Cambodia practices two types of land distribution: social concessions that redistribute land to small peasants, and economic concessions that attribute large areas to large enterprises – concessions for

99 years or more. The objective is to open the markets and promote job creation. In reality, the economic concession causes land rights problems for the small peasants: for example, no preliminary studies of boundaries, encroachments on private land. Moreover, enterprises use a rather speculative strategy, abandoning the plantations for forest exploitation.

[Jim Delaney]

Since the 1960s, economists have generally agreed that small farms are more productive than large farms, due to better management of labor, inputs, etc. There are also ecological reasons: rice fields do not support cultivation as well over large surfaces because of irrigation issues, for example. In 2008, for the first time in twenty years, the World Bank expressed doubt about the productivity of small farms because of the dramatic modernization of agriculture, the lack of capital available for small producers and the intensification of regulations. In Việt Nam for example, small producers faced many difficulties in selling their product to large retailers.

Day 4 - Thursday, July 22, Afternoon

2.1.5. Environmental Impacts of the Agrarian Transition^[11]

[Jean-François Rousseau]

Over the last two years, Rodolphe De Koninck and I have been working on a research project aiming to understand how Southeast Asia's

agriculture has evolved in spatial terms and how agricultural practices have intensified in the region since the 1960s.

Before addressing these questions, I would first like to make a few methodological remarks on statistical data research, its modalities and its limits. Extensive statistical databases are available on the Internet. These encompass data about a wide range of indicators, typically at the nation-state scale of analysis. The data that we will discuss today were all retrieved from such databases. It is important to keep a critical mind when considering these data which originate from governmental sources. The information provided can serve particular political agendas. Also, as statistical methodology varies between countries, questions arise concerning what these data cover and the extent to which they can be compared. Finally, since the focus of the information is on a national scale, the local and qualitative dimensions get lost. It is therefore the researcher's responsibility to put these statistical data back in their context, building from his/her field work experience. You will be asked to do just this during this workshop.


For now, let's discuss four concepts which are important in my presentation, namely: food crops, cash crops, agricultural intensification and expansion:

- food crops are essentially meant for consumption by peasants and local societies themselves;

[11] Rodolphe De Koninck and I would like to thank NUS Press for allowing us to publish here some figures already appearing in our *Gambling with the Land. Southeast Asia's Agricultures, 1960-2008* (in print).

- cash crops lead to market transactions
 - think of rubber, or palm oil destined for the production of agro-fuels. In Southeast Asia, cash crops are most often produced in plantations, some of which date from colonial times. Also, contrary to what their name indicates, cash crops also include crops such as coffee or cocoa that are essentially used as food;
- agricultural intensification consists of the adoption of farming practices that achieve higher yields on a given plot of land. Traditionally achieved through improved irrigation techniques and organic fertilizers, agricultural intensification increasingly entails the use of chemical inputs and genetically modified seeds;
- agricultural expansion is the enlargement of the agricultural domain, of cultivated areas.

Figure 36 *Southeast Asia, Cash crops (rubber, palm oil and coffee) and food crops (rice and maize), 1961-2008*




Source: FAOSTAT (2010).

This expansion mainly occurs into forested lands, but polderization is also a means to achieve expansion.

The following figures illustrate how these four concepts are evolving in Southeast Asia.

These graphs present the areas devoted to three important cash crops and two food crops in Southeast Asia: rubber, palm oil, and coffee on the one hand and rice and corn on the other. We see that cash crop areas grow

Figure 37 *Cropland Expansion in Selected Regions, 1700-1990*




Source: Nelson Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin (2010).

the fastest. Agriculture in Southeast Asia is ever more integrated into global markets; peasants are no longer cultivating their own plot to feed themselves and their community as they used to.

These figures suggest that there is a clear correlation between the expansion of the agricultural domain and deforestation in Southeast Asia. Also, contrary to what prevails in other regions, Southeast Asia's agricultural expansion continues to progress.

Figure 38 *Southeast Asia, Population Growth and Cropland Expansion, 1700-2007*




Sources: FAOSTAT (2010); Nelson Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin (2010); Neville (1979).

In Southeast Asia, farmland expansion really began at the end of the 19th century, driven by colonial authorities. Since this period, agricultural expansion has unfolded in more or less similar ways in both the peninsula and the archipelago. From the 1980s onwards, the rate at which land in the

region has been put under cultivation has really accelerated. There is a link here with the mechanisms of globalization, which opened new international markets for Southeast Asian food crops and, following on from this, catalyzed the expansion of cash crops.

Figure 39 *Southeast Asia, Forest Cover, 1970-1990*




Source: Bernard and De Koninck (1996).

Urbanization alone cannot explain the reduction in forest lands that has marked these last decades: forests had already disappeared from Southeast Asia's most

densely populated areas by the 1970s. Agricultural expansion in increasingly remote areas is the main driver of deforestation.


Figure 40 *Vietnam, Forest Cover, 1943-1993*



Sources: De Koninck (1997); FIP; Maurand (1943).

In Việt Nam, the deltas of the North and South had lost almost all of their forest land at the beginning of the 1940s. Since then, agricultural expansion has occurred mostly in peripheral regions such as the Northern and Central Highlands.

Figure 41 *Value Added in Agriculture in Total, per Worker and by Country, 1960-2008*



Source: World Databank (2010).

Agricultural intensification and expansion often occur concurrently in Southeast Asia. Agricultural intensification is the outcome of – among other factors – the growth of irrigated areas, double harvesting, mechanization and the increased usage of chemical inputs and improved seed varieties.

Five aspects characterize the dynamism of Southeast Asian agriculture:

- agricultural expansion and intensification first occurred in the archipelago – the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, before spreading to the countries of the peninsula;

- this dynamism concerns both food and cash crops, although the areas allocated to cash crops increase more rapidly;
- the historical evolution of this dynamism is characterized by three distinct stages: the pre-colonial era (mainly associated with rice); the colonial era (introduction of cash crops such as coffee and rubber); the post-colonial era (characterized by palm tree plantations, for instance);
- it is characterized by an extremely rapid crop rotation;
- expansion and intensification have now started to stabilize in certain areas of Southeast Asia. In Thailand, the farmland expansion reached a peak during the 1990s, and is now decreasing. The same situation prevails on the Malaysian peninsula.

Work by groups on the statistical data and first elements of analysis offered by the participants

Group 1

We studied the changes visible in these graphs that retrace the evolution of rice farming in Southeast Asia, making reference to the conceptual “windows” of the agrarian transition. We focused on Cambodia and found that rice culture in this country went through three distinct phases:

- 1970-1975: decline in rice areas and yields due to the war and rural exodus. Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge regime forced the population to go back to the countryside, leading to population density increases within rural areas;
- 1980-1989: rice areas and yields grew, although quite modestly. The end of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 triggered

- another important rural exodus, although it did not bring political instability to an end;
- since 1998: rice-growing areas have remained relatively stable while rice yields are on the rise, due partly to land reform, political stability and Cambodia’s accession to ASEAN (April 30, 1999) and the WTO (October 13, 2004).

Group 2

Our data concern the evolution of palm tree plantations and their yields between 1961 and 2008 in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. This evolution is first and foremost characterized by important plantation expansion in Indonesia and Malaysia and the rapid increase of these plantations’ importance relative to the national agricultural area. The expansion of the archipelago’s palm plantations took off in the 1960s in Indonesia and in Malaysia, while this process was initiated a few decades later in Thailand and in the Philippines. Also noteworthy is that Thai plantation yields increased sharply from 1974 onwards.

[Jean-François Rousseau]

While the extent of Indonesian and Malaysian palm tree plantation is similar, Malaysia obviously allocates a much larger portion of its agricultural area to this crop. This highlights how important considerations of scale are also as regards the relative importance of the deforestation taking place in both countries to make room for the plantations.

Group 3

Our team analyzed the evolution of the extent and productivity of coffee plantations in Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Việt Nam. Although its area has been

decreasing since 2004-2005, the Indonesian coffee domain is the largest among those studied. In Việt Nam, coffee plantations have been increasing essentially since 1995, mainly as a consequence of the Renewal policy. Việt Nam dedicates a bigger portion of its agricultural area to this crop than any of the other countries. The extent of Laos' coffee plantations is much smaller, but it is growing rapidly.

From the late 1980s onwards, coffee yields have grown rapidly in Việt Nam, reaching a peak in 1996-1997 and slowly decreasing after. Intensification of production and expansion of coffee plantations are common characteristics in all of the countries we looked at.

[Jean-François Rousseau]

I would like to point out the influence that world coffee prices have on production. While prices have a direct impact on the extent of areas cultivated, the link to yields is less direct. In general, when the market value of a commodity rises, the areas over which that crop is grown tend to expand. However, several crops show optimal yields a few years after they were planted. For instance, coffee crops generally attain their highest yields when plantations are aged between five to fifteen years. The fact that Indonesian coffee plantations are older than those from the Southeast Asian peninsula partly explains their lower yields. The opposite situation prevails in Việt Nam: lands given over to coffee grew rapidly from the mid-1980s onwards, and the Vietnamese yields have been the region's highest since the beginning of the 1990s.

Group 4

Between 1950 and 2008, fisheries and aquaculture developed at a steady pace in the five countries studied here (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Việt Nam). We divided these countries into two groups: those with strong growth – Việt Nam and Indonesia –, and those with more gradual growth, namely Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia. These differences are notably linked to geographical characteristics, including insularity and the extent of a country's coastline. Until 1980, all countries experienced a moderate growth: this was a period marked by numerous conflicts during which population growth rates were lower than those of today. Beginning in 1980, Southeast Asian fisheries and aquaculture took off, propelled by a more lively population growth, along with rising demand from both domestic and international markets.

[Jean-François Rousseau]

Aquaculture production is growing much faster than that of fisheries, because of the rapid depletion of maritime resources. However, fisheries still contribute more fish and seafood to overall Southeast Asian production than aquaculture does today.

[Bruno Thibert]

Let's listen to the group that worked on deforestation.

Group 5

We studied the following six series of statistical data:

- receding forest cover, per Southeast Asian country, 1700-2007 (sources: FAOSTAT and N.I.E.S.);
- receding forest cover for the archipelago regions and the Southeast Asian peninsula, 1700-2007 (sources: FAOSTAT and N.I.E.S.);
- territory occupied by forests, by Southeast Asian country, 1990-2007 (source: FAOSTAT);
- portion of the territory occupied by forests, by Southeast Asian country, 1990-2007 (source: FAOSTAT);
- areas of forest planted by Southeast Asian country, 1990-2005 (source: UNEP Geodata);
- areas of forest planted as a percentage of the totality of forests by Southeast Asian country, 1990-2005 (source: UNEP Geodata).

The 1700-2007 data show a significant decrease in the forests over the entire Southeast Asian region starting around 1880, particularly in the archipelago. This decrease seems to have started to intensify around 1970-1980. The most remarkable decline happened in the archipelago at the end of the 20th century. The data by country, for the same period, underline that Indonesia was the main actor in this regional dynamic, with a loss of approximately 70 million hectares. Thailand and the Philippines are the other two countries that have suffered the greatest losses. The more detailed data from the years 1990-2007 show again that Indonesia is still the unfortunate champion of deforestation, followed by Myanmar, the Philippines and Cambodia. The other countries seem to have more or less stabilized their forest areas, Việt Nam even showing a growth of around 10% during this period. The latter has had the

greatest growth of the ratio of forests planted to total forest area, followed by Thailand.

The main cause of deforestation in Southeast Asia is the territorial expansion of agriculture. If we look at the phenomenon through the window of territoriality, the marginal regions (mostly mountains and highlands) have gradually become farmland. If we consider the windows of livelihoods and globalization, we can cite significant population growth and increasing access to world markets.

The environmental impacts of deforestation disturb biodiversity, affect water flows and cause a loss of soil stability due to increased vulnerability to erosion, as well as the partial loss of carbon sinks.

[Bruno Thibert]

You have justly identified a decrease in forest area over all Southeast Asia. The main cause for deforestation is the expansion of agriculture as you have described. Indonesia is a phenomenal case! The significant loss for this country is also explained by logging and forest fires. The state has an undeniable influence because of its agricultural policies. It is also worth highlighting private investment in cash crops. I would also like to mention that forest plantations in Việt Nam cannot entirely explain the total increase in forests because the data shows around 1.5 million planted hectares and a total gain of around 3.5 million hectares. Could this be due to a more aggressive policy for forest protection or could the data be influenced by a redefinition of the categories for land use?

Group 6

We have studied the following six series of statistical data:


- areas occupied by mangrove forests, by country, 1980-2005 (source: UNEP Geodata);
- areas occupied by mangrove forests, trends over time, by country, 1980-2005 (source: FAO 2007, working paper 137).

Indicators on the surface area of mangroves in this region cover seven countries: Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Việt Nam, and the Philippines. The data are not homogenous, there are a few gaps. Nevertheless, the general trend is a decrease in mangrove forest surface area over all the countries from 1980 to 2005.

Indonesia stands out due to its larger area of forestation and significant forest loss; for the peninsula, the same conclusions can be made as for Việt Nam. We think that the expansion of shrimp farming is a major cause of the decrease in mangroves – Indonesia, Việt Nam, and Thailand are the biggest producers and exporters of shrimp in the world.

The differences seen between the countries, especially between Indonesia and Thailand, can be explained by the effectiveness of environmental protection policies (regulations window). Finally, receding mangrove forests have an impact on the level of salinity and soil erosion (environment window).


Figure 42 *Indonesia - Trends in mangrove area extent over time*



The estimates for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005 are based on the trend analysis, rounded according to the original data collected.

Source: FAOSTAT, Working Paper 137.


Figure 43 *Malaysia - Trends in mangrove area extent over time*



The 1980, 1990 and 2005 estimates are the original data (see the National level mangrove estimates table above); the 2000 estimate is the result of the regression analysis.

Source: FAOSTAT, Working Paper 137.

Figure 44 *Vietnam - Trends in mangrove area extent over time*



The estimate for 2005 is an expert estimate based on the qualitative information currently available. The plantation efforts currently undergoing in the country may have balanced the small changes occurred since 2000.

Source: FAOSTAT, Working Paper 137.

[Bruno Thibert]

Shrimp farming is certainly a driving force behind the loss of mangroves. In Việt Nam, in Cambodia and in Thailand, it is indeed the main reason. Other factors may also be at play: other forms of aquaculture (the Philippines, Indonesia and Việt Nam), excessive logging for wood and/or coal (Việt Nam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand), agricultural expansion (Thailand, Việt Nam, Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia), urbanization and industrialization (the Philippines). Populations depending on mangrove wood are severely affected by its loss.

I would add that Malaysia has a remarkable protection policy for its mangroves – the country produces 6 million dollars of lumber per year; and 12 to 18 million dollars in fishing, a sector that employs up to 10,000 individuals. Despite this, their mangroves are very little degraded, thanks to a long tradition of managing this resource.

Among the actors behind these changes, we can include the state, thanks to its policies on aquaculture expansion financed in part by private interests. Moreover, the local communities are sometimes responsible for excessive logging for wood and/or coal. The greatest impact is of course the loss of biodiversity; the flora and fauna of this ecosystem are very important resources for local habitants. The loss of mangrove forests also renders the coasts vulnerable to erosion, especially in Việt Nam. In conclusion, I remind

you that mangroves protect the coasts from tropical storms and other natural events – the Malaysian forests lessened the effects of the 2004 tsunami while Thailand and Indonesia were hit very hard.

Group 7

Our group worked on rice, coffee and corn yields (1961-2008: FAOSTAT) as well as on the use of chemical (1961-2005: WDI) and nitrate-based fertilizers ^[12] (1961-2008: WDI).

The general trend is an increase in yields over the entire region – high Indonesian rice yields have been surpassed by Việt Nam since 2000. Fluctuations in coffee yields are significant in Thailand and in Việt Nam.

The countries fall into two different groups as regards fertilizer use: Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos use little; Indonesia followed by Thailand, Việt Nam, Malaysia and the Philippines see a high usage – the proportion per hectare is the highest in Malaysia.

Agricultural emissions of nitrous oxide are high as a proportion of total emissions, notably in the Philippines where the use of nitrate fertilizers remains low; is this linked to under-developed industry? The same holds true for Việt Nam, above all after 1995, because of the importance of the agricultural economic sector. In Malaysia, this rate remains low despite an increase between 1995 and 2000; while the quantity of nitrate fertilizer used per hectare is the highest in the region, because of industrial development. The N₂O emissions are very high in Indonesia due to high use


[12] Nitrous oxide (N₂O) is one of the three main greenhouse gases. Society emits it through soil cultivation and the use of nitrate fertilizers, the production of nylon and the combustion of organic material, and fossil fuels. Agricultural practices can stimulate the emission of nitrous oxide from the soil and play an important role in the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere. *[editor's comment]*

of chemical fertilizer and the geographical characteristics of the country.

Nitrate fertilizers are particularly present in high-yield countries, where nitrous oxide


emissions are significant: Indonesia, Thailand, Việt Nam. Agriculture's portion of these emissions is considerable.

Figure 45 *Total consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers, 1961 - 2002*




Source: FAOSTAT.

Figure 46 *Agricultural nitrous oxide emissions (% of total), 1990-2005*



Source: UN Geodata.

Figure 47 *Southeast Asia nitrous oxide emissions, 1990-2005*



Source: WDI.

Didier Orange

The solution to this problem has been known for 50 years: organic fertilizers. However, it is still not widely used because it depends on technological comprehension by the actors, and on their strategies. This is why we engineers need to share and collaborate with researchers in social sciences.

[Bruno Thibert]


One of the drivers of productivity, especially for rice farming, is the increase in the number of harvests per year, thanks to irrigation and use of improved varieties. There is a correlation between the use of fertilizers and an increase in productivity. Moreover, Indonesia and Malaysia made greater use of it earlier (around 1970) than most other countries (1980-1990). Think especially of the green revolution in Malaysia that aimed for significant agricultural intensification. The larger rice producers, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam, are the greater consumers of nitrate fertilizers while Malaysia uses very little in proportion to its total fertilizer use. The character of its

agricultural sector, especially its rubber and palm oil, can explain the difference. Indonesia uses by far the most fertilizer, but its vast agricultural surface area is the reason why its consumption is comparable by hectare with Thailand and the Philippines.

Double cropping of rice demands more resources from the soil to nourish the crops. The period of renewal for natural nutrients is reduced, resulting in impoverished soils. This over-use of farmland and the accumulation of chemical products have become important factors contributing to the soil's fragility: increase porosity in soil structure, friability on the surface and amplified leaching deeper down. This raises the potential for surface erosion as well as the amount of chemical products carried in the percolating water, which leads to a rise in sediments and concentration of chemical elements in waterways. Depending on regional geology, it is even possible that percolating water could affect the water table.

Day 5, Friday, July 23, Morning

Figure 48 *Coal Consumption in Southeast Asia, 1980-2006*




Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Group 8

We worked on emissions of carbon dioxide – CO₂ – in Southeast Asian countries (1960-2005: WDI), the consumption of coal (1980-2006: U.S. Energy Information Administration), energy consumption in the transport sector (1970-2007: WDI), and deforestation (1700-2005: FAOSTAT and N.I.E.S.). The causes observed in this region are the increase in energy consumption – Indonesia and

Thailand are the two most significant consumers (coal, transportation) – and exploitation of the forest. In the Indochinese peninsula, Thailand is the country with the highest energy consumption rate in the transportation sector for the period 1970 to 2007. According to the World Bank, Indonesia is the third highest emitter of CO₂ in the world, after China and the United States. The effects of deforestation there are equally spectacular – in the mid-1990s,

Figure 49 *Energy consumption of the transport sector in Southeast Asia, 1971-2007*



Source: UN Geodata.

the *Mega Rice* project transformed the forests of Kalimantan into the rice basket of the country; in two years, one million hectares of forest were cut down.

[Bruno Thibert]

The biggest emitters of CO₂ are Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. We can see that these three countries have the highest energy consumption in the transportation sector and the first two are big consumers of coal.

It is interesting to note that the dips observed in the statistical data in transportation energy and coal consumption during 1996-1997 show the effects of the financial crisis that first affected Thailand then spread to the rest of Southeast Asia. The increase in transportation energy consumption is closely linked to the development of networks and the increase in the number of vehicles. Merchandise has to be transported further and further in order to reach an increasing number of markets.

One of the reasons for the increase in coal use is a growing need for electricity.

Transportation and coal consumption are significant factors in CO₂ emissions contributing to global warming. We can also consider the data on N₂O, studied by the previous team, in our tableau of sources of greenhouse gases. We must also look at methane (CH₄) emissions to refine the analysis. If we also take deforestation into consideration, despite the fact that the oceans are still the most important carbon sinks, we can see that the elements are in place for a contribution to climate change.

I would also like to emphasize the consequences of deforestation: decreasing biodiversity, the acceleration of erosion with land clearing (despite its replacement by agriculture) and the modifications of water flows – trickling on the surface and drainage at depth.

In order to prepare the synthesis of the workshop, the participants are divided into groups according to themes. Each group must present the next day using PowerPoint – 250 words maximum. The themes studied previously are now used in these learning exercises: globalization; actors and institutions; environmental transformation; market integration and intensification, and regulations; conditions and means of subsistence; urbanization; territorial intensification and expansion.

Reading (www.tamdaoconf.com)

- *Agricultural Intensification and Territorial Expansion* (adapted from Jonathan Rigg and Rodolphe De Koninck, ChATSEA Process Paper n° 1)
- *The Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia*
- *Peri-urbanism in Southeast Asia* (adapted from Michael Leaf, ChATSEA Process Paper n°3)
- *World Development Report 2008. Agriculture at the Service of Development*, World Bank Washington, D.C. Extracts: "Overview" and "Bringing agriculture to the market".

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2.2. Economic Transition Experienced and Perceived by the Population: Analysis of the Complementarity Between Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches

*Mireille Razafindrakoto – IRD-DIAL, Jean-Pierre Cling – IRD-DIAL,
Christian Culas – CNRS, François Roubaud – IRD-DIAL*

(Re-transcription)

Day 1, Monday, July 19

*Presentation of Teachers and Participants
(cf. list of participants at the end of this
chapter)*

[François Roubaud]

You can see that you are a very diverse group. Diverse in both nationality – there are five different nationalities present here – and specialty. Our workshop is marked by diversity and we will try to make sure that these diversities can communicate with each other. This is exactly the subject of our workshop: bringing qualitative and

quantitative approaches together. Three of the teachers are quantitativists, statisticians and economists. We have been working in Việt Nam for some years on different questions: the labor market and the informal sector, evaluation of public policies and governance.

[Christian Culas]

I am an anthropologist, originally specializing in the Hmong ethnic group, in Thailand, Laos and Việt Nam. For the last six years, I have been working on the emergence of civil society in Việt Nam, in particular in rural environments. My other field of research

is the study of development projects in mountainous areas.

2.2.1. Methodological framework for the quantitative and qualitative approaches: objectives, principles, methodology

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

This workshop is an extension of the training course that we have given over the three previous sessions of the Summer School. The idea is to link the qualitative approach with the quantitative approach, starting from statistical studies that we have presented in the previous Tam Đảo Summer School Week sessions.

In order to better organize the days to come, it would be interesting to know how many of you are familiar with quantitative approaches, in other words statistical studies, and how many are familiar with qualitative approaches. Among the participants, who has already done field work?

The participants are divided by their answer into two similarly sized groups.

Perfect, the exchange will be all the more rich. We are counting on you to rise to the challenge that presents itself this week: achieving a better understanding of quantitative and qualitative approaches, finding their complementary aspects, articulating them, learning how to obtain results from a methodological point of view. And, from an analytical point of view, extracting information from the theme that we will analyze this week. Do not hesitate to ask questions and come to see us after the sessions.

How will these four and a half days be organized?

Today, we will give the basis and a methodological framework for the two types of approaches by trying to set out the following points for each one: objectives, underlying principles, methodology. First of all, we will present statistical studies – *how do we approach a statistical study?*, then a session on qualitative studies. At the end of the day we will see more clearly the differences and complementarities between the two approaches.

Tomorrow, Tuesday, we will undertake a critical analysis of some quantitative results on the observed changes in the labor market and the strategies and perceptions of individuals. In the afternoon, we will present and discuss results from some semi-structured qualitative interviews. The discussions will treat the analytical results as well as the methodological aspects.

We will distribute six interviews that you should study in order to facilitate the discussions. Three types of approaches will be used: statistical studies, semi-structured interviews and socio-anthropological qualitative interviews. You must examine the advantages and weaknesses of the different approaches.

Wednesday morning, we will proceed with setting the context for and preparing the set-up of the qualitative mini-studies in Tam Đảo hill station. We will form working groups in order to understand the migratory and professional trajectories of individuals (small merchants, craftsmen/women, etc.).

The surveys will take place on Thursday morning. The afternoon will be spent working in groups to discuss and analyze the results of the interviews.

The half-day on Friday will be for putting together the results of the field work into a presentation. It will be interesting to compare the results obtained locally with those that we will present tomorrow from statistical surveys and semi-structured interviews. We will conclude the week with the preparation of Saturday's feedback session. For the feedback session, we need to choose two people to represent the workshop.

Thematic Framework

We will try to see how the population has experienced the economic transition that started in Việt Nam at the end of the 1980s. This involves examining the impact of two phenomena: urbanization, and the increasing importance of private initiatives and investments with the opening of the country to external markets. In the economic sense of the word, transition corresponds to changes in the economic structure and in the behavior of actors after major modifications in the context.

We will ask precise questions: what do we see in the labor market? What are the changes?

--> Strategies of migration and professional placement of individuals (the place and role of the informal sector): impact on revenue, job satisfaction, well-being.

--> Can strategies and behavior be explained by changes in standards, modes of social regulation, the way activities are managed on a local level?

"Transition" is understood on two levels:

- macro: economic transition (on national, regional, city-wide scales) through statistical data;
- micro: transition and mobility linked to employment on an individual, family or village level. The manner in which individuals experience (act) transition can be understood through their migratory and professional trajectory through time. The family and village scale is described through the networks that have played a role in their professional mobility (loans, contact-advice, etc).

This workshop is taking up a challenge. It is an interdisciplinary confrontation, statistician economists on one side and socio-anthropologists on the other. This will mobilize different approaches and methods in order to study a given theme. It is necessary first to define the common questions, with the objective of looking at them from different angles, while trying to coordinate the approaches and identifying their complementarity.

Image 1 Why, How and to What Extent Can We Quantify?



Source: 2007 Scott Adams, Inc./Dist. by Inc. www.dilbert.com.

When we have a tool, when we use an approach, it is necessary to be aware of its advantages, strengths and weaknesses. It

is important to keep a critical point of view on the way in which the tool is used and its results.

Box 6

"Statistics do not give an "exact representation of the real world"; this world is obviously very complex; every statistic is conceived, and must be interpreted, within a "conceptual grid". You must use this critically; you cannot use it to its best effect if you do not know how it was produced, or without concerning yourself with the criteria which have helped to define the divisions it puts in place."

Edmond Malinvaud, Preface of Le métier de statisticien, Michel Volle (1984)

Statistics must select, simplify and summarize in a relevant way. How to do this isn't easy or obvious. Nevertheless, methods and practices are constantly developing and being refined, so as to improve the rigor and relevance both of the data collected and of the indicators they allow us to calculate.

Here are two quotes from Edmond Malinvaud, a well-known statistician economist in France. These two quotations are a good illustration of the way we perceive statistical tools.

Often, researchers have a tendency to say: *"Aha! I will use an existing survey!"* without knowing anything about its process and set-up, the place, the way in which the criteria for samples were chosen, or the variables defined; they will go straight into the analysis and try to produce results that perhaps don't make any sense.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

Let's take an example. You read that 50% of Vietnamese work in agriculture. Should you consider this to be the truth? First thing: the source. This number comes, for example, from the employment survey that was done by the General Statistics Office over the whole of Việt Nam in 2009. It is a number that Mireille presented in the plenary session. This statistical survey was done with a certain level of production. They tell you that the Vietnamese work in agriculture. This term can have different definitions according to the country and its history. What does "work" mean? How many hours? Is it the principal employment? Secondary? Finally, they say: 50% of Vietnamese. Does this mean that they divide a number by another? What are the absolute values associated with this proportion? What is the active population?

Such a simple statement depends on a certain number of hypotheses, definitions of concepts and statistical methods.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

I will now present the different stages of a statistical survey. We must remember that

it does not involve simply finding people and presenting a questionnaire. A statistical survey is a complex chain of tasks that starts with the development of the methodology and continues through to the production of results. There are three phases:

Methodological Phase

- Field, units of observation, categories
- Sampling
- Questionnaire

Technical Phase

- Data collection (field)
- Data entry and sorting
- Extracting first results

Publication Phase

- Analysis, interpretation of data
- Presentation, discussion (first results)
- Publication of results
- Advanced studies

Let's look at the last two phases.

We can isolate the "field phase" where there will be data collection followed by data entry, cleaning up the data, in order to produce the first results. I want to underline the importance of this phase because it can lead the researcher to question him/herself: some values and results may seem absurd. So we must ask ourselves why. This can lead us back to the cleaning phase in order to delete some aberrations in the data or correct data entry errors. We need to ask ourselves how non-responses and missing data will be treated. We must also define some options on how to treat non-responses and missing data. During this step, it is also necessary to calculate the weightings, extrapolation coefficients, and the confidence intervals.

The publication phase corresponds to the analysis of the results and the interpretation of the data. Here we have the first results which merit discussion with specialists on the issue in order to verify the relevance of the analyses. During the publication of the final results, the databases are cleaned up. The methodological phase, all the conditions in which the survey was carried out, all that was initially detailed is often forgotten: how was the survey carried out? It is an important question which affects the interpretation of the results, but which unfortunately is not often taken into consideration. We must ask: what are the ideas and underlying theories that were used to put the survey into place?

Each step is of paramount importance. A multitude of small errors at each step can lead to results or data that are totally useless *in fine*: this can happen if the questions are poorly formulated, the questionnaire poorly thought out or the clean-up of data poorly done or controlled.

We will give you concrete examples. Imagine that we are interested in inequalities within households: how are the household tasks distributed among men and women? If we survey households and not individuals, we will not get results. It is essential to define the unit of observation.

Let's take the Việt Nam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). This survey was conducted among households. Individuals were interviewed about their employment. The people said: *"I work in the public sector, I work in the private sector, I have a small business."* Each member of the family gave his or her own job description. This survey shows the activities of individuals in a given unit. There is also another section concerning non-

agricultural activities of the household, where the head of the family is asked about the units of production belonging to the household, and its revenue. In this particular section of the survey, we know that the head of the household said: *"We have a small business that sells different types of merchandise and another small workshop where we make doors."* However, we have no information on who works where: who works in which business? With this survey it was difficult to understand how these small family businesses function within the households.

It is necessary to think through the observation unit: who will we interview: the household, individuals? What types of households? Are we more interested in the activities or in the individuals? The quality of a survey depends on the questionnaire. The statistical survey depends on the field work and especially on the method used by the interviewers. What are their interactions with the interviewees? Were they able to build confidence? Did they make an effort to try to obtain truthful responses? To what extent were the questions reformulated without influencing the interviewees in their answers?

It's sometimes thought that we recruit interviewers after preparing the questionnaire, then send them straight out into the field. This is false. During a real statistical survey, specialized interviewers go out into the field. The training phase for the interviewers is also essential.

Finally, there are different types of surveys, defined according to various objectives. Will the survey be conducted all at once, or will the surveyors come back to the field? Can the interviews be held face to face,

by telephone, by mail, self-administered – the interviewee fills in the questionnaire? The mode of interview depends on the budget, the level of precision that we want to obtain and in some cases, the sensitivity of the issue.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

We are going to focus on the methodological phase of a statistical survey, looking at the sampling then creating the questionnaire.

The basic hypothesis of a quantitative statistical survey is that we can quantify phenomena. I previously cited the example of Vietnamese who work in agriculture. We can assume that it is easier to quantify an activity: in what sector does a person work, where, when? When it comes to perceptions, we can see that this becomes much more difficult: what do you think, why do you do that? But here as well, we assume that we can quantify it. Afterwards we'll come back to all the problems of comparing quantitative results with qualitative surveys.

The methodological phase is of paramount importance. If your sampling is poorly done, if your sample is biased, your results will not be representative, your results will be poor. Likewise, if your questions are poorly formulated, people will not answer or will give an answer that does not correspond to the question asked.

Let's start with the field of survey. First it's necessary to define the target population: individuals, households or different units. The other question is the geographical coverage: is the survey national, regional, urban, etc.?

The sampling phase is very technical; it is based on the statistical theory of polling. We will not present the details of this technique now because we will not use it this week. However, it is important to know the principles. Why take only a part of the population and why not interview everyone? It is a question of cost and complexity. Surveys therefore interview 1,000, 2,000 or 100,000 individuals. We set a number of people to interview sufficient to obtain good quality results and a reliable model. Polling theory helps evaluate the quality of a survey according to the number of people interviewed. The main thing to remember about sampling is that the number of people to be interviewed for a given survey, with a given level of quality, does not depend on the population. If you are doing a survey on employment in China, where the population exceeds 1 billion 300 million inhabitants, or in Hà Nội, you will need the same size of sample; this will depend on the level of precision you want.

Sampling Strategy Representativity of Answers to a Statistical Survey

Calculating the size of the sample

Depends on choices about:

- the risk of error of estimation

(= a sampling error; note, this is different from errors in responses);

- the confidence level

(= probability that the result is within a certain interval);

There is a relationship between the size of the sample, the error of estimation and the confidence level; if two of these variables are fixed, the third can be deduced.

The size of the sample survey does not depend on the size of the total population

In China or in Việt Nam, you would need the same sample size to obtain the same level of precision of results (sampling error, confidence interval).

Example: we want to survey the population about their holiday preferences (seaside/countryside); we fix a 3% risk of error (E)

We must survey:

About 2000 people (1850 exactly) for a confidence level of 1%;

About 1000 people (1062 exactly) for a confidence level of 5%;

About 750 people (747 exactly) for a confidence level of 10%.

We surveyed 1000 people.

We obtained the following results:

- 53% prefer the sea;

47% prefer the countryside.

Interpretation (fixing the confidence level at 99%)

- The percentage of those who prefer the seaside is between 49% and 57%;

- The percentage of those who prefer the countryside is between 43% and 51%;

So the percentages for each result (seaside/countryside) are not significantly different if we fix a confidence level of 1% (the risk of error of estimation is thus $\pm 4\%$).

Source: Authors' construction.

What is important is that a figure taken from a statistical survey is not a 100% true figure. There is a margin of error. So we must pay attention to the interpretation of the figures and comparison with other results.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Two practical details. We often see tables of survey data with 2 digits after the decimal. When you see the polling error and the manner in which we can interpret the numbers, this mode of representation is ridiculous. This gives the impression of exactitude, whereas

this does not make sense. Finally, when you analyze a statistical survey and you know that the sample is small – 100, or 300 individuals for example – it is necessary to be careful when interpreting the results and to look at them with a critical eye.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

There are two methods for sampling: probability (random), non-probability (non-random). For a random sample, several polling methods are possible.

Box 8 Sampling Strategy

Probabilistic (random) sampling

Implies a random selection

Probability of inclusion of each unit in the sample,

→ possibility of calculating the sampling error (confidence interval).

Several different methods allow the selection of a random sample. The choice of method depends on:

- Polling base (you must have this if you're to have a random sample);*
- The way in which the population is distributed;*
- Costs and timescale.*

Objective: reduce sampling error as far as possible for the most important survey variables.

Source: Authors' construction.

Here is a list of examples of the most common polling methods:

- simple random;
- systematic;
- probability proportional to size;
- stratified;
- cluster;
- several degrees;
- several phases.

We will not use these, they are just examples.

The first, most well-known and simplest method: simple random sampling. You will extract, for example, 0.1% of the Vietnamese population: the Vietnamese population being around 85 million inhabitants, you will choose approximately 85,000 people randomly to participate in your survey. The type of sampling used especially in the surveys in

Việt Nam is stratified sampling where we are interested in, for example, the structure of employment by region. Instead of selecting 85,000 people without paying attention to the region, we will try to have a certain number of people interviewed in each of the regions – either the same rate of selection in each region or a different rate.

All of these methods can be used if we have what we call a polling base, meaning a file with the entire population that we want to interview and where we can just pull out a certain number of people. If the polling base does not exist, we need to use other methods that we call “non-random sampling”. These methods are obviously less precise.

Box 9 Sampling Strategy

Non-probabilistic (non-random) sampling

Absence of a polling base, random sampling impossible.

Sample = structure comparable to that of the study population.

Choice of units of observation is arbitrary:

-->Variable probabilities of forming part of the sample.

Blind or accidental sampling

Choice of a strategic time and place, and arbitrary selection.

Systematic, non-random sampling.

We survey individuals chosen at a fixed interval (in a queue).

We choose the first individual arbitrarily.

Sampling by quota

A technique that one can bring together with stratified sampling; you create a model on a reduced scale, in terms of certain characteristics, of the study population. But selection is arbitrary. The surveyor can fill quotas as desired.

Source: Authors' construction.

Example of blind sampling. You want to survey the traders in a market and you will interview 100 of them. You could take, for example, those that you find; a second non-random method is to stand in the street and interview a passer-by every five minutes.

Last example: sampling by quota. You think that in the population, there are about as many men as women and you want to interview two hundred people; you will therefore find one hundred men and one hundred women in the street. Once you have interviewed two hundred people, you stop the survey.


Polling methods should be used according to the circumstances, budget, and population, always with the same objective: reduce polling error in order to have the most precise results possible.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

To introduce the last stage of the morning, I would like to show you this drawing which illustrates what not to do in creating a questionnaire.

Image 2

The Quantitative Approach: the relevance of hypotheses and questions?



Source: Annual Reports. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 1998-1999 Ottawa (Ontario).

We must find a balance, in designing simple questionnaires, that allows us to gather a maximum amount of information, capable of shedding enough light on the issues that we want to work on. There is a balance to be found between a heavy questionnaire that can reduce the quality of the survey and of the answers provided, and a light questionnaire that does not provide enough depth on the issue that we would like to analyze.

Another balance is found in the formulation of the questions. They must be precise but

short, and at the same time understandable by all categories of the population. Should we oversimplify a questionnaire in order to be understood by the entire population – educated and non-educated people? What words do we use? How to formulate the question? Often, statistical surveys led by institutions are the result of a long discussion process. A questionnaire is finalized after several years. Sometimes we realize that a question was not understood, and elicited no response. It is very important to finalize a questionnaire because one of the advantages

of a statistical survey is to be able to repeat the experiment, to follow the evolution of a given variable in the population.

Example. We have set up a survey on corruption. The following question was asked in a given country: "Have you been the victim of corruption in the last year?" This type of formulation can be criticized: what will the population understand by the word "corruption?" What will they consider as corruption? This question is interesting

because if it is repeated and maintained with an identical formulation from one year to the next, the population will interpret the same type of phenomenon. If we observe a great rise in the percentage of individuals that answer "Yes", from one year to the next, this evolution clearly translates a phenomenon that means something.

There are three steps in the creation of a questionnaire.

Box 10 Creation of a Questionnaire

Indicator 1: motives for the creation of their "business" in the informal sector

- they sought work, higher income, better conditions;
- constraints to the creation of the unit (start-up funds, investment, premises for the activity, etc.);
- opportunities (networks, family traditions, qualifications and so on).

Indicator 2: perception of their professional situation

- working conditions and difficulties;
- degree of satisfaction;
- self-esteem and recognition.

Indicator 3: prospects and what they would do if they had the choice, and they had to formalize their activities

- expansion of the activity in the future;
- will their children take it on?;
- views on payment of taxes and registration; behavior as regards the State.

Source: Authors' construction.

For a wide-ranging issue on a given subject, we have some underlying working hypotheses – is it true? is it false? We will then attempt to find the indicators that can illustrate this hypothesis, then the themes that we can talk about concerning each indicator. Finally, we will create the questions to ask, meaning the kinds of responses to look for.

Let's take an example concerning the individuals who work in micro-units, most often in the informal sector. The principal theme that we would like to address is: *do these people – craftsmen, traders – who work in this sector do so by deliberate choice or not?* Different questions (indicators) provide elements of information on this subject: what motivates these people to create their "business" in the informal sector, how do

they perceive their present situation, what is their degree of satisfaction, how do they perceive their prospects and what would they do if they had the choice to move to this or that sector?

Around these different types of indicators, some issues will be identified in order to narrow down to what we are looking to measure: for example, for the first indicator – reasons for creating a family business –, what were the paths to creation, what were the opportunities? It is necessary to identify the interviewees' perception of their work conditions, the types of difficulties that they face.

Then the next step is to attempt to understand if they are satisfied or not with their situation, and why. Three types of issues are addressed concerning the degree of satisfaction: do they want to expand their activity in the future, do they think that their children will take over the activity (means of understanding how they perceive their profession), what is their point of view regarding the government (do they think that it is necessary to be registered)?

Here are some useful principles in creating a questionnaire:

- 1) Clarity and precision. Often, the goal of the question (pursued by the surveyor) is not always visible. But over-explaining what we are trying to measure can lead to strategic behavior on the part of the interviewee;
- 2) Simplicity. We must try to identify and remove words or notions that are too complicated for the interviewees, give lists of concrete examples instead of concepts or notions which may be abstract;
- 3) Size of the questionnaire: as light as possible. It is important to have a precise questionnaire, and to simplify

the interviewees' task. It is sometimes necessary to separate questions and proceed in stages, to add intermediary questions to facilitate comprehension. When surveys are too short, people don't always "get into" the questionnaire. The answers can be insincere;

- 4) Sequence of the questions and order of the items/methods. Sensitive questions are not asked at the beginning of a questionnaire. Build up a relationship of trust with the interviewees before getting into difficult subjects.

Before finalizing a questionnaire, it is important to test it in the field, *i.e.* carry out test surveys among a few individuals. It is also necessary to train the interviewers. During this stage, they will react by saying: *"I did not understand this question. It is poorly worded"*. During interviewer training there is also a testing phase, at the end of which the questionnaire will be modified and revised.

[Christian Culas]

We will continue with the presentation of the qualitative method, in particular through the anthropological approach. I will start with the foundations of anthropological research. Although the process is different, many things will be similar to what my economist colleagues just explained.

My plan has three main parts:

- 1) Epistemological Foundations of Anthropological Research
- 2) Empirical Process: from the Problem to Field Surveys;
- 3) Data Production in Anthropology: Methods and Issues.

Box 11 *The qualitative approach*

"[...] In any branch of knowledge, research results must be presented in an honest and sincere way [...]. In ethnography, where an honest presentation of data is perhaps even more indispensable, we note, alas!, that in the past there has been a general lack of precision [...] I think that the only ethnographic sources of any scientific value are those where it is possible to make a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the results of direct study, the data and interpretations furnished by local people, and on the other the deductions of the author".

(Bronislaw Malinowski 1963: 58-59)

Malinowski is one of the first ethnographers, the first westerner to have spent much time in a village that was not of his culture – in the Trobriand Islands, coral atolls which form an archipelago off the eastern coast of New Guinea. The end of the text that I've quoted makes a clear separation between two things: on the one hand, direct study – data, interpretation given by the natives, in other words all that the anthropologist takes from the field –, and on the other hand, deductions, analysis, interpretation. Malinowski differentiates between the reality of others and our interpretations. He says that it is necessary to be careful as those two things are very different.

The reality we refer to is what we can observe and obtain from others. Others have a world, and the researcher can capture and observe only a part of this world. The researcher comes to find information there, and produce data. This data will be analyzed and interpreted in order to produce a finalized scientific document. We will focus more on the stages from the reality of others to the production of data, than from data to interpretation.

Epistemological Foundations of Anthropological Research

How can we really know another person? I am not another, so can I know him/her? It is an old debate in philosophy, in history as well; in the other social sciences, it is much more recent.

I take two extreme positions. The first: positivism considers that science has sufficiently powerful means to enter into the reality of others and understand it in its totality. This is a model that comes from physics. Human society is like a molecule, like a plant: we can dissect it in order to arrive at a state of maximum knowledge where everything is known. The second: ultra-relativism says, on the contrary, that the reality of others is not knowable; "Science itself is built by men, and science is a social position. Science is therefore ideological, political, it is not objective and for all these reasons, it cannot know the reality of others". Anthropology but also the other social sciences, such as history in particular, work at keeping an intermediary position between these two extremes in order not to be blocked by one of the two positions.

There are limitations, we know this. In order to be conscious of these limits, we will study them and say: *"We know to what point we can know"*. When we speak about reasoned conscience, meaning that the researcher will evaluate his own manner of working, this is a critical approach. Our economist colleagues have said the same thing this morning: *"We produce data, we criticize our own data"*.

Epistemology is the study of the manner in which sciences function, their logic and rigor. In epistemology, this type of action is called "reflexive loop": the researcher will look at his/her work as something that can be criticized. We do the same tests on the validity of the data produced from anthropological studies as economists do, only not from a mathematical but from a logical point of view. It is a question of the empirical adequacy of statements; this means that we will question the manner in which the data production process takes place. Is the relationship strong enough between the realities studied and the data, or is it too slack? We work on the quality of this relationship and we try to produce data that is as close as possible to the reality observed.

We must be as rigorous as possible. We have a paradox here because we often think of the qualitative approach as being flexible. We speak about a lack of rigor. However, we can be both qualitative and rigorous. What is important is to know what we are looking for, and in particular to be able to tell the difference in the search for truth: is this true or is it false? The question is not well constructed from a scientific point of view. In social science, we talk about the search for "truthfulness," we approach something that is like the truth. This is the method for sociology, history, but also for almost all of the sciences,

even physical sciences. Astrophysicists would not accept someone saying "it's true" or "it's false". Today, we can say one thing because science can do this, but maybe tomorrow it will be completely different. How can the social sciences be rigorous? We will evaluate the adequacy (the strong correspondence) between the data produced and the reality observed, in other words, the shift from observable reality to data. How does this take place? We can evaluate by verifying and cross-checking information. Then, the second level of verification happens during the stage when data is transformed into finalized scientific texts, *i.e.* in the interpretation of the data.

Lê Xuân Thọ

You use abstract terms: empirical, epistemology. The use of these terms is difficult. The connotation of "correspondence, empirical adequacy" is difficult to understand.

[Christian Culas]


I am aware of translation problems, but it is necessary to have slightly abstract terms in order to describe some parts of our research work. Maybe the audience is not as used to anthropological terms as statistical terms. In order to define epistemology, we can simply say that the object of sociological study is society, the object of epistemology is science; in this case, sociology or anthropology are the objects of epistemology. Epistemology is the science that studies sciences in order to understand their logic, principles and limitations. When we speak about epistemological foundations, we are stepping back a bit from our science; it then becomes the object of study. "Empirical adequacy" was coined by Olivier de Sardan. Empirical adequacy is high when the study

data produced and the reality of the people studied are in close correlation, in other words, when the data are as close as possible to (although they are always slightly removed from) the realities experienced by the social actors studied.

Empirical Process: From the Problem to Field Study


Here is the ideal scenario for anthropological research. In reality, we generally start with a problem, and we often skip the first steps.

Figure 50 *Empirical Process: From the Problem to Field Study*



Source: Author.

Figure 51 *Construction of the Study Object*



Source: Author.

Data Production in Anthropology

For our studies on Thursday morning, there is a whole series of stages of the scenario that you will not have the time to do. We will work together on the method and tools, and then we will prepare our field questions.

How to tell the difference between actions like "taking down and collecting" or "producing" data? In the verbs, "taking down, collecting", there is the idea (often unspoken) that the data exists on its own and we will look for it (like harvesting fruit on a tree); the other side of the expression "produce data" implies that it does not exist on its own, but that it is the researcher that will manufacture it, produce it. In many anthropological or

sociological texts, the researcher seems to look for the information: it is there, he/she "captures it" then uses it as if it was already given, as if everything was done ahead of time. This is a totally positivist position – taking pieces, but in reality transforming nothing. If we believe we are gathering data, we do not seek to know why we are looking for it or how we produce it. The action of the researcher is thought to be neutral; "we are only gathering, reproducing the reality of others with our words, our phrases". In contrast, when we say "we produce data", we try to understand it: when we produce, we act, we transform, we make choices. It is the display and justification of these choices that allows the anthropologist to produce rigorous work.

Anthropological study produces much data, and only a small part will be used to write articles or books. This is an important difference from the quantitative approach: almost all of the quantitative data produced is used. When we make a questionnaire or a survey, we lose very little of the data, as opposed to anthropological or sociological research (data from interviews, discussions and observation).

Let's take an example. I wrote a thesis on religious movements. My objective was to know how the Hmong in Thailand, Laos and Việt Nam organized themselves on a

political and religious level. In the villages I studied the economy, demography, migrations and other subjects that did not have a direct relationship with my study object. But to understand these religious movements, I had to address all of these issues. I have five notebooks of information on the economy and yet, in my thesis, it only takes up one or two pages. During a socio-anthropological demonstration, we do not use everything. But I must have a thorough knowledge of the economic issues facing the people that I study, even if I write almost nothing on this theme.

Box 12 Socio-Anthropological Surveys

Combinations of 6 types of data production during the field survey:

- 1 – Insertion-immersion in the living environment of the interviewees (or "participant observation");
- 2 – Interviews (discursive interactions deliberately solicited by the researcher);
- 3 – Observation (description of situations, acts, conditions of discourse);
- 4 – Census procedures (resorting to systematic investigation tools);
- 5 – Written sources (archives, local reports, accounting documents, etc.);
- 6 – Audiovisual sources (less systematically used than the other sources).

Source: Author.

The list presented here is important because often, in sociology or in anthropology, we think that we only conduct interviews. In reality, the production of data is extremely diversified. The modes of data production have different status:

- reading texts, method very similar to that of historians;
- interviews;
- observations: these are much more difficult to measure because they are only carried out while a situation is happening. In the

field, we can rarely produce observations. It is necessary to wait for things to happen;

- "insertion, immersion". This is maybe the big difference with sociologists. An anthropologist considers that in order to understand a group, it is necessary to live with them. The constraint of time is important. It is necessary to adapt to the local rhythm, local life, in order to enter into the rhythm of action, discourse; it is also necessary to learn the language.

Let us address some aspects of our work from the week. There are three ways to produce data: interviews, immersion and observation. I will cover interview-observation more in detail on Wednesday morning. We do not have time for the last section, immersion and insertion. The only place where we can go is to the market at the Tam Đảo hill station. I suggest that you try to meet the traders there as soon as possible, start to immerse yourself, introduce yourself, create bonds with them, make contact. In the first stages, you will not need to do any research; the inhabitants and traders will see you and “get used” to you. If they meet you three or four times, it will be much easier to start the survey. When we arrive in a village, it is always difficult at first; the information collected at that time is somewhat superficial. The quality information often comes from the quality of the relationships between the researcher and the people that he/she is studying; this human dimension of trust is one of the basics of anthropological study.

[François Roubaud]

Today, we will have our general presentations, so it is OK to keep quiet. But tomorrow, you will be asked to participate. We will provide you with interviews on which to work.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

What differentiates the two approaches that we just mentioned?

Cristina Bellinins Lieven

Does sociology use statistical tools more?

[Christian Culas]

An entire branch of sociology is more or less quantitative. Polls, for example, use statistical

economics methods to produce data. But there are also long sociological interviews that are similar to anthropology. The field is not sufficient in itself to define the method used. Similarly, according to the subject studied, an anthropologist will conduct a census of the land and production, for example, in order to understand the agricultural system.

[François Roubaud]

Sociology is slightly intermediary from the point of view of the methods between quantitative economics and partially or exclusively qualitative anthropology. Sociology does not only use surveys. Between quantitative surveys, semi-structured interviews, and anthropological interviews, sociology will most likely use semi-structured interviews, while anthropology will use open interviews.

Lê Xuân Thọ

When we talk about quantitative, this is something measurable. We speak about numbers, samples, and size. The numerical data provides a relative exactitude. This method delivers a national or international view. Comparisons are possible between regions, provinces or countries. Analysis is objective. However, it does not lend itself to precision. As opposed to the quantitative method, the qualitative approach gives a precise knowledge of the object studied. I believe that one of the weak points of qualitative study is subjectivity.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Based on Thọ's remarks, it seems to be that there are always pre-conceived notions regarding the quantitative and the qualitative. Are numbers guarantees of objectivity? I don't

think so. We don't get closer to an objective reality simply because we work with numbers, or get further from it because we carry out a qualitative analysis. Everything depends on the manner in which the research is done. It is necessary to know the limitations of the meaning of the data, and know how to interpret them.

Nguyễn Ngọc Anh

The quantitative approach cannot translate the aspirations of individuals; this is for the qualitative survey.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

Today, we will hand out the qualitative interviews. You will divide up into groups of two or three in order to analyze the documents. It would be preferable for you to have different disciplinary fields represented in each group, and for each group to speak a common language.

Table 15 *Differences and Complementarities Between the Approaches*

	QUANTITATIVE APPROACH	QUALITATIVE APPROACH
Tools	Statistical Surveys	Qualitative Interviews and Observations
Disciplines	Mainly economists (and sociologists)	Mainly anthropologists and sociologists
Scale of Observation	Wide (a large number of individuals). Macroscopic scale	Local (a given locality or sub-group)
Sample	Large (often random)	Restricted (targeted and often non-random)
Objectives (construction of the object of study)	- Analyze the characteristics of a population (macro level) - Study the determinants of practices/ behavior and representations (micro level = individuals and actors)	Research the logic which underlies behaviors and representations (micro level = individuals and actors)
Approach	"Hypothetico-deductive" approach <i>Verify the theoretical results</i>	Inductive approach <i>Form theories from empirical observations</i>
Starting Point	Starts from a theoretical model to test it against the facts Starting point: formulation of a hypothesis (with concepts, definitions, principles and rules from the start) → deduction of observable consequences → test/validation	Empirical observations "in the field" Starts from actors' reality, not from preconceived ideas on that reality → construction of interpretations using analytical concepts which allow the observation of practices and interactions to be taken into account. Starting point = concrete situations, accessible to the observer → extract the concepts, principles and rules applicable

Source: Authors' construction.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Here is an overall presentation of the differences and complementarities between the two approaches. We have insisted on putting a column in the middle because the dividing line between them is not completely fixed.

The first difference is the scale of observation. Quantitative approaches most often concern a larger number of individuals – macroscopic scale – while the qualitative approach deals with a more local scale of observation, a given location or a population sub-group. The second difference concerns the sample of people surveyed. These are two things that are distinct from the scale of observation. The sample for a quantitative approach is often large. We interview many people with principally random samplings – we choose people randomly. In qualitative approaches, the sample is more limited, targeted and not often random.

The objectives. The quantitative approach proposes two types of analysis: macro level where we try to obtain the overall characteristics of a given population; micro-level analysis and objectives so as to understand what is happening at the level of individuals, the actors that we study. We then try to understand, to see the characteristics, the behavior, the practices or the perceptions. The qualitative emphasizes the search for the

logic behind behavior or practices. But there are also complementarities: the quantitative tries to understand the logic, but cannot be as thorough. Similarly, the qualitative tries to describe a given population, but the approach will not be as wide-ranging as in the case of quantitative approaches.

Methodological approach. To simplify: the quantitative approach uses hypothetico-deductive processes – we have theories and we try to verify these theoretical results using numbers; the qualitative approach is more inductive, it bases its theories on empirical observations. In the quantitative approach, we speak about theoretical models. We formulate a hypothesis; we work on concepts, definitions of principles. Then, we test and validate (or discredit) the hypothesis that we have formulated. The qualitative, and notably the anthropological approach, is based on empirical observation, field work, without pre-conceived notions about reality. Then we construct the concepts, the categories that will result from the observations.

The two approaches can come together. There is the possibility of the “return effect” – reverse causality. In both cases, we should take into account that the interaction can have effects on individuals or that the institutions present will create interactions at the level of the society.

Table 16 *Differences and Complementarities Between the Approaches*

	QUANTITATIVE APPROACH	QUALITATIVE APPROACH
<i>Tools</i>	<i>Statistical Surveys</i>	<i>Qualitative Interviews and Observations</i>
<i>Status of Interactions</i>	The individuals or institutions present will create interactions (but taking into account the return effect as well)	It is the interaction that produces the individuals or institutions present (but possible return effect)
<i>General premise</i>	Law of Large Numbers → Representative nature of the results The interviewee understands the question; he/she answers; the response is independent of the formulation; the response corresponds to the "reality"	Minority behavior and discourse are the product of society and shed light on the majority behavior. Understanding society = understanding the articulation of different types of behavior and discourse. *
<i>How survey is situated in time</i>	Repeated surveys (using the same methodology) Panel studies	Study according to the timescale of one unit (individual, household, village)

Basic premise of the qualitative approach: no hierarchy, in terms of meaning or representativity, based on the number of cases observed. Even a marginal case – even exceptional or unique – can offer a social meaning which can help to explain the behavior of the majority of the group.
→ Move slightly away from the point of observation in order to see new things or see things from a different angle.

Source: Authors' construction.

There is an important difference in the general rule underlying each of these two approaches. The quantitative relies on the rule of large numbers and on the idea that the data that we collect are supposed to be representative of a given population. We also assume that the questions asked are well understood, that the questions are answered with an independent response, and, in the end, that the answer corresponds to the reality that we are trying to capture. For the qualitative approach, what we produce is the result of what happens in a given society. It provides an insight into the whole of the society and, even if only relevant to a minority, identifies its mode of functioning.

[Christian Culas]

Let's take an example. We studied the village meetings among 1000 village families. We noted that 995 families go to the meetings, so 5 do not go. In the quantitative approach, the 5/1000, or 0.5% will almost disappear from the descriptions and the analysis. We consider that this is the margin of error, of a lack of precision. The anthropologist, on the other hand, will try to interview these 5 families in order to find out why they do not go to the meetings. This could be an entry point to understanding the tension and conflict within the village, for example. For the anthropologist, just because only a small number of people

do something does not mean that we must neglect it in our analysis. We must evaluate the importance of the actions of even one individual, regardless of the small number.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Here is a list of some limitations that we would like to underline in relation to the two approaches.

Quantitative Approach and Statistical Surveys

- Lack of importance given to the point of view of the interviewee.

Complex social processes are not easy to capture with a questionnaire.

A questionnaire with notions, pre-established categories does not allow for adaptation to the history, the language, thoughts and feelings of the interviewee.

- Answers collected by a questionnaire are not spontaneous but solicited (or even unconsciously directed); the interview obliges them to take a position.
- The classic interview with a questionnaire depends on the efficiency and the pertinence of the questions chosen (which depends on the hypothesis).
- The information can be truncated (non-exhaustive).

1. Analysis Unit: the individual scale can be insufficient

Behavior depends on personal choice and/or social norms and/or institutional constraints and/or opportunities.

Belonging to a group influences personal choices, which themselves can also influence the group.

Qualitative approaches let the interviewee speak by setting him/her at ease as much as possible, without necessarily asking a question, just during the course of a conversation.

2. It is necessary to detect all solutions/possibilities

In order to understand a migratory or professional history and integration in the informal sector, it is necessary to construct a *"panorama or range of possibilities"* from the experience of social actors by taking different parameters into consideration: location, status and type of employment, type of motivation, mobility and social history of the individuals, all the groups and institutions that intervene, etc.

The "range of possibilities" is not necessarily available ahead of time, but must be built by the observer or researcher.

3. Information on the prevailing constraints and logic

Choices depend on:

- the technical nature of the activity (*qualification of the individual, place of residence, etc.*);
- supply-side conditions (financial constraints, labor market supply, etc.);
- but also on representation: the significance that the activity undertaken assumes for the individual;
- types of relationships between actors (employers and employees)


Let's imagine that we choose to interview some individuals. This option has consequences for the results. The behavior of an individual can be the result not only of a personal choice, but also of his/her

environment – social standards, institutional constraints.

We have collected statistical data on the informal sector in order to follow the trajectories of individuals that are actors in this sector, and to try to identify ways to

improve their living conditions. To define effective policies, we will need, for example, to understand the career and migratory paths of these individuals. For this we will need pertinent questionnaires.

Image 3 *The Pertinence of Numbers Analysis*



Source: Tom Toles, *The Washington Post & Universal Press Synd.*, April 2009.

Qualitative Approach

The first remark concerns the idea of representativity. Of course, the idea of statistical generalization is impossible. Based on the interviews that you will conduct in Tam Đảo, you will not say: "I studied a small restaurant that told me it earned five million dong per month" and deduce that all the restaurant owners in Tam Đảo earn the same amount. Generalization occurs at another level. Based on a qualitative, socio-

anthropological approach, we generalize the process and the logic based on interviews. For this we need to succeed in grasping all the conditions and social mechanisms with which the individual is integrated. In one context, with these conditions and mechanisms, we observe a given phenomenon. Generalization is done in this manner: in such a precise context, here is what we find. This logic linking the phenomenon to the totality of the surrounding context can be generalized.

Another limitation. It is very difficult to adopt a non-directive attitude. As opposed to the quantitative approach, we try to listen to the point of view of the interviewee and not direct his/her responses. This requires an expertise in following the person in the dialogue that will establish itself.

We will now hand out the semi-structured interviews that you will work on for tomorrow, Tuesday. They are interviews conducted in tandem with quantitative surveys in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City on family and individuals, formal and informal enterprises. We ask you to read these interviews in order to prepare our group discussion on the results. Each one of you has received two interviews: interview 1 – a restaurant owner who serves grilled duck; interview 2 – a crab noodle seller. Four other interviews were distributed, according to your working group, so that you can familiarize yourself with the different types of interviews and speakers: a retail merchant, a hat maker for the army, an iron door maker, the boss of a popular restaurant.

These are semi-structured interviews addressing a large number of themes. We ask that you find the elements that you will use for analyzing this issue: how do people perceive and experience the present transition? This will be visible through the professional and migratory path that individuals have taken.

- Where do they come from?
- Where have they migrated to? Alone, as a family?
- Have they changed jobs? What kind of employment have they had during their life (trajectories)?
- What are the factors that explain these changes? What were their motivations?

What were their constraints? How have they experienced the different phases of their life? Their satisfaction (are they happy?)?

Second type of factor: social networks.

- To what type of association do they belong?
- Characteristics of the networks: neighborhood, family, neighbors, distantly linked people. The ties and relationships within a family will also be linked to the professional paths of the individuals.

Day 2, Tuesday, July 20

2.2.2. Critical Analysis of some results obtained by observing changes in the labor market and individuals' strategies and perceptions

[François Roubaud]

We will work on the semi-structured interviews. I hope that you have had the time to progress with the readings, so that this afternoon we can quickly obtain some results.

We will apply the concepts, ideas and methodology mentioned yesterday to a concrete case: migratory and professional trajectories and transitions, with a focus on the informal sector in Việt Nam. The morning will be spent on the possible areas of convergence between qualitative and quantitative. We will present a summary of the synergies we envisage. Then we will present some descriptions of the labor market and of the informal sector in Việt Nam, asking you to try to lead the

scientific approach yourselves: what are the questions associated with this information, what are the hypotheses, what are the results that you can see on the screen, what are the limitations of the results presented?

Unlike other workshops, our process is experimental. The idea of bringing the quantitative and qualitative approaches together is often put forward, but it is rarely put into practice.

You were to study the semi-structured interviews, immerse yourself in the environment of the hill station and identify some informal units, small trading activities that will be the object of interviews on Thursday morning. Who has made progress on this?

Inthakesone Thaviphone

Yesterday we started looking after class. I do not know this region very well. I noticed some Catholic churches. We met a former soldier who lived in Laos for four years. He lives with his wife in Tam Đảo which is his native village. He no longer works, his wife has a small shop. She sells drinks.

[François Roubaud]

Typically, this could be the object of a study: an interview of this lady and her husband on the subject of social networks and/or family networks. This is a good introduction, with a rich history including international migration. From the point of view of life trajectory, this could be interesting.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

I would like to remind you of some elements we touched on yesterday on the subject of the qualitative approach. Let's examine

point by point the current weaknesses of the qualitative method:

- need to know the overall context / macro context

What happens at the local scale is inscribed in an overall context (national, international).

- at the local level, some aspects of the context need to be measured

What is the demographic, political, economic importance of different groups (poor/rich, native/emigrant, ethnic groups, etc.) at the national level? The distribution of employment in a city?

- possible divergence between perception (qualitative) and statistically measured results

- Differences in the definition (and measure) of the concept

Example of the concept of inequality: perception of a drastic increase in inequality by the population whereas the statistics show overall a weak evolution, with only a very small proportion of individuals who have become very rich.

- Differences due to choice of indicator of the phenomenon

Perception: crime or corruption is increasing

Reality: no change, but the media discuss it more (reporting more cases) resulting in a biased perception

- Differences due to the fact that the interviewees are not representative of the population.

The interviewees are those who agreed to speak to us (more educated, less poor, etc.)

Bias that could be surmounted by a detailed knowledge of the field.

[François Roubaud]

Let's give an example of selection bias, which happens when we choose people who are not representative of the population. In 2009, there was an international crisis. One of the objectives was to discover the impact of this crisis on the labor market. In the newspapers, massive lay-offs in industry and export enterprises were discussed. One qualitative analysis project selected a certain number of groups to examine the impact of the crisis. They chose groups composed of people who worked in export zones, industrial parks and were obviously directly affected by the international crisis. These groups were by nature the most exposed. The conclusions of the study on the impact of the crisis on the labor market were naturally dramatic.

[Christian Culas]

The limitations presented are not absolute. The quality of a method depends on the object to which it is applied. We understand that qualitative surveys are not enough for an accurate reading of the reality that we want to study. If you are well aware of the limitations of each type of approach, it is possible to know what type of method to apply according to the object of study. Applying "recipes", repeating the same research actions in different contexts, is not possible. The tools that you will use will be defined by the object that you will study, and by the context of your study. It is up to you to adapt your methods to each type of survey; this is neither easy nor reassuring, but it is the only way to obtain good results.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

I think that the perceptions, even erroneous ones, of the population deserve to be taken into account in the analysis. Even if the perceptions of the population are not representative, they can explain some behavior, influence some mechanism within the society.

We have measured the evolution of corruption in Madagascar. Over a given period, from a statistical point of view, we have observed a decrease in petty corruption affecting the population. At the same time, the discontent of the population increased to a crisis point, without us really understanding what the various originating factors were. We realized that according to the perception of the population, as opposed to the actual corruption that the population was subjected to, corruption had increased greatly. The data on perception in a given country can explain some phenomena. We must absolutely not neglect subjective data.

Yves Perraudau

I would like to illustrate what was just said about the image, the reality and the image of the reality. Reality does not exist, but we must try to perceive it as best we can. The media today has a tendency to falsify this reality. I will not go into the role of the media here, but communication is a product that must be sold, which means that we are much more interested in evolution and rhythm than journalism is, at its level.


As regards social illusions, excessive fishing is often mentioned, which would suggest,

for example in Europe, that there is an absence of regulation; whereas there are almost 1000 laws on the subject! This activity is much regulated.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

This is a scenario for possible complementarity between the quantitative and qualitative approaches. We will get back to that on Friday.

Figure 52 *Complementarity Between the Approaches*




Source: Authors' construction.

I want simply to emphasize the common ground shared by the two approaches where the quantitative approach will try to understand the behavior of individuals and their perceptions. On the one hand, we look more closely at macro-level or overall phenomena. We count averages, sums of individual behavior. On the qualitative side,

we do not consider that society is just a sum of individual behaviors, but that there are also many institutions, standards, etc. Therefore there is a complete logic in the behavior and the interactions of this society, which can escape the quantitative approach and must be taken into consideration in the analysis.

Figure 53 *Toward a Possible Linkage of the Approaches?*



Source: Authors' construction.

Increasingly, the two approaches mutually enrich each other. On the one hand, the proponents of the quantitative approach say that it would be interesting to illustrate their results using qualitative surveys in order to shed new light on them. On the other hand, researchers favoring the qualitative approach tend to resort to numbers in order to obtain an overall context in which to situate what happens on a local level.

[Christian Culas]

One of the most obvious limitations in the qualitative approach concerns the question of representativity. The anthropologist or sociologist needs to use quantitative data in order to know in which general context the object of research is based. The objects of social phenomena are increasingly complex

and connected (at national and international levels), and we call this globalization. Our methods of study, micro and macro, must often be linked in order to be able to understand a phenomenon in its entirety. The macro level is not sufficient, neither is the micro! We work more and more in the context of a dialogue between different scales of interpretation of social phenomena. It's by varying the scale of interpretation of the same phenomenon (for example agricultural activities) at the familial, communal, provincial, national, regional, etc. level, that we succeed in giving it a non-linear and coherent dimension, because most of the levels are linked to each other, so understanding this relationship helps us understand our object of study.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

We could imagine an ideal scenario, a true linkage between the two approaches, which is still extremely rare in reality. In the case of a complete articulation, we can imagine four successive phases:

- First phase, inductive (qualitative interview): field-level knowledge and information (actors, categories, markers, objectives, etc.);
- Second phase: "modeling" or elaboration of hypotheses ("theoretical model") based on the information in the first phase;
= translation of theoretical models into testable models (key variables to collect);

- Third phase: empirical analysis

Statistical survey using a representative sample: testing the "model" against statistical data in order to evaluate its accuracy

Descriptive and econometric analysis;

- Fourth phase: return to the field and in-depth interview.

First case: discovery of evidence of typical behavior (by the majority) but explanation of "exceptional findings", "outliers", other

results that need to be explained or made more explicit.

Second case: model not validated by statistical data, making it necessary to identify new elements

--> *new cycle of analysis*: induction/ modeling/estimation/validation.

For our workshop, we will start off with the statistical survey already in place. We will see if the results are coherent with those obtained from qualitative surveys. Then we will try to see if the range of variables of the statistical survey covers the whole field of study, if there are any phenomena, categories or indicators missing from the statistical study that it is necessary to reintroduce. We will also see how the qualitative interviews enrich the interpretations of the results obtained from the statistical survey. Finally, our objective is two-fold: an analytical objective, aiming to clarify the phenomena that we will study, the changes in progress, the logic for behavior and perceptions of individuals; and secondly a methodological objective, *i.e.* the comprehension of the reach and limitations of the two types of approaches.

Box 13 *Linkage. Objectives of the Workshop*

Compare the respective contributions of the quantitative or qualitative methods.

Qualitative interviews as a complement to a quantitative survey (our starting point). But the opposite could have been chosen: (quantitative approach as a complement to qualitative).

A. Verify the hypotheses in order to analyze the quantitative data.

Avoid possible errors of interpretation.

A1 Study the coherence of the results from the statistical (quantitative) survey and the semi-structured interviews (and if it is not coherent, why?).

A2 Verify if the quantitative interview (questionnaire) covers the study field.

Verify if the range of chosen indicators, themes, as well as the questions and the items defined during the creation of the quantitative questionnaire covers the whole field of study.

B. Analyze how the qualitative interviews, non structured or semi-structured, can enrich the interpretation of the data from the quantitative survey.

Bring precision to the results obtained by the questionnaire.

Broadening of the field of study by bringing in more information.

The interviews bring above all information on the logic behind the opinions and behavior of individuals.

Results

1. Analytical: explanation of current evolution and behavioral logic.

2. Methodological: reach and limitations of the two types of approaches.

Source: Authors' construction.

[François Roubaud]

Let's get to the practicalities. We will first look at an analysis of the informal sector using quantitative instruments. Then we will integrate two qualitative elements: socio-anthropological semi-structured interviews and non-structured interviews, on which we will work for three half-days. The goal of the Tam Đảo Summer School Week is above all methodological. The study of the informal sector in the economic transition provides us with a concrete case. You will therefore be involved in real time in a process of ongoing research.

What are the theoretical hypotheses? What is the global framework of questioning? The starting point is the retreat of agriculture in the Vietnamese economy and in Southeast Asia. If we simplify Rodolphe De Koninck's arguments, this agrarian transition is moving toward a form of industrialization and integration in the global market. It is the shift from a traditional society to an industrial and modern society as experienced in developing countries. In fact, this process of industrialization goes through a stage of informalization of the economy. Non-agricultural activities that are not modern develop – street vendors, tailors, repair

shops, etc. Is this a transitory phenomenon that will gradually disappear or a sustainable, permanent phenomenon?

To this, we add a theory more common in economics: dualism. For the informal sector, this theory can be set out in two ways: 1/ The informal sector is disconnected from the formal sector – there is therefore a form of independent economy –; the formal sector, in fact the modern sector, is a sort of enclave economy that has little impact on the majority of the population, and unlike a colonial economy, is not linked to the domestic economy; 2/ The informal sector is a passageway to the formal sector.

It is an intermediary stage in the shift from agriculture to modern forms of employment and large companies. This transitory sector is destined to disappear.

What does the quantitative approach applied to cases in Việt Nam tell us about these issues? We will work on these tables and graphics that set out associations and allow us to measure the impact of certain phenomena and make associations between variables, two by two. From the point of view of economics and statistics, there is a more complex “econometric” approach where we measure multiple correlations, trying to estimate the direction of causality.

Table 17 *National Context.
The Size of the Informal Sector*

Jobs per Institutional Sector in Vietnam

Institutional Sector	Jobs	Structure (%)	
	2009 (in1000)	2007	2009
Public	4 550	10.7	9.7
Foreign Co.	1 360	2.0	2.9
Private Domestic Co.	3 610	5.7	7.7
Formal Individual Co.	3 610	7.8	7.7
Informal Individual Co.	11 100	23.5	23.7
Agriculture	22 660	50.0	48.3
Total	46 890	100	100

➔ **Informal sector: first source of non-farm employment**
➔ **23% of total employment**
➔ **50% of non farm employment**
➔ **Estimates: 20% of the GNP 25% work revenue**

⇒ **On average, 1/3 of households get a part or the entirety of their revenue from the informal sector in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh Ville**

Source: LFS2007 & 2009, GSO; our own calculations.

What are the hypotheses and questions here? What are their limitations, seen from the point of view of a narrower qualitative

approach? The first question is to find out if this sector exists in the case of Việt Nam. How large is it?

I remind you that one of the first functions of quantitative analysis is to quantify the phenomena, the importance of different variables in a representative manner. A first step has already been taken in constructing this table. We have thought about what we want to obtain. Jobs have been divided up according to institutional sector: public sector, foreign enterprises, large domestic enterprises, small independent activities which are registered, and the informal sector – meaning individuals who work in non-agricultural activities and who are not registered with the state.

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

What is the hypothesis used? I assume that all people of working age and who have a job are allocated to only one institutional sector. Does the informal sector exist in Việt Nam? "Yes", undeniably, this sector exists; it accounts for 23.5%. It provides more jobs than any other sector of the Vietnamese economy, outside agriculture.

[François Roubaud]

What can we see in the 2007 and 2009 columns?

Nguyễn Hồng Bắc

The evolution of the informal sector will depend on the policies and the will of the state. Does the government want this sector, or does it want to develop it or suppress it? As in every country, the informal sector has always been considered as a transitory zone, a zone for buffering the shocks of crisis. In a crisis period, it creates the most employment. In order to understand this evolution, we need other parameters.

[François Roubaud]

That is an excellent response. There is the long and short term. The factors in play are not the same in different sectors. The crisis between 2007 and 2009 contributed to the growth of the informal sector, because many laid-off employees went into the informal sector. First analytical conclusion: the informal sector represents a huge part of the economy over the long term.

Yves Perraudau

Are these full-time jobs? What is the status of the spouse in agriculture?

[François Roubaud]

What does this table mean? What are its limitations? This is exactly the exercise that I want to carry out now, based on the questions asked. These jobs are not equivalent to full-time employment. They are simply employment, but in this sector we perhaps only work four hours per week; in which case the figure of 24% is greatly overestimated. Yves suggests that the informal sector is a stop-gap sector in which the average number of hours per week is relatively low, which means we have a bias if we simply quantify jobs.

The spouses are taken into account in the employment. We often give them the status of unpaid family help.

Let's go back to the question of limitations. Are the statistical categories that we use reliable? There are four major categories of workers: the employers, self-employed workers and those who are independent and do not employ workers, salaried workers and finally the unpaid family workers.

Table 18 *The blurred demarcations of Employment Status
LFS 2007 and 2009*

	LFS2007		LFS2009		GSO	
	MoLISA	GSO	GSO		LFS2007	LFS2009
Employer	0.8%	3.2%	4.8%	IHB (% jobs)	23.5%	23.7%
Self-employed Worker	34.3%	53.5%	44.8%	FHB (% jobs)	7.8%	7.8%
Wage Worker	22.5%	30.0%	33.9%			
Unpaid Family Worker	42.1%	12.9%	16.9%	IHB (PU/jobs)	15.9%	15.3%
Cooperative + Other	-	0.4%	0.3%	FHB (PU/jobs)	3.9%	3.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	HB (Farm & NF)	56.7%	49.6%

Total: Occupied Population. Other: Apprentice.

Sources: LFS 2007 & 2009, MoLISA, GSO; author's calculations.

Two identical surveys were done in 2007, one by the General Statistics Office (GSO) and the other by the Ministry of Labor (MoLISA). According to the MoLISA survey, 42% of the active population is unpaid family workers; but this figure is only 12% according to the Statistics Office, so one out of every three people is in the wrong category! This is an example of a blurred demarcation, a contradiction in the official statistics. Which is the right source?

The informal sector represents one quarter of employment. This figure is probably an underestimate for four reasons:

1) Only the figures for principal employment are considered here, whereas many people have several jobs. These are not taken into account in this table.

2) The life cycle. I can be in the formal sector today, but yesterday I was in the informal sector. I therefore have experience of informality in my life that is not measured by this table.

3) The perspective of the individual can be expanded to that of the household. In a household, there may be some formal employment, e.g. civil servants or workers in large companies, but the other household members may be informal. Thus informal revenue enters these households.

4) Jobs are measured according to a definition of the active population as starting at fifteen years old. However, some people may work between the ages of ten and fifteen years old – the children most likely to be working are those in agriculture or the informal sector.

Table 19 *Socio-demographic Characteristics
by Institutional Sector - Hà Nội*

Institutional Sector	Jobs (Nb)	Structure (%)	Rural (%)	Women (%)	Age	Education ≥ Grade 12 (%)*	Permanent Resident KT1 (%)
Public	590,748	17.82	28.4	49.6	37.9	79.3	82.3
Foreign Co.	133,963	4.04	69.4	64.7	26.9	51.8	62.3
Private Domestic Co.	416,298	12.55	40.3	41.7	32.1	47.3	77.6
Formal IE	256,682	7.74	45.7	45.7	36.9	31.2	86.9
Informal IE	1,051,296	31.70	69.5	43.3	38.8	15.7	92.4
Agriculture	866,219	26.12	93.9	61.0	42.9	9.2	99.5
Total	3,315,908	100	63.0	49.9	38.3	23.1	89.1

* LFS2007 for the level of education

IE Individual Enterprise or "Household Business".

Source: LFS2009, GSO; our own calculations.

We have quantified a huge phenomenon. Let's try to see what the associations of variables are in the theory of this transition. If we consider the idea of agrarian transition, with an informal sector that is a transitory informal sector: what should we expect to see?

Hypotheses. This sector will most likely be an urban sector bringing together individuals who are moving from the countryside toward formal employment in the city. These pass through the informal sector on their way to finding employment in the formal sector. It is secondary labor for households, for an additional income. This might involve those who have little or no education, and women.

For those who are not Vietnamese, in the last column "Permanent Residents with KT1 Status": these are individuals registered as permanent non-migrant residents in the neighborhood where they live.

Are these hypotheses validated in this table?

Virginie Diaz

I would say that the hypotheses are not validated. We see that this sector of individual informal enterprises is made up of 43.3% women. Therefore, there are more men. The informal sector is essentially a masculine sector. It is also a sector involving essentially permanent residents. There is no real migration as 92.4% of the sector consists of permanent residents. Finally, it is essentially rural: 69.5% of the people in the informal sector belong to a rural environment.

[François Roubaud]

Exactly. We must discount all the hypotheses on the informal sector in Việt Nam except for one: the concentration of unskilled individuals. The rate of higher education is very low. Only 15% have had higher education, in 80% of the public sector and 50% of the large enterprises.

Table 20 *Characteristics of Employment*

Characteristics of Employment by Institutional Sector

Institutional Sector	Experience (years)	Wage Workers (%)	Social Security (%)	No. of hrs per week	Revenue (1,000 VND/mo)
Public	11.2	98.7	87.4	44.4	1,717
Foreign Co.	4.0	99.4	82.8	51.0	1,622
Private Domestic Co.	4.4	92.4	42.8	51.5	1,682
Formal IE	7.1	34.4	1.9	52.4	1,762
Informal IE	7.9	23.9	0	47.5	1,097
Agriculture	16.9	7.2	0.1	39.5	652
Total	12.4	30.0	14.2	43.8	1,06

- ⇒ **Many years of experience**
- ⇒ **Low rate of salaried employment**
- ⇒ **No protection**
- ⇒ **Low revenue**

Source: LFS2007, GSO; our own calculations.

Yves Perraudau

We need an idea of the average number of hours worked in Việt Nam per week. I believe that this must be around forty-four hours. These will indeed then be full-time jobs, because they are above forty-four hours – 47.5 hours.

[François Roubaud]

Absolutely, the informal sector is a sector of precarious employment. You see that social protection is non-existent, that the revenues are the lowest after those of agriculture. The reason for this is not at all that these are temporary jobs. These are jobs where people work harder than elsewhere and for longer periods of time: 7.9 years.

We will try to prove or disprove the fact that the informal sector is an enclave economy, or a transitional passageway between agriculture and the formal sector.

Table 21 *Matrix of Transition in the Labor Market
(excluding inactive and unemployed)*

	Agriculture	(Non-Farm) Formal employment	(Non-Farm) Informal employment	Total
2002	2004			
Agricultural	86.2	2.6	11.2	100
Formal employment (Non-Farm)	6.3	75.4	18.4	100
Informal employment (Non-Farm)	17.6	11.6	70.8	100
Total	61.1	14.8	24.1	100
2004	2006			
Agricultural	88.3	2.6	9.1	100
Formal employment (Non-Farm)	7.8	76.3	16.0	100
Informal employment (Non-Farm)	18.4	11.2	70.3	100
Total	59.6	15.6	24.8	100
2002	2006			
Agricultural	82.8	3.9	13.3	100
Formal employment (Non-Farm)	6.7	74.4	19.0	100
Informal employment (Non-Farm)	20.8	12.1	67.1	100
Total	59.6	15.6	24.8	100

= an important proportion of transition of farm jobs to informal non-farm jobs**

Source : VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006, GSO ; Nguyen, Nordman, Roubaud (2010).

Nguyễn Hữu Chí, C.J. Nordman, F. Roubaud (2010), "Panel data analysis of the dynamics of labour allocation and earnings in Vietnam", Communication at the international conference on "The informal sector and informal employment: Statistical Measurement, Economic Implications and Public Policies", organized by AFD, DFID, GSO, ILO, IRD, MOLISA, UNDP, VASS, World Bank, Hà Nội, May, 6-7, 2010.

86% of the people who worked in agriculture in 2002 were still in agriculture in 2004. What are the characteristics of the survey used? We start with individual employment in 2002 and we see what they have become in 2004 or we start with 2004 and look at what they became in 2006. The same examination can be made between 2002 and 2006.

There are two ways to study individual trajectories:

- We survey today then we ask: "What were you doing before?" The difficulty is the retrospective survey: we try to trace the trajectory (as we do in the qualitative

approach). However, the people do not necessarily remember what they were doing in the past, or are tempted to make up stories. People have a tendency to transform reality;

- We undertake panel studies: we do a survey one year, then the next time we interview the same people. Here, we carried out a survey in 2002, and then we came back in 2004 and 2006. Panel studies are extremely complicated to put into place, but at the same time they give very interesting results on individual trajectories.

Here we have some matrices of transition. These are the classic tables of quantitative

sociology as regards social mobility. Is there movement between the informal sector and other sectors? Does a person stay in the informal sector?

If we go back to the hypotheses that we formulated: are the sections of the economy sealed off from each other? If yes, 100% of those who were in agriculture in 2002 will still be there in 2004 and 100% of those who work in the informal sector in 2002 will still be there in 2004. We see that in reality, there is a transition: movement from agriculture to the formal sector, from agriculture to the informal sector, but also from the informal sector into agriculture or from formal employment into agriculture.

If we look at the first column, we have the impression that people are leaving agriculture essentially to go into the informal sector. This validates the hypothesis "agriculture / informal / formal". But if we look at the intermediary stage of the informal sector, when people come out of the informal sector they return to agriculture. The informal sector is closely tied into the system of transition of employment. During his/her life, an individual can go from one sector to another; these transitions are complex and not as simple as put forward by the dualist position.

Table 22 *Changes in Revenues by Job 2002, 2004 and 2006 (except for farm jobs)*

2002	2004				Total
	Formal Wage Worker	Informal Wage worker	Formal Self-employed	Informal Self-employed	
Formal Wage Worker	34.5	1.5	68.0	-8.4	29.9
Informal Wage Worker	18.4	31.2	240.5	91.4	45.1
Formal Self-Employed	-18.2	-66.1	14.6	19.0	6.2
Informal Self-Employed	-50.1	-29.8	55.1	23.0	20.2
Total	21.8	5.9	31.1	17.7	18.7
2006					
2004					
Formal Wage Worker	27.8	38.4	15.4	35.0	28.3
Informal Wage Worker	18.7	24.1	150.0	104.7	36.2
Formal Self-Employed	-61.8	-44.0	31.6	40.1	27.0
Informal Self-Employed	1.9	-17.4	43.7	28.6	27.2
Total	24.5	17.2	38.2	36.5	29.5

- Decrease in revenues for those who go from self-employment to wage work
- Strong increase in revenue for those who go from informal wage work to self-employment

Source : VHLSS 2002, 2004 et 2006, GSO ; Nguyen, Nordman, Roubaud (2010)

Nguyễn Hữu Chí, C.J. Nordman, F. Roubaud (2010), "Panel data analysis of the dynamics of labour allocation and earnings in Vietnam", Communication at the international conference on "The informal sector and informal employment: Statistical Measurement, Economic Implications and Public Policies", organized by AFD, DFID, GSO, ILO, IRD, MOLISA, UNDP, VASS, World Bank, Hà Nội, May, 6-7, 2010.

Why would someone move from the informal sector to the formal sector? Is the pay higher? Transition towards independent status – be it formal or informal – for wage workers in the informal sector seems to be economically profitable. In reality, it is more complicated: when individuals shift from an informal to

a formal salary, they may see an increase of 18%; the increase is 31% if they stay in the informal sector. The shift to the formal sector as a wage worker is not necessarily beneficial: in many formal enterprises, the employees are not well paid.

Table 23 *Reasons for Creating a Family Production Unit*

Main reason for setting up an HB (% of HBs)

Industry	Did not find wage-earning work (large enterprise)	Did not find wage-earning work (HBs)	To get a better income	To be independent (own boss)	By family tradition	Other	Total
Hanoi							
Manufacturing.	25.4	15.5	28.2	14.7	9.0	7.2	100
Trade	32.9	8.8	28.8	18.3	1.4	9.7	100
Services	30.8	13.1	29.0	10.6	1.0	15.5	100
Total IHB	30.6	11.9	28.8	14.2	2.6	11.8	100
Total FHB	13.8	6.5	33.9	31.0	10.5	4.4	100
Total HB	27.3	10.9	29.8	17.5	4.2	10.4	100
Ho Chi Minh City							
Manufacturing.	12.1	9.9	12.4	37.2	17.6	10.7	100
Trade	22.2	8.8	14.3	36.1	4.5	14.0	100
Services	19.9	13.3	16.1	31.2	4.7	14.8	100
Total IHB	18.9	11.1	14.7	34.1	7.4	13.7	100
Total FHB	6.4	2.4	18.3	54.4	12.5	6.1	100
Total HB	15.7	9.0	15.7	39.2	8.8	11.7	100

Source: HB&IS Survey, Hà Nội (2007), Hồ Chí Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; our own calculations.

Why do individuals choose, or are they obliged, to create small enterprises in the informal sector? The dualist hypothesis that we seek to test is: you work in the informal sector because you cannot find a job in the formal sector. In this table, for all of the informal businesses in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, the reasons for which individuals and business leaders chose this sector are: *“because we cannot find a salaried position in the large companies,” “to earn more money in the informal sector,” “in order*

to be independent,” “because it is the family tradition,” etc.

Do you think this hypothesis is true or false?

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

We cannot give a clear answer based only on this table.

[François Roubaud]

On the contrary, I think that we can answer “yes”. In Hà Nội, 30% of the people who work

in the informal sector wanted to have a job in large companies. The same is true for 19% in Hồ Chí Minh City.

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

Those who work in Hồ Chí Minh City want to be independent.

[François Roubaud]

Here is the answer to the question. In Hà Nội, those who want to be independent are in the minority (14%; 34% in Hồ Chí Minh City).

In the two cities, many say that they are working in the informal sector because they have not found work in the formal sector. But what is the principal reason for setting up an enterprise? To earn more money, or to be independent? This will be useful in your interviews: what are the advantages of working in the informal sector? It is still the case that the hypotheses formulated by economists and researchers are not true. People do not start an independent enterprise with the ultimate goal of getting work in the formal sector. This is true only for a minority, between one-third and one-fifth.

Table 24 *Prospects in the Informal Sector*

<i>Hà Nội</i>	% of heads of PU who believe in a future for their PU	% of heads of PU who want children to carry on with business
Manufacturing	64.0	33.5
Commerce	44.2	18.1
Services	31.7	15.0
Total Informal PU	42.2	19.5
Total Formal PU	73.4	37.1
Total PU	48.3	22.9

- ⇒ **The heads of production units are not optimistic**
- **only 42% consider that their PU has a future**
 - **less than 20% want their children to carry on the PU**

Source: 1-2-3 Survey, Phase 2: Household Business and Informal Sector (HB & IS), Hà Nội (2007), GSO-IRD-DIAL.

This table presents the responses to these two questions, which were asked of the heads of individual enterprises:

- Do you think that your enterprise will improve in future, that you will be able to earn more?
- Do you want your children to take over your business when you retire?

The informal sector, for various reasons, can provide better earnings, and independence. But are the people working in the informal sector more optimistic about their future?

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

They do not want their children to take over the business.

[François Roubaud]

Exactly. But then, where do they want their children to work? They want them to work for the government, in the public sector.

At the beginning, we thought that the people working in the informal sector wanted their children to work in the private sector and in particular for foreign companies.

Table 25 *Prospects in the Informal Sector*

Industries	Heads of HB who think that their HB has a future	Heads of HB who wish their children continue HB	If no, in which sector would you like them to work?					
			Public	Domestic enterprise	Foreign enterprise	HB	Agriculture	Total
Manuf.	56.4%	23.9%	72.2%	11.1%	8.8%	1.5%	0.0%	100
Trade	39.3%	13.9%	62.3%	17.7%	13.1%	5.2%	0.5%	100
Services	43.3%	14.4%	64.5%	14.1%	14.3%	3.8%	0.0%	100
Total IHB	45.0%	16.6%	65.3%	14.9%	12.6%	3.9%	0.2%	100
Total FHB	67.2%	39.4%	69.7%	6.0%	20.0%	3.4%	0%	100
Total HB	48.4%	20.0%	65.8%	13.9%	13.4%	3.8%	0.2%	100

Source: HB&IS survey, Hà Nội (2009), GSO-ISS / IRD-DIAL.

According to you, how should we interpret this response? Only a qualitative survey can give some answers. What is your opinion on the question?

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

Stability.

[François Roubaud]

Yes. Stability is an important element.

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

Social security.

[François Roubaud]

Even if social security is not perfect, it is still preferable to have it. There are various

advantages, notably the fact of getting a retirement pension.

Pattiya Jimreivat

Respect.

[François Roubaud]

Indeed. When you work in the administration, people respect you – more so than a simple street vendor. Less stress? Yes. In the public sector, you are supposed to arrive at a certain time in the morning and leave at a certain time in the afternoon. In the private sector, you can be fired more easily.

[Christian Culas]

Working in the public sector and occupying a senior-level post can also be financially

beneficial, because it is possible to be paid for services rendered with “envelopes”.

[François Roubaud]

The public sector can bring more power.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

We will now move to the analysis of the qualitative interviews that we have handed out. We will concentrate the analysis on two interview re-transcriptions: one with the “*bún riêu*” (crab vermicelli) seller and one with the grilled duck seller. Then Mireille will present a comparison between the results of the six interviews that we have handed out and expand on them a little, with quantitative data that we have gathered on these same vendors and informal enterprises. We will finish with a critical approach from Christian Culas on the responses to these interviews and on the manner in which they were conducted.

We will hear from each group. We would like for one person in each group to present the analysis that you have made according to the principal criteria that we asked you to analyze. Given the limited time and the time needed for translation, each person should speak for no more than three minutes.

We ask that you give us your observations on: 1/ the professional migratory trajectory; 2/ the link between trajectory and satisfaction; 3/ the social networks (how do different people interact, mobilizing social contacts for business?); 4/ how are relationships with the other members of the family organized, in the context of business activity and the evolution of their trajectory?

Group A Presentation

Some information concerning the “*bún riêu*” vendor, Mrs. Hạnh, and her family. She was born in 1967 and her husband was born in 1965. They have 2 children, born in 1990 and 1992. Mrs. Hạnh completed middle school – until 9th grade in Việt Nam – and her husband through 8th grade; their daughter graduated from high school; their son studied until 11th grade.

Mrs. Hạnh has been working since she was 19 years old, first for four years as an employee in a production unit for bicycles, then in a bicycle tire manufacturer. She got married and had two children. Since 1993, she has been selling crab vermicelli, like her mother-in-law. She works in the street, on the sidewalk. She does not have a set place for her work. Her daily revenue is not very high, around 200,000 đồng. This is the main source of income for the family. The social network of Mrs. Hạnh is not very wide because she is registered in another neighborhood. Because of this, she has little support from the public authorities or from her neighbors.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

This is still a bit factual. Has this lady changed jobs many times? Is this stable? At the outset, she said that she started working at 15 years old, but she gives information only from the age of 19. This is a problem.

Group B Presentation

Her husband has a small job. That revenue is for his own needs. He contributes little to the needs of the family. Mrs. Hạnh seems satisfied with her work. After deducting all the expenses for the purchase of raw materials, she makes 200,000 đồng per day. She chose

to become a vermicelli vendor in order to be able to work and take care of her children.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

There is a lot more to say about this survey.

Group C Presentation

Mrs. Hạnh does not want to develop her small business because she doesn't think that she has the competence required for managing employees. She does not want to register with the public authorities either, to become a formal production unit.

Level of satisfaction: she is not very satisfied with her work even though the revenue allows her to cover the family's daily expenses. The government has forbidden the circulation of cyclo-rickshaws in the neighborhood, and her husband can no longer contribute to the family's income. The main reason for choosing this job is financial. Finally, she mentions no social network. In order to start her small business, she borrowed from individuals. She has no established contact with the women's association.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

Apparently you have done a very thorough job. Many ideas come out of what you say.

Group D Presentation

According to us, Mrs. Hạnh decided to become a vermicelli vendor because it was her mother-in-law's trade and the neighborhood did not have many other vermicelli vendors. Her husband was a cyclo-rickshaw driver previously. He is now a moto-taxi driver because he can no longer physically drive a cyclo. This has nothing to do with the new regulation. We think that Mrs. Hạnh will work at her job for a long

time: it is her principal source of revenue, her house on the street is an advantage, she has adopted a sales strategy to keep clients loyal. She will not expand her activities because she doesn't think she has sufficient management skills. Moreover, her husband is in the house all day, so she can only sell in the evening.

Her professional history is essentially related to personal reasons. We believe that her choice depends on her level of education, her personal skills and the fact that she could not find work in the formal sector. She receives nothing from the public authorities. Her case is certainly representative of a large part of the population.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

I will ask the last group to sum up or perhaps to give an opinion on what the other groups have said.

Group E Presentation


Mrs. Hạnh's clientele is regular and there is little competition. She faces financial difficulties. The interest on her debt is high. A large part of her revenue is used for paying off her debt. Also, the construction work to widen the road will disturb her activities. Finally – a rare occurrence but a major limitation – in 2007 her business activities were halted by bad quality ingredients.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

This exercise is a little like a police investigation where we are looking for clues to try and find the answers to our questions. These clues are somewhat difficult to decipher, and each one has given different, but complementary answers. Here are some additional elements for analysis:

Figure 54 *Sketch of the trajectory, constraints and motivations of the head of a business unit in the informal sector*

Chi Hạnh (42yrs), vermicelli vendor – bún riêu



Source: Authors' construction.

Trajectory and prospects. We note some uncertainty which emerges from the presentation of a person's life story. I believe that the interviewers who are familiar with this type of approach are used to this ambiguity when we ask uneducated individuals to speak about their present life or their past. It is interesting to point out the stability of her current work; 17 years of activity in the same sector, even if it is informal. Is selling vermicelli sustainable? You have touched on this subject many times. But it is still not clear. She doesn't state clearly why she started this small business. She tells us only that her mother-in-law also sold vermicelli, but she doesn't say that this is the reason. That's our interpretation.

Social Networks. You have said some interesting things even if this issue is not developed much in the questionnaire. Mrs. Hạnh borrows from people that she knows are in difficult situations, she says this very clearly.

Functioning of the family. Her daughter helps with the business every day for a few hours. So the mother and daughter are the only ones working.

The same exercise is repeated using the analysis of a survey conducted with a former soldier currently working in the restaurant industry (study called "Grilled Duck")


[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

We have analyzed the two studies we gave you; they are part of a series of sixty very rich qualitative interviews conducted in Hồ Chí Minh City and in Hà Nội.

Our challenge now is to use the information in these two life trajectories in the best way possible. The idea is not to look at the figures in detail, but to take a step back in order to examine the first things we have learned both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

How does the population experience and perceive the phenomenon of the economic transition in progress today in Việt Nam? Two phenomena are presently in progress: urbanization and a growing importance of the private sector and therefore the industrialization of the country. The general tendency is to believe that we are shifting from a primarily agricultural country to a growth in employment in the modern industrial sector. We also note an informalization of the labor market. Is it transitory? Will the informal sector disappear to make way for the modern sector?

Figure 55 *Typology of Household Businesses (HB)*



Source: HB&IS Survey, Hà Nội (2007), Hồ Chí Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL, Authors' calculations (using DTM "Data and Text Mining" software).

In resorting to data analysis techniques (analysis of multiple links), three groups of family enterprises must be identified. The most precarious are headed by uneducated people; they are often located in the street and are mobile. Most of the individuals say that they have not found paid work in the private sector. The skills are often learned on the job. The second group, that we can call "resourceful", has unit leaders with a slightly higher level of education; they usually have premises – their house – and have learned their trade through experience, either having worked in another private company or in a large private or public enterprise. The choice of activity is often linked to family tradition and is not necessarily due to constraints in the labor market. Finally, the last group, the "most professional", is made up of more formal

enterprises. The level of education is high, the enterprise is of larger scale; these individuals have chosen to create their informal units for the sake of independence.

The number of years these enterprises have been in existence does not affect whether they belong to a group. It does not seem that a very precarious unit becomes a large, more professional, more formal unit over time.

Why does the quantitative approach provide an overall framework in which to situate the whole analysis? Is there coherence between the results of the two approaches? What is the additional information provided by the qualitative approach?

If we look at the results obtained on average in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, as well as those of the production units in the

qualitative interviews, we can compare and categorize the latter in terms of size, production and revenue. All of the units in the qualitative interviews are in the “most professional” category. On average, the production units – both formal and informal – make four million đồng per month. The majority of the qualitative interviews we have studied concern units that earn more than the average.

Let's illustrate the characteristics of the people interviewed in the qualitative approach.

At least six points of convergence can be highlighted:

- 1) Creation of production units is disconnected from possible search for work in the formal sector;
- 2) The interviewees seem to point out an improvement in living conditions (this point is verified at the quantitative level, not on the qualitative level);
- 3) Increase in revenue when the individuals go from wage work to self-employment;
- 4) Instability and uncertainty surrounding these activities. The individuals are not sure about their future, the revenue is not stable;
- 5) The level of initial investment is very limited;
- 6) Practically no individual wants his/her children to continue the activity: *“I would like a real job for my son”, “it is just temporary, I would like for my daughter to work in the public sector”*. This confirms statistical results.

We note two inconsistent elements between the qualitative and quantitative surveys. They concern the number of employees in a production unit and the source of investment funds. First of all we see inconsistencies

resulting from oversights: not taking into consideration the girl who works only two hours in the enterprise, for example, or the woman who helps from time to time. For statistical surveys, it is necessary to point out: “Any person who contributes to a production unit must be counted as an employee/worker in this production unit”. Then the figures show that in terms of a percentage of the value of capital, most investment comes from savings and inheritance (93%) while the qualitative surveys show that many individuals resort to borrowing from their family or their friends.

The qualitative approach shows the extremely complex trajectories of individuals that have had many jobs in their life before their current production unit. People go from the formal private sector to the informal sector; others who worked in public enterprises are self-employed. Some had other trades in the informal sector and have only changed activity. The backgrounds are extremely different.

The vast majority of the enterprise owners say that they have no future: does this mean that these activities are destined to disappear? Is the informal phenomenon transitory or not?

The individual entrepreneurs would not like for their children to work in this sector. Thus, if they get what they wish for, there will be no one to work in the informal sector later on. Why do they say that their activity has no future? It seems that there is much uncertainty in their activity that prevents them from considering further investment. Or else, they are not sure of themselves as regards their qualifications and capacity to invest more. They have access to funds, they can ask those close to them, but only to a limited extent. It is difficult to go from a micro-enterprise to

a larger enterprise. They say that there is no future in their enterprise and do not want their children to continue their activity, but they want to keep their activity. They do not have the opportunity or the desire to leave the informal sector. Therefore, these activities will last.

The importance of the family context was reinforced. The motivations behind the creation of informal units might be linked to the birth of a second child or the fact that the husband does not earn enough money. These factors count for as much as does the dynamic of the enterprise.

Another interesting point that we do not see in the quantitative surveys concerns social networks. These networks include the family, nuclear or extended, as a source of capital and place of activity – does the family have a house or not? Does the house have access directly onto the street? It is also through these networks that trades are learned.

"To find work, you need either money or contacts"; "You must make friends and partnerships in business". There is mutual aid, exchange of workers between partners even if there is no formal association. Not being registered in the neighborhood seems to have an influence on the possibility of accessing support: "I have not contributed to the administrative services of the neighborhood, so how can I get a loan"?

Day 3, Wednesday, July 21

2.2.3. Qualitative Mini-surveys in the Field: Framing and Preparation

[Christian Culas]

We will begin this day by preparing for Thursday morning's field surveys. We will use the interviews you read yesterday and extract elements of method, but also note limitations.

Our exercise is delicate because an anthropological study is usually prepared over a long period of time and not in half a day, like today. Moreover, the anthropological survey is an interaction between a researcher and an interviewee. The researcher must listen to the person that he/she is questioning. To clarify the anthropological method, we could say that an anthropologist is a little like a wood sculptor: even if we have an excellent professor, it is necessary to work the wood for hours, make attempts and mistakes, learn to touch and feel the material for yourself (no book can teach that), much like learning to tell what people want and can say, in order to make them talk without making them uncomfortable. So there are no methods that are applicable automatically, but basic principles that guide us – and above all lots of practice.

I've picked out the main types problems from the surveys that we worked on at the beginning of the week:

- the "research questions", or office questions, and the "questions asked in the field". These are two types of questions that we must keep in mind. The problem is not negligible. In the transcriptions of interviews that you have, I was able to extract four pages of

examples where the interviewer asks the interviewee to answer “research questions”! This is an error in method. An office question is abstract, often very complex; for example *“To which social network do you belong?”*; the field question is practical, simple, easy to understand, and refers to the concrete experience of the interviewee, for example *“Where will you sell your vegetables?”* or *“How many times per week do you go to the city for your work?”*;

- in principle, a survey is associated with the use of open questions. However, these are often linked to closed questions. Statistical surveys and questionnaires favor closed questions as they are easier to manage (computerization is easy). This type of question can be in a mathematical form: “Yes”, “No”, “No answer” or “Maybe”. If you ask the person: “Tell me about when you arrived in Tam Đảo”, you may end up with long narratives that will be complicated for data management. In comparison to statistical surveys, the semi-structured interview generates much information because it does not involve closed questions;
- poor listening. This creates two types of problems: the person interviewed can feel a bit frustrated; and as to producing your data, you will obviously omit some important things. If someone wants to speak to you about a subject, and you cut them off to talk about something else, you will lose a great deal of information;
- lack of logical follow-up: we talk about something then, all of a sudden, the researcher or the interviewee thinks of a question and simply changes the subject. In the “Grilled Duck” survey, I noted four or five places where this happened;
- “moral and sanction” – type questions and remarks. For example, in the “Iron Doors”

interview, the researcher says: *“Ah! You don’t pay taxes? You must pay your taxes!”*. It’s not the researcher’s position to say that; you must avoid speaking as a representative of the law or the government; it is not the function of the researcher. The interviewee will become stressed and stop answering questions. In Tam Đảo, for example, you see animals captured in the forest being sold in the market. It is absolutely forbidden by law, but you are not going to say this to the vendor.

Your job is also to create a relationship of goodwill with the person being interviewed. All these elements create distance and suspicion. You must find issues and subjects where you will have common ground.

Take an example of establishing the trust of a specific informer. Đồng Kỳ village is in Bắc Ninh province. It is a very rich village because they make sculptured wood furniture inlaid with mother of pearl. As an anthropologist, I wanted to study the poorest people in the village. There are many reports on this village that speak only about the workers and the bosses, but as this village is a showcase for successful craftwork, we are not talking about the poorest. After several days, we realized that the poorest individuals were those that were in charge of transporting wood with a little horse-drawn cart. The furniture makers and our Vietnamese research colleagues told us: *“Listen, in this village, the interviews are difficult. These people live in a closed world. They do not want to talk. In particular, the transporters are very difficult to interview.”* So we thought up a strategy for starting up contact with these people. Their horses were tied up outside near a stock of wood. I approached them and started looking at a horse; the horses are looked after with

loving care by their drivers. Then the owner came over and we started to talk about his horse: where he had bought, how old it was, did he have others? etc. Then I asked him which technique they used for shoeing the horses (there are two techniques), what type of iron they used, and who knew how to do this in the village? He was surprised by these detailed questions that had such relevance to his daily life. He had the impression that he shared a part of his daily life with the foreign researcher – this is true and it was my objective to make him feel this. I explained then that my grandfather and father were blacksmiths, and that I practiced the trade when I was younger, but with little experience. We were then invited into his home; we met all the cart drivers and could carry out good-quality interviews. It is relatively easy to enter into contact with these horse drivers if we know how to enter their world, listen to them and pay attention to the focus of their activities. But I spent almost one hour making contact, something that is not possible when we have to “get through” the questionnaires.

Among those who have already conducted anthropological surveys, have you already used this sort of strategy to enter into contact?

Souphanthong Douanglattana

I am not an anthropologist. My master's degree subject was “The Representation of Ethnic Minorities in the Media”. When people asked about my study subject, I answered that I was working in the archives on documents about development economics because the subject was taboo.

[Christian Culas]

You have to have a strategy in order to hide the truth about your research a little and to try to gain information. You know that the information is there. If you come as a journalist, you are almost certain not to get the information. When we work on a subject, even a banal subject like social networks, it can be interesting to introduce yourself to peasants without giving the subject of your study. If we say that we are working on social networks, people will only talk about that. It is necessary to find a broader subject, for example “Development in Rural Zones”. The objective is not to mislead your informers, but find a way to avoid confining them to over-narrow themes which hide from us the other facets of reality.

[François Roubaud]

We understand that we are trying to establish trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. Can giving money or presents be a strategy?

[Christian Culas]

The situation is common in Việt Nam. If we work for one of the institutes that depend on the Academy of Social Sciences, we must pay the interviewees. This method has been much discussed. I think that it creates more problems than advantages. Such a situation is not healthy for a survey. In rural areas, in Việt Nam, people often do not accept money from researchers, and if they do, they give fruit in exchange to balance out your “gift”.

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

One of the objectives is to build trust between the interviewer and interviewee. There may be abuses of this trust by some surveyors:

"I am here to help you, you can benefit from it."
Some individuals can thus profit from the trust given. In some cases, the interviewees are too busy to answer the questions; they tell us: *"Put what you want, improvise. I will attest to it."*

[Christian Culas]

You show us cases that are on the ethical borderline. To make people believe that we will help them is very dangerous. When a person does not really say what they are working on, says that they are working on the economy for the archives, that's not so serious. In countries like France, or Việt Nam, all of the ethical conditions for research have not yet been formalized. In Australia for example, when you propose a research subject for a Master's degree or doctorate, you go before a scientific committee that analyzes the relevance of your subject and an ethics committee that evaluates the subject and the method.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

We can see whether the quantitative and qualitative approaches are complementary or not, in methodology and results. To some extent, Christian's arguments apply to statistical surveys as well. I've been involved in some field surveys where the relationship between the interviewer and interviewee was extremely cold. The interviewee gets tired and only responds in order to get the questionnaire over with. We could reasonably doubt the reliability of the answers! During a statistical survey, time is scarce because the number of people interviewed is large. It is necessary to establish a link, find something in a few minutes that will establish trust.

We have surveyed for many years in the same area of Madagascar. We made sure

that the results were presented to the community afterwards. This allowed us to use the information and to discuss it with the authorities. It is important to make a public presentation of the results so that afterwards they may be taken up and disseminated by the press, for example.

[Christian Culas]

Mireille has widened the discussion and touched on a subject that is much discussed in anthropology: surveys of a population in reality consist of "taking" something. But what do the researchers give in exchange? To say "this will help you develop" is a bit delicate because researchers cannot make the authorities do anything. However, it is possible for us to deliver our results, the work.

Trần Thị Hồng Thủy

In 2005, we carried out a survey on the business environment in Việt Nam. Interviews were conducted with businesses about their perception of corruption and the difficulties they experienced with the public authorities. The surveys showed a high level of discontent among enterprises as regards their relations with the public authorities and a high level of corruption. We published our results and submitted the work to the enterprises that participated; in exchange, to thank us for the work we did, we received money.

[Christian Culas]

An envelope in Việt Nam has at least two meanings: it can be synonymous with corruption, but it can also be a means of creating a link in the form of a present.

When you ask questions, qualitative, quantitative or semi-structured, try to put yourself in the place of the interviewee:

"I am in my home, in my shop, strange people arrive that I don't know and who I will probably never see again, and they spend four hours asking me questions on my life, my family, my work." This is an embarrassing situation to say the least! Also, we often hear from young, inexperienced researchers – anthropologists, sociologists and maybe even statisticians – complex questions such as: *"Can you explain to me the impact of the economic crisis on your revenue over the last ten years?"* Obviously, answering this type of question is not easy, it is a typical example of an "office question"; a question that the researcher asks himself in the office, but with the interviewees the questions must be different to get valuable responses. You must think hard about the meaning of the questions asked during the survey.

Let's go back to the methodological problems. In the "Iron Door" survey, which is a well-designed survey, I nonetheless noted some problems. We ask the manufacturer to "compare the advantages and difficulties in your business since 2008", bringing in the effects of the crisis. Obviously, it is a question that the people cannot answer. This is exactly the type of question that a researcher asks in his office but that we cannot ask during an interview. One of the keys for formulating questions that make sense out of abstract, constructed questions is to deconstruct them into smaller elements that are easy to understand. The principle is to ask questions that are as practical and concrete as possible. It is up to you to deconstruct the office questions in order to make field questions.

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

What you explain here is very interesting. It highlights the importance of training

interviewers before the field survey. In the General Statistics Office, there are training courses for interviewers so as to present the questionnaire and the methodology. We use this opportunity to test the questionnaire, because in Việt Nam, depending on the region, the vocabulary used is different.

[Christian Culas]

If you have three ideas, you must ask three questions; all of the work consists then in reconstructing the responses to these questions.

Let's move on to another type of problem: the shift from questions that are a priori open to closed questions.

In the so-called "Grilled Duck" survey, the researcher asks: *"Have you faced difficulties in establishing your business?"*, and adds: *"For example, finding clients, etc."* The interviewee will then be focused on the propositions made by the researcher, which is a typical profile for closed responses.

Another example. The researcher is trying to find out how often the restaurant receives deliveries of duck and other materials. Instead of asking: *"When do you receive deliveries?"*, he says: *"Do you get deliveries every day?"*. The person being interviewed will try to answer positively because that is easier; if he demurs, his response must be justified.

Are there any questions on my remarks and examples? Is it clear? You have noticed that my question was closed...

[François Roubaud]

Can you ask it again in an open field question form?

[Christian Culas]

That would be: *"I tried to explain to you two types of problems. I could not further expand on the subject. If you need any explanation, please do not hesitate to ask. It is very important that you understand what I said."* You see that the introduction of the question is a reminder of the context and a more supple approach in order to put people at ease and establish trust?

Cristina Bellinins Lieven

In the "Crab Soup" survey, two interviewers ask the questions. Several times, they were speaking almost at the same time. How should we work as a team when we are dealing with a single interviewee?

[Christian Culas]

Ideally an interpersonal relationship is created: one researcher, one interviewee. If not, one of the surveyors can be in charge of taking notes. A good surveyor can write while looking the person in the eyes to keep contact. If you can't do that, you ask the questions and your colleague takes notes.

Cristina Bellinins Lieven

We will be working with a translator. Is there any specific advice you can give for this?

[Christian Culas]

The principle is to try to express yourself in short sentences, without complicated words. Think of the interpreter's job which includes understanding what you say and translating it while at the same time being attentive to the behavior of the interviewee. It is a complex and delicate job.

Mohamad Zain Musa

While out and about in Tam Đảo, I saw different ethnic groups. Could we work on ethnic diversity, or proceed with surveys on the organization of the Summer School?

[Christian Culas]

The ethnic groups San Dìu and Kinh are present in Tam Đảo, but it is impossible to tell them apart physically. The percentage of San Dìu is small. They are all dressed the same way. As for the study of the Summer School, why not! You must know, however, that the people the hardest to study are researchers and politicians. A researcher will say why, how, etc.; and you will certainly get lost in his/her answer; a politician will try to say nothing, but with pretty phrases that will seduce you!

How can we get to the question of transition in Việt Nam, from our studies of the informal sector?

Box 14 *Problem and Hypotheses*

General Problem: how does the transition in Việt Nam translate in the case of the street vendor of Tam Đảo?

Research Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1) The street vendors in Tam Đảo are people who migrated recently (less than a generation).

Hypothesis 2) The street vendors of Tam Đảo are people who have been settled in Tam Đảo for many generations.

Hypothesis 3) The street vendors of Tam Đảo came here through an aid network? Who makes up this network?

Hypothesis 4) (to develop from data produced during the field survey).

Source: Author.

The category "Street Vendor" is a very general classification. They can be knick-knack sellers, motorbike-taxi drivers, hairdressers, fruit and vegetable sellers, etc. We come back to our four axes of research (trajectories of individuals, motivations and constraints, social networks, and characteristics of other members of the family). Depending on our results, we'll advance other hypotheses.

The risk is that the hypotheses that we have put forward are too simple for the reality that we want to study. We apply empirical adequacy. Between our hypotheses and the field, we need to be flexible to try and build relationships. This is one of the specific characteristics of anthropological survey: we have hypotheses, and we go to the field several times. Our hypotheses will then change because the data produced bring in new elements; our data and our hypotheses are under construction.

[François Roubaud]

Iteration is an integral, obligatory part of the socio-anthropological approach. It can also be used in the quantitative approach, through surveys. We conducted a survey in this way on the informal sector in 2007; you saw the results presented yesterday morning. We had a few areas of dissatisfaction as regards the answers given. Here are two examples:

- 1) Parents who have business units in the informal sector do not want their children to take over the business. In the first survey, we stopped at this conclusion. In the new survey, we added the question: "You do not want them to work in the same informal production unit as you; so where do you want them to work?" We have presented the results to you: they all want their children to work in the public sector;

2) You remember that the sources of finance to start an enterprise were essentially savings, inheritance and, to a lesser extent, the family. Then we learned that in Việt Nam, there is a form of informal financing, “tontines” – a group of people all chip in the same amount, then each person receives the whole pot in turn. In the 2009 survey, this form of financing was added, to analyze its possible role.

[Christian Culas]

My colleague describes a case of iteration after treatment of all the data. We have a finished survey. We realize that some data was not collected. There are also intermediary forms of iteration. You go to the street merchants and you realize that they are talking about other issues that you did not expect. We are in real-time; we cannot go back to the office. Anthropological iteration also takes place in real-time, during interaction.

Statistician-economists have an overall premise; they have a research theme that covers the entirety of the subject that they are trying to study. Anthropologists do not think that they have seen it all; they have some study angles corresponding to people's activities, but they believe that we cannot define everything at the office.

[François Roubaud]

Christian is right when he says that the socio-anthropological method is more interactive and flexible than the quantitative methods. Nevertheless, we try to add elements of flexibility in our surveys. By its very nature the process is more rigid because once a survey is underway, we cannot change the hypotheses. We do not have interaction in real-time, as in socio-anthropological surveys, but because we realize the value of this interaction, this extension of the field, we try to get close to it using the instruments at our disposal.


[Christian Culas]

You are witnessing in real time the correlation of anthropological and statistical methods, the dialogue between two types of methods.

We have constructed hypotheses that are not definitive with some mini-surveys in the field.

Let's go on to the technical part of your surveys. We will see why some questions transform or distort the responses.

Figure 56 *Unsatisfactory Responses: Three Reasons*



Source: Author.

The people you interview are not stupid, but they are sometimes confronted with questions that do not make sense to them.

Box 15 *"Office" Questions / "Field" Questions*

"Office" Questions

A - How are weddings organized in your village?

B - To what social networks does Mr. Nam belong?

"Field" Questions

A - Can you tell me how the last wedding in the village was organized?

B - How many people in your family?

B - Where do the members of your family live?

B - What do the members of your family do for a living?

B - Have you kept in contact with your school friends?

B - When do your neighbors help you with the farm work?

Source: Author.

Question A is a very general type of question that brings a consensual type answer. People will speak about the “ideal marriage” in their village. They will tell us what *should* be done. If you are aware that you are trying to find out the ideal of marriage in the village, it is the right question. The problem is that often you want a description of a real, practical marriage.

The second type of question concerns social networks. Here is a concrete example. In the Nam Định province, some colleagues asked a direct question in the field: “*What are your social networks?*”. The person being questioned gave a list of names. We were living with a family and we saw a person come every day with large bags that he dropped off in the house. He would talk for a few hours, sometimes exchange money, and then he would leave. We tried to find out who this person was, what he did. The interviewee explained: “*It’s my cousin. He works in*

Thái Nguyên province, and he brings back some very good tea from the fields of Thái Nguyên. I sell it for the entire district of Thái Nguyên.” When we asked this person why she did not speak about her cousin in terms of social network, she replied: “*We’re talking about my cousin; he is not a social network!*”.

Let’s get back to our four axes of research and to the “professional and migratory trajectories”. Together we will define the important questions that we should keep in mind in order to obtain a sufficient range of knowledge.

Our overall objective is to compare the results and methods of pure quantitative statistical data, qualitative data, but also semi-structured interviews and more open, less directive interviews. It is important that the people tell us their trajectory, their motivations and difficulties.

Box

16

Outline of Questions on Categories Professional and Migratory Trajectories

- *If the interviewees recently came to Tam Đảo, => migration in what conditions?*
- *How did they come to work in Tam Đảo?*
- *How have you prepared your arrival in Tam Đảo?*
- *Was someone from your family already in Tam Dao before you came?*
- *What difficulties have you had during your move to Tam Đảo?*
- *What difficulties/facilities have you had in creating your own work in Tam Đảo?*

Source: Author.

These questions merit being asked to each person. You have here both office and field questions. We look for answers as regards motivation, difficulties and satisfaction. *"What difficulties did you encounter on arriving in Tam Đảo?"* is a field question because the individuals can answer it directly. A hypothesis is not indicated on this slide: *"People who set up in the street in Tam Đảo are privileged people"*, meaning that they have specific access to business. The hypothesis here is that not everyone has access to a site for doing business in Tam Đảo. We hope to obtain a list of difficulties: is it an administrative problem, people established for a long time, a group of people who help each other? It is up to you to bring back this information. This question brings together "motivations", "constraints" and "social networks" because we assume that someone who has lots of contacts will manage difficulties more easily.

In each team, you will start to work on the important questions that you will list. These questions must be answered during the interview. Since this is a workshop on methods, if I give you all the questions that must be asked, you will use them and you will only be "appliers of the method". What I would like is that you yourselves manipulate the different categories to formulate the questions. If you do not succeed, your errors will be used to examine why the method did not work. All of this will be used for the common good.

Cristina Bellinins Lieven

The interviews last approximately two hours. How many people will we interview?

[Christian Culas]

One person if you spend the morning with a vendor who tells you everything in detail for four hours, maybe two if you get everything you need in one hour. Follow the rhythm of the people that you will meet.

Tạ Thị Tâm

Are there sensitive questions for the people in Tam Đảo that we must avoid? The people work two months in the year, how will we calculate the household's revenue?

[Christian Culas]

With the small vendors, the subject of taxes should perhaps be avoided; some are no doubt not registered. You should not touch on problems of religion or politics. We are interested in life trajectories; I do not think that this includes sensitive subjects.

On revenues, you must understand why the households only work for two months. What do they do the rest of the time?

[François Roubaud]

I remind you that tomorrow morning the interviews will be done in pairs. In the ten groups that are here, there will be at least ten interviews, maybe more. The objective is to go on to the analysis of the interviews in the afternoon. Starting today and continuing tomorrow fits with the idea of iteration: we start the interview, we discuss it, and then we come back with some new ideas.

Day 4, Thursday July 22

2.2.4. Interviews and Group Studies

Thursday morning is set aside for the implementation of the work prepared in advance over the last three days in interaction with the participants. Some parts, that were too long to achieve, had been prepared by Christian Culas. The objective is to conduct a socio-anthropological survey. The participants were divided into ten groups. Some began the interviews on Wednesday afternoon with the people that they identified at the beginning of the week. The work involved interviewing people working in the informal sector in order to collect information on their life trajectories, degree of satisfaction and social networks.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

We will ask you to get back together in the five groups that we previously set up. Within these five groups, you should discuss your interviews. We, the teachers, have also conducted an interview and we will discuss it. We can discuss any questions you may have. We will reserve the afternoon for analyzing interviews, problems that you have had, surprises, and hypotheses that were confirmed. Everything is of interest. Tomorrow, we will get to the reporting. All together, we will discuss the different conclusions and reactions in relation to the workshop as a whole.

Preparation in Groups / Discussions

[Christian Culas]

I suggest that you present the points that seem to be the most important. If you have some short sentences that summarize the situation well, report these. For example: "I do not want my son to do the same work as myself." This will let us enter into the background of those that you have studied. Please let us know if you have had any difficulties with collecting data or methodological aspects.

Each group presents a summary of approximately ten minutes focusing on life trajectory, motivations/constraints, satisfaction and social networks. Below, we present the feedback from two interviews conducted by the participants.

Mrs. Mai sells food products. She is 38 years old, married with two children. Mrs. Hoa is a fruit vendor. She is 33 years old, her husband is 36. She also has two children – a boy and a girl.

Professional Trajectory and Prospects:

- *Mrs. Mai started working at the age of 18 as an employee in a restaurant. When she was 20, she opened her own restaurant in Tây Thiên then she started selling food in two locations: in Tây Thiên three months per year, in Tam Đảo five months per year;*
- *Mrs. Hoa doesn't remember at what age she started working. But before the age of 23, she was doing farm work, and then she started to sell merchandise in Tam Đảo.*

In Tam Đảo, Mrs. Mai sells corn, eggs, sausages, beer, drinks, etc. In Tây Thiên, she only sells rice. Mrs. Hoa sells the same things in both locations: fruit, sweet potatoes. Mrs.

Mai has a supplier; the products are invoiced after the sale. She plans to rent a stall in 2011 in order to have a fixed location. Mrs. Hoa sells products that she harvests in her garden, and the rest is purchased. For both women, there is little competition. They are more or less satisfied with their situation. They both work in Tây Thiên during the first lunar months during the holidays, and in Tam Đảo in the summer. They do not have a very high level of education and received no training in particular.

Revenue per household:

- *Mrs. Mai's household makes a total of twelve million dongs per month; she contributes 50%;*
- *Mrs. Hoa's monthly household revenue is six million.*

Business in Tam Đảo does not require too much capital for Mai because she does not pay her supplier until after she sells the merchandise. On the other hand, in Tây Thiên, selling rice requires the purchase of material (bowls, chopsticks, etc.). Mrs. Hoa's work requires little capital. For her, it is somewhat stable.

Mrs. Mai's family is renting their house in Tam Đảo. They own a house in Tây Thiên. Mrs. Hoa owns a house between Tam Đảo and Tây Thiên. This family commutes daily; they do not rent a house. Neither business is registered. The first business was started with no particular support; the second received two million dongs as a gift from the parents. Mai's family is composed of two young children. The parents can only work in the morning; the afternoon is spent with the children. Hoa's oldest daughter is old enough to work with her mother.

Prospects for the Children's Future:

- *the first couple (Mai) did not answer the question because their children are still too young;*
- *the second couple do not want their children to take over the business. They are making efforts to earn enough money for the children to continue their higher education and would like for them to work in the administration.*

The first couple is satisfied with their present work. Mrs. Mai wants to develop her activities. Mrs. Hoa does not want to stay in the informal sector and would like to find employment in the formal sector.

[Christian Culas]

Thank you for this rich report on the small vendors of Tam Đảo. Some presentations were synthetic, others more narrative. I think that you have touched on different aspects of anthropology: meeting people, listening to their stories, collecting and organizing data, reporting. Tomorrow, we will have a round table examination of the methods. I would like to thank you for this very intense work carried out in such a short time.

I remind you that the documentary "Rêve d'ouvrière" (Worker's Dream) will be shown tonight. It deals with the labor market and its problems in the suburbs of Hà Nội, which is related to the subject of our workshop.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Christian offers a methodological examination. I propose, as an addition, to examine the results of the statistical surveys. I would like for you to take a step back in order to think about it analytically. Here are some conclusions and some questions to be raised:

- the surveys indicate few migrants in the province of Hà Nội. It seems that this is not the case in Tam Đảo. Are the majority of people that you have interviewed migrants, or from the region?
- do the migrants encounter particular difficulties? If only the residents can be registered, what are the reasons for these migrations?
- *mobility of individuals in their professional trajectory*. The statistical surveys show that the individuals move from farm work to informal employment. Is this the case in Tam Đảo? Are there people who have gone from the formal to the informal sector?
- is changing jobs beneficial? What are the causes and consequences?
- *creation of production units*. The statistical surveys highlight the difficulties in finding a job elsewhere. Is this the case concerning the people interviewed? The idea is to identify those who have chosen voluntarily to settle in the formal sector and those who were forced to do so;
- *prospects*. It seems that very few people are thinking about developing their activities
 - the level of satisfaction is rather high. However, they state that they do not want their children to take over the business. This paradox is to be explored;
- *precariousness of small scale activities*. Is there a link between the size of the social network and the health of the enterprise?

[François Roubaud]

We have shown you three methods: quantitative method, semi-structured interviews and socio-anthropological surveys. We have tried to show you through practice the theoretical advantages and limitations of these three methods. Our objective is now to draw up a summary

applied to the concrete case of the informal sector, to define trajectories and transitions; but also to define the limitations of the quantitative approach and to compare its results to the anthropological surveys conducted today. From one method to another, the facts can be contradictory. The themes not addressed in one method can be central to the other. Try to apply the criteria that we have given you as well as the different methods that you know.

Day 5, Friday, July 23

2.2.5. Summary, Results and Analyses of the Complementarity of the Approaches. Preparation of the Feedback Session

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

Before getting back to the analysis of the interviews, we will review and make a few points on the different interviewing methods. We would like for you to speak on this subject in order to clear up some points.

Pholpath Tangtrongchitr

You gave us an example of the methods relative to the quantitative approach – “Do you prefer to go to the beach or to the countryside for vacation?”. You have presented the questionnaire’s results with a confidence limit. You have then given an interval number. I don’t really understand your calculations, can you explain them?

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

Very good question, I will get back to this point.

In a quantitative statistical survey, you have a detailed questionnaire that is submitted to the interviewee with a list of questions. This list will then be transformed into numerical data. Notice that these questions are not all quantitative. For qualitative surveys we have two options: semi-directive interviews, open interviews. These involve discourse, narration and not statistics.

Example. If we make a quantitative analysis of our survey – the average revenue of the population, the percentage of the population that prefers to go to the beach for vacation –, we generalize from the sample surveyed to the entire population. We think in terms of representativity. In your case, in Tam Đảo, you cannot generalize to the entire population.

[Christian Culas]

For a qualitative survey, representativity is not a major criterion for research. The objective is to realize what the lifestyle is and to think about a small group of people. Even if the interview is long, it will be impossible to say: *"The soup vendors in Việt Nam do this type of thing, or have this type of life."*

Wan Mohtar Wan Ikhlas

Can we translate the results of qualitative surveys into numbers?

[Christian Culas]

This is possible in some cases. But the questions have not been constructed so that the responses can be coded then treated in

a mathematical manner. This makes the task complicated.

I would like to highlight an important point. During quantitative analysis, it is necessary to interpret tables of numbers. This interpretation can be different depending on the researchers. In the same way, with qualitative surveys, the analysis is partially linked to your personality, to your subjectivity. Between two researchers, and based on the same survey, we will maybe have different analyses.

[François Roubaud]

Can we treat qualitative data quantitatively? Can we approach the complexity of reality with quantitative surveys? In response to the first question, for this we need a large quantity of qualitative data: large quantities of responses or phrases (qualitative data). Right now, there are computer programs that analyze textual data, qualitative data, which treat discursive data in a quantitative manner. For example, by counting how many times the word "happiness" or "informal" is mentioned or by measuring the associations between two words: "informal" and "happy". In 2008, we organized a workshop on data analysis with specialists on this question.^[13] As regards the second question, let's take the example of the relatively poor measurement of professional and migratory trajectories in statistical surveys in general. The quantitavists realized the limitations of their instruments. They tried to create specific surveys allowing them to retrace trajectories in order to transform life

[13] L. Lebart, M. Piron, M. Razafindrakoto, F. Roubaud and J-P. Cling, Analyse des données 2: consolidation à l'analyse du marché du travail et du secteur informel au Việt Nam, in Lagrée S. (editor), Les Journées de Tam Đảo. Nouvelles approches méthodologiques appliquées au développement (2), Université d'été en sciences sociales, Éditions Thế Giới, Hà Nội, September 2009, pp. 157-237. Also available on: www.tamdaoconf.com.

histories delivered by anthropologists into numbers. These are biographical surveys:^[14] we try to trace migratory, professional, familial, residential trajectories from childhood onwards with quantitative surveys.

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

During the Tam Đảo Summer School Week 2009, the speakers for the anthropology and statistics workshops got together to discuss the benefit of better understanding the linkage and the comparison between the two methods. During the preparation of the current workshop, we have attempted to see if this type of comparison had already been done, from an abstract but also practical point of view. We realized that exactly fifty years ago, in 1960, surveys had been conducted in Algeria by a team of statisticians and sociologist-anthropologists, with Pierre Bourdieu. The research theme was practically identical: “work and employment”, with samples similar to ours (1200 people for a statistical survey, 60 people taken out of the 1200 for an anthropological semi-structured survey). I believe that this is the first time in Việt Nam that we combine quantitative and qualitative in this way. The work is on surveys, it is methodological work but also scientific research. You will be able to make the connection with the other workshops, especially with the workshop “Training in Field Surveys in Socio-anthropology”.

[François Roubaud]

I would like to answer the question asked by Phopath on the confidence intervals and the samples. We know that in Việt Nam, 85% of

the people are Việt (Kinh) and 15% are from ethnic minorities. If we take a small sample, I could end up with 100% ethnic minority. This is obviously completely misleading. Therefore, it is necessary to select many more individuals. If the sample is large enough, in 99% of the samples that I will select (this percentage is called “limit” of confidence or of significance), the percentage of Việt (Kinh) will be between 83% and 87% for example (this interval is the “confidence interval”). I am getting closer then to the reality of the percentages of ethnic groups in Việt Nam.

[Christian Culas]

It seems important to discuss the interviews that you have conducted yesterday. There are some very precise things that will help you find your way in an anthropological interview. The migratory and professional trajectories were addressed and understood and the motivations/satisfaction part was also quite well completed. However, the constraints were not as well studied. On social networks, you collected very little information; this is perhaps linked to the definition given in French and in Vietnamese.

Trần Thị Hồng Thủy

For us, a social network represents the family, neighbors, cousins as well as the community.

[Christian Culas]

You show a large amount of complicity between social network and members of the family. Several groups have confirmed that there was no social network; the people surveyed were not members of an

[14] See “Demographic Transition and Familial Transformations” in this work.

association. This is an over-interpretation of the reality. Here is a classic problem in anthropological research: we consider that the people are actors in a collective group when they are in an institutional group. However, there are many non-institutional groups that are very important, for the economy, sociability, religion, etc. In Việt Nam, we use institutional groups – mass, voluntary associations. The official data shows that Việt Nam is the country that has the highest number of people registered in associations in the world, around 76% of the population. This number is often an argument for stating that Việt Nam is very advanced in civil society matters and negotiating and discussion groups. Before my fieldwork in Việt Nam, I also thought that associations were very important, that everyone must be very active in these meetings. But, in the villages, one realizes that it is very different. For example, in a rural village, around 100% of women are enrolled in the women's organization; you must be registered in case you need something and for family planning services. Nevertheless, many women do not have the time or the desire to go to the group's meetings. So, despite the number of women registered, the level of activity of the women enrolled is low, which better illustrates the real practices and importance of this organization. Enrollment must be differentiated from active participation. The numbers can hide a significant part of the practical reality.

Lê Thế Vững

For us, the definition of "social network" is very broad.

[Christian Culas]

The tables of your collected data are obviously simplifications that are sometimes frustrating. The level of education is often the reason given for difficulties in collecting data. I would like for you to ask the question about the relationship between the life trajectory and the level of education. What are the causal links?

Lê Thế Vững

It was difficult to interview older people, their memory was not reliable.

[Christian Culas]

I want to make a point to show you that the level of education is not correlated with the capacity to tell a life story with very detailed experiences. I spent almost my entire life as a researcher in the mountains of Thailand, in Laos and in Việt Nam, among the ethnic populations that practically never went to school. Nevertheless, they told the story of their experiences very well. Your work as an interviewer and researcher is to try to comprehend what the person can understand from what you say, to enter into their mental universe to allow them to express themselves. It is up to you to adapt. One of the strengths of the anthropologist is to "look" at what one does in order to analyze and ask if it makes sense.

You have pointed out a direct connection with the locality Tây Thiên in the migratory trajectories. This is a surprising piece of data in the context of the "Tam Đảo Summer School", since 2008 we have led a workshop in this

region and we have never had information on the relationships between Tây Thiên and Tam Đảo.^[15] Why do the people you interviewed spend three months in Tây Thiên, then six in Tam Đảo? In Tây Thiên, it is the period from January to March. During this period, in Tam Đảo, it is cold and no one comes. Around the time of Tết, Tây Thiên holds large religious festivals that attract thousands of tourists. The activities start later in Tam Đảo, when the weather is nicer. The two sites are complementary in their timing.

[François Roubaud]

According to your surveys, the people were very open and welcoming. Some of you realized that this work was easier in the country than in the city. The question is how to adapt the interview to an urban situation – much more difficult and tense. Your interviews lasted around one hour to an hour and a half; they corresponded to the length of semi-structured interviews. You certainly were closer to the semi-structured interview than the anthropological one which requires much more time.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

We have also had the chance to see an extremely rich kind of anthropological interview with the documentary film shown yesterday – “Rêve d’ouvrière”. Why does this correspond to an anthropological interview?

It followed only a few people, so it is not quantitative. The questions were often open and above all the director followed the people. In the beginning, she didn’t ask any questions. She followed one person only to understand, without asking any questions, to see how she lives.

Anthropological study contributes all of the symbolism linked to what work represents, the social and familial context. We are concerned with the population’s perception, its lifestyle, and its trajectories. All of this is linked to a concrete question: what type of policy must we apply to the informal sector, should we develop this sector or not, do individuals work there voluntarily? Understanding the logic, behavior, social networks surrounding informal production units can help define policies that can support them and encourage them to formalize.

Do you have anything to contribute as regards the interviews that you have conducted yesterday?

Nguyễn Hồng Bắc

The poorest individuals seem to have the most solidarity. For example, the suppliers accept being paid after the sale of the products. Also, the social networks, family and close relations, occupy a central place. One interviewee used an uncle’s premises; those who sell the same

[15] – C. Culas, O. Tessier, Formation en sociologie et anthropologie: méthodes et flexibilité, enquêtes de terrain et organisation du recueil de donnée, in Lagrée S (Editor), Les Journées de Tam Đảo. Nouvelles approches méthodologiques appliquées au développement (2), Université d’été en sciences sociales, Éditions Thế Giới, Hà Nội, September 2009, pp. 241-356;

– C. Arditi, C. Culas, O. Tessier, Anthropologie du développement: formation aux méthodes d’enquêtes de terrain en sociologie et anthropologie, in S. Lagrée, J.-P. Cling, M. Razafindrakoto, F. Roubaud (Scientific Editors), Stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté: approches méthodologiques et transversales, Université d’été en sciences sociales, Éditions Tri Thức, July 2010, pp. 549-570.

Also available on: www.tamdaoconf.com.

products get together to buy a vehicle for transportation.

[François Roubaud]

The strong tie between the agricultural and non-agricultural activities explains certain gaps in the quantitative and qualitative results. We have not seen this in the surveys in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, maybe because they are urban zones. The link with agriculture appears here because we are in a rural region. We have said that the poor have more solidarity, *e.g.* do not pay the license fee and the suppliers give them credit. A person does not pay the license because he/she probably knows the local authorities. These are not the poor. It is solidarity between those who are poor and the local authorities who are not. The solidarity among the poor does not seem to be very clear to me.

[Christian Culas]

The management of how products are paid for is local, which proves that the managers, or the suppliers, have flexibility in their behavior. They adapt according to the people they are dealing with, this allows the system to function.

Cristina Bellinins Lieven

I have the impression that we are witnessing a restructuring of the labor market. We have interviewed a person coming from a wealthy farming family. The opportunity of tourism development in Tam Đảo led them to open a shop with the help of an uncle and aunt. These are wealthy individuals working directly in the formal sector. A second interview involves a 66 year-old lady who leaves the agricultural sector for tourism activities in Tam Đảo. She had no

initial investment, no premises. She is in the informal sector.

[François Roubaud]

The hypothesis is interesting: the networks are smaller in Tam Đảo than those people can use in the large cities. Can we migrate from the country to Hà Nội with little or no network? Different countries in the region are represented in our workshop; what happens in your respective countries, in another context? Another question: what differences have you observed between the two types of surveys, semi-structured and anthropological?

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

We know that many national or international migrations are linked to migrants from the same village, the same region. Is the presence of temporary migrants in Tam Đảo a factor that favors migrations from Tây Thiên? It would be interesting to observe the ties that exist with the merchants of Tam Đảo.

Cristina Bellinins Lieven

In Cambodia, for the young men, there is a network of pagodas that can house many unmarried young men. They live in these pagodas, sharing rooms. For young women, when they work in the factories, they live in dormitories. In Việt Nam, are there places that serve as hostels so that one can cross the country knowing that there will be a place to stay and eat?

Nguyễn Hồng Bắc

We do not have this system of pagodas in Việt Nam. Many young people work in woodworking or construction. It is common to ask for the authorization of the owner to

set up a tent and to sleep directly on the work site. The workers can also rent a room that they share.

Pattiya Jimreivat

Many people from the country come to Bangkok to work. They benefit from the family or personal contacts they have there. Many Lao come to Bangkok as well. In the temples, the monks often accept people who come from the same village or the same province.

Souphanthong Douanglattana

In Laos, young men can also take advantage of the network of pagodas when they go to the capital to find work.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Try to identify the essential and complementary advantages that do not appear in the statistical surveys or the semi-structured interviews.

[Christian Culas]

We spoke much about the constraints, but not enough about what was “facilitating”. The anthropological survey shows us a limitation of the categories produced.

The participants

“Motivations and Facilitating factors” are in the same category.

[Christian Culas]

Motivation is something more personal, facilitating factors are more external. What are the small things that facilitate the installation of the production units?

[Jean-Pierre Cling]

Do all the people who come to Tam Đảo sleep there or do they go home at night?

[Christian Culas]

Maybe 80% of the people questioned have a link to Tây Thiên village. We didn’t ask if the people slept in Tam Đảo or if they went back to Tây Thiên. Has anyone collected this data? Is the housing collective or individual? That’s another way to render social networks visible: sharing a house, it often means having a strong relationship.

Lê Thế Vững

The woman interviewed lives in the house of a friend. She only pays for electricity and water. Another lives in a neighbor’s house; they cook and eat together. The younger vendors only come here on the week-end, the busiest time of the week for tourists. This lady must face the competition of these young vendors and stays at the hill station permanently.

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

We interviewed a photographer. Previously, there were around sixty photographers in Tam Đảo; now there are forty. The social network is very developed. They spread the word when groups of tourists arrive. They rent rooms to spend the week-end in the hill station, from Friday to Sunday.

[François Roubaud]

We will now talk about prospects for the children.

Pattiya Jimreivat

The lady we questioned wants her children to pursue their higher studies; she is working in order to finance this.

Souphanthong Douanglattana

The man that we interviewed is working in the formal sector. He borrowed money so that his children could go to school. He would like for them to work as civil servants, for them to have a real social status.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

Some important summary points: informal work is generally less hard than farm work; the families in Tây Thiên that were expropriated come to Tam Đảo, at least for a few months in the year; the people are pretty satisfied to move from farm work to informal work; they want their children to work in the formal sector.

[François Roubaud]

I would like to know if those that work more with quantitative methods were convinced of the advantage in bringing their surveys closer to qualitative approaches. And inversely, were the sociologists and anthropologists present convinced by the quantitative approaches or not?

Nguyễn Hồng Bắc

The results obtained are very satisfying. During the film "*À qui appartient la terre?*" in the plenary session, we concluded that the agrarian transition is also a source of serious land problems. The qualitative approach, linked to the quantitative, allows us to suggest relevant policies on this point.

[Mireille Razafindrakoto]

I would like to thank all the participants for having joined this workshop which was for us a real challenge. The subject was complex: we had to find complementarities between different types of approaches, the group was made up of people with very different backgrounds. Some work with quantitative approaches while others are specialized in the qualitative. We had to take the diversity of the group into account. We were pleasantly surprised by the results obtained in such a short time. Thank you very much for your participation. We hope to see you at the next session in 2011!

[Christian Culas]

You all have the publication from the Tam Đảo Summer School Week 2009. You will find this week's training as well as a synthesis of the field level data in the book that will be published in 2011. You have participated in a future trilingual publication – English, French and Vietnamese – which will be available online on the site www.tamdaoconf.com.

2.2.6. Workshop Feedback Summary

(Re-transcription)

[Christian Culas]

This workshop was born out of a discussion in 2010 between statisticians, economists and anthropologists who wanted to establish a dialogue between the quantitative and qualitative approaches. The challenge was great and solicited a certain amount of skepticism about establishing a relationship

between the statistical, mathematical approach and a narrative anthropological analysis. I wanted to underline that the week spent together was a fantastic human and intellectual experience.

Reporter 1

Our training was constructed around statistical surveys at macro level – national, regional and urban – and socio-anthropological methods on a micro scale – individuals, families, villages.

Image 4 Quantitative Approach: Statistical Surveys



Source: Vincent Rif, *Survey on the timetable of Belgians*, drawing for the *Echo*, June 2008.
NB: The dialogue has been changed and added by the authors.

Image 5 Qualitative Approach: Surveys



Source: Vincent Rif, *Survey on the timetable of Belgians*, drawing for the *Echo*, June 2008.
 NB: The dialogue has been changed and added by the authors.

What is a statistical survey? It is a survey that quantifies a phenomenon. It is carried out in the form of a questionnaire and uses large amounts of data. The quality of a statistical survey depends on the accuracy of the conceptual breakdown and the definition of the categories. It also depends on the quality of the questionnaire, interaction, trust between surveyor and the surveyed. The survey can be in the form of an interview, "face-to-face", over the phone or by mail. A statistical survey is made up of the following three steps:

- methodological stage: definition of the field of study, sampling and questionnaire;
- technical stage: collection of data in the field, entering the data and the extraction of the first results;

- publication: analysis and interpretation of data, presentations, description of the first results.

What are the limitations? Pre-established notions and categories cannot be completely adapted to the history and the situation of the interviewee at the time. A questionnaire doesn't let you easily record social processes and remains dependent on the efficiency and relevance of the questions chosen in advance. The information obtained is not exhaustive.

The Socio-anthropological Survey. The processes and the researcher's choices on all of the information collected in the field are at the heart of the survey. The anthropologist does not consider all of the information obtained at the time of the survey. We call the intellectual processes at work, "data production":

- insertion and immersion in the environment, and participatory observation;
- interviews and interaction initiated by the researcher;
- observations and descriptions of the situation, the acts, the conditions, the discourse;
- census-type processes, resorting to devices that are built up from systematic investigations;
- written sources – articles, local reports, etc.; audio-visual sources.

This type of survey is prepared over a long period of time. It is not the result of any pre-fabricated recipes. The interview follows the research themes set at the office, but must adapt in real-time according to the data produced in the field.

What are the limitations? It's only possible to generalize the processes and objective relationships.

During the entire workshop, our problem was to examine the phenomenon of transition via case studies on street vendors in Tam Đảo

Table 26 *Differences and Complementarities Between the Approaches*

	Quantitative Approach	JUNCTION	Qualitative Approach
<i>Tools</i>	<i>Statistical Surveys</i>		<i>Qualitative Interviews and Observations</i>
General Postulate	Law of Large Numbers → Representative nature of the results		In-depth case studies → Truthfulness, plausibility
Scale of Observation	Global (large group of individuals) Macroscopic Scale		Local (a location, a given sub-group)
Sample	Large (often random)		Limited (targeted and often not random)
Procedure	"Hypothetico-deductive" Procedure <i>Verify the theoretical results</i> + "Inductive" Procedure Theorize empirical observations	Combination (different orders and proportions)	"Inductive" Procedure <i>Theorize empirical observations</i> + "Hypothetico-deductive" Procedure Verify theoretical results
Principal Instruments	- Questionnaire (closed questions with answer options giving in advance) - Polling Base (sample)		- Observation, description, notes/ recording, photo, interview; - Open Questions - Socio-anthropological Interview.

Source: Participants and trainers.

Table 27 *Differences and Complementarities Between the Approaches*

	Quantitative Approach	JUNCTION	Qualitative Approach
Results	Information at the macro level	Information	- "Stories" - Qualitative Information - Logic of Behavior
Advantages	- Global socio-economic framing - Generalization of information		- More interaction with the interviewee - We try to grasp all the information/conditions of the individual being interviewed
Inconveniences	- Doesn't take the point of view of the interviewee in account very much - Suggested responses - We do not know if the information/options are exhaustive.		We cannot generalize
Way to resolve: combination and harmonization of the two methods alternating/interacting (in particular concerning cases where there is a change of context, factors or new subjects)			

Source: Participants and trainers.

Reporter 2

Now, here are some results from the application of these methods to our study of the informal sector in Việt Nam.

Table 28 *National Context - The Size of the Informal Sector*

Jobs per Institutional Sector in Vietnam

Institutional Sector	Jobs	Structure (%)	
	2009 (in1000)	2007	2009
Public	4 550	10.7	9.7
Foreign Co.	1 360	2.0	2.9
Private Domestic Co.	3 610	5.7	7.7
Formal Individual Co.	3 610	7.8	7.7
Informal Individual Co.	11 100	23.5	23.7
Agriculture	22 660	50.0	48.3
Total	46 890	100	100

→ **Informal sector: first source of non-farm employment**
→ **23% of total employment**
→ **50% of non-farm employment**
→ **Estimates: 20% of the GNP**
25% work revenue

⇒ **On average, 1/3 of households get a part or the entirety of their revenue from the informal sector in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City**

Source: LFS2007 & 2009, GSO; our own calculations.

The informal sector is the second source of employment after farming. Whereas agricultural employment represents 50% of the job structure by institutional sector,

informal individual enterprises make up one job out of four and contribute to around 20% of GDP.

Table 29 *Prospects*

<i>Hà Nội</i>	% of heads of PU who believe in a future for their PU	% of heads of PU who want children to carry on with business
Manufacturing	64.0	33.5
Commerce	44.2	18.1
Services	31.7	15.0
Total Informal PU	42.2	19.5
Total Formal PU	73.4	37.1
Total PU	48.3	22.9

- ⇒ **The heads of production units are not optimistic**
- **only 42% consider that their PU has a future**
 - **less than 20% want their children to carry on the PU**

Source: 1-2-3 Survey, Phase 2: Household Business and Informal Sector (HB & IS), Hà Nội (2007), GSO-IRD-DIAL

42.2% of production unit (PU) heads think that they have a future, 19.5% want their children to take over the business in this sector.

We have completed this study in Hà Nội through in-depth interviews. Four axes of research were proposed: trajectory and perspectives; motivation; constraints and satisfaction; resources and social networks.

Presentation of the conclusions of the interview "Mrs. Hạnh, Vermicelli Seller" discussed this week – cf. Day 2 and Life Trajectory Scenario – and the qualitative surveys conducted at the hill station – cf. Day 4.

[Christian Culas]

Three types of methods were brought together: quantitative, qualitative and semi-structured interviews. The experience, which was new to the participants, was to conduct a survey similar to an anthropological survey.

Audience

Did you think about the sustainability of informal employment?

Participant

Let's again detail the two approaches. The quantitative method is above all used in statistical surveys in order to obtain socio-economic numerical data on a macro

scale. The qualitative method corresponds to socio-anthropological field surveys. It analyzes a society and concentrates on a group of individuals; the quantitative approach is based on samples which give representativity of a country or a province, for example. The two procedures differ: the quantitative is based on hypotheses and uses the information to verify these hypotheses, or not; the qualitative is based on a conclusion formed in advance, a pre-hypothesis, and uses the survey to link theory with empirical observations.

As to the sustainability of informal employment, we have used data from the national level to chart developments in the informal sector. These past few years, the importance of agricultural jobs has decreased in favor of informal employment. We think that the informal sector will last in Việt Nam: the individuals who work in this sector are unskilled, without capital, and have little hope of finding a job in the formal sector.

[Christian Culas]

We are not looking for the same thing in each of the processes. The qualitative approach tries to be representative: based on limited chosen samples, it aims to represent a large population. For the qualitative, this objective of "representing a large population" is not

central to the research: we do not try to be representative, but rather to find the truth, we try to get as close as possible to the reality of a small group of people.

Our workshop has the particular characteristic of dealing with a subject that is connected with the three other workshops: agrarian transition, role of the family and family ties, social networks and finally the information on the locality of Tây Thiên. In fact, in Tam Đảo, by asking questions other than those of the workshop *"Issues, Tension and Conflict Surrounding the Appropriation of Land"*, we have learned that the people of Đền Thờng work as vendors for the tourists that come to the hill station. So there are some connections to be made between the workshops of this fourth Tam Đảo Summer School Week!

Reading (www.tamdaoconf.com)

Olivier de Sardan, *L'enquête socio-anthropologique de terrain: synthèse méthodologique et recommandations à usage des étudiants, Laboratoire d'études et recherches sur les dynamiques sociales et le développement local (LASDEL), Etudes et travaux n°13, October 2003.*

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2.3. Training in Surveying Methods and Fieldwork Practices in Socio- anthropology: “Issues, Tension and Conflict Surrounding Land Appropriation and Use”

*Pascal Bourdeaux – EPHE, Emmanuel Pannier – université de Provence-
Aix-Marseille 1, Olivier Tessier – EFEO*

During the previous Tam Đảo Summer School Weeks in 2008 and 2009, participants in the fieldwork workshops described and analyzed the process of establishment of a tourism project, “Tây Thiên Festival”, in the rural commune of Đại Đình. This project is set to be finalized in 2013 – *cf.* publications available on www.tamdaoconf.com.

The participants were able to identify three successive phases of development that were all characterized by *top-down* establishment and management methods and incoherence between the definition of the nature of the project and its end result. The increasing space taken up by the project on residential and farm land has resulted in an exponential increase in the number of expropriations.

The lack of transparency in the decision-making process, basic lack of information and communication, considerable fluctuation in the level of compensation given to expropriated villagers and the disregard by the local (commune) and higher (district, province) authorities for the socio-economic consequences of the project for the local population, are some of the factors that explain the conflicts between the different groups of actors and the radicalization of views on this project.

One of the most remarkable features of this subject, is that the problem – public intervention in a land issue in the form of a tourism project – was created before our very eyes.

The cross-cutting issue of “transition experienced/transition decreed” will be addressed during this “Field Workshop 2010” through a study of the tourism project’s establishment and its local impact. This issue, common to all three working groups, will be addressed from three independent but complementary angles:

- Group led by Emmanuel Pannier: the project as it is experienced “from below”, the practical aspects of its local development and the reaction of surrounding inhabitants about a) issues and practices for accessing land resources, b) methods for expropriation and compensation, c) the nature of and opportunity to express tension and conflict between the strategic groups (villagers’ demands, authorities’ reactions), d) the circulation of information and communication about the project;
- Group led by Olivier Tessier: to the extent that the tourism development project is directed and managed in a *top-down* manner, the analysis in terms of strategic groups and impact on the local population will be looked at along with the intermediary (district) and superior (province) level administrative and political actors;
- Group led by Pascal Bourdeaux: in order to understand the local issues surrounding the tourism project, the group will look at strategies adopted for integrating the “Tây Thiên Festival” into the local sense of community symbolically (in terms of memory of places of worship), historically (worshipping memorial places) and economically (mobility and welcoming pilgrims).

(Re-transcription)

Day 1, Monday, July 19, Morning

[Olivier Tessier]

This is the fourth consecutive year that we are organizing this workshop on field study techniques; tomorrow, as in 2008 and 2009, we will go to a village at the foot of Tam Đảo for three days of work. Our objective for the three days is to share our field study experiences.

*Presentation of Teachers and Participants
(cf. biographies of teachers, list of participants
at the end of the chapter)*

This morning, Pascal Bourdeaux will present his thoughts on oral history and the use of oral data by historians. Then, Emmanuel Pannier will give us a general view of the village, Đền Thông and the particular context in which we will carry out our field work. Finally, the participants from Lào Cai province who participated in the 2009 workshop will report on the principal conclusions of last year’s work. You will be able to discuss the methods and results of the study with them. At the beginning of the afternoon, I will present some concrete aspects of survey techniques. At the end of the day, the workshop participants will form three groups according to the three themes that will be addressed this year in the field. Each group will consist of three pairs of participants.

2.3.1. Approaches to Oral History Field Studies Through Case Studies in Southeast Asia

[Pascal Bourdeaux]

I would like to lead a discussion on oral research, on oral surveying as it may be seen by a historian. Let's begin with a series of questions: how does a historian understand field surveying? How should we evaluate the validity of collected data? Does it make sense for him/her? What does the concept of *oral history* mean? This presentation has a practical rather than a theoretical purpose, because it can lead us more precisely to define the different approaches and debates that exist within each field of study. Taking the very general example of contemporary history, think about the difference in specificity between political history which deals with fairly well-known actors, social history which is defined as more qualitative and prosopographical, cultural history which focuses on the history of attitudes and feelings, where individual and psychological data that some historians reject take precedence over perceptions and representations... I base my presentation on my personal reflections from my own experience in the "field". As a historian, I conducted studies and interviews in Việt Nam, in particular in the south. I would like to start a discussion with you, sociologists or anthropologists, in order to better understand how our respective sympathies can enter into discussion. "Approaches to Oral History Field Surveys Through Case Studies in Southeast Asia"; let's go back for a minute to the contradictions in the title. Historians do not use field surveys, but testimonies, interviews and eyewitnesses. They can give different social uses to oral "information". The term "oral history" is an English term which

is a problem for many historians, which I will come back to later in my presentation.

I will develop three angles of reflection: 1. Oral history in general historical sciences, from its origins to the 1980s; 2. The change in France from oral history to oral sources; 3. Oral history programs active in Southeast Asia, and the situation of the historian and oral tradition in Việt Nam.

*The Oral Tradition and Ancient History:
the Actor and the Witness*

Let's go back, first of all, to the sources of ancient history and Greek Antiquity. Herodotus defines history as an inquiry (*historia*), coming from the term *histor* which means "witness" or "judge"; it was considered to give a sense of observation. When the great Greek historian, Thucydides, wrote his history of the Peloponnesian war in the first century of our era, he used eye witnesses, people who were present and who saw the events. The oral tradition is therefore at the very foundation of history. With the appearance of Christianity and the emergence of ecclesiastical history, the history of the Church, the oral tradition would play a new role. Witnesses' accounts would authenticate religious revelation; this was the role of the witness. Before the invention of writing, oral transmission – from one witness to another – authenticated the revealed word. During the medieval period of the Western Middle Ages, up until the 13th century, oral tradition perpetuated itself before some accounts could be written down. The written word then took precedence over the oral. The work of the historian was no longer to gather eye-witness accounts; the historian silenced the witnesses and became a compiler of documents and testimonies. Think about

the erudite Benedictine “monk copyists”, who created large medieval libraries. So the historians of Antiquity, in ancient times, had already addressed the question of the oral character of history. It was a cross-cutting consideration throughout history, which made a strong comeback at the end of World War II. Contemporary history would lead to the consideration of new methods.

Creation of Historical Traditions

The 19th century marked the emergence of science, scientific research and positivism in particular. By moving away from mythical or theological times, history became “historical science” or “the science of the past”. New schools of history appeared and reinforced the direct relationship between history and documentation. For methodical history, there was no history without documentation; oral elements had no place in the writing of history. History became the science of written traces. We were more interested in the authenticity of a document’s provenance than in its contents. Between the two wars, in the West, “new history” came into being. Let us put a parenthesis around World War II, which would cause a break in historical chronology as well as in attitudes and, by extension, in the way we write history and think about the present.

For oral history, strictly speaking, we must look at post-World War II United States. All of the destruction, violence, authoritarian regimes and the Holocaust would play an important role in the way contemporary history was thought about and memory and eye witness accounts were considered. In 1948, at Columbia University in New York, Allan Nevins, a journalist turned teacher, created the first oral history center. The goal was to

gather the stories of the political, economic and cultural elite. This project coincided with a new modern invention, the tape recorder: from then on, we could interview and faithfully transcribe everything that was said. Thus we easily evolved from re-transcriptions of oral interviews to the creation of oral sources and archives. In the 1960s, many oral history centers appeared in the United States and in Europe; substituting interviews for written sources became a common practice.

The department of sociology at the University of Chicago would begin to take an interest in minorities and outcasts in American society. Although the approach originally appeared as early as the 1920s, this University would really launch the surveying of individuals who, until then, had been relegated to the margins of history – African-American and Hispanic populations, outcasts of the social system – *out world*. So began a form of militant history.

Another noteworthy element is the program for conserving the memories of veterans launched by President Roosevelt after World War II; as well as in Europe, particularly in France, the creation of the Committee for the Study of the Liberation and of course, the crucial role of the Holocaust in understanding past events and the struggle against Holocaust denial. Think particularly of the book by Wieviorka, *L'ère du témoin* (The era of the Witness) which gives a general reflection on the production of testimonies.

A new dimension appears in previously colonized countries, using interviews and oral history as a form of anti-colonial militancy, to recall the history of colonized people which was absent from colonial history. Thinking generally turned toward a “history seen from below”, history of the little, simple people;

this gleaned elements of daily life and society, and *Alltagsgeschichte* or *gesellschaftsgeschichte* would later be spoken of under the influence of German historiography. In India, this line of investigation would create *Subaltern Studies*. This new approach to social science research would oppose that of the old colonizing powers, English research of the upper classes, upper castes. It got closer to the untouchables, the little people, in order to integrate them into the processes of the transformation of society. Critical Marxism also made an appearance. In England, oral history developed with Anthropology and Sociology and gave birth to the *New Social History* – which focused on the life of workers. In Germany and Italy, linked to a fascist past, oral history would play a double role after the student revolutions of 1968: by looking at outcasts, minorities, subordinates, while at the same time questioning the fascist past.

In France, the historians would generally unite against these historical approaches (vestiges of Comtism, quantitative history, structuralism). The situation started to change under the influence of Daniel Bertaux and the study group on the biographical approach in sociology.

The history of daily life, of attitudes became of interest in the 1960-1970s. Let us take for example the study of religious ethnography that Georges Condominas led on popular Buddhism in Laos. In this research, the author takes Buddhism as it is experienced and practiced. He stays away from textual or philological analysis of Buddhism in order to truly examine how people live their Buddhism. It is also extremely ambiguous to speak about experienced religion or popular religion. This type of approach has been criticized or, at the very least, caused many debates between

sociologists. On this subject, let us note that when G. Condominas' study was re-edited as an EFEO publication, those responsible opted for a modification of the title: "Buddhism in the Village" replaced "Popular Buddhism". We see here the questioning, the search for the "popular" or "experienced".

In France, two historians from Aix-en-Provence University would make their mark on the appearance of oral history. Claude Bouvier and Philippe Joutard founded the "Centre de recherche méditerranéen sur les ethno-textes et l'Histoire orale" (Mediterranean Center for Research on Ethno-texts and Oral History). As opposed to that of other countries, the oral history that emerged here was not militant. Another foundation was the creation of the "Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent (IHTP)" (Institute of Present Day History) in Paris in 1978. Contemporary history was no longer considered to be only the history that started in France and in Europe with the French Revolution in 1789. Present day history was now post-World War II history. Other ideas would appear, such as immediate history, defining the very contemporary period: historians would lead epistemological reflection (methods, meanings, usage) on how to explain present day history as a source.

Before bringing up the common criticisms of oral history, I would like to mention Florence Descamps, lecturer at the "École Pratique des Hautes Études" who, for very many years, has taught a course on history and oral archives. In 2001, she published *"L'historien, l'archiviste et le magnétophone"* (The Historian, the Archivist and the Tape Recorder). This work of nearly 1000 pages addresses the history of the use of oral

sources in social sciences, the different stages that lead from the conception of a collection of oral archives to its conservation. I believe that there is an important distinction here between the historical approach and the socio-anthropological approach: a historian puts together a collection or "corpus" of documents, he/she is concerned with conservation and transmission; this implies legal questions on consultation and use of documents. Finally, the book looks at the use of oral archives and poses questions about the interest and richness of oral sources.

Oral History in Debate

The first difficulty is the authenticity of speech and of what is said. The spoken word can evolve and a witness can affirm one thing and then go back on what was said. Historians also work with solicited sources, *i.e.* they create their source and direct the testimony and its story. During the interview, we must not only be aware of the content, which is historical content. The events happened in the past, but we must be aware of the interaction, the actual moment of the interview in order to understand the silences, the slips, the behavior of the person. It is similar to the approaches of sociology, socio-linguistics or psychology, as regards these angles of speech analysis. Here, some historians are very reticent to go down the path of psychology: "*Make history, not psychology!*" Among the many perverse effects of oral history is the "handicap of hindsight"; memory is influenced by what we experience now, by conformism, by the quest for status. There is distortion, a gap between the past, the present and the role of memory. This leads to the crucial question of the relationship between memory and history. History is not memory; memory can be used to make history, by criticizing,

analyzing and deconstructing this memory. Oral testimony is a living memory for three reasons: for what it brings back from the past; for what it reveals about the present; and for what it creates in the moment (experience of history, archives and society). This question disturbs the historian's work because his/her work is sometimes opposed in the name of a particular cause. For example, in France look at the issues and debates about colonization since the 2005 law when the witnesses and actors spoke. What they produced was a work of memory, which they wanted to assimilate to history.

Among other perverse effects, one of the first is to know who is speaking when I say "I". When we inquire, does it involve personal memory? Is it a collective memory? Is it a private or a public memory? Who is speaking? The second important problem is extrapolation – can one generalize from a particular case? – or the "subjective ordering of events". It is also important here to find the appropriate hierarchy between the individual and collective experience.

The whole issue is to show that "oral history" is not history but a proof of history, a historical material that provides a critical reconstruction of the past. Thus the resistance in France to the concept of *oral history* (as militant history and as an approach that interferes with the history-memory relationship), and the preference for the term "oral sources" (to indicate life stories and accounts that make it possible to write history) or "oral archives" – even if this term was judged to be improper at the beginning of the 2000s because they are not strictly "archives" (oral testimonies are gathered without concern for the medium), they are not always "oral" (written notes or transcriptions until technical means make a

stable and complete conservation possible) and there are unresolved legal problems (status of the archives, status of a witness).

Oral History, Sources and Archives from 1980

It is necessary to define the meaning of the expressions *oral history*, *oral archives*, *oral sources*, *“living memory”*. The definition of oral history is linked to that of *contemporary history* and *present day history* or *immediate history*. Many people resist the term oral history because of its militant connotations: a witness account and a witness are not historians; the historian must stand back, let time pass, and analyze sparse information from a limited access. The job of the historian is to cross-examine sources, bring internal and external criticism to a document. We criticize, analyze the discourse, we consider elements that come from other interviews or written sources in order to see if they are concordant or not.

There is one common accepted use of the term “oral sources”. The oral archive is a sound archive that only contains recordings of the speech of people or institutions during their ordinary activity. The *oral archive* is gathered by an archivist, ethnologist, sociologist, surveyor or historian, in order to be kept in an institution, available for future researchers. It does not include oral testimonies gathered by a researcher during a survey; this would be an *oral source*. Indeed, the *oral source* is a “solicited” source, in the sense that it is taken from a witness by a researcher, according to the type of information that he/she needs for research. Some also call oral archives “history with a witness”. We’ve seen this last term in the heritage approach: we conserve documents and we try to apply archiving techniques for classifying, defining and making them available. In the national

archives of many countries, but also in large businesses, ministries or public institutions, an oral archives cell conserves these interviews in order to build a collection much like written documents. In the military archives, for example, an oral archives center has existed for many years where the tapes are used as archives.

All of these aspects raise a problem of legal status: the interview, the oral source, is it an archive like any other? Is it subject to the same law of preservation, of free access after thirty years in France? To whom do these interviews belong? Who are the authors – the witness or the interviewer? What, incidentally, is the link to intellectual property or to privacy? Indeed, interviews have a complex status because of their nature and the plurality of individual or institutional actors implicated in their production: as research material, they could have the status of public archives; as original creations, intellectual property rights could be applied; built up as a digital body, they could be subject to the laws pertaining to database producers; published, they are exposed to civil law... These legal questions were raised over the last ten years and are now beginning to be addressed.

Oral History and Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, oral history appeared in the 1960s. The University of Singapore and the National Archives of that city-state created an Oral History Center of major importance at the end of the 1970s. Other countries, like Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, followed with the same aim to fill in the gaps in the study of contemporary history, meaning World War II and the wars for independence. Oral history of the former colonies rightly tries to retrace the processes of national

independence. For some years, the University of Singapore has been publishing works on methods and field data by using this technique – *oral history*, in the English sense of the word. Oral research in Southeast Asia does not *a priori* seem to show any specific characteristics, but this question should be examined more thoroughly by analyzing, for example, the studies coordinated by the sociologist Roxana Waterson (*Southeast Asian Lives, Personal Narratives and Historical Experience*) or even the works of Mohammad Amin Sweeney, specialist in Malaysian literature and its oral character.

Finally, what about Việt Nam? More to start the discussion than to answer the question, I would like to finish by mentioning the recent publication of a collection of testimonies of veterans, former workers too, who participated in the battle of Điện Biên Phủ (Đào Thanh Huyền *et al.*, 2010). This work is considered by myself and by many among us as an example of oral surveys and testimonies that bring something to the historical event. The book has just been translated into French. However, we can pick out two paradoxes: while the winners and/or the major figures (don't we call them "historical figures"?) generally write history through their memoirs, this work presents the opposite situation: soldiers from the ranks and ordinary citizens tell their story; the inquiry is conducted by journalists and not historians, which creates ambiguity about the relationship of the historian, the anthropologist or the journalist to this

work. And at the least, an added subject for discussion.^[16]

[Olivier Tessier]

I would like to say something about the occasionally conflicting relationship between history and anthropology. There is a fundamental difference between these two fields.

Anthropology was born from the discovery of exotic peoples and therefore from the view that we suddenly had of the Other. The idea was that there were two types of humanity, the civilized western world and the far-off wild world; to these were associated other pairings of opposites: state societies vs. those without state, societies with writing vs. those with oral tradition. From an epistemological point of view, this involved organizing human societies by opposing the civilized world, reserved for historians, against the uncivilized, given over to ethnological curiosity: history considers individuals as the only real agents of the human future and tries to record the results of their actions and what happens in unique events; anthropology postulates that society cannot be reduced to the individual, and tries to make sense of the large scale of, and constraints imposed by, communal living. In this scenario, history is founded on written sources in the context of a diachronic approach in order to understand complex societies, while anthropology resorts to direct observation and oral inquiry in the context of a synchronic approach in order to understand primitive societies that have no history.

[16] Two months after the Summer School session, an important collective work was published in France. This presented a summary of all the current historiography questions to which we refer the reader: C. Delacroix, F. Dosse, P. Garcia, N. Offenstadt, *Historiographies. Concepts et débats* (2 volumes), 1325 p., Paris: Gallimard, coll. Folio histoire, Sept. 2010. cf. Bibliography at the end of this chapter.

At the end of World War II and above all with the end of the colonial period, the unanimous and radical criticism of the old evolutionist paradigm, that postulated a fundamental difference between the two types of humanity, brought about an overall reconsideration of ideological conceptions. The comparisons between societies with and without a State, with and without writing, those based on history or on the status of the individual not bound to any social framework, lost all their value as categories: they are no longer used as criteria for the differentiation of cultural or geographic areas. Currently, history no longer looks only at the great men and events, but gives priority to the study of "large forms of communal living" (F. Braudel) and anthropology also takes an interest in individual and historical events.

This evolution has brought about a complete revision of the sources of information that were mobilized by each disciplinary field: history favored written sources because it directed its research toward the most conscious if not most explicit manifestations of life in society, while anthropology was more concerned with the unconscious foundations (Levi-Strauss, 1958). To conclude on the subject of sources, today we agree that there is no society without history; as to the absence of writing, the evidence is that this has no absolute value.

Social-anthropology has four major means of data production: participatory observation, interviews, that we will be practicing for three days, recension procedures, meaning surveys conducted systematically among a sample of individuals, and finally written sources the use of which is similar to practices in history. The range of written sources is

very diverse: press, scholarly literature, gray literature, archives, etc.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

I suggest that you look at Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan's text on this subject from the workshop *"Economic Transition Experienced and Perceived by the Population: Analysis of the Complementarity Between Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches"* which explains in detail the question of data production. These issues were also addressed in the training workshop on field studies in 2009. (www.tamdaoconf.com).

[Pascal Bourdeaux]

Have some of you had training in history? In order to start the discussion, can I ask you what differences you see between your training and what you are doing today in the field surveys? Do you consider yourselves to be historians or sociologists and anthropologists? What do you ask of the historical or historian's approach?

Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy

I studied anthropology but our training was not very thorough. I use this approach, especially in-depth interviews, when studying a fact or a cultural problem. Can you explain the difference between the survey of oral sources, and in-depth interviews?

[Pascal Bourdeaux]

I carried out field studies in Việt Nam in a very empirical manner. It must be because of this that at the outset, and maybe even today, I failed to master the rudiments of anthropological inquiry. Let's take an example. I led a survey in a village in Kiên Giang province in the Mekong delta. The

study was on the migration of 750 families, originally from Thái Bình and Nam Định, that had settled in this region at the beginning of the 1940s. I opted for a historical study of the migration itself, migration networks and the families' assimilation in the rural world of the Mekong delta. As a historian, my reference point was the arrival of the migrants in 1940, then I tried to trace the cultural and social environment of the region of that time. When I went into the villages, the idea was to find those involved in the migration. This is the historian's definition of the actor and the witness. The questions I asked flowed from a historical interest. A sociologist or an anthropologist would have certainly started their inquiry and their field work differently. In analyzing the discourse, I was more interested in memory, in what the interviewees said about their past. I was also interested in their impressions of the region, the deforestation and the lack of agricultural development, the application of their agricultural techniques, the relationships with peasants from the south, etc.

All of the questions that I asked myself and others, were directed toward the past; the historical and chronological dimension were very important. I already had in mind the situation and historical context of the Mekong delta at the beginning of the 1940s. I also knew the chronology up until today: the historical periods, war, conflicts. This chronological dimension is fundamental for a historian.

[Olivier Tessier]

In the context of such a survey, the historian is interested in reconstituting the event in its context and reconstructing what happened with a historical vision. In the anthropological

or socio-anthropological process, we could ask the same questions, but the idea of the reconstitution is to gain a historical perspective in order to explain the present. The object of study could be the same. We can work with similar tools, but the end results can be different depending on the disciplinary field and the question that we ask ourselves at the outset.

[Pascal Bourdeaux]

For the historian, at least for me, the present is analyzed as an element of discourse on history. The anthropologist's process is the opposite.

Nguyễn Thu Quỳnh

I would like to say a few things on the difference between the two methods. As Olivier Tessier says, the goal of historical studies is to reconstruct a fact, an event in the memory of people; written data is favored over oral data. In anthropology, we work on the present; oral data is important. I think that the oral method in historical studies is not very different from in-depth interviews. We always try to use historical sources *a fortiori* for the construction of a chronology.

Đặng Hoàng Lan

I am studying anthropology. I think that the oral method is used more in history; the person who directs the interviews is obliged to listen and is not allowed to interrupt the speaker. In in-depth interviews, it is possible to interrupt the interviewee; the interviewer has pre-prepared, open questions; we can interrupt the speaker in order to redirect the interview.

[Olivier Tessier]

There is an interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. We cannot go see someone and ask him/her to tell us their life story, letting their story unfold without intervening. The interviewer must guide the speaker. In the case of our study village, the conflicts are so self-evident that our intervention is almost zero. We are sometimes obliged to interrupt the flow of words. In interviews with historical depth, it is necessary to prepare an outline, to guide and encourage the speaker.

Hem Sokly

For us jurists, we must answer the question: what happened and what is happening now, to put the future into perspective? The different methods are mixed together.

[Pascal Bourdeaux]

I think that there is confusion on the meaning of “oral method”. The historian who uses testimonies and witnesses opts for the same techniques as a sociologist or anthropologist, in the form of an in-depth interview, and possibly through participatory observation. There is no major difference. The object of research and “use” that we make of it afterwards are different, but the techniques are the same.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

We must distinguish between using oral methods for understanding social reality, and the methodological tools, such as interviews. Here we use a tool – interviews – to serve the method, which is oral. An in-depth interview is therefore a subset of the oral method, they are not two different methods.

[Olivier Tessier]

This is a discussion that we have had over the last three Summer School sessions. It is important to differentiate the method, meaning the intellectual construct produced by the researcher to try to respond to a hypothesis, and the technique of interviewing which is a particular tool, the semi-closed interview for example, which serves the method. In anthropology, we may resort to triangulation, cross-checking sources, analysis of discourse as methods. The interview is in itself a tool that we use to respond to the needs of the method.

2.3.2. Critical Synthesis of Results of Surveys Carried Out in Đại Đình in 2008 and 2009

[Emmanuel Pannier]

Our goal is to use the surveys carried out in 2008 in our study village. Going back several times to the same study site, analyzing the data at the office then returning to the site is a methodological principle in anthropology, iteration. I refer you to the Tam Đảo Summer School Week publications on the site www.tamdaoconf.com.

First of all, I will present some data, analyses and interpretations produced last year, then I will present the questions left unanswered, on which we will work this afternoon.

General Context

The commune of Đại Đình includes fifteen villages. In 2007, 2,200 families lived there; that is a total of around 9,200 people. The commune is home to two ethnic groups: 40% Sán Dìu and 60% Kinh, the majority

ethnic group in Việt Nam. The Sán Dìu were the first to inhabit the place; the Kinh arrived in successive waves, most significantly in the 1960s. These migrations were organized by the state in order to populate the mountainous regions. The area of farmland, in 2007, was 724 hectares; annual livestock production per capita was 277 kg. The average revenue is 5.5 million đồng per person per year. According to the criteria of the commune, poor families make up 21.5% of the population, or 460 families.

Đại Đình is famous for its numerous temples and pagodas. The most famous temple is called “Tây Thiên Quốc Mẫu” which means “Temple of the Mother of the Country of the Western Sky”. The site has been recognized as a national historical and cultural heritage site by the Ministry of Culture and Information since 1991. One can also go to the Center for Buddhist Meditation – “Thiền Viện Trúc Lâm Tây Thiên” – built in 2005 which welcomes pilgrims every year, as well as monks who live there year-round. Today, this site is part of the national cultural heritage. The commune has become a very important place for religious and eco-tourism.

The Tourism Development Project: Origin and Methods of Intervention

In 2005, the commune was chosen by the state for a project for the development of tourism which is part of the larger program called “Tam Đảo 2”. The project involves, in Đại Đình, the expropriation of cultivated land and inhabited space. The change in the way of life is radical; it will mean a transition at the local level. The initial premise was that the development of tourism would generate new activity and revenue sources which could take the place

of existing rural systems. The establishment of the project, however, is not simple; active tension has arisen between the villagers and the local authorities. The project can be broken down into several stages. First, the construction in Đền Thông of a 1.1 hectare parking lot over former rice fields. 38 households were expropriated, before the official authorization. Moreover, the role of private and public sectors was confused. The peasants we interviewed could not clearly explain who the initiators of the project were: a private company or the state? This confusion was a source of conflict. It exposes the lack of transparency and inadequate procedures. The villagers were obliged, notably by the intervention of local authorities but also by the presence of private investors, to sign the expropriation forms. The surveys led since 2009 show that at that time the project involved no less than 30 hectares of land and sixty or so households. The third phase consisted of the building of a 160-hectare tourist complex on farm and inhabited land used by four villages from the commune – Đền Thông, Sơn Đình, Ấp Đồn, Đồng Lĩnh. 163 households were involved, i.e. around 800 people. One of the questions left unanswered is whether these different phases were originally planned or not.

During the first surveys led in 2008 in the village of Đền Thông, none of the peasants spoke about the pursuit of this project. The question is to interpret this absence of information as best we can – this also reinforces the advantage of coming back several times to the same field study site. Should the project have really been only as observed in 2008? Were some aspects of the development project hidden? Then what are the objective

reasons for this? We will try to answer these questions this week in the villages.

Today, only the parking lot has been built; the beginning of the tourist complex is not visible, mainly due to conflict with the local people. One of the principal reasons for this is linked to the question of compensation for land.

*Compensation for Expropriated Villagers:
Principal Source of Tension and Conflict?*

This is the central question; it is one of the principal causes for resistance by the villagers. What data is available concerning land compensation? Between the first project – parking lot – and the third phase of development – tourist complex – the methods of compensation have changed. Cash compensation for rice fields has risen from 9.8 to 21.6 million đồng/ha. This amount fluctuates according to the area and status of the land – rice fields, hills, residential land –, and the location of the land – along the road, interior of the village. Compensation can also take on other forms: school tuition for children, professional training (embroidery, basket weaving), privileged access to land for business development. During the September 2009 surveys, the cash compensation had still not been paid.

Our survey this year is supposed to confirm all these data, as these elements were still in negotiation last year.

On a methodological level, it is fundamental to distinguish between the discourse recorded during the surveys and the analysis made afterward: in other words, the reasons given by the individuals and the reasons objectively identified by the researcher. We are in a situation of tension and conflict;

the data can be influenced by this situation. One methodological solution is to contextualize and proceed with triangulation: in other words, place the data in a larger context and cross-check the data with other sources of information. These are methods that allow us to objectify the discourse heard.

[Olivier Tessier]

There is no absolute objectivity of discourse. Objectivity is that of the context and the person who is speaking. Our field will show us the variability of the ideas proposed by different people on the same subject, following their own interests and the interests of the group to which they belong. If we want to go beyond journalism, we should absolutely apply a standard format and scientific procedure to our subjects, no matter how sensitive and emotional they are.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

In Việt Nam, the land belongs to the state. Individuals only have the usufruct of the land, and the villagers of Đền Thông are well aware of this fact. This is an element to take into account. In general, people are not hostile to change; the peasants are ready to quit agriculture and raising livestock for other more lucrative activities. The Vietnamese are mobile, and have been for a long time; of course they are attached to their native village, but they can live far away; they are attached to the land of their ancestors, but they do not necessarily need to live in the birthplace of their ancestors. Leaving the native land is therefore a common practice. This is another element of the general context to take into account in order to objectify the statements of the villagers.

These few elements of context help us understand that the reasons for blocking this project are not linked to the fact of leaving rice farming, of losing the rice fields, but are linked to the way in which the expropriation was carried out, and what was offered as an alternative. The methods put in place caused the villagers to lose trust in the authorities. This is not a hypothesis, but rather an interpretation made last year, based on the current state of the data available. These are therefore elements that need to be proven, explained and verified.

Conclusion and Perspectives: The Question of Transition

The inhabitants of this commune are going through a situation of transition, from one social, economic and symbolic state to another. It is a question of identifying the means of these transformations; this involves defining the initial state, the final state intended and the process of transformation between the two phases. The 2009 surveys opened up some leads. It is a *top-down* directive transition; it operates in the short and medium term. But this does not imply that the population remains passive. Local-level transformations will modify what was decreed and planned by the state. An essential question is to ask the nature of the intervention and the involvement of the local population (villagers and authorities).

We know that the population was not consulted on the conception of the project, and no impact study was done. Local actors reacted differently and with various levels of organization, either with opposition, accommodation, or re-appropriation. In Đền Thông there is a particular form of *top-down* transition where the population

participates with reactions, conflict and negotiations.

[Olivier Tessier]

This presentation is very useful for the information it provides and also for the problems and questions it raises. Thank you for putting the issues into perspective and for your proposed research leads for the field this year.

Our discussion will center on the notion of transition which can take the form of a progressive evolution, of a controlled process or on the contrary, a crisis or sudden change. To tie into what we studied last year, it would be useful to work on the strategic groups, the groups of local actors who can have different, divergent or totally opposing interests concerning the project. We must not imagine that there is a uniform group of peasants against a homogenous group of local authorities. There is variability in opinions and attitudes and we must highlight these. A strategic group is an ensemble of people who, facing a given problem, will adopt a common position because of a convergence of interests. If we imagine all of the villagers confronted with the tourism project, we obtain a diversified range of attitudes and levels of appreciation: a trader situated along the roadside would welcome the project with enthusiasm; on the other hand, when you lose your land and your house, you cannot support this type of development. My example is a caricature, but it shows that there is a range of attitudes and we cannot be satisfied only with the views of the peasants interviewed. Therefore, this year we will attempt also to work at the district and province levels in order to shed light on the interests of the political leaders.

Day 2 - Monday, July 19, Afternoon

[Emmanuel Pannier]

We have presented some socio-anthropological tools: interviews, observations and critical reviews. We have also touched on certain methodological principles, such as iteration and triangulation. In anthropology, a method in itself cannot pre-exist the survey. The method is the combination of these principles and tools. So there is no predefined methodological recipe. One of the ways of learning to build your own method is to practice and build expertise. In this spirit, we would like to propose that the participants from 2009 share their experience with us.

2.3.3. Tension and Conflict Surrounding Land Expropriation: Results of the 2009 Study

PowerPoint presentation of the 2009 Workshop Report – cf. www.tamdaoconf.com

Lê Thành Nam

I would like to refer to a hydro-electricity project that will soon be built in Sa Pa. One of the province's mountain communes is populated by Hmong and Dao, and the area of arable land is around 130 hectares. The construction of the dam must occupy a surface of 90 hectares of arable land. As of today, the Pilot Committee for the project still has not proposed to the population any alternative to the loss of their land. Complaints have been lodged. The committee and the local authorities promised training sessions

for those who wanted to work on the site. But only those who had passed their baccalaureate were accepted.

Hem Sokly

Does Vietnamese land law provide solutions to expropriation procedures? You explained that the peasants are ready to hand over their land if the compensation is higher; what are the criteria used to set the price of land? In Cambodia, compensation must be equivalent to the market price.

Lê Thành Nam

The state fixes a range of prices according to the types of land, but compromises with project leaders are also possible. However, in 2009, we were unable to determine the price set by the state.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

On the subject of land, I refer you to the reading material proposed in this workshop on the plurality of standards.^[17] There are official standards and informal local standards. It is pertinent to examine the difference between these different levels of standards, but also the relationships that they maintain between them, the manner in which the social actors evolve within these standards. For example, in Việt Nam there are land laws and official rules on compensation, but we need to examine how this law is actually implemented in the village we are studying. Understanding how the social actors move through these various standards brings to light other social dynamics.

[17] Jean-Pierre Chauveau, Marc Le Pape and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, "La pluralité des normes et leurs dynamiques en Afrique. Implications pour les politiques publiques." – Website www.tamdaoconf.com.

Chu Thị Vân Anh

There was no impact study in Đền Thông, our field of study in 2010.

[Olivier Tessier]

The example of Sa Pa is interesting because it shows that the development of the territory involves choices. Việt Nam has developed rapidly for the last twenty years. We may not agree with the establishment of a tourism project, a golf course like the one in the film shown during the plenary session, but these choices imply *de facto* a need for land for the construction of infrastructure. Historically, in all countries, this necessity for territorial development leads to expropriation and conflicts. In France, for example, many conflicts result from the construction of railroads for high speed trains. So what we see here is not an exceptional case. However, this does raise the issues of political choice and priority of needs. It also raises questions about the transmission of information, communication with the people concerned and attempts or lack thereof for an acceptable compromise.

Our goal in the field is to highlight these particular issues, to identify the procedures and to try to show the gap between the legal and theoretical context and the reality experienced by the actors.

To summarize, in previous years we have only met with the communal and village authorities. So it would be interesting to speak with the district authorities and the pilot committee for the project. The peasants have not been given enough information. So it would be useful to draw up a typology for the circulation of information because the answers given appear to be very different or

sometimes contradictory. Is it advantageous for the provincial and district authorities to present clear and transparent information?

2.3.4. Review of Survey Techniques: Conducting Interviews

[Olivier Tessier]

Basics for All Interviews

The first step is to introduce yourself, give your name and explain the context surrounding the interview and why you are there. Then, get some general information on the family's situation: level of schooling, official position in the village or commune, participation in the associations of the Fatherland Front, etc. The objective is to describe the state of the family then characterize the domestic unit. Is it a simple household, complex, two households living under the same roof?

It is interesting to write up a brief history of the household, especially in Đền Thông because most of the Kinh households arrived in the 1960s under the influence of the state policy "Building a New Country". You will then get to some elements that characterize the domestic economic situation: type of habitat and construction, electrical appliances, number of motorcycles, etc. All of these questions let you build up trust with the person, discuss simple things; they also give a pretty good snapshot of a village and allow you to place the family in the local historical and socio-economical context.

Two Levels of Recording Data

The second point concerns the methods of recording data during interviews. Today, recording devices allow us to record an

entire exchange or discussion even if it lasts for several hours. Nevertheless, this undeniable technical progress represents a major practical inconvenience: the danger of finding yourself very quickly drowning in an enormous mass of information that will end up being unmanageable, as the interns in 2009 discovered on the last day of the workshop which was reserved for processing data! Also, recordings cannot replace taking notes directly during an interview; notes let us better organize the collection of information. We only take notes on principal ideas or important elements that come out during the interview, some numbers and unusual information.

Taking notes has two advantages: first, the interview takes on a discursive form. There is nothing more unpleasant for a person being interviewed than to see only a head bent over a notebook! That person will get tired of the interview very quickly and put an end to it. Secondly, taking reasonable notes constitutes a first level of data processing. Next Friday, during the short processing phase, we will have to refer to your written notes; we will only refer to the recordings if an important aspect needs to be clarified. This seems simple, but it takes expertise and practice. When we have an interview outline, we know what we want to obtain and we can prioritize the questions to be asked; however, for those not familiar with the exercise, it can prove to be somewhat complicated.

Questionnaire Outline and Research Leads

We will identify a number of issues and hypotheses that we would like to address during these three days of field work. For this, we will list questions that we will organize in the form of semi-open

or open-ended questionnaires. These interview outlines must be considered as simple "check lists": the order of the questions and issues does not matter and it is not necessary to systematically ask all the questions listed for each person. So you must stand back from the questionnaire. In reality, when a speaker starts down an interesting line of discussion, it is essential to follow this, and to try to thoroughly investigate the issue. This means prioritizing the questions in real time, giving them relative importance according to each speaker.

We must also try to characterize and be precise about the broad categories spoken of. We cannot be satisfied with the answer "*I am a farmer*". This is a first level of characterization: based on this, your questions will try to obtain details about the area of farmland, the number of employees, the practice of temporary migration, the mixed systems associating agricultural activities with extra-agricultural activities, etc. The goal is to understand the diversity and complexity of the situations and their possible combinations in order to produce a typology of categories and sub-categories that best reflect reality.

Even if for some annexed or secondary themes you may be content with vague or ambiguous responses, for the questions at the heart of your issue you must push the discussion until you feel that you have understood the problem in its entirety. This is the principle of triangulation mentioned above, but applied within the same interview and not between different sources: we ask the same question formulated differently in order to verify key information.

Moving from Research Questions to Field Questions

The confrontation of two categories of thought that is part of the situation in which every anthropologist finds themselves in the field creates a double constraint that, if we are not careful, can significantly alter the data gathered during the interviews:

- first, it is very difficult for social actors to explain their daily life, their practices and their beliefs;
- second, the researcher exerts, consciously or not, an influence on the interview process and therefore on the nature of the information collected, even if this is just through the questionnaire, where preconceptions and culturally coded notions meet. *"When the interview involves questions on social actions or attitudes, the meaning of any information coming from this procedure cannot be disassociated from the meaning that circumstances make the 'informer' say: we get an answer only to what we asked, which includes the manner in which we asked it."* (Passeron, 1996: 92).

This formula emphasizes the importance of the observer in the interview process and their inevitable influence on the nature of the information collected by bringing culturally coded concepts and notions into the questionnaire – which is not to say that this is intentional manipulation.

In other words, the meaning given to a question by the receiver is not systematically similar or even comparable to the meaning given to it by the cognitive categories and theoretical orientations of the researcher. The interviewer and the interviewee are therefore both susceptible to being affected by their own cultural reference points,

because of the need that they each have to objectify their position in this artificial relationship created by the interview. Not to mention the intentional or unintentional intrusion of the researcher as an actor in the local situation.

It is necessary therefore to reformulate your questions by breaking them down into a logical series of precise and concrete questions that are meaningful in the interviewee's cultural mindset, to limit any source of misunderstanding and thus ambiguous or excessively standardized answers. In other words, there are two major categories of questions:

- questions and hypotheses that the researcher asks himself at the university, surrounded by his books, that we could call "office questions";
- questions that he will raise with the population, in the villages, that are classified as field questions.

As an example, in 2008, a group of participants asked a peasant this question directly: *"Do you think that there are more social vices since the development of tourism in 1991?"* If we ourselves can debate the definition of the expression "social vices," we must certainly ask how aware a peasant will be of the trends of such a phenomenon. Whether the answer is "yes," "no," or "I don't know," it will be impossible to evaluate the validity of information collected this way, and therefore its relevance. To transform research questions into field questions, I use the trick of putting myself in the shoes of the person being interviewed: "What could I answer if someone asked me this?" You should do the same.

Attitude During the Interview

You must keep in mind that the conditions of the interview create an artificial situation: we are foreigners to the region and – some of us – to the country, we arrive in a group, we sleep in the same hotel then we go out into the villages to question the population. Some of this can be surprising! So, ideally we would establish a style of discussion or conversation that limits – because it will never disappear completely – the difference in status between the researcher and the speaker. The goal is to establish trust, to break this one-way relationship where the researcher comes to extract information and data. To encourage interaction, we can use humor; we can joke with the person. We can empathize and agree with the person regarding his/her opinions: *"exactly," "it's true," "you are right, for me it's the same, I would never accept that!"* Taking the same position as the interviewee will encourage them to continue. We can also try to reverse the flow of information and readily answer the interviewee's questions. At the end of the interview, avoid getting up and leaving too quickly; this is unpleasant for the interviewee. This could jeopardize the possibility of meeting with them again in the future. Take the time to have a cup of tea with them, to discuss and answer their questions.

Outside Intervention

It is common for someone from the outside – a neighbor, a village leader – to enter the house during an interview, join you at the table and start answering questions in the place of the person being interviewed. In this case, there are two options:

- you judge that this intervention is beneficial because it provides more information. It is then imperative to apply the principle of

identification of the remarks in your notes: who said what? Ignoring this principle will create a significant bias and make the processing of the information haphazard;

- you think that this intervention is hindering the interview because it places a barrier between you and your subject. You can then politely ask the outsider to not take part in the interview and remind him/her that you didn't address the question to them. Although this may be a bit delicate to do, you must absolutely avoid asking the intruder any questions, because this is a signal that you invite them to participate in the discussion.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

Since the interviews are done in groups of two people, one of you can try to bring the person outside of the house so as not to interfere with the interview, or to start a separate conversation with him/her while the other person continues the interview.

[Olivier Tessier]

Another point to highlight. When you start an interview, no other researcher should come into the house and disturb your work. In that case the interviewee would be surprised and this intrusion could break the established relationship by modifying the environment you have already created.

Finally, one last principle: the interviews should take place in people's own homes as much as possible. You must avoid asking them to come to the hotel or to another place that you have chosen. In their own home, the informer is in familiar surroundings, you are their guest, they welcome you. This type of relationship cannot be created outside of the home.

By making an effort to go to their home, you make the first step toward establishing a balanced relationship of exchanges.

2.3.5. Practical Organization of the 2010 Field Study

[Olivier Tessier]

We have divided the workshop participants into three groups of six people each of which will then divide up into three pairs, the same number as the base units of study in the village. To do this, we took into account one important element: six people have already participated in previous workshops and are considered "resource people". So we put two "resource people" in each group. Finally, we will work on the same study object as in 2008 and 2009 – establishment of the tourism project –, but with different entry points for to the three groups.

[Pascal Bourdeaux]

My group will look at the sociology of religion, at the places of worship and their involvement in the tourism project. We will go to the Meditation Center attached to the *Trúc Lâm Yên Tử* order; we will observe the practices of the local population notably those of the *Đạo Mẫu*. One other important element is the *Tây Thiên* festival that we will be able to study through interactions between the village and the pilgrims, and through the relationship between religious tourism and economic development.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

We will look particularly at the basis of the concrete methods for the establishment of the project, and the way in which it is

perceived, experienced and reformulated by the local population. Three entry points are identified:

- issues and practicalities of accessing land resources;
- methods for expulsion and compensation;
- nature and opportunity for expressing tensions and conflicts between the strategic groups. We will evaluate the typology of the strategic groups.

[Olivier Tessier]

As for me, I started off with the observation that the project is applied in a *top-down* fashion, from the province to the district then to the village. The peasants seem passive and oppressed by the reality. In these conditions, it seems necessary to obtain the point of view of each politico-administrative level. But if this approach does not prove feasible, our group will join the issue led by Emmanuel Pannier. We will need to adapt according to the field.

One of the principal objectives of the workshop is the continuing construction of our research object. We must therefore be able to update our comprehension of the research object by integrating the information collected during the morning or during the day, and to reexamine the relevance of our hypotheses along the way and, if necessary, formulate new ones. This dynamic work is the heart of our workshop and is linked to the theme of each of the groups.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

The survey outline that we will build up this afternoon is not the definitive outline that we will use all week; it will be necessary to adjust and modify it each day according to the progress of our interviews and the new

data. It is important to keep this principle of permanent adaptation to the empirical reality of the field in mind.

Pen Chorda

How do we select the sample for the interviews?

[Emmanuel Pannier]

Our objective is above all methodological and our position is qualitative. In reality, it is not possible to produce exact scientific quantitative data in three days of surveys, nor to build a precise sample established according to status, age, etc. We are looking for qualitative data above all.

[Olivier Tessier]

The question on sampling comes up every year; is our work representative? I do not know if the criteria of age, gender, etc., are pertinent and will allow us to construct a really representative sample.

We cannot carry out preliminary interviews to determine the nature and diversity of the criteria that would allow us to obtain a representative sampling. There is not enough time. The only possibility would be to try to aim for some kind of exhaustive coverage, which is impossible in three days of fieldwork. Also, in a crisis situation, our results will only be representative of this case, of this village placed under pressure by the establishment of an exogenous *top-down* project. Furthermore, random selection is a scientific practice. Since we are adopting a qualitative socio-anthropological approach based on a random selection of people to interview, I think that the sample does not pose a problem.

Finally, and maybe most importantly, our goal, which is to identify the strategic groups present, is incompatible with the prior construction of a representative sample. In fact, the existence of these strategic groups is not (only) determined by the similarity of their members evaluated on the basis of a finite number of criteria, but by their sharing, at one time or another, a common position when faced with the establishment of the tourism project.

Division into sub-groups and preparation of the survey framework by theme. The work involves: identifying some avenues of research and questions according to each sub-group's theme and according to the information from previous studies on the situation in the commune; reformulating each one of these questions into a series of field questions.

Days 2, 3 and Morning of Day 4

The workshop moves to Đền Thông village in the Đại Đình commune in order to conduct the surveys prepared in class. The interviews with the villagers are done in pairs; each trainer organizes their day to follow one of their own sub-groups.

Day 4 - Thursday, July 22, Afternoon

2.3.6. Collective Analysis of Data: Cross-checking and Interpretation

[Olivier Tessier]

Here we are, back from Tam Đảo hill station. In order to follow a scientific approach, which could pertain to reporting fieldwork or writing an article, two distinct phases should be carried out: the synthesis of data, and its processing and analysis for reporting. So as to give you the freedom to produce your own analyses and to cross-check your results with those obtained by the two other groups, we propose a synthetic analysis of the data.

My group will try to define the context in which the project was built by identifying the role played by the actors at the different politico-administrative levels (province, district, commune and village). The objective is to set out an organizational chart of the project. We place ourselves in a neutral position. The organizational chart will describe the mode of intervention by the project, by the authorities and by the private company from the province to the village level. What happens at the villagers' level does not concern us; we will have to prioritize the information in order to explain in concrete terms to someone who has never been to the area how the project has developed in time and space.

[Pascal Bourdeaux]

In my group, we will focus on the question of transition through the use of places of worship at two fixed dates, the beginning of the 1990s and today. We will begin from the moment that the site was classified as part of the national heritage. We want to see how

the state has intervened in the development of this touristic-religious site. We will also see the shift from religious tourism to eco-tourism. Finally, we will examine the relationship between the festival, the tourism activities and the economic and social impacts. Remember that we are working on a synthesis of data that aims to record all the information; we will think about hypotheses or analyses afterwards.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

Our interest lies in synthesizing and prioritizing all the information available on the implementation of the project and on the reactions of the villagers. We have opted for a subdivision along these themes:

- land: type of land, mode of land use, etc.;
- extra-agricultural activities, revenue sources and degree of dependence on agriculture;
- circulation of information: the idea is to identify what the peasants know about the project and how they know it;
- new employment activities envisioned after expropriation;
- compensation promised, compensation received and how it is used;
- peasants' demands;
- concessions from the State to the population since the start of the project: what is planned, what is being negotiated, what is already in effect;
- use of the conceptual tool of "strategic groups".

The afternoon is used for group work to organize and synthesize the data collected in the village. Each of the three groups meets with its respective trainer to process the information collected on the specific theme defined. This first level of data processing – classification and synthesis – is done until Friday morning. It will be used during the collective analysis and interpretation session in order to establish a common analytical synthesis. From the general synthesis, the participants prepare the oral presentation of the workshop for the day of reporting on Saturday.

Day 5, Friday, July 23, Morning

Each sub-group is finalizing the work of organization and synthesis of data. The goal is to elaborate a common synthesis of the data gathered and the analyses and interpretations made, centered on the notion of transition, decreed and experienced transition.

After the participants present and cross-check their analyses and interpretations, the trainers propose an outline for presenting and analyzing the data. The final product is a common synthesis of information, analyses and interpretation on the tourism development project and on its implications in terms of social, cultural and economic transition. One designated person in each group makes an oral presentation of the data synthesis.

[Olivier Tessier]

You have accepted to “play the game” and present only the data, without going into interpretation. This will enrich your presentations and constitutes a solid basis for your work. Let’s go over some main points together.

Regarding the institutional environment that we were presented with, we are struck by the complexity of the set-up and the difficulty that we had in understanding the functioning of the project. I wonder if this is not a way to render the system completely opaque, to make it hard to grasp. We have the impression that we are moving from a planned *top-down* system to a planned system mixing private and public sectors with a “touch” of *top-down*. In the end, I have the impression that the systems of the intervention are not transformed, only the actors change: we call into play actors from the private sphere, but the base population is crushed and subjected to the will of superior politico-administrative ranks. It seems that the peasants do not have the capacity to make their demands heard, nor to intervene on the process: they intervene simply in order to demand equality of treatment and justice on the level of compensation. The peasants’ reactions show the diversity of the strategies of local actors according to their relationship to the project. This is a critical point because it prevents us lumping all the peasants on one side and the project on the other. I also note the way in which the places of worship are reused: people are moving from popular local worship to an overall national vision as a support to economic development. One of the successes of the group that worked on the subject was the identification of this process of rehabilitation.

[Pascal Bourdeaux]


What is interesting to me in these surveys and in the linkage between the three groups is the different scale of the observations. We see the issues and the conflicts on the local level as well as the tensions that the project creates at the upper levels.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

We have ordered and organized the data in order to interpret them. But at this point, spontaneous analyses are already coming to light. The interpretation and classification of data are always to some extent interlinked. It is nevertheless important to distinguish between these two phases in anthropology, because the role of interpretation is important and not always checked. To use J-P Olivier de Sardan's term, the reader must be able to distinguish between "what exists", i.e. the data, from "what is possible", i.e. our interpretation. Such a distinction lets us classify field situations better and therefore develop the critical analysis aspect.

Therefore, this phase of organizing data distinct from their interpretation is important not only for those who will read our work, but also for ourselves, because we can easily mistake an interpretation for a piece of existing data. There is a text by J-P Olivier de Sardan, *"Violence Against Data. Interpretive Risk and Empirical Legitimization in Anthropology, or of Some Figures of Over-interpretation"* – Enquête, n°3, p. 31-59 – that explains how to avoid bias in interpretation. Our work now consists of bringing together data from the three groups in order to draw out a common analysis of the issue of transition which is decreed, imposed, seen from above, and the question of perceived transition, seen more from below; how the situation observed in all of its diversity can, or cannot, be applied to what we call a transition. There is a starting situation and a final situation. What are the processes in play between the two states? Our goal is to try to process all the data presented in an analytical manner against a background of transition. We suggest starting from this general framework.

Figure 57 *Transition: Analytical Framework*



Source: Authors.

Day 5 - Friday, July 23, Afternoon

[Olivier Tessier]

On the basis of the morning's reports, we will now divide the presentations into four main parts.

The first introductory part is composed of three sub-parts: context, history of the project and possibly building on field workshops from the previous years. For the last point, we must clearly identify the moments and stages of the project when the successive "field workshops" were involved. This will explain how and why we saw certain things last year that we have interpreted poorly because we were in the middle of the evolution phase of the project and did not have all the elements necessary for comprehension. This will also allow us to

justify why we think that we have an overall vision of the project this year.

The second part will look at imposed and decreed transition. It takes a new look at the results from the group that worked on the organizational chart and the *top-down* decision making process. This part also integrates some elements revealed by Pascal Bourdeaux's group concerning the use of religious places and their evolution. The Tây Thiên festival appears to be a pretext, since in the overall tourism project, the religious dimension has faded. We could refer to utilization and even exploitation of religious practices and places of worship purely for economic development. The last point consists of studying the way in which the public authorities and the private companies envision the future and the adaptation of the peasant after they have been expropriated.

The third part looks at experienced transition, as perceived by the peasants. This was the work done by Emmanuel Pannier's group. We will also look at the part concerning religion and popular beliefs, meaning all the aspects of the religious domain that come "from below" and escape the control of the Management Committee of the site.

The last part is an interpretive and analytical conclusion. Keeping in mind the plenary sessions proposed in Hà Nội, how do we characterize the transition that we just described? What are its characteristics? How is it unique and, *a contrario*, does it present elements in common with the concepts forged on other realities? We will attempt to characterize this dynamic while keeping a critical position towards existing theoretical categorizations.

Discussions and comments on the outline and on the manner in which data is brought together and the interpretations of the three groups.

2.3.7. Summary Report of the Workshop

(Re-transcription)

[Emmanuel Pannier]

We carried out a field survey for the third consecutive year. This training workshop aims to establish a cumulative and iterative process by going back and forth between data analysis and the field. Another objective is to teach methodological principles unique to the socio-anthropological approach. This is a process of learning – through

practice – the anthropological method. The analyses presented today are the result of a collective effort for the production of data and interpretation of the same social reality by around twenty participants from Việt Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.


Reporter 1

I will present the results from the field survey carried out in Đại Đình commune, in Tam Đảo district, on the subject of a tourism development project.

Đại Đình is a commune rich in natural and human resources; it has well-known tourist and religious sites such as Tây Thiên and the Trúc Lâm Meditation Institute. In July 2001, the People's Committee of Vĩnh Phúc province approved a development plan for a tourism and cultural site at Tây Thiên. In 2005, the committee authorized the company Bình Minh Ltd. to requisition some rice fields in order to build a 1.1 ha parking lot for the Tây Thiên festival. Three years later, the area concerned had risen to 30 hectares of land. But the project really took off in July 2009 with the official launch of the project entitled "Tây Thiên Tourism and Spiritual Site" on an area of around 160 hectares belonging to four villages – Đồng Lĩnh, Ấp Đồn, Đàng Thông and Sơn Đình.

The level of compensation for the expropriated peasants was officially set at 58.3 billion VND per sào – 360m². This is a *top-down* type project. The People's Committee from the province, in Decision n° 4242 on December 3, 2009, named the company Lạc Hồng as primary contractor. The provincial construction service is in charge of developing a management plan knowing that it has already signed a contract with a private enterprise for design and investment

Image 6 Vinh Phúc Province, Districts and Communes



Source: Participants.

aspects of the management plan. This was validated by the construction service and by the provincial People's Committee in Decision n° 2112. Tam Đảo district has been charged by the province with surveying the land in order to proceed with compensation. The role of the communal authorities is limited to raising awareness of the project among the population.

The local authorities and the company Lạc Hồng have made promises to the village population regarding the economic advantages of the tourism project, principally in terms of training and job creation. In practice, the villagers do not believe in the investment or in the promises made.

Even though the 160 hectares of agricultural and inhabited land have been seized, the inhabitants continue to build houses and other permanent buildings on it.

Reporter 2

Let's look at some aspects of the religious transition in this commune. The site of Tây Thiên has been classified as a national cultural heritage site since 1991. For about twenty years, Vĩnh Phúc province has invested in the restoration of temples and pagodas in the region. Since 2002, it has managed local pagodas and temples, and has created a Management Committee in charge of the maintenance and management of the temples on a local level.

Image 7 Thượng Temple After Restoration, Re-opened in 2009



Photo: Nguyễn Thị Thu Thủy - July 2010.

Image 8 Thông Temple Gate, under construction




Photo: Pascal Bourdeaux – July 2010.

Image 9 *The Tourism Project*




Photo: Pascal Bourdeaux – July 2010.

Image 10 *The Tourism Project*



Photo: Pascal Bourdeaux – July 2010.

According to estimates by the Management Committee, 180,000 people were enrolled during the first six months of 2010. Temples have multiplied these last years: temples dedicated to the worship of the Holy Mother built by the villagers in coordination with tourist activities, Mẫu Sinh Temple built by a private company, Trình Temple in the neighboring commune of Tam Quan built by the villagers, etc. The compensation payments have allowed investment in tourism. Let's look at a few examples taken from the field surveys:

- investment in the construction of a temple following payment of compensation for expropriation from five hectares of farmland;
- construction of lodging for tourists;
- businesses near the bus station located near the site depositing money in interest-bearing accounts.

The Meditation Institute, inaugurated five years ago, also plays a major part in the new tourism development program imposed on the commune.

Image 11 Meditation Institute



Photo: Pascal Bourdeaux – July 2010.

Reporter 1

Let's examine the situation in relation to the project seen "from below". We have classified the households according to their agricultural revenue:

- households living from farming and working for other landowners;
- households living from farming and small businesses;
- households whose revenue is not from agriculture.

The effects of expropriation differ largely according to the categories of household. There is a large gap between the promises of the local authorities and what the peasants have really received apart from financial compensation: *e.g.* leases on land for commercial use, rice supply for one year, training, etc.

Information circulates to the villagers through three channels: officially, *via* the authorities – not very credible for the inhabitants; family network; and informal discussions, which are a source of rumors and growing tension. Overall, there is a glaring lack of information:

- development plan: the inhabitants do not know that the project involves an area of 163 hectares;
- there are uncertainties on the where they will be relocated;
- compensation varies according to the period (2007, 2010);
- professional reorientation: little information on the training proposed.

Interests differ according to the strategic groups of villagers but, in the end, only the traders are truly in favor of the project, as

opposed to the majority who own only farmland as their principal resource.

Reporter 2

What are the links with the forms of transition? Transition implies a dynamic transformation from one state to another and therefore the passage through a transitory state. We have used this definition as an analytical framework for the situation of transition.

These transformations are analyzed from three distinct angles: economic, social and religious.

- What was the socio-economic and religious situation at the starting point (A)?
- What will it be at the end point (B)?
- What is the nature and form of the transition from A to B?

The peasant families from the village make a living from farming; they will need to work for landowners: as agricultural activity diminishes, they will consume what they no longer produce. Therefore their dependence on the market will increase, probably with a random development of commercial activity: street vendors, construction work, jobs on the tourism site (Hạ Long, Tam Đảo).

The social functions within the households will change with the development of small businesses, official or informal, managed by women; and the reorganization of male activities (childcare, working the fields, local jobs or not, etc.). The relocation of the household will also bring about changes in the living environment: relocations at some distance from the village, relocating in smaller or collective type housing (apartments), disappearance of gardens, etc.

From a spiritual point of view, we witness a shift from the construction of a religious

complex dedicated to worship – starting in 1991 – to a management mode centered on religious tourism.

Finally, the project is clearly an application of a *top-down* model of development. Participation by the villagers is painfully lacking and the lack of information further accentuates the sources of tension and conflict.

Audience

I am very interested in your presentation, which is very much related to the documentary shown at the plenary session in Hà Nội. Could you detail the criteria for land compensation?

Audience

Each year, the government defines the criteria and the level of compensation. This calculation is done according to the type of land (habitation, farm) and the nature of the crops.

[Emmanuel Pannier]

Professional training courses were proposed – in embroidery for example – but the results are not very good – especially due to an absence of opportunity for employment. The issue of information is clearly important: the lack of transparency is an acute problem. This year's fieldwork, especially on the politico-administrative level of the district and the province, allowed us to define the diversity of the dimensions that the project takes on, to measure the gap between what is officially planned and what the villagers know for a fact, and to understand in greater detail the impact of this project on the villages and the life of the inhabitants. This change of scale was therefore a key to understanding

the divergence between the interests of the groups of actors and the power struggles taking place.

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2.4. Demographic Transition and Familial Transformation

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(Re-transcription)

Day 1, Monday, July 19

*Presentation of Trainers and Participants
(cf. list of participants at the end of this chapter)*

2.4.1. Notions of Transition in Demography


[Philippe Antoine]

My presentation will address the theory of demographic transition based on illustrations from different continents and Southeast Asia. The classic scenario of demographic transition is the following:

The four stages of demographic transition:

- stage 1: birth and death rates are both high, and demographic growth is almost nil;
- stage 2: death rate (in particular infant mortality) starts to decrease, thanks to development and improving health conditions. At the same time, the birth rate remains high, which causes very strong demographic growth (typically 3% per year);
- stage 3: as the country develops (rise in education and standard of living) the birth rate begins to decrease;
- stage 4: with a low birth and death rate, the population stabilizes (growth rate is never zero, but we estimate that an annual increase of 0.4% corresponds to a stable population).

Figure 58 *Demographic Transition Scenario*



Source: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transition_démographique.

When the birth and death rates are high, we refer to “traditional societies” and when death and birth rates are low, we use the term “modern society”. In principle, the fall in mortality rates happens before that of birth rates. During a period of time which can vary in length, the gap is maintained between the birth rate and the mortality rate: the difference corresponds to the growth of the population. In this period of transition, population growth is particularly strong; this recalls the great scares of the 1960s and the questions of demographic overpopulation.

Most countries follow this scenario, but they are at different phases of transition. What is very different between the regions is the length of this phase. For example, some western countries started the transition in the XVIIth or XVIIIth century and ended it at the beginning of the XXth century, while other countries can go through the same evolution

in thirty years. We try to explain changes in behavior of an entire population; factors that explain that at a given time, a population can experience health problems, high birth and death rates, and that some individuals have a certain level of education, more resources and demographic behavior that belongs to this level of transition. It is also necessary to refer to factors that no one has thought of in the post-transition scenario. I am thinking about some Eastern European countries where the decrease in fertility was so great that the population decreased.

In order for a population to remain stable and reproduce itself, each woman must give birth to her replacement: there is a fifty percent chance that she will have a girl, so in order for each woman to have a girl, each woman must have two children.

[Martine Segalen]

Can you define the terms: birth rate, fertility rate?

[Philippe Antoine]

The birth rate is the average number of births in a population in the year n . For example a high rate is 40 to 50‰; this means 40 to 50 children for one thousand inhabitants of a country.

The fertility rate only concerns women of child bearing age, between 15 and 49 years. We calculate this rate for what is commonly called the hypothetical cohort: we divide the number of births between 15 and 19 years by the number of women from 15 to 19 (per year); same thing for the next age group, 20-24 years, and so on. We add up all the rates from 15-19 years to 45-49 years, in order to reach a fertility rate for all women between 15 and 49 years old.

The birth rate is a value in one thousand, while the fertility rate is related to the Synthetic Fertility Index (SFI) which is expressed as a number of children.

[Bernard Formoso]

It may be useful to calculate the fertility rate on the scale of a village or a commune, just to compare it to the national fertility rate as it is presented by the census.

Rosakon Siriyuktanont

Women under the age of 15 and women over 49 years can have children.

[Philippe Antoine]

Correct, but in fact, demography works on average behavior; exceptions are not taken

into account. Also, in most countries, if we add a fertility rate for the group between 12 and 14 years old, the trend would not be affected.

[Bernard Formoso]

Would the fertility rate be lower for the 45-49 year age group?

[Philippe Antoine]

For some countries, indeed, we see the results from 12 years or over 55 years old. There are extremes, but this remains insignificant in terms of the demographic importance of these extreme ages in terms of fertility.

Lê Hoàng Anh Thư

You spoke about birth rate and fertility rate: which is the most significant for studying the demographic transition?

[Philippe Antoine]

In this case we use the birth rate. The transition is also the difference between the birth rate and the death rate; this concerns the entire population. The difference between the two has a demographic impact. But when we speak about fertility in and of itself, we prefer to use the SFI, the number of children per woman. We can visualize two children per woman, but we have a hard time visualizing a rate of 50‰.

Lê Hoàng Anh Thư

Is there a formula for converting a fertility rate to a birth rate?


[Philippe Antoine]

The birth rate applies to the whole population. When we calculate the birth rate, the numerator is the number of births,

the denominator is the total population. We include the entire very young population (if the country has a young structure) in the denominator, while it plays no role in fertility. For a very young population, we will have a relatively low birth rate because there will be many people in the denominator that do not contribute to fertility.

I would like to bring your attention to fertility. The transition in terms of fertility is presented as a shift from “natural” fertility to “controlled or directed” fertility. On the planetary scale, some regions are particularly affected by a very high fertility: West, Central and East Africa. Western countries have a low fertility rate. Between these two extremes, the decrease in fertility has started – Latin America, Asia.

Figure 59 *The Transition of Fertility in Industrialized Countries*
Evolution of total fertility rate in England&Wales,
in France and in Sweden (1740-1940)




Source: Ined 2004.

This graph is interesting because it shows that the decrease in the fertility rate takes place over a very long period in most western countries. In France, fertility decreased

steadily, while this decrease took place much later, more in conformity with the scenario of the demographic transition, in England and in Sweden.

Figure 60 *The Diffusion of the Transition in Countries in the South*
Total fertility rate by country in 1965-1970



Source: Chesnais (2003).

On other continents, the evolution is different depending on the country: the timescale is much shorter (e.g. Chile). But overall, from the moment that fertility starts to decrease, as in Mexico – almost seven children per woman in the 1970s – we move to a little more than 2 children per woman (2005).

On the African continent, the situation is very different: some countries have not started any transition, the most well-known being Niger where there is still a very high fertility rate, around eight children per woman. The Ivory Coast started its decrease in fertility in the 1980s. Algeria is an interesting case, because it made the question of population an important ideological issue in the 1970s. I remind you that at the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, western countries were worried about the “demographic boom”; an American author

spoke about the “population bomb”. Algeria led an entire school of thought that was against family planning programs; the best way to reduce fertility was development and not contraception. At the same time, Tunisia, a country with the same Muslim traditions, engaged in a very aggressive family planning policy program. Tunisia is one of the first countries in Africa to have a very active contraception program and legalized abortion. It is interesting to note that these two neighboring countries came into the 2000s with comparable fertility levels – a little more than two children per woman using different population policies.


Many family planning programs were developed in Niger, especially through a South/South cooperation between Tunisia and Niger. This transfer of policies did not succeed. The political discourse in Niger is

not compatible with the expectations of a population that is still attached to a high birth rate. This is partly due to the fact that Niger is an essentially desert country, the climate conditions are harsh and individuals are trying to maintain an abundant labor force.

The situation in Iran is particularly interesting: even if, in the West, we think that women are worse off since the Mollahs' revolution, the

fertility transition is one of the most rapid that we have seen historically. There has been a shift from seven children per woman to two children in the space of twenty years. Important family planning programs were proposed and the population aspires to smaller families.

Figure 61 *Evolution of the SFI by Continent between 1970 and 2000*



Source: United Nations, *World fertility patterns*, 2004.

The comparison of the SFI by continent shows that on average, the Asian continent has had the most significant decrease.

According to the demographer Ansley Coale, there are three conditions for fertility transition: couples must have become aware of their capacity to plan and control their fertility and intervention on fertility must be considered socially and morally acceptable; restriction of fertility must be advantageous; effective contraception must be available.

High fertility, however, follows a certain rationale. A high mortality rate, in particular of infants and children, requires a high fertility in order to keep one or two children. Also, all labor-intensive production modes require high fertility. Finally, the relatively traditional societies maintain the hope that their children will take care of them when they are older – costs of children and intergenerational transfers.

In the classic transition scenario, when the infant and child mortality rates decrease, the fertility decreases. The development

of education for men and women, the evolution of women's rights, the level of economic development, the evolution of family ideals, the possibility of access to health and family planning programs are all explanatory factors.

Kom Udom

How is the decrease in child mortality one of the factors of the decrease in fertility?


[Philippe Antoine]

We start from the hypothesis that when child mortality is very high, the strategy of the parents is procreation. But when health conditions improve, infant mortality

decreases sharply, and people no longer feel the need to have as many children since their children are surviving.

Demography is the study of population in time; our field swings back and forth between dynamic and static aspects. Let's take the example of the age pyramid, snapshot of a demographic situation at a given time. From the bottom of the pyramid, we have newcomers, *i.e.* births; from the top, disappearances due to deaths. I emphasize from the start that I will not touch on international migrations in my presentation. In order to illustrate the age pyramid, men, women, ages from birth (0 yrs), I will show the

Figure 62 *Insert Demographic Dividend*
Population between 15-65 years / dependent population



Source: Author.

ages of 15 years, and of 65 years, and at the top of the pyramid around 100 years.

Through entrances and exits of the population (births and deaths), this pyramid changes its appearance from one year to the next. The graph that I am showing refers to the

effects of these modifications to the pyramid. This graph shows the relationship between the population of 15-65 years old and the dependent population, by hypothesizing that the population from 15-65 years is productive as opposed to dependents (children under the age of 15 and people older than 65). A ratio of 2 means 2 active people for 1 dependent. If this ratio falls to 1.4, we will have 1.4 active for 1 dependent. We are talking about the demographic dividend. In 2010, Europe entered the end of its demographic dividend while on the Asian continent it will be at its optimum from 2010 to 2030 – starting in 2030 the population will age, putting more responsibility on the active. In Europe, because of the double effect of a rapid decrease in fertility and the lengthening of life expectancy due to progress in health care, the responsibility for inactive and old people will weigh more and more heavily.

The African continent will enter into a demographic dividend phase in 2050. You can see here the link between demographic dividend and the current economic boom – even if other factors are taken into account. This also highlights the importance of the debates that we hear in Europe on the question of retirement – however, demographic predictions had already been made after World War II; starting in the 1950s, the demographic evolution that would affect Europe was apparent. Demographic trends entail long periods of time and often, political time is much shorter than demographic time.


[Martine Segalen]

I would like to ask a question about the gulf between long demographic time and short political time. Without making excuses for the politicians, haven't demographers sometimes made erroneous predictions? It is understandable then that there is a certain reticence in acting quickly – all the while recognizing that there are all sorts of other reasons for delaying decisions. The demographers once spoke of the "P Bomb", but it never came. Demography, despite everything, is not an exact science.

[Philippe Antoine]


In the game of demographic perspectives, there are generally high, medium and low scenarios. An estimation of a few thousandths of a percent in operation over fifty years can indeed lead to important variations. Undeniably, in many countries, the decline in fertility was quicker than predicted. Major changes of direction can occur, for example a new virus that would cause a sharp increase in mortality. It is also difficult to imagine how low the fertility will descend in some countries, and it is always possible that there can be an increase in fertility in other countries. It is the probable scenarios which can be alarming for policy makers, especially on the question of future demographic ageing, which was announced as early as the 1950s and is happening now. The more we make predictions on a large scale, on the scale of a continent, the lower the probability of error. In the field of urbanization and international migration, the predictions are particularly variable. For example, Mexico City

Figure 63 Evolution of the Synthetic Fertility Index in Africa between 1960-64 and 2000-04



Source: Ined 2004.

Figure 64 Two Typical Models of Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: Ined 2004.

was presented as the largest city in the world for a long time, but this was never the case.


Before getting around to the Asian continent, I will illustrate the transition in a few African countries.

In Mali, the birth rate has practically remained the same from the 1960s to 2005; the death

rate started to decrease at the very beginning of the demographic transition. Ghana, a slightly more developed country, has had an economic boom for the last ten years: fertility started decreasing in the 1980s, the death rate started a constant decline in the 1950s.

In a case like Mali, the gap between birth and death rates – population growth rate – is

Figure 65 *Two “Disturbed” Models of Transition*



Source: Ined 2004.


significant (3.4% in 2005) per year; in Ghana, it went from 2.6% in 1950 to 3% around 1975 and then decreased (2.2% in 2005). More unpredictable scenarios are possible.

Two such examples are the rise in the mortality rate in Liberia, which suffered a war in the 1990s, or Zimbabwe, the counter-example of transition. The prevalence of AIDS in this country is particularly high, so in the middle of the 1980s the rise in the mortality rate was very dramatic; the decline in births was also due to

the fact that child-bearing aged women were especially affected by AIDS. Here is a scenario, to get back to Martine's question, that was not effectively included in the demographic predictions; growth could perhaps become negative since the authorities were late in putting anti-AIDS programs into place.


Looking at the Asian continent, especially East and Southeast Asia, and since I'm not a specialist in the region, I would like to show the slides and let you comment on them.

Figure 66 *Transition Scenario in East Asia*



Source: Ined 2009.

Figure 67 *Transition Scenario in Southeast Asia*



Source: Ined 2009.

Rosakon Siriyuktanont

I can give the example of Thailand. For the last twenty years, birth control was considered to be a strategy in the fight against poverty. This is the reason for a decrease in births. Often, the notions of “traditional” and “modern” are in opposition to one another; does this make sense in demography?

[Philippe Antoine]

This brings us back to the first graph I presented. The pre-transition scenario is “traditional”, so Mali would be, for example, in the beginning of the transition phase. It is the “classic” transition scenario.

[Martine Segalen]

Isn't the traditional/classic scenario Euro-centric since demographic science was developed first in Europe and this continent was the first to experience these changes? Maybe in 50 years, we will realize that the European scenario was a particular scenario and the terms “classic,” “traditional” and “modern” will be obsolete.

[Bernard Formoso]

I wonder if this classic/modern opposition is not a very positivist vision. We would put in opposition to each other a situation marked by poverty and high birth and death rates, and a situation marked by a certain interpretation of progress that would closely link the decline in death and birth rates with economic growth.

For Thailand, the death rate increased slightly, beginning in the years 1985-1990 in this particular case. It was at this time that the AIDS epidemic played a role in the death rate. Beforehand, this rate had been declining steadily, to a lesser degree than the birth rate; beginning in 1986, it started to rise.

Moreover, the demographic transition in Thailand progressed in 1960-65, then had a tendency to slow down after 1995: the 1960s saw the beginning of very sharp economic growth. There is a correlation here between economic growth and the birth rate. However, 1995-2000 was marked by the financial crisis, and the birth rate tended to stabilize.

Rosakon Siriyuktanont

The first two causes of death remain above all cancer and accidents, not AIDS.

[Bernard Formoso]

This is true, but cancer and accidents (road accidents for example) already existed before 1986, AIDS just added to the tally.


Supaluck Taechapongstorn

I would like to add that family planning was introduced in 1974; from this time condom distribution programs for families were offered.

[Philippe Antoine]


The data concerning the situation of transition in Asia were extracted from a text by Magali Barbieri and Isabelle Attané (*cf.* reading).

Figure 68 *Transition Scenario in Thailand*



Source: Ined 2009.

Figure 69 *Transition Scenario in the Philippines*




Source: Ined 2009.

These countries are in different phases of transition: in Thailand we see that the transition is coming to an end and natural growth has sharply declined to 0.7% in 2005. The Philippines is in the intermediate

transition phase; there are no longer many impacts on natural growth because death and birth rates are decreasing at approximately the same rate. This country had a particularly high fertility rate in the '50s and '60s.

Figure 70 *Transition Scenario in China*




Source: Ined 2009.

China has a managed birth rate with strong political control, but there are some variations in the application of the policy. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that these scenarios are sometimes set out using a lot of real data (Thailand) and sometimes from estimates (China). For the latter country, you

can imagine that because there are political constraints to have only one child per woman (even if the statistics do not show this, there is actually more than one child per woman), we can imagine, if this policy were reversed, an increase in the birth rate.

Figure 71 *Evolution of Average Annual Population Growth Rates from 1960-65 to 2000-2005 in Southeast Asia and East Asia*




Source: Ined 2009.

From the 1960s to 2000, practically all countries recorded a decline in growth rates, in particular in Japan – growth of 1% per year in the 1960s and almost zero after 2000. In Việt Nam, we have gone from nearly 2.2 to 1.4%.

There is an entire debate on the role of marriage in the decline in fertility. In societies where formalized marriage is very important, there is still a link between the delay in getting married and the decline of the fertility rate.

Figure 72 *Evolution of Age for First Marriages in Southeast Asia and East Asia*



Source: Ined 2009.

The higher the age of marriage, the lower the fertility rate when there are very few births out of wedlock. It is not the only explanatory factor, but it contributes to the decrease in fertility rates. In most countries marriage ages are rising, which is something we see in some African countries and much less in Asia and the other continents. In general, we attribute this to an improved status for women, increased schooling for girls, and more generally a shift from arranged marriages to choosing one's own spouse.

Supaluck Taechapongstorn

What is the explanation for the Chinese trajectory?

[Bernard Formoso]

I believe that it is necessary to put these considerable variations into perspective with the policies that were put into place in China during those years. Returning to the countryside, or periods of repression during the cultural revolution in the 1960s should be taken into account.

[Martine Segalen]

It seems to me that the analysis merits a link with the rate of nuptiality, meaning the number of marriages for 1000 inhabitants. If we marry younger, this implies encouragement to marry, and we should see if the nuptiality rate rises at this time. For example, for Europe, and France in particular, the correlations are strong between the rise

in the number of marriages and the fall of the marrying age after the two world wars: there are “catching up” periods after not having had the time to get married.

[Philippe Antoine]

The decrease in fertility rates can also be explained by the prevalence of contraception. Countries with high fertility rates would have a low contraceptive prevalence – meaning the use of modern contraceptive techniques and on the contrary the countries with a high contraceptive prevalence would have a low fertility rate.


[Martine Segalen]

Is abortion included in the modern contraceptive methods?

[Philippe Antoine]

They are contraceptive methods linked to the pill and the condom. Ordinarily, abortion is counted differently.

Figure 73 *Evolution of the Synthetic Fertility Index between 1960-65 and 2000-05 in Southeast Asia and East Asia*




Source: Ined 2009.

The correlation is significant. There are exceptions, as in Việt Nam where the contraceptive prevalence is relatively high, and the SFI is still two children per woman;


in South Korea, which has approximately the same contraceptive prevalence, the fertility rate is much lower.

Figure 74 *Relationship Between the Fertility Rate and the Human Development Index (HDI) in Southeast Asia and East Asia*



Source: Ined 2009.


Figure 75 *Synthetic Fertility Index and Contraceptive Prevalence in Southeast Asia and East Asia*



Source: Ined 2009.

In almost all continents, there is a clear decline in mortality, no longer in terms of death rate, but in terms of life expectancy. It is a progress very widely shared by all regions of the world, with the notorious exception of Africa.

Figure 76 *Evolution of Life Expectancy by Sub-region (1950-1955 to 2000-2005)*




Source: Ined 2009.

The indicator considered is “life expectancy”, meaning the average number of years a person lives. This life expectancy at birth is an average. It is very low in Africa because people die very often during the first year of life. For a life expectancy of 45 years, approximately one out of five dies before the age of five.

Likewise, if we look at the evolution of life expectancy over the whole region, there are countries that have made spectacular progress, in particular Việt Nam with an improvement of nearly 50%, going from 47 to 73 years life expectancy between 1970 and 2000.

Figure 77 *Evolution of Life Expectancy between 1970-1975 and 2000-2005 by Country in Southeast Asia and East Asia*




Source: Ined 2009.

For all the points that would be on the continuous diagonal line, there is no difference in life expectancy between the 1970s and 2000s; those who are near the intermediate dotted line have a 25% gain in life expectancy, and for those near the top


line on the left the improvement is 50%. This life expectancy depends on the conditions in the country at a given time; countries like Việt Nam or Cambodia have experienced events that have caused a great number of deaths (wars) followed by increased progress.

Figure 78 *Evolution of Infant Mortality Rate by Sub-region (1950-1955 to 2000-2005)*



Source: Ined 2009.

Figure 79 *Evolution of Infant Mortality Rate Between 1970-1975 and 2000-2005 by Country*



Source: Ined 2009.

Another indicator of mortality is infant mortality. East and Southeast Asia have also seen considerable progress. Infant mortality affects children between 0 and 1 year old. Above all it depends on the conditions of pre-natal healthcare, delivery and pediatric care for children in the first year of life. It is very sensitive to the health conditions of the

country and the existence or not of health infrastructures. In these domains, progress has been considerable. Many countries have reduced infant mortality by half.

To illustrate demographic ageing, let's take the Chinese example.

Figure 80 *Evolution of Population Structure by Age in China: Population Ageing*



Source: Ined 2009.

In the 1950s, the population is relatively young, with a fairly large pyramid base. In 2000, the effect of the decline in the fertility rate sharply reduced the base of the pyramid. We reach a rate of fewer than two children per woman. Starting in 2030, the number of elderly will sharply increase.

With more than 30% of the world population, East and Southeast Asia account for a considerable amount of the demographic evolution of the planet. The slowing of worldwide demographic growth is in large part due to the demographic transition in this region. During the second half of

the XXth century, there was a considerable acceleration of demographic growth, which led to extraordinary transformations in all aspects of society. Despite the slowing of growth observed in the mid-1970s and the rapid deceleration which followed (with an average annual rate inferior to 1%), the rise in population will continue. The fertility rate, which was still close to 6 children per woman around 1950, is inferior to the generation replacement thresholds and significantly less than in other developing regions, that is to say 1.9 children per woman in 2005, compared to an average of 3.2 in the rest of

the Asian continent, 2.5 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 3.1 in North Africa and 5.5 in sub-Saharan Africa.

At the beginning of the XXIst century a new demographic challenge has arisen: the ageing population. While around 2000, one person out of ten was more than 60 years old, it will be one out of six in 2020 and one out of four in 2040. This evolution, which is quasi-inevitable considering the very low level of fertility already reached and the continued decline of mortality among the elderly, will require a considerable adaptation of the social and institutional structures in the countries of the region.

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During the week, Philippe Antoine led two other sessions on the biographical analysis of nuptiality – presentations on July 20 and 22. With the agreement of the lecturer, the transcription of these has not been included in the present work; the fifth annual Tam Đảo Summer School Week will offer the workshop "Biographies: from Quantitative Study to Analysis". This practical training on biographical studies through surveys and their analysis will be held during the summer of 2011 by Philippe Antoine, Donatien Beguy and Andonirina Rakotonarivo; it will be the subject of a separate publication. In addition, we inform our readers that the themes developed below are taken from texts transmitted by Martine Segalen and Bernard Formoso.

2.4.2. Demographic Transition. Local Variables and Cultural Factors: Thai and Vietnamese Examples, by Bernard Formoso

"Demographic Transition" is a general process. It has been observed in most countries in the world at different eras, with different scales, durations and methods. Interpretations of the phenomenon most often settle on causes that are also general. It is associated firstly with modernity and especially with the very vague notion of development. Thus, according to the definition given by INED, demographic transition "designates the shift from a traditional demographic regime where fertility and mortality rates are high and nearly balanced, to a modern regime where fertility and mortality

rates are low, and also balanced.”^[18] The factors of progress put forward to justify the transition are always the same. They include rural exodus, improvement of sanitary conditions of an increasingly urban population, rising education levels which indirectly affects birth rates through an increasing use of contraception, raising of the age at marriage, and loosening of familial structures because of the progress of individualism, or even the rise in professional activity among women: the more they work, the fewer babies they have. These trends are identified using a statistical instrument and are usually analyzed in terms of macro-economic and macro-sociological correlations.

These “one-size-fits-all” explanations are not wrong, but are nonetheless frustrating from an epistemological point of view. They certainly express phenomena of which the convergent effects correlate to show the transition process in general terms, but because of this overall viewpoint, they are incapable of getting past the stage of possible correlations to that of cause and effect. Indeed, as Roy Ellen rightly points out, the solution to the methodological problem of moving from simple correlation to causality depends on the scale chosen, because this determines the number of variables that can be involved. On the scale of a country, where most of the research on demographic transition is pitched, the number of variables involved is so large that the revelation of direct causality is impossible. From a methodological point of view, we must remember that the more we break up social, economic or other factors into variables, and the more these variables

are limited by the choice of a relatively small sociological scale, the more we have a chance of seizing the nature of the factors that inform social practice. The smaller the scale, the greater the tendency for demographers to make errors in their predictions and it is obviously at this level that the contribution of ethnologists working on the qualitative aspects can be the most useful.

The second problem presented by the macro-sociological approach to demographic transition is that it is often reduced to an explicative diagram that is univocal and materialistic. The reasoning behind this approach holds that all national societies would follow the same global process of economic development and demographic adjustment characterized by modernization, give or take a few nuances which depend less on the nature than on the amplitude of the factors in play. This minimizes the importance of cultural parameters. In reality, and some demographers admit this (Charbit, 1980 and Chesnais, 1986), it is necessary to step away from some of the demographic and economic aggregates ordinarily used as interpretive keys, and rehabilitate the crucial role that socio-cultural factors play in the field, using monographic studies. Only these will allow a detailed understanding of the observed evolutions.

The purpose of this session is not to question the general interpretation of the phenomena of demographic transition, but to add nuance to it. This will involve showing the value of simultaneously taking into consideration local situations and cultural factors, through two

[18] Citation from the site <http://www.ined.fr/fr/lexique/bdd/mot/transition+d%C3%A9mographique/motid/9/>.

case studies. The first study is on two villages in northeastern Thailand where I worked in the mid 1980s; the second was carried out by the Canadian demographer, Danièle Bélanger, in association with researchers Thi Hai Oanh Khuat, Liu Jianye, Le Thanh Thuy and Viet Thanh Pham at the beginning of the 2000s. This study deals with high male birth ratios which remain visible today in Việt Nam, as in other East Asian countries of Confucian culture marked with a powerful patrilinear ideology.

Demographic Transition in Two Villages in Northeastern Thailand

The Northeast region is second only to the Central Plains region in Thailand for rice production. This region, the largest of the country (1/3 of the territory) is marked by unfavorable topographical and soil conditions. It is in fact dominated by ancient, lateral, and high alluvial terraces which cannot be irrigated using gravity. Problems caused by the deficiency of natural resources are exacerbated by the second highest population density in the country, and by a rate of urbanization and level of industrialization which are the lowest in Thailand. The Northeast, truth be told, is the rural heart of the kingdom. It contains more than 40% of the country's agricultural lands, but also the majority of smaller farms (less than 5 ha), worked directly by their owners. In short, the region is the bastion of the poor small peasantry of the country. As such, it is home to large battalions of protestors called "Red Shirts" who were involved, not long ago, in a show of force with the Thai government when they demanded elections and the return of the ex-Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who led policies that were advantageous

to them but who was removed from power in 2006.

These recent events are the latest convulsions of the recurring tensions between the regional population and Bangkok. Starting in the 1960s, in a geopolitical context marked by the second Indochinese war, the government tried to reduce these tensions. With the support of the Americans who had established air bases in the region, it constructed roads to link the region to the rest of the country. Moreover, USAID contributed to the construction of large irrigated perimeters. These efforts and others like them were pursued with the help of financing by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. However, they only serve 10% of the rice growing land. Enormous investments that the government cannot afford would be necessary to increase this percentage significantly.

I linger on the subject of irrigation because one of the two villages that I studied in the 1980s was situated in one of these irrigated perimeters developed by the state. The construction of the Non Wai perimeter, which is irrigated by water from the Ubon Rathana reservoir, was started in 1965, but was not fully operational until 1981 after the rice growing surfaces had been leveled and tertiary irrigation and drainage canals were dug. In the meantime, however, and since the beginning of the 1970s, the inhabitants of the village were able to develop a riverside economy by pumping in water during the dry season from the primary and secondary canals. This water was used to grow fruit and vegetables or to produce two rice harvests a year in the zones adjacent to the canals. New possibilities created by irrigation were one of the principal variables taken

into consideration in the study that I did in 1984-1986 in the context of a multi-disciplinary team which brought together French and Thai researchers (Formoso, 1997). The other main variable was the distance in relation to the urban centers. More precisely, the study compared two rice-producing villages of the Khon Kaen province. The first village, Ban Amphawan, was not only situated inside the irrigated perimeter of Nong Wai, but was also located only 13 km from Khon Kaen city, capital of Khon Kaen province; this was the city chosen in the 1960s to become the principal growth center for the entire northeast. At the time of the study, Khon Kaen had 140,000 inhabitants (400,000 at the end of the 1990s, 500,000 in 2010) and because of its status, had modern and diversified infrastructures especially in the domains of health and education. In the 1980s, the city's power of attraction on rural populations living in the immediate vicinity was already being felt. Thus the proportion of employees in the public and private sectors was twice as high as in Ban Amphawan than in the other village in the study. This second village, named Ban Han, was located in an ecological environment comparable to that of Ban Amphawan. However, it was totally dependent on rain for its rice crops and its inhabitants could only manage one harvest per year as opposed to two in the other locality. Moreover, it was much more isolated than Ban Amphawan, as it was situated 6 km from a small district center with 3,500 inhabitants and more importantly 84 km from Khon Kaen. To conclude this brief presentation, let us add that our team, including geographers, ethnologists, sociologists and historians,

had chosen these two villages because they were already the object of a detailed socio-economic study 15 years before and thus we had a base for not only synchronic, but also diachronic comparison which allowed us to analyze in detail their evolution since the 1960s.

Considering all of these elements, how did the demographic transition operate in these two villages? Let us note first that Thailand's demographic transition took place between 1967 and 1997, over the course of 3 decades. All observers agree that the 1960s is when the economy took off in the country. On the other hand, in 1997, Thailand was the epicenter of a financial crisis that spread to the other countries of the region. In the years that followed the crash, the country stagnated economically. From this time on, the birth rate stabilized. In 1967, the gross birth rate was 39.5%, while from 1997 it remained stable at around 16.5%. The decrease in the death rate was more modest because of the low level of development of the health care system in the country, along with the lack of social protection. The death rate was 10.7% in 1967; it went down to 7.7% in 1997.^[19] To explain this, it is also necessary to mention the local impact of the AIDS pandemic which had a statistical effect starting in 1986 (slight recrudescence of the death rate, because since 1984 approximately one million people have been infected by the virus across the country).

In 1985, the two villages had birth and death rates that were close to the national average. In Ban Amphawan, the birth rate was 17.9%,

[19] Source: <http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=THA&codeTla=ne=1&codeStat=SP0YN.TFRT.IN>.

in Ban Han it was 23.9%, and the national average was then 22.3%. The low birth rate recorded that year in Ban Amphawan must be interpreted as a demographic accident because in 1984, the previous year, the birth rate in this village was 24.1%. As for the mortality rate, in 1985 it was 5.4% in Ban Amphawan and 6.4% in the village outside of the perimeter, while the national average was 6.022% for that year. Looking at these figures, we can conclude that the demographic evolution of these two villages was in synch with the overall transition process observed on a country-wide scale. Concerning deviations from the national average, especially in the village inside the irrigated perimeter, it is hard to interpret them other than as micro-local and cyclical variations, for two methodological reasons. The first depends on the size of the populations taken into account. Ban Amphawan only had 773 inhabitants in 1985 and 115 women in the 15-49 year old age bracket, which is the normal child-bearing age bracket; Ban Han had 1137 inhabitants and 181 women at the child-bearing age. The size of these populations is too small to even out the variations in the birth and death rates that inevitably occur on a micro-local scale. These variations are all the more obvious because the time frame for the analysis is narrow. In fact, the birth and death rates are calculated from one year to the next. These methodological considerations bring out the fact that studying birth and death rates is more adapted to large mass statistics than to small sample populations.

On these smaller scales, the fertility rate, which determines the average number of

children women have during their lifetime, is more useful for discerning the trends at work and the demographic incidence of local factors, whether they are economic, sociological or environmental. In the irrigated perimeter village, Ban Amphawan, the birth rate for 1985 was 3.4 children/woman (3.7 if we count children who died at a young age); in the village outside the perimeter, Ban Han, however, it was much closer to the 1985 national average of 2.55 children/woman, at 2.9 children/woman (3.1 if we count children deceased at a young age).

How to interpret this significant difference in birth rate between the two villages? If we follow the predictive reasoning used by the current interpretive scheme for demographic transition, Ban Amphawan, the village closest to a large city and therefore theoretically the most influenced by urban lifestyles, values and consumption models (especially as regards the use of contraceptives), should logically have been closer to the national average or even slightly below it, as was the city of Khon Kaen which, in the 1980 census, already presented a birth rate of 2.3 children/woman.^[20] Whereas we are far from this as the women of Ban Amphawan had an average of 3 to 4 children, as opposed to 2 to 3 nationally and also in Ban Han. In fact, to correctly interpret the difference, we must refer to a local factor: the implementation of the irrigated perimeter.

Other authors have pointed out (Taillard, 1978) that a notable demographic effect of the implementation of this type of infrastructure is the increase in labor that it requires. Whereas

[20] Source: *Population and Housing Census Changwat Khon Kaen*, Bangkok: National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister, 1980.

for a rain-fed rice production system, there is only one harvest per year – that of the rainy season, leading to under-employment during the dry season – in the irrigated zones, the rice growers produce two to three harvests per year and, considering the constraints of irrigating the fields, cannot benefit from the free exchange of services between villagers in order to ensure that the essential tasks like planting and harvesting get done. Hence the

labor problem, which the villagers tried to compensate for in different ways.

Of course, in the case of Ban Amphawan, the perimeter was not entirely operational until 1981, only four years before the study; nevertheless during the 1970s local farmers could already see the new needs for labor through the riverside economy that they developed near the principal irrigation canals.

Table 30 *Birth Rate, Death Rate and Natural Population Growth in Ban Amphawan and Ban Han*

Village	Birth Rate (a)	Death Rate (b)	Natural Growth Rate (a) - (b)
Ban Amphawan	17.9‰	5.4‰	12.5‰
Ban Han	23.9‰	6.4%	17.5‰

Source: Authors' construction.

Table 31 *Fertility Rate of Women 15-50 Years Old in Ban Amphawan and Ban Han*

Village	Number of Mothers	Number of Births	Number of Deaths (-1 yr)	Average Number of Live Children/ Mother	Average Number of Children/ Mother	% of Children Deceased at a Young Age
Ban Amphawan	115	426	31	3.4	3.7	7.3
Ban Han	181	449	54	2.9	3.1	8.6

Source: Authors' construction.

At that time, they began putting strategies into place to meet new demands for labor. The first strategy was to reduce emigration, seasonal or not, toward urban centers, toward other rural regions in the country or abroad (Middle East, Asian industrial powers). They encouraged young relatives to leave their poor villages which were facing under-employment, join their households and reinforce their labor force. Thus, when we compare the population growth of the two villages over a period of 15 years, we observe that the number of inhabitants in Ban Amphawan rose by 50% from 1969 to 1984, going from 514 to 773 people, while in the same interval, the population of the village outside of the perimeter rose only 22%. The total number of households grew at about the same rate over the 15 year period in the two villages (+55% in Ban Amphawan; +44% in Ban Han), while the decrease of the average size of households that we see in both villages, which is part of a trend that affects the entire Khon Kaen province,^[21] was more prominent in the village situated outside the perimeter. In Ban Han, households went from 6.4 people in 1969 to 5.7 people in 1984, while in Ban Amphawan the decrease was very slight: 6.5 people in 1969 *versus* 6.3 people in 1984 (Formoso, 1997).

Apart from anchoring the local labor force and reinforcing it with relatives from elsewhere, the other supporting strategy which also explains how the size of village households

could evolve was maintaining the fertility rate of Ban Amphawan at a level above the national average. In more prosaic terms, many couples from this village resisted the move toward family planning, even though it was very active in the country,^[22] and felt that it was necessary to continue to have children in order to meet the growing need for labor that would be caused and had already been caused by doubling the rice-growing cycle. Finally, we see from this example the non-negligible affect that local socio-economic factors – in this case the reorganization of the production system – can have on the general demographic transition process.

The Cultural Parameter: The Male Birth Ratio in Việt Nam

After having dealt with social and economic factors which can inform us on the demographic transition process on a micro-local level, I will now look at the possible effects of cultural factors on the overall, national scale. The example that I will first address to illustrate my point is that of the male birth ratio in Việt Nam, as it was studied by Danièle Bélanger, Khuat Thi Hai Oanh, Liu Jianye, Le Thanh Thuy and Pham Viet Thanh (Bélanger *et al.*, 2003). This study is based on the following general observation: the demographic transition is marked in many Asian countries, such as China, India, South Korea Taiwan and Việt Nam, by high masculinity rates among births. In other words, in these countries, there are significantly more boys born than girls.

[21] In comparing the results of the *Population and Housing Census* that the National Statistical Office carried out in 1970 and 1980 in Khon Kaen province, we see in fact that in rural areas the average size of households went from 6.2 to 5.7 people over a 10-year period.

[22] John Knodel, A. Chamrathirong & N. Debavalya, *Thailand's Reproductive Revolution: Rapid Fertility Decline in a Third World Setting*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. See also the 1991 Survey of Population Change, Bangkok, National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister. According to this report 27% of married couples with wives between 15 and 50 years old resorted to sterilization.

To explain this phenomenon, the demographers cite intermediary causes coming from social practices. These causes would be: 1) a lower number of girls counted at birth (they are not registered because they count for little in the patrilinear ideology of these countries); 2) selective abortion of female fetuses or a lack of care for female children which may go as far as infanticide and which results in a higher mortality rate for young female children. Between these two causes, selective abortion is more prevalent, aided by the development of medical imaging (antenatal ultrasound scans).

These two intermediary causes trace back to a more fundamental cause, which is cultural. Indeed, these Asian societies have patrilinear social structures in common and a powerful ideology of patrification, of which Confucianism offers a particularly dogmatic expression in the countries where it is present (China, Korea, Việt Nam). In this context, having a son is seen as an economic necessity as much as it is a social one (family prestige) as well as religious, in that among societies permeated with Confucian heritage, it is the son's responsibility to mediate spiritual relationships with the ancestors which dictates the harmony and well-being of the family. Therefore, in Confucian culture countries the aim of parenthood was traditionally the quest for one or more sons, and this preoccupation has taken a particular turn in the context of demographic transition and especially in the political context where this transition was reinforced by strict control of births as was the case in China (*cf.* single child policy).

Việt Nam, like other Confucian-culture countries, had one of the most rapid demographic transitions among developing countries (Rele *et al.*, 1993). In addition, as with its Chinese homologue, the Vietnamese government took an authoritarian route. Since the end of the 1980s it has favored a limitation on the number of children to one or two children per couple. This measure is nevertheless unequally implemented from one province to the next, and affects above all civil servants and members of the military who, in case of an infringement, are exposed to punitive fines or community service work (Goodking, 1995). This voluntary action and the effects of the reform movement *đổi mới* meant that in the mid-1990s, the average fertility rate had fallen to 2.6 children per woman and by the end of the decade did not even exceed 2.2 children per woman – a figure very close to the generation replacement threshold (Bélanger *et al.*, *op.cit.*). Despite this low fertility index and forty years of governmental promotion of sexual equality, the preference for boys is still very present in Việt Nam and is seen in various pre- and post-natal strategies.

The study of Bélanger *et al.* highlights these strategies through an analysis of the 1989 and 1999 censuses and especially of their sampling at 1/20th which is statistically representative of the entire national population. It also takes into account the study on the standard of living of the General Statistics Office which provides retrospective family data obtained from a sample of 5,823 married women of child-bearing age.^[23] Finally, it studies the totality of births and abortions occurring in the

[23] General Statistical Office, *Vietnam Living Standards Survey 1997-1998*, Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2000.

principal hospitals of Hà Nội (1999) and Hồ Chí Minh City (1996, 1999 and 2001).

Before going into the detail of the study's results, it is necessary to remember that the ratio of male births is the ratio between living male and female children. The norm for human populations is situated between 104 and 107, with an average of 105, meaning that there are 105 boys born for every 100 girls. According to the study by Bélanger *et al.*, in 1989 the ratio of male births was 107 in Việt Nam, but large disparities existed between the different provinces and regions of the country. Thus, the provinces in the south (Long An, Đồng Tháp, An Giang, Tiền Giang, Bến Tre, Cửu Long, Hậu Giang) had a higher ratio, between 110 and 115 (Bélanger *et al., op. cit.*). In 1999, according to the 1/20th sample data which appears to be the closest to reality, the national male birth ratio was 107.7 with, again, large disparities. Thus, 18 provinces present a ratio superior to 110, with a maximum of 128.5 in Thái Bình. The study also points out that the male ratio for last-born children rises with the age of the mother, changing from 107 when the mother is between 20 and 24 to 110 for mother from 35 to 39 years old (Bélanger *et al., op. cit.*). Data collected in hospitals confirm the phenomenon and show that the male birth ratio rises sharply with the rank of birth. Thus the ranks 3 and 4 (3rd and 4th child) show masculinity rates between 147 and 223. Here we see women who had girls for their first children but employ different strategies to have a boy. Among these strategies is abortion when the ultrasound reveals that

the child is a girl. Abortion has been legal in Việt Nam since 1954 and occurred much more frequently from 1989 with the legalization of private clinics. Another popular strategy is the discreet removal of the intra uterine device to try to have another child, hoping for a boy. The armed forces and civil servants, who are subjected to more pressure than other parents to respect the governmental injunctions on birth control, have more of a tendency to select their child according to the sex from the first or second child. We observe as well that the families, in rural areas of the north especially, who already have two sons do not try to have more children, because they do not want to divide their farm into three smaller parts and they also want to avoid having problems with the authorities.

Conscious of the problem of asymmetrical masculinity and the significant consequences at the demographic level, in January 2003 the authorities voted for legislation that forbids couples from determining the sex of the fetus whatever the means used. The law sets fines and penal measures for those who break the law (Bélanger *et al., op. cit.*).

Finally, this study is interesting because it shows the weight of cultural conditioning on procreation practices. Certainly, the male birth ratio in favor of boys does not affect the course of the process of demographic transition. It adapts to it. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the process, it significantly limits the number of girls available later on the matrimonial market, and can create alarming demographic consequences.

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Day 2, Tuesday, July 20

2.4.3. Transformations of the Feminine Condition in View of Demographic, Cultural and Social Changes, by Martine Segalen

Speaking about the "demographic transition" for an entire population ignores the fact that certain elements of this transition exclusively concern women, as young pubescent girls, pregnant women and mothers. This presentation begins by comparing feminine life calendars from the XVIIIth century to the present day to show what the demographic data reveals, then it will study multiple causes for the profound transformation of the feminine condition – more so than that of men – and consequently of the institution of family in contemporary Europe. Finally, it will emphasize the role of public policies torn between declining fertility rates and generalized ageing of the population throughout Europe, and the rise of the equality between men and women.

In the framework of this presentation, I manipulate different types of data and sources, demographic as well as historical.

The presentation begins by comparing the child-bearing careers of women in two generations, showing the extraordinary change in the feminine condition.

But history does not stop in 1960 and if we look at the generation of women born in 1990, we can compare these figures to those of today: average age of marriage 30 years; at the first birth 30 years; birth rate for France 2.0

Table 32 *Mortality, Nuptiality and Legitimate Fertility of Two Generations of Women: 1750 and 1950 in France*

	Generation 1750	Generation 1950	
		"Maximum Fertility" (a)	Probable History (b)
1. For 100 Living Girls, Proportion of Survivors			
at 15 years old	48%	94%	94%
at 50 years old	30%	90%	90%
2. Average Age of Puberty	16 years old	13 years old	13 years old
3. Average Age of First Marriage	26 years old	23 years old	23 years old
Proportion of Single Women at 50 Years Old	11%	8%	8%
4. Average Age at the Birth of First Child	27 years old	24 years old	25 years old
Average Age at the Birth of Last Child	37 years old	38 years old	30 years old
Average Number of Children			
Per Woman Married at 20 Years Old, Subsistent Union until 50 Years Old	8.7	12.3	2.8
Per Married Woman	5,3	10,1	2.2
Per Living Woman at 15 Years Old	4.2	9.3	2.0
In the Generation	2.0	8.7	1.9
(a) Theoretical fertility in the absence of all birth control (contraception or abortion).			
(b) Estimation does not take into account illegitimate births (+0.15 children per woman), or divorce (effects on fertility difficult to evaluate).			

Source: Henri Leridon, "La Maîtrise de la fécondité: ses motifs et ses moyens" p. 51.

in 2008; significant rise in the age of the last pregnancy to around 42 years old.

These numbers show that behind the concept of demographic transition for an entire population, we have major transformations which concern the feminine condition.

The Feminine Condition in Previous Societies

In peasant societies, women work very hard within a strict distribution of labor and roles; they manage domestic life, the health of men and family and work in the fields, all the while bearing and giving birth to children. The couple is based on inheritance strategies: the notion of the couple does not exist, the workplaces of men and women are

separated; the men are outside, in the fields or in the café, the women stay at home or in their own social spaces which are the kitchen or the washroom. In this society, the roles are separate and hierarchical.

In the city, at the factory, the beginnings of capitalism – and particularly textile capitalism – seriously disorganized family life by putting first the woman, and then the children in the factory. Low salaries for men meant that everyone must work in the factory. In Lille, in 1856, the cotton and linen spinning factories employed 12,939 men and 12,792 women from Monday to Saturday, 5:30 am to 8 pm, 300 days per year. The woman's salary was inferior to the man's, and children earned even less. Children were valued in the factories for their small size; they could slip under the looms to repair broken threads, clean bobbins, and collect cotton scraps (Segalen, 1994).

A maternal proletarianization emerged: fatigued by the working conditions, female workers were accused of having lost their domestic skills. The decline of male status within working class domestic groups did not necessarily lead to a rise in female status. Observers highlight the destructive effects of industrialization on traditional skills:

"Industrialization will produce, by entire groups, a new type of mother, who works outside of the home from 12 to 14 hours per day and comes home exhausted, haggard, exasperated, sometimes incapable of carrying out the most basic motherly and household tasks. What is new, is not that work sets a mother against her children (that was often the case in the countryside), it is the massive, collective and blinding character of the phenomenon. Peasant and farming women sometimes worked just

as much, but each one was conscious of their common fatigue in the privacy of her own home and in front of only a few witnesses, sometimes doctors. Now, factories and poor housing gathered these poor women together in one place, giving their misery a scandalous dimension," (Knibielher and Fouquet, 1980, p. 245). Traditional female sociability, through which their feminine knowledge was transmitted, was destroyed. This knowledge concerned the household domain, kitchen, laundry, childcare, etc. Even if these practices were sometimes deemed "superstitious" among peasants, they continued to be passed on as wisdom coming from the beginning of time. The situation changed in the city where the contrast between the behavior of the female worker, and learned and middle-class knowledge, was too glaring. Observers are frankly hostile toward the working-class ways of doing things. They are obliged to state that women are de-cultured. At the end of the century, the criticisms accumulate: *"Women workers do not know how to sew, mend, cook a broth, or raise their children. That industrial work, as overpowering as it was, had destroyed the ancient feminine knowledge and the virtues of housekeeping, is not particularly surprising."*

When she is not working in the factory, a woman looks for another way to earn extra money: for example, in London, a decrease in female labor corresponds to a rise in the number of boarders. In other working-class cities, married women worked in non-industrial sectors: they were washerwomen, they managed cafés, they cleaned houses or took in work at home. We observe a rise in this type of work toward the end of the XIXth century, notably with the sewing machine. Although this mechanism appeared to be the ally of the middle-class woman in her

traditional tasks, “the iron seamstress” was the instrument of external capitalism within the home. For a small salary, tied to her machine, the woman finds herself in her traditional posture and function again, reinforcing the symbolic image of the disciplined woman (today the same image is the stenographer bolted to her typewriter, and in the 1990s to her computer, with word processing). With the development of the clothing industry, many women get enough money out of their machine to pay for the rent of the instrument of their domination and to supplement their husband’s salary. In order to obtain this slim revenue, they must work entire days, sometimes till late at night. This is why at the dawn of the XXth century, we see women returning to the factory, which seems to them to be preferable to the torments of working at home – these women would then flock to the war factories (Perrot, 1978).

Whatever the involvement of the woman in paid work, her principal role is to ensure the survival of the family despite the conditions of extreme poverty which characterized all of industrial Europe in the XIXth century. Obviously, the birth of numerous children added to family responsibilities. Child abandonment rose dramatically with industrialization, which prompted the public authorities to put into place structures for helping what they defined as “found children”, “abandoned children” or “assisted children” – *foundlings* (Fuchs, 2002). Often, their mothers, whether they were single or married, were new to the city, without a network of relatives or neighbors who could help them in their distress. Work and childcare were incompatible, especially for women who were employed as housekeepers or domestic help, a profession which was expanding in

the XIXth century. In Paris, at least one-third of the women who abandoned their children were domestic helpers for whom their work made motherhood impossible; another third were seamstresses, or factory workers (Fuchs, 2002, p. 176).

Until the 1930’s, certain working-class families used the strategy of fertility, producing numerous children who cost money when they were young, but who could then bring a salary home to the family. However, on the whole in French society, we see an overall fall in fertility, birth control being practiced via abortion or coitus interruptus.

It is useful to have this reminder of the historical conditions in which women lived so as to measure the changes that have occurred.

Ideologies about Women and the Family

One should know that the changes in the status of women, of which we will study the causes, have been the subject of debate for several decades. Scientific discussions surrounding the criticisms of the “bourgeois” family and the question of division of labor and roles launched the vast popular movement that in France was called the “movement for the liberation of women” (*mouvement de libération des femmes*) or MLF, a radical movement from the 1970s. The rejection of marriage and the couple was therefore born out of an ideological position.

In the period immediately following the war, the danger to the family took on a new image; an internal danger resulting from neurotic relationships, the suffocation of the family and the destruction of its members by the intolerable pressure inflicted by family restrictions. Women seemed to be very

dominated, dependent on the resources of their husbands, which limited the number of divorces. The influence of Freud and the discoveries of psychoanalysis contributed to the radicalization of anti-family positions. The works of Simone de Beauvoir highlight the failings of traditional middle-class morals and marriage, both contributors to the alienation of the woman, and this is a trend that would strongly influence the criticism of family produced by feminists in the 1970s.

The re-emergence of domestic work as a field of scientific study is due to Marxist critique of the 1970s. It denounces the oppression of women in the context of patriarchal exploitation. The capitalist production mode having led to a gender-based division of labor, the feminists wanted to *"show the activities of women in the family and get recognition for these as work, and exploited work. By presenting housework in terms of production, feminist movements forced us to rethink the functions attributed to the family and the general functioning of the economy"* (Chabaud-Rychter, Fougeyrollas-Schwebel and Sonthonnax, 1985).

Christine Dupont (1970) posed the question of the public character of the family by affirming that domestic work produced value. Certain economists challenged this position, stating that the product of domestic work was of immediate value at the point of use, but was not goods that enter into a network of commercial exchanges. The feminists responded that most of the services provided in the home could be found on the market. The nature of domestic work was therefore part of the public domain, even if national accounting still ignored it, and even classified the contribution of women to the production of goods and services sold on

the market as production for family use. These controversies, in conjunction with the fight for the liberalization of contraception and abortion, occupied public debates in the 1970s and 80s, then subsided only to reappear nowadays as regards the still-debated question of male-female equality.

At the turn of the XXIst century, the work that was started in the 1970s was taken up again: thirty years after it began, gender sociology was reconciled with the family. French-style feminism, inspired by Marx, critical of the condition of women in marriage, re-energized the research: after a period of militant opposition to an institution seen as the incubator of inequality between men and women, feminist sociology, which had done much to decompartmentalize sociology, denounced the inequality between genders, which is often social inequality.

The Causes of the Change in the Status of Women

It is necessary first to point out the medical progress of the end of the XIXth century concerning child delivery and stillbirths. Women no longer needed to deliver ten children in order to have at least two survive. The consumer society favored the improvement of the feminine condition in two ways: it was no longer necessary to sew your own clothes or make your own jam – better to buy them at the market than to make them at home. In addition, the level of education of women rose while the labor market opened up new professions. Finally, the liberalization of morals allowed a greater sexual liberty for girls. New attitudes toward virginity and the sexuality of young women have now been accepted for more than twenty years in our society: for one

generation. These changes in status make women the drivers and promoters of a new social model.

But among the most important causes, we should note the two contraceptive revolutions.

Natural contraception and chemical contraception define very different relationships with society: even if they have the same effect – limiting births – they do not use the same means, and do not have the same motivations.

According to the theses developed by Philippe Ariès, “natural” contraception, which became established at the end of the XVIIIth century in France, is a male contraception, a contraception of the ascetic, where the man controls his sexual impulse and pulls away at the most pleasurable moment.

Previously, people couldn’t even imagine that they could modify the sexual act, an act of nature. This is where the revolutionary idea lies, in this change of the attitude toward the body. Historians see in this an upheaval of consciousness. Ariès states that *“contraceptive practices are unthinkable in ancient societies because they are foreign to their mental universe.”* The attitude toward sexuality was also supported by religious doctrine which considered chastity as the optimal state; marriage was the lesser of two evils, but the sexual act should be reserved for the aim of procreation. Sexuality for sterile purposes was condemned.

However, at the end of the XVIIIth century, in the Catholic country that is France, the practice of *coitus interruptus* reached diverse social classes – middle-class and peasant.

This technique was certainly known in some milieux such as that of prostitution or in the salons of high society; what is new is the speed of the diffusion of the *“funestes secrets”* (fatal secrets). The effects are immediately felt in the fertility rates. From a statistical point of view, this contraception is highly efficient, because it reduces the number of births; at the level of each individual couple it is not as certain: even when “being careful” – a euphemism which refers to the dissociation of pleasure and risk of pregnancy – they have more children than they want. It is this margin of security that distinguishes the modern methods of contraception from the old methods.

The desire to limit one’s descendants is linked to a new attitude toward children, that they must be taken care of and educated: *“It was when the French started to take an interest in children that they began to have fewer of them,”* writes Doctor Jean Sutter to summarize the thoughts of Philippe Ariès (Burguière, 1972, p. 1121).

Since the 1970s, a second contraceptive revolution has taken place with the moral acceptance of modern techniques (notably chemical). On many points, they are the opposite of classic contraceptive techniques. Detractors of these new methods described them in passionate and ideological terms: “contraception of pleasure”, “calculated children” – a discourse which has totally disappeared with their diffusion and acceptance throughout Europe. The voluntary limitation of births corresponds to a new economy of conjugal relationships, centered on the couple. This voluntary choice, manifest in the rapid fall of fertility, precedes the widespread adoption of modern contraception techniques. From 1964-65

we observe a significant decrease in fertility, whereas the widespread use of the pill and the IUD doesn't really take off until 1970. This phenomenon is all the more remarkable in that it has affected other European countries in the same way. Today, children no longer arrive and are accepted, but they are planned, scheduled and desired.

According to a study carried out in 1988, the age at which young people have their first sexual experience dropped considerably between 1960 and 1980. At the end of the 1960s, one third of women were virgins at the time of marriage; in the mid-1980s, this was the case for only one out of ten women. The median age for first sexual relations seems to have stabilized around 18 years old (Toulemon and Léridon, 1991; Bozon, 1993). This liberation of morals was underpinned by the total control of contraception, unthinkable only thirty years ago. The first period of juvenile cohabitation, which demographers analyzed in the mid-1970s as a "trial marriage" period, was in fact sterile. The young cohabitants married when a pregnancy occurred or when the couple wanted to have a baby. It is not the same ten years later, as we see a significant rise in births out of wedlock.

The extension of the period of higher education for women, as well as the rise of the female workforce, also explain the development of this practice; marriage appears contradictory to the aspirations of women for personal autonomy and openness to external opportunities. Entrance into the adult world is unclear today, whereas in the past it was signaled by marriage, which opened the doors to sexuality as well as to independent housing and salaried employment. On one hand, the age of

legal majority is lower at 18 years old (since legislation in 1974), and women's first sexual relations occur at an earlier age, but on the other hand, education is prolonged and young adults enter the workforce later and later. Juvenile cohabitation offers a social buffer for reconciling these contradictory demands. Today, this cohabitation is legitimized by the creation of the PACS (Civil Solidarity Pact) which has been remarkably successful among young couples.

Some observers find that the economic situation since the 1990s, characterized by difficult access to the labor market and unemployment among young people, is also responsible for the development of common law unions, given that marriage is supposed to happen once one has stable employment. While this hypothesis holds true for some couples, we cannot say it is universal. First, economic crises keep young people in their parents' homes. Since the 1980s, 18 to 22 year-olds live at home longer, instead of finding their own independent housing as they had since the 1950s. Second, the economic argument doesn't apply to certain protected categories, such as civil servants – and they have also developed this practice.

The Law and Public Policies

The law has followed the change in morals and made rapid advances toward male-female equality, even if this is still far from being achieved. If we look at the legislative changes that have taken place over the last thirty years, we see an important redefinition of the institution of family as it is defined by the law: the dismantling of the father and of the patriarchal society. Let's not forget that these changes take place within the context of a welfare state, which was more and

more generous during the post-war boom (Segalen, 2010).

Principal Measures in France Concerning the Family in Civil Rights, Public Policies and Social Policies

1939. Family Code

1944. Women allowed to vote (ruling of April 22)

1945. Establishment of the dependents' allowance (set against tax)

1946. Family Branch of Social Security (family benefits, single salary benefits, antenatal benefits, maternity benefits)

1948. Housing benefit

1965. Reform of marital law establishing conjugal equality and solidarity

1967. Neuwirth law on contraception

1970. Law replacing *paternal power* with *joint parental authority*. The notion of the *head of the family* disappears from civil law

1970. Orphan benefits

1972. Childcare benefits

- Law making all filiation (legitimate or illegitimate) equal; proof of biological filiation (genetic paternity test) so filiation becomes a reality that can be proven

1974. Second Neuwirth law establishing subsidy of contraceptives

1975. Veil law on abortion

- Law allowing divorce by mutual consent, as well as via contentious procedures

1976. Single Parent Benefit (*Allocation de parent isolé* - API)

1982. Parental Education Benefit (*Allocation parentale d'éducation* - APE)

1987. Law establishing joint parental authority

1989. Convention on the Rights of the Child voted by UN

1994. Home Childcare Benefits (*Allocation de garde d'enfant à domicile* - AGED)

1999. Law enshrining Civil Solidarity Pact (*Pacte Civil de Solidarité* - PACS), a contract which gives a common law union status to people living together, either same-sex or heterosexual couples. Unmarried cohabitation is recognized by civil law

2000. Children are recognized as people with the same status as adults: establishment of a legal authority, superior and independent, for the defense of children

2001. The legal time limit for having an abortion is raised to twelve weeks

- Discrimination against illegitimate children as regards inheritance is outlawed, and the rights of widowed spouses are reinforced

2002. Establishment of paternity leave: a father receives eleven days of paid leave when his child is born

- Law generalizing the principle of shared parental authority, making alternating residences possible for the child, bringing family mediation into civil law and foreseeing the possibility of a delegation of parental authority to a third party without taking it away from one or the other parent

- Law on access to information about the origins of an adopted person and the creation of a National Council on Access to Origins

- Gouzes law on family names

- Reinforcing of co-parenting (in case of the separation of a couple, married or not, the parents have strictly equal status concerning parental authority)

2004. Substitution and fusion of all previous childcare benefits into a single Young Childcare Benefit (*Prestations d'accueil du jeune enfant* - PAJE)

- Divorce reform, removing the concept of fault in certain cases

2005. A ruling presented to the Council of Ministers leads to the abolition of the civil law terms "natural" and "legitimate" filiation.

A mother – even unmarried – will no longer need to obtain an act of recognition for her child: filiation is established by birth – but an unmarried father will still have to go through this process.

Sources: Commaille, Strobel, Villac, 2002, p. 69-70, Montalembert, 2004.

Among all these measures I have listed, we find some significant inclinations of public policies as regards the family.

Measures affecting the institution of family were first attributed to right-leaning governments, because of their former preoccupation with the birthrate, but this is no longer the case today. For a long time, the French State has been unable to ignore the fall in the birthrate, which has consequences for the ageing of the population.

A long tradition of familialism in France has meant that governments, no matter what their political leaning, take an interest in the demographic future of the country. Nevertheless, since the end of the 1980s, intervention in private life is not necessarily accepted by all political sensibilities. The catchwords among politicians are neutrality and free choice – a decoy, it has been said. The State has noted the transformations of the family, and assimilates the plurality of conjugal models, the process of blended families, women in the professional workplace, and inter-generational relationships in its plans. In this complex and changing landscape, the political discourse claims to try to facilitate the well-being and harmonious balance of individuals.

Contemporary Public Policies are Subject to Tension

Policies on the family and changes in the law are closely linked together around three principles, characteristic of the contemporary institution of the family:

- recognition of the fragility of unions;
- necessary protection of the child in light of precarious filial relationships, by ensuring a link with the father;
- rise of the demand for equality of treatment of men and women in private and professional life.

The law has accompanied these changes, adapting to the instability of unions whether they are institutionalized or not by marriage, and trying to protect single mothers as well as children. In addition, family policies have moved from a pro-birth objective for all families to a social objective for the most needy, to focus on the single parent families created by ruptures of unions: this is what the specialists call “socialization of family policy”.

So-called family policies, like legal measures, have changed considerably since the end of the 1990s, focusing principally on:

- women/mothers in precarious economic situations;
- children, via a call to parents to be responsible. The issue of “parentality”, or capacity to fulfill your obligations as a parent, arises from concerns linked to the issue of insecurity. Some see this as a wish for a “moral re-arming” through mediation for “parenting support” which gently promotes an improvement in parenting skills, without harm to individual liberty;

- and for some years now, the "risk" of the dependence of the elderly, whose demographic weight will increasingly affect society.

These public actions are therefore less and less familialist in the old sense of the word. They do not try to rectify, in the name of national interest, the errors or insufficiency of families. Instead, they are designed to manage the most fragile social groups of society. But in its efforts to reduce public spending, the government is often tempted to delegate the most fragile groups, children and elderly, to local institutions or family solidarity. However, studies show that family solidarity is strong as long as it is supported by public solidarity; weakening the latter would seriously threaten the former.

In sum, young people of both genders reject the idea of a housewife in the home; women consider that economic activity is a means of independence, whereas for young men, women's salaries increase the household revenue. Underlying attitudes show that young men have more conservative attitudes on the distribution of roles in the home. Even if they believe in the model of the independent woman, and feel solidarity with young women, some men seem reluctant to abandon their present advantages in the distribution of domestic tasks. Politicians insist therefore on the necessity of reconciling family life and professional life; reconciliation is still considered to be feminine because of the lasting nature of the distribution of tasks.

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Day 3, Wednesday, July 21

2.4.4. Evolution and Continuity in the Choice of Spouse: Cross-cultural Study of Vietnamese and Thai Cases, by Bernard Formoso

During the last thirty years, the development of studies on the choice of spouse and marriage conditions in Southeast Asia show that contrary to theories on convergence of family behavior, the linear transition from arranged marriages to marriages for love or from a formal union to an informal union is not operative in this part of the world (Cauquelin, 2000; Nguyễn, 2006; Malhotra, 1991). Certainly, a general process of individuation is taking place sporadically. Conditions in which individuals acquire education and skills that allow them to access economic emancipation earlier than in the family environment are favorable to this process. Mobility for studying and then for work also contributes to this process by

allowing eligible individuals to avoid parental influence and thus better express their own choices. On an ideological level, more space is given to the individual, for his/her well-being, personal fulfillment, feelings of love, while on a political level, women's rights advance, even if in practice they come up against many obstacles and distinct inequality still exists.

The repercussions of these mutations are a younger marrying age, notable delay of parenthood after marriage, increased rejection of marriage in favor of other types of unions, decreased stability of conjugal unions, and growing proportions of people who do not succeed in founding a family, especially women with high levels of education. Thirty years ago, marriage was almost universal in most Asian countries, so much so that the proportion of single adults was very small. Whereas, for the last two decades, we observe a significant change in large Asian cities. In 2000, 17% of women aged 45-49 years old remained single in Bangkok and 13% in Singapore (Jones, 2005).

Given these general trends, we must nevertheless remember that familial adaptations in the face of economic, political and ideological evolution of the modern world vary widely from one cultural and social context to another. Thus when cultural parameters remain constant, the attitude toward marriage varies significantly between rural and urban contexts, high and low education levels, or still yet between rich and poor individuals. Whatever variables are considered, however, adaptations are marked by both continuity and change, the nature and relative importance of which must be examined case by case. During this session, I will illustrate this by putting two examples of partially convergent evolution in perspective,

one relative to the changes in Việt Nam concerning choice of spouse since 1954, and the other concerning mutations starting in 1960 that characterized marriages in certain rural zones in the northeast of Thailand. There are numerous analogies between these two examples: in each case, we have gone from marriages arranged by the family but approved by the future spouses, to the opposite situation where individual initiative takes precedence, but parent approval is still sought. In spite of this reversal, the concern remains to preserve familial cohesion and form long-lasting unions. To this end, in both cases people try to establish compatibility through homogamy and a preference for endogamy, if not within the village then at least from the place of origin. However, the timing of nuptiality has changed little in Việt Nam over the last thirty years, whereas it has changed in the rural zones closest to urban centres in the northeast of Thailand. The Vietnamese case is also instructive in that it shows that the intervention of the State in marriage, although strong in the communist era, has had little effect on the structure of matrimonial choices and its evolution.

Changes and Continuity Regarding Marriage in Việt Nam since 1960

As regards the Vietnamese case, I will use two studies. The first is that of the demographer Danièle Bélanger, carried out on a sample of around one hundred people from the Hà Nội region that were married between 1960 and 1990. This study was published in 1997 in the review *Autrepart* (Bélanger, 1997). The second study, with a more monographic character, was done by the ethnologist Nelly Krowolski

between 1990 and 1995 in the village of Mông Phụ, in the Red River delta around 45 km from Hà Nội (Đường Lâm commune, Hà Tây province).

Danièle Bélanger bases her study on an apparent paradox. This country's urban population is at an advanced stage of demographic transition, because in 1986-1987, the composite fertility index was already 2.2 children per woman as against 4.6 in the countryside, and it has continued to decrease to 1.86 children/woman in 2008 for the country as a whole and to less than one child per woman in urban areas.^[24] However, the calendar of nuptiality has evolved very little; the median age at first marriage has only risen by a half year for women in the 40-45 year age bracket to that of 25-30 years, in the mid-1990s. This quasi-inertia seems all the more surprising to Danièle Bélanger because in other countries of Confucian tradition, demographic transition has gone hand in hand with a marked lowering of the marrying age (Coale *et al.*, 1993; Bélanger, *op.cit.*). As a result, the author studies the familial changes that have accompanied the slight increase in marrying age and the simultaneous decrease in fertility. In order to address this question, she needs cultural reference points that she looks for in the way in which marriages took place and how couples' lives were organized in Việt Nam before 1945.

Before the Second World War, the Vietnamese family was patrilinear and virilocal. Up until 1945, polygamy was legal and essentially served to ensure a male descendant, necessary for ancestor worship (Bélanger, *op.cit.*; Krowolski, 2000). Despite this, the

[24] Source: <http://www.populationdata.net/index2.php?option=pays&pid=228&nom=vietnam>.

Vietnamese woman enjoyed a relatively advantageous status compared to that of her Chinese sister. She had her own assets both from a dowry and from her right to a part of her parents' inheritance. Moreover, she held the purse strings, supervised the children's daily education and was therefore called the "general of the indoors". Even if the couple normally lived near the boy's parents, it was acceptable for a husband to live with his wife when he was an orphan or when the wife's family did not have any male heir and the boy's parents had many sons. In pre-1945 Việt Nam, marriage was agreed upon by the families, although the children to be married were generally consulted before the decision was made. Among the criteria that played a part in the discussions between families was geographic proximity (people favored village endogamy), socio-economic homogamy (it is preferable to marry someone of the same level), and lineage exogamy. At the end of this brief panorama of marriage conditions up until 1945, Danièle Bélanger notes that from the 1920s a process of individuation began, which refers to the fact that more and more young people in Hà Nội, having received a French education, questioned the Confucian family order and claimed more power over their own marriage (Bélanger, *op. cit.*).

This questioning of the traditional order had powerful political support after independence. Indeed, in 1959, the communist government promulgated a law declaring conjugal family to be monogamous and egalitarian. This law condemns polygamy, arranged marriages and underage unions between children (Bélanger, *op. cit.*; Krowolski, 2000). The legal age for marriage is set at 20 years for men and 18 for women. In addition, the law gives a precise definition of illegal

marriages, particularly between parallel and cross cousins over three generations. However, as Nelly Krowolski points out, the civil records as they were then kept could not provide the information needed to enforce this prohibition (Krowolski, 2000). Ideological campaigns were regularly carried out in order to establish marriage as a voluntary union between consenting individuals. The question is, of course, what was the real impact of this policy. All the more so because in 1986 the Vietnamese communist party decided to engage in a transition toward a market economy by privatizing land ownership and liberalizing private commerce. This reform seems to have had effects on the Vietnamese family – effects particularly noticeable in the resurgence of pre-socialist marriage rituals.

In addressing this question, Danièle Bélanger notes first a major change that has intervened between the 1960s and 1990s in the way in which future spouses meet. Although in the transitory phase of the 1960s-1970s, the family continues to play a part in matrimonial choices by introducing young people that they would like to see their children choose from within their social circle, during this period meeting people outside of the family circle becomes more popular and reaches all the social classes. This second option will end up affirming itself as the dominant mode starting in the 1980s, at the same time that the *dôi moi* reforms are launched. However, an element of continuity remains, "*the entry of a potential spouse into his/her spouse's family remains (...) a central step in the process, even if the parents are no longer the initiators*". (Bélanger, *op. cit.*). In other words, even if marriage is now conceived principally as a union between two individuals, the idea that it is also an alliance between two families

endures in the mentality of the younger generation and because of this, the opinion of the parents remains a determining factor. A reversal in the order of initiative is therefore taking place, because now the children start the process. Nevertheless, the agreement of the children is now replaced by that of the parents. Parents are sometimes opposed to the choice made by their children, notably when the principle of homogamy is not respected. In this case, most children do not go against their parents' opinion and those who risk it are mainly boys, notes Danièle Bélanger.

Now that the general trend has been described, it is necessary to add some nuances. First, in the socialist era and especially during the war years, matchmaking takes place in all socio-economic classes. During this period, indeed, many parents worried about not being able to marry their daughter before she was "expired" ("*ế chồng rồi*"), meaning too old and therefore less attractive, all the more so since the loss of males during the war was enormous. Consequently, they put great pressure on their children to decide quickly. Only the young people who left their village in order to work in the city could escape this pressure and choose their spouse freely (Bélanger, *op. cit.*). Another nuance is that the oldest sons are subjected to more family pressure and arranged marriages than the other children, because their parents aim in this way to continue the lineage. The last aspect to highlight is that even when young people take the initiative in the choice of spouse, the meeting often happens through the efforts of a third party, a relative, friend, school mate, or a work mate. This is the preferred method, as it is difficult to imagine entering directly into a relationship with

someone for marriage (Bélanger, *op. cit.*). Also, acting through chosen friends who come above all from one's own social environment means the possible matrimonial choices are adjusted more easily to the principle of homogamy. Danièle Bélanger remarks that the homogamous rule has been internalized by the younger generations to the point that even before having thought about marriage, young people ask about the status and history of the family of a possible spouse by using criteria such as place of origin (question of endogamy), education, age, profession, economic situation and the way in which children should be educated. The idea being that it is necessary to find a partner that is similar to oneself in order to attain a balance between the families, without which the couple could not live harmoniously. This rule of homogamy is more easily perpetuated among young people than it was during the socialist era before *đổi mới*; the communist party appropriated this rule by getting deeply involved in bringing couples with good revolutionary backgrounds together. The party investigated the political past of wedding hopefuls and their families through the local organizations which each citizen of Hà Nội was obliged to join according to his/her place of work. In order to legalize cohabitation, a prerequisite for marriage, every citizen had to produce a document from the party which authorized a marriage with the desired person. This triggered an investigation into ancestry which took into account the moral and political past of the family for three generations. This past was contained in a document, the *lý lịch*, which also determined the studies and chances for professional promotion. Although applied more or less strictly in different places, this procedure created a group of "first-class"

citizens, as opposed to another second-rate group which was composed of politically dubious people. Often, families precluded matrimonial control by the state by choosing spouses who corresponded to traditional criteria as well as those decreed by the authorities. Note that occasionally the party acted as matrimonial agency by proposing spouses to its female members over the age of 30 (Bélanger, *op. cit.*).

Nelly Krowolski's monographic study shows that political control over marriages seems to be less strict in rural areas. Thus, in the commune where she worked, she found some cases of marriage occurring between 1972 and 1990 where one of the spouses was younger than the minimum legal age for marriage set by the law. This study is interesting as well in that it shows that the principle of local endogamy is still largely practiced today and that the familial strategies in this sense are still in operation. Thus in Mông Phụ, nearly 85% of men married between 1972 and 1990 had found their spouse in their native commune (and more than 60% in the same village). For the women, 67% had found their husband in the commune and 43% in the same village (Krowolski, *op. cit.*).

In the ancient configuration, familial homogamy was combined with a statutory heterogamy between the husband and wife. Ideally, it was necessary for the man to have a level of education and revenue higher than that of his spouse in order to ensure the hierarchical and conjugal harmony prescribed by Confucian ethics. Danièle Bélanger observed that after 1986, and the implementation of *đổi mới* reforms, the stability of the future couple no longer depended on this hierarchy, but on the

experience, conclusive or not, of the pre-conjugal relationship. In other words, the feelings of love and their longevity were now the priority, even if the criteria for making a decision to support a relationship were different for men and women. The former emphasized physical criteria where the latter favored criteria concerning social integration. In addition, conjugal destiny is interpreted differently according to whether you consider the point of view of the man or the woman. In the view of the former, the woman should certainly be a government employee during the socialist era, but could also take on the role of mother and housewife in the contemporary capitalist context; while women remained firmly attached to their economic autonomy and wanted to continue to work for the state or open a business (Bélanger, *op. cit.*).

Finally, the observations made in the Hà Nội region reveal three types of family evolution according to Danièle Bélanger (Bélanger, *op. cit.*). First, ruptures. These particularly result from the dynamic between parents and children concerning the choice of spouse. Marriage becomes an individual initiative and no longer familial. However, these ruptures do not end in a dissolution of hierarchical ties between parents and children. These are maintained, as shown by the necessity of obtaining the approval of parents when a spouse has been chosen. *"The principle shifts from an agreement between two families to an agreement between the parents and children"*, notes Danièle Bélanger (Bélanger, *op. cit.*). In addition to ruptures and continuities, we also see resurgences. This is the case for engagement and wedding rituals that had been reduced to a minimum during the socialist era and which have come back in all their previous splendor. The resurgence

of the Confucian model of the housewife is also part of this movement of resurgence. From this, one fact is obvious: the choice of spouse in the socialist period is more similar to the traditional model than the egalitarian model put forth by the law of 1959. Besides that, explains Danièle Bélanger, the evolutions noted are not exclusively due to the economic changes of 1980, but are part of a continuum started at the beginning of the 20th century. However, the shift from a socialist type economy to a capitalist type seems to translate into placing renewed value on family ties (Bélanger, *op.cit.*).

Evolution of the Marriage Procedure in Rural Thailand

In order to illustrate the evolution of marriage in the rural areas of contemporary Thailand, I will use a comparative study on this theme that was done for a multi-disciplinary project bringing together French and Thai researchers in the mid-1980s. This project involved two villages in the northeast of the country of which I have already described the contrasting characteristics, but it is necessary to remember that one – Ban Amphawan – is in an irrigated zone and is near the principal urban development center of the Northeast, while the other – Ban Han – is subject to a rain-fed rice culture regime and is further away from both the major axes of communication and a large city (Formoso, 1997).

Generally, the kinship system and the rules linked to marriage are different in Thailand from in Việt Nam. In Thailand, the filiation mode is cognatic and not patrilinear. This means that girls and boys inherit equally from the parents with, however, a larger part of the inheritance reserved for the last of the girls if she takes care of their parents in their

old age and until their death. The residence of the young couple is uxorilocal, according to a rule that still applied to more than 80% of households in the two villages in the mid-1980s. The husband thus lives with his wife's parents for a period that can last anywhere from a few months to several years, or even until the death of the woman's parents in the case of the lastborn daughter; she then inherits her parents' house. Aside from this particular case, as soon as it has the means, a couple builds a house and is economically autonomous by being given part of the land of the wife's parents, and assets from the husband's side as well. As is the case in Việt Nam, some adjustments are made when the husband's side does not have enough men to work the fields. In this case, discussions held between the two families before the wedding could result in a virilocal residence.

Also as in Việt Nam, marriages are traditionally arranged between the families, even if up until the changes in the choice of spouse beginning in the 1960s, children to be married were consulted and could refuse the person presented. It was only with their consent that formal negotiations were begun between the two families, under the supervision of a local notable recognized for being wise and chosen by both parties. Negotiations involved the mode of residence, the marriage payment to be paid by the boy's family and the activity of the future couple.

Before these negotiations, other criteria were taken into account by the parents in the case of arranged marriages. First, in the Thai Buddhist context, it was necessary for the boy to have lived for a period in a monastic order before the marriage. This ordination is a rite of passage from "raw" manhood (*khon dip*) to "cooked" manhood (*khon suk*), meaning

mature and civilized. So if he hadn't yet been ordained, the prospective of an impending marriage would lead the young men to fulfill this duty for at least the duration of a *phansa*, a Buddhist retreat (approximately 3 months). As for girls about to be married, they are expected in return to be fervent Buddhists and accomplished housekeepers, which is proven by their participation in making food offerings to Buddhist monks and the mastery of feminine crafts such as weaving. Another restrictive condition is the relative age of the future newlyweds. The rule among Thai people is that the man must be older, even if it is only a few months older than his spouse. In order to ensure the best of luck for the household, Thais consider that the woman should display all the signs of respect toward her husband – the obedience and submission which are normally expected of a younger person toward her elder. In return, the husband has a duty of benevolent protection of his wife (Formoso, 1990). Third, the marriage must respect the unique Thai rules of exogamy, meaning that the spouses should not be too closely related, especially not first or second cousins. In addition, homogamous marriages were favored as in Việt Nam, with the regulating factor being the amount of matrimonial compensation that the boy's side had to give; this is adjusted according to the socio-economic status of the girl's family. Hypogamous marriages (boy's family wealthier than the girl's) were admitted. In rural environments, a variant of the homogamous principle was a clear preference for alliances between agricultural families, providing dowries of land from both sides and maintaining the size of the farms at a viable level despite the fragmentation of the land resulting from inheritance rules. A clear inclination toward local endogamy

was functionally linked to this propensity to marry among agricultural families, because the lands cultivated would be close to each other. Thus, in the Udon Thani province village that Stanley J. Tambiah studied at the beginning of the 1960s, 73.5% of husbands were from the same village or county, while at the end of the 1960s, in the two Khon Kaen province villages that we studied, 52% (Ban Amphawan) and 64.5% (Ban Han) respectively of husbands were from the same village or county (Tambiah, 1970; Formoso, 1997).

The 1960s, which correspond to the beginning of the economic growth in Thailand, also saw the start of significant changes in the choice of spouse in the cities as well as in the country. In the context of a process of individuation comparable to the one observed in Việt Nam, young Thais take more and more initiatives to find a spouse that they like, then they try to persuade their parents that the choice they made was the right one. If the latter do not approve, the wedding does not take place. If, on the other hand, they do agree, the discussions between the families to decide on the mode of residence and matrimonial payment amount are carried out with the help of an intermediary, as in the past. As we can see, consensus between parents and children is still very important. Because of this, the reversal of the parent-child relationship concerning the choice of spouse operates without changing the criteria for choosing a spouse. In rural areas, the boy must still be ordained in advance, even if retreats in the monastery have a tendency to be shortened to the absolute minimum, sometimes only a few weeks. Also, the rule stating that the man should be older than the woman is still widely applied. Thus, in 1984 only 7.4% of couples in Ban Amphawan and 7.6% in Ban Han broke

this rule (Formoso, 1997). We should point out that older wives still act as if they are younger than their husbands, meaning they use terms to address their husbands that designate him as older and adopt attitudes of deference that characterize relationships with an elder.

Another continuity; local endogamy remains dominant in the two villages in 1984, as 58.7% of the men in Ban Amphawan and 48% in Ban Han married women from their village or county (Formoso, 1997). Although in the village outside of the irrigation perimeter the proportion of local marriages has decreased between 1969 and 1984, dropping from 64.5% to 48%, this kind of evolution, observed elsewhere in Thailand at different times, is difficult to interpret. As Jeremy Kemp remarks, it reveals more about situational than structural changes (Kemp, 1982). The fact is that in the mid-1980s, marriages between agricultural families remained the norm in both villages. Only two married men or women out of 500 were originally from the city at the time of the study in Ban Han, and 14 out of 286 in Ban Amphawan. And it must be pointed out that in the latter village, the 14 people concerned were first-generation city dwellers whose parents, originally from rural areas, had migrated to the city to work in unskilled jobs. We also observe that the households in both villages where one spouse was working in the private or public sector, continued to manage a farm to supplement their salary.

In fact, other than the new priority given to individual choice of spouse, the only noticeable change in these two rural villages is the decrease in the age of nuptiality. It is also the principal point of divergence with the evolution of the matrimonial process in Việt Nam. In the 1980s, the women of the two villages of northeast Thailand married

between 15 and 30 years old, with most of them between 20 and 25 years old, while the men married between 20 and 40 years old with the 25-30 year age bracket being preponderant. Significantly, 6 to 8 men out of 10 in the 20-25 year age bracket were still single in the mid-1980s in these villages, while 5 to 6 men out of 10 in this same bracket were already married in the 1960s. Similarly, more than half of the women aged 20 to 25 years old were married in 1984 as opposed to 6 to 8 out of 10 in the 1960s (Formoso, 1997). Another observation is that it's in the village closest to the city that the decrease in the marrying age is the most significant. Such an accentuation of the phenomenon, perceptible among men and women, is principally due to the peri-urban position of the irrigated village. Conditioned, particularly through schooling at the colleges of Khon Kaen, by a city mentality which values individual liberty, outings and entertainment; moreover attracted by the city and the job opportunities that it offers, the youth of Ban Amphawan have a tendency to put off marriage as urbanites do. The *Population and Housing Census Changwat Khon Kaen 1980* reveals also that 71.6% of men and 49.9% of women in the 25-30 year old age bracket living in Khon Kaen were single at the end of the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, Ban Amphawan was very close to these percentages, with 81% single men and 45.5% single women in this age bracket (Formoso, 1997).

Finally, from the methodological point of view, the two examples cited in the context of this session reveal that it is dangerous to interpret the matrimonial evolution in a linear fashion, in reference to one-size-fits-all models without any nuance. Contrary to the image that we generally have, "arranged

marriage" in Việt Nam as in Thailand never took on the form of a choice made by the parents and imposed arbitrarily and unilaterally on the children. Thus, the transition from the family's choice for the individual to a choice suggested by the individual to the family is accompanied by a remarkable continuity concerning the social and cultural criteria for the choice of spouse. Moreover, in Thailand as in Việt Nam, individuation in the choice of spouse was not accompanied by a loosening of inter-generational ties. These have kept most of their power to structure social relationships. Finally, the Vietnamese case, in the resurgences that it reveals, proves that the linear evolution model for familial behavior is far from universal. At the end of the day, these two case studies remind us – if it was necessary – of the importance that demographic analysis must place on particular local characteristics.

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Day 4, Thursday July 22

2.4.5. Socio-demographic Studies on the Choice of Spouse and the Social Transformation of Contemporary Marriage, or, how we have moved, in France, from a family founded on marriage to a family founded on the child, by Martine Segalen

Four themes will be addressed in this presentation: studies concerning the choice of a spouse; changes from so-called traditional marriage to present-day “non-marriage”; new rituals that accompany the new marriage; the family without marriage, the child’s role in founding the family.

The Choice of the Spouse and the Choice of the Companion

In the 1960s, sociology turned toward the new matrimonial model which had been allowed to expand by the expansion of the salaried working class. Young people, entering rapidly into a very active labor market, no longer needed to wait for the real or symbolic death of their father in order to establish a home of their own. This “liberty” was frightening at the time; wouldn’t it lead to disorder for the reproduction of society?

The study of the *Choice of the Spouse* is the major work of family sociology of this period, and we must recognize it as a model in the field. In it, Alain Girard (1964, 1974) shed light on the formidable weight of objective regularities, which the common understanding took no account of – namely the importance of homogamy.

Theoretically, anyone can marry anyone. However, the choice of spouse is not entirely

unrestricted. Social groups continue to reproduce from within themselves. Several American studies and a large national study in France give results that agree with this. Marriages unite spouses with the same geographic origins for the most part, despite the mobility that characterizes industrialization. In France, the national study conducted by Alain Girard in 1958, *Le Choix du conjoint* (The Choice of the Spouse), comes to the same conclusion: “*The majority of marriages, seven out of ten, are between people with the same origins: in two out of ten households, the two spouses are born in the same town, three out of ten in the same canton (county), more than five out of ten in the same arrondissement (region)*” (p. 188).

Many post-war American authors had highlighted the social factors of attraction: race, ethnic group, religion, education, social class, having the same values. Alain Girard’s wide-ranging study measured these phenomena in French society in great detail.

“*The frequency of social homogamy is twice as strong as if the marriages took place independently of social origins of the partners [...]. It is dominant among farmers, workers; in the service industry, on the contrary, the social origins of spouses are much more varied, social mixing occurs above all in the lower middle classes*” (p. 75-76).

With comparable social origins, it is not surprising that the majority of spouses had identical levels of education (66%). Even more remarkable is religious homogamy: in 92% of couples, the spouses belong to the same religion, or are both without religion. The frequency of socio-professional homogamy after 1960 did not decrease at all for marriages occurring between 1960 and

1969. Alain Girard observes, in the preface of the second edition of *Choix du conjoint*, that it even seems to be higher for marriages occurring after 1960.

Each social environment has its own places, institutions and practices that allow young people to meet, get to know each other and choose a partner, thus the importance of studying meeting places and the formation of couples.

In analyzing the fundamental role of the ball in the formation of unions, Alain Girard shows that under this label, we find the “country ball”, where farmers and workers meet, the university balls, surprise parties and bourgeois rallies, etc. Each social category has its own type of dancing party. Thus, when people explain that they met “randomly”, this is most often due to a social process that puts them in a position to meet people from the same social group. It is remarkable to note the concordance between these facts and the opinion survey which suggests agreement on a collective norm:

“Despite a liberalism in principle which has developed in the collective conscience, a very deep feeling remains, which agrees with and sanctions the de facto situation. The structures and forms of social life bring individuals from the same social group together. In the end, it is among people of the same group that we have more luck and it is acceptable to choose your spouse, and the choice diminishes little by little, if you must meet someone in your entourage that ‘matches’” (Alain Girard, p. 198).

Alain Girard summarized this situation with a popular proverb: “one doesn’t pair a jay with a magpie”.

Another study updated Alain Girard’s study by focusing not only on the choice of spouse but also on that of the “companion”, in an open sociological perspective which takes into account new behavior marked by a relative distaste for marriage (Michel Bozon and François Héran, 1987, 1988). The regression of geographic homogamy is significant because of growing residential mobility. It is the more stable social groups (and those that are relatively remote) such as farmers and workers that marry most often in the place where they were born and work. Executives (very mobile social groups) are more exogamous. But geographic exogamy doesn’t threaten social homogamy, marriage with peers, which continues to characterize contemporary unions.

The study by Bozon and Héran confirms the significance of social homogamy, a social practice which can seem extraordinary because of (i) great socio-economic changes in France since the 1950s (social and geographic mobility, tertiarization of society, rapid disappearance of farmers and more recently workers) (ii) new attitudes that have appeared regarding marriage since the 1970s.

The French continue overwhelmingly to choose their spouse or their companion (concubine, live-in partner...), from within their own social group. Moreover, it is in the upper level socio-professional groups and in the farming communities that we observe, as in the XIXth century, the most distinctive homogamous behavior; employees, the most heterogeneous group, appear more mobile in their matrimonial choices.

How to explain the dominance of social homogamy in a society where cohabitation is developing, and in which social relationships are marked by informality and the development of a leisure society? By using the questions from Alain Girard's study on the places to meet a spouse, Michel Bozon and François Héran focus on meeting places and styles. Comparing the results of their studies with those of Alain Girard, they see that the neighborhood, work, balls and visits to the homes of individuals now account for only one-third of marriages instead of the two-thirds they represented in the 1970s. Instances of socializing with the neighbors declined while those of meeting people among one's peer group increased (evenings among friends, associations, "clubbing", which takes the place of the classic "balls"). Social control no longer happens through the parents, but through the sociological circumstances surrounding the places for socializing, which are very coded socially. Outings with a "gang" of university students, "nightclubs" for young workers or employees. The chances of mixing socially, despite the rise of the "middle classes", remain lower than ever.

Individual choice based on private criteria has taken the place of the patient parental strategies of the olden days. Even so, powerful social mechanisms continue to make unions (marriage or cohabitation) a place for replicating social diversity.

A new study is in progress which now introduces the role of social networks on the Internet, in order to see if new modes of relationships change homogamous factors.

Competition Between Marriage and Common Law Union

The 1980s and the birth of a new love

The new status of women, drivers and promoters of a new social model, disrupted the model described by Alain Girard. In the first conference in Tam Đảo, we described these characteristics: women's work, sexual autonomy provided by effective contraception. This liberalization is seen notably in the new attitudes toward virginity for young girls and the sexuality of young people, which have now been accepted for over thirty years in our society: the space of one generation.

Marriage is placed far away or not on the horizon at all for a couple, but on the contrary, all couples form at a young age. In the 1980s, a new idea appeared: after marriage founded on love, *i.e.* love which leads to marriage (*cf.* American post-war films: we fall in love, then we marry), comes the idea that the demands of love have become incompatible with marriage, (Commaille, 1982; Roussel, 1983). This new love has two characteristics: it is absolute and destined to be ephemeral. The refusal to marry is a refusal to submit the couple's relationship to other forces than feelings. Love is essentially a private matter, into which an intervention by the State seems unbearable. The expectations weighing on a couple are multiple: affective, sexual, material. They leave no room for compromise, which explains the number of divorces as well as the number of common law union break-ups. The 1960s notion of the united couple with plans for the long term was replaced by the notion of a temporary choice. Marriage would appear more and more to be a simple formality, a "social commodity"; trial marriage

would seem to be a reasonable practice and common law unions would be seen as a good thing: the breaking of marriage ties, or of those of concubinage would be envisioned at the beginning of the union as the best way to preserve the love and autonomy of the spouses.

An evaluation of the state of marriage at the beginning of the XXIst century lends a certain nuance to these hypotheses developed twenty years ago. Marriage is no longer a founding institution for couples, but this does not mean that it is refused. If it survives, of course at much lower levels than during its glory days (between 270,000 and 300,000 per year), it nevertheless takes on new meaning with the lowering of the average age of the first marriage (in 2003, 30.6 years for men and 28.5 for women). Marriage no longer constitutes the founding act for families, but forming a couple remains an objective for young people. And nothing, sociologically, distinguishes those who are married from those who are not. From now on, sociology is more interested in what happens within the couple than in its morphology. It tries to understand the mysterious alchemy of the couple which leads to its demise or makes it last.

Common law union does not "de-institutionalize" the family and the PACS

Concubinage, cohabitation, common law union, trial marriage? The rise in the number of unmarried couples surprised observers with its suddenness and its scale. In 1960, 300,000 couples were counted; 1,500,000 in 1990, 2,400,000 in 1999, 2,680,000 in 2002 and 3,000,000 in 2010, *i.e.* a multiplication by a factor of ten in fifty years.

The Civil Solidarity Pact (PACS), in effect since November 15 1999, gives a legal status to unions, including certain rights, and registers them with the court. Partners commit to "*helping each other mutually and materially*"; they benefit from advantages, such as fiscal (joint declaration), inheritance (abatement on inheritance) and social (tenancy rights, rights to the social security benefits of the partner). They are relatively easy to dissolve and do not require a judge as intermediary.

Since its creation, the number of PACS has increased dramatically. In 1999, 6,139 were finalized. In 2006, 77,362, and in 2008, 144,000 of which 94% were heterosexual couples. The number of marriages, 267,000 celebrated in 2008, should therefore be read in the light of the sharp rise in the number of PACS and legislative evolution which has a tendency to make the two contracts similar; marriage has become easier to dissolve while the protections offered by the PACS now approach those offered by marriage (since 2005, the government has also opted for extending the rights of PACS partners, notably in the public domain: the PACS is mentioned in birth certificates where it now implies an "*obligation for assistance*").

Initially created to address the problems of homosexual couples, the PACS deviated from its function, offering a couple a sort of "*light*" marriage, with fiscal protection and the guarantee of an easy separation. It is an intermediary case. Somewhere between concubinage and marriage, it is nevertheless closer to a common law union than marriage because, at the birth of a child (or before), the mother's partner must make a declaration: as in common law union, filiation is divided. PACS partners do not receive a *livret de famille* (family record book), which contains

the civil law articles that are read during a marriage ceremony. In 2008, 13% of PACS were dissolved.

We should draw a parallel between the new divorce law of 2005 which authorizes a divorce without any motive, bringing it closer to a PACS which authorizes an easy separation without going before a judge.

Some couples consider the PACS as a purely private and administrative act; others, on the contrary, surround it with rituals which simulate a marriage (Rault, 2009). Since 2009, the “Wedding Exhibition” has become the “Wedding and PACS Exhibition”.

For New Marriages, New Rituals

Among choices available to couples, marriage is still among the most popular because of its social and symbolic aspects and the publicity given to the event, but for how long? Although marriage continues, new rituals demonstrate the changes to it.

In the year 2000, the 300,000 marriage milestone was reached and the media did not hesitate to declare that “*the marriage craze is back*”, but everything is relative. After the historic low of 1994, with 254,000 marriages, a comeback was reported, which above all showed a delay in marriage, spouses being increasingly older. A sociologist specialized in marriage rituals shows how these reveal social changes (Segalen, 2003).

Marriages today celebrate something else besides a change in status, since the grooms are 30 years old and the brides 28 years old. Matrimonial rites cannot have the same meaning as they did when the spouses obtained their status as adults from the marriage itself. Born of the will of young

protagonists that have already acquired the new status which was before only accessible through marriage – residence, sexuality, procreation – these nuptials are the expression of a compromise between the couple and the familial constellation. Ritualistic inventions, emergence of new social actors, development of the festive dimension which makes a wedding more and more like a show that must “succeed”; these are the salient features of marriage at the turn of the XXIst century. The couple prepares months or one year in advance for a party that is supposed to reflect their image, where friends participate with musical creations or acts. Everything joins in this inventiveness, so much so that weddings become an important economic sector, epitomized by wedding trade exhibitions which offer all sorts of packages, including turn-key weddings. New sequences have been invented over the last twenty years: the *vin d'honneur* (reception immediately following the wedding ceremony), which assembles a maximum number of guests, the bachelorette party – a new step which celebrates the passage from female amorous vagabonding to conjugal fidelity –, photography, recording the party (the memory of which must be conserved) on video and nowadays on DVD. The cost of a wedding is very high, so much so that young couples may want to opt for a small wedding if their economic priorities are elsewhere. Often, the difficulty in planning a wedding worries some couples and deters them from getting married.

In fact, in contrast to the 1960s, the marrying couple organizes their own party, choosing the relatives and friends that they would like to invite, because in many cases they are the ones who are financing it. Marriage unites

adults, often parents, that have freely chosen to publicize their union. Engaged couples have elaborate discussions on their choices for the ceremony and often invoke “tradition” as a way to place their union in the context of long-term social normality.

New Familial Models

In France and in Scandinavia, more than 50% of children are born out of wedlock. Thirty years ago, this only represented 6% of the total number of births. What was once contrary to social norms has today become normal, along with significant development of de facto unions.

In 2009, in more than 65% of households, the mother is active and, either alone or with her husband/partner, decided on the timing and number of children she wanted to have.

Now, couples plan and have children 10 years later than their own parents did up until the 1970s. On average, the mother is 29 years old, sometimes much older. Longer life expectancy, improvement of pre-natal care, the development of blended families mean that women over 40 do not hesitate to become mothers or have another child. In addition, the medical profession is perplexed when the “scheduled” child is not forthcoming. The child should come when it is wanted and not take too long in doing so; and this impatience leads to an increase in the demand for Medically Assisted Procreation (MAP) techniques.

Whereas up until the middle of the XXth century, children had a productive value, today they have only an affective value for the family. Children of the Nation, children of parental desire, today they believe or are led to believe that they are their own masters,

subject to the law but at the same time objects manipulated by a consumer society. In the space of one century, they have become unrecognizable and so have their parents.

Desire for a child, right to a child

The new child is that of the new couple for which the mode of formation has radically changed in the space of thirty years. Up until the 1970s, so-called juvenile cohabitation ended up in marriage, which produced a child. The model is not at all the same today. Two young people meet and are rapidly involved in sexual relations which may lead to them living together (if they are old enough and have the means to establish independent housing) without clear plans other than to test the quality and nature of their relationship. Among young people, who doesn’t have a “boyfriend” or “girlfriend”, a term which has in fact lost its original meaning? According to the *Robert Dictionary* definition, friendship is indeed “a reciprocal feeling of affection or sympathy which is not founded on blood relations nor on sexual attraction”. However, today it is the term used, and the notion of friendship is found in the term *copain* (masculin friend)/*copine* (feminine friend) which implies a certain familiarity, contrary to “friendship” which associates affection and distance. If the amorous relation continues, and is inscribed in a larger family and social context, boyfriend or girlfriend becomes “companion”, term which will be used, for example by the grandparents for indicating the father of the child of their own child (Segalen, 2010).

At the establishment of the couple, plans for children do not exist. It is meant to first see how the interpersonal relations will develop, to see if each one gets what he/she wants

out of it. Perhaps, some months or some years later, the desire for a child will be the sign of an affective and professional stabilization of the couple, or thought of as a stabilizer of the relationship. Marriage follows, or not. It's optional.

Before having a child, couples need to "live their life", while they are "young"; they must "build" their relationship, ensure that it is sufficiently gratifying and at the same time, that their partner will be the dream mother or father for his or her child. Everything that was gained through the marriage contract – which meant you never had to ask yourself these questions again – is examined, subject to choice, source for hesitation and uncertainty in an informal relationship.

Before chemical contraception, couples tried their best to limit births. Since its arrival, the desire for a child has taken on another form, that of a voluntary act: contraception is stopped, the couple decides to try to give life. They first examine the socio-economic parameters related to the birth of a child, which are obviously not at all similar to previous economic calculations. But questions remain. Is it the right time in the career of one or the other, is the housing sufficient for having a child according to contemporary requirements, meaning a room for everyone? The couple works at "creating the conditions" for having a baby before they start trying to make a baby, if the material requirements for having a child, which are considerable today, seem to be met. Obviously, the economic factor is not the only one considered in this major decision. A certain ambivalence exists: the use of contraception has become so natural, taken for granted, that couples do not always have the impression that they are following a strategy. The reality of the planned,

scheduled child, opposes the perception that they have of what reproduction should be, a natural and disinterested act (Régnier-Loilier, 2007).

According to psychoanalysts, "*the decision to have a child*" is created by the subconscious; the desire for a child largely escapes the rational wishes of the progenitors. So the subconscious can explain forgotten contraception, or timely conceptions so that births will happen at a symbolic date in the history of the family, or in order to "*fill a void*" after the death of one of its members. The desire for a child corresponds to irrational hopes (even if material considerations count): to be part of the normality and conformity of the group, to aspire to filiation, which does not necessarily link to the continuation of the lineage. The newborn helps the other, the progenitor, gain access to adulthood. Bearer of the desires of its parents, what the psychoanalysts call the "*narcissistic contract*", the child should fulfill the hopes of its parents in exchange for their care and love.

Contrary to Simone de Beauvoir and the feminist movements of the 1970s, it is understood today that maternity is one of the central components of feminine identity. In rural societies of the past, sterility – always attributed to the woman – was a great misfortune. Today we pity a woman who does not have children and we are yet more surprised if she affirms (and dares to do so) that it is voluntary and a well thought out decision. All the more credit to her as society is "baby-phile", at least in its discourse and its representations. The French model includes encouragement to have a baby: "*The woman who wants to, but cannot procreate considers herself to be left on the bench by society, whether she places herself at a distance from*

the group or the group excludes her. The women themselves, their family and their group consider sterility to be a curse." Pregnancy is fashionable.

You need only to observe the radical change in the wardrobe of future mothers. Until the 1960s, all sorts of sacks attempted, without success, to hide what was still called *le doux secret* (the sweet secret), a bulge that women did not wish to exhibit. Somber colors and baggy clothing did not motivate women to go out, which was a way to protect them from the dangers supposedly awaiting future mothers. Today, they wrap their bellies with colorful scarves which emphasize the roundness; they wear two-piece bathing suits, proudly display their rotundity, following the lead of celebrities. In fact, psychoanalysts worry about the "fetishization" of pregnancy, the celebration of a sort of "maternal erotic" of which the first sign was the photo taken by Annie Leibovitz in 1991 of Demi Moore, seven months pregnant and wearing only a diamond ring, on the cover of the American magazine *Vanity Fair*. Even if the photo makes a ringing declaration of pride and the beauty of a pregnant woman's body, this "baby attitude" is not without danger when the real child arrives, with its night-time crying and colic, for good. In fact, there are psychiatric wards today, dedicated to treating the "baby blues", often young women who are filled with anxiety about their newborns, as well as specialists who try to understand a newborn's excessive crying.

Since the development of ultrasound, in the 1970s, the child arrives well before the birth. Initially designed as a medical technique for detecting abnormalities of the embryo and of the fetus, the ultrasound has become one of the principal rites of passage in contemporary

society. We don't get married anymore, but we present the photograph of the embryo to future grandparents, thus announcing their impending change of place in the generation, while socializing the relationship of the couple.

With the development of this technique, including three-dimensional imagery, the maternal belly no longer holds any secrets. Psychoanalysts speak about the worrisome strangeness of the "*current transparency of pregnancy*". From the third month of pregnancy, we know all the activities, as well as the gender, of this new "modern hero". At the same time real and a fantasy, often named when the baby bump is barely visible, the fetus is present in the life of the couple, to the point of believing that the birth is only an unimportant formality, and no longer the life-and-death event that it used to be – and still is in many societies in the world. The beginning of life is moved backwards in time.

When the draft Neuwirth law was being debated in 1967, some deputies developed particularly interesting arguments to defeat it. Jean Coumaros, a Greek doctor (UDR, Moselle) exclaimed: "*Have the husbands considered that from now on it is the woman that will hold the absolute power to have or not to have children, by taking a pill, even without their consent? Men will lose their sense of pride in their fertile virility and women will become mere objects of sterile pleasure.*" Jean Coumaros was not wrong: because of "the pill" women were allowed sexual pleasure, like men, and it took away an essential part of the foundation of their domination. It is a major social and symbolic innovation, finally casting a doubt on the universal principle of the "*biological differences between the sexes*"

which was based on man's control of woman's power of procreation.

Western men had – whether they liked it or not – accepted the dismantling of their statutory position and status. Their role had been fundamentally transformed. For their part, women gave up none of their maternity, all the while encroaching on masculine territory by entering the labor force. The irreversible phenomenon of feminine labor renders the new maternity and paternity more conscious and responsible, which is seen in the delay of the age at first birth which characterizes our time. In the end, it takes two to make a child, and the mother as well as the future father, need to feel ready. It is at the level of the couple that negotiations take place. The fact of “making”, in the sense of “manufacturing” the child leads new fathers to involve themselves very closely in the pregnancy of their wife. With “the pill”, the all-powerful progenitor gives way to a joint action, but one about which the final decision depends on the woman.

Although women are thus the masters of procreation, men – happily – are not less present. Even if their place has changed, their commitment is in the end more mature and thought-out than it was before when they alone held the power of life. Whether it is a pregnancy without medical intervention or one that resorted to Medically Assisted Procreation (MAP), both partners want to reassure themselves of their procreative power. Men are just as concerned as women by the conception of the child, making with her the decision to stop contraception.

To summarize, we can say that new fathers have to find their place, they are subjected

to the need to be a man and at the same time to share the tasks of the mother equally. They also have difficulty in being the authority figure that they were before, when the relations between parents and children are governed by democracy.

To conclude, we can say that marriage is all the less useful now that concubinage and the PACS offer status and protection without further interference of the state in private life. Unlike the child born to a married couple, for whom filiation is automatically established at birth, for a child born out of wedlock, filiation is the result of a voluntary act. In marriage, the mother commits, in effect, to a principle of fidelity, from which flows the automaticity of paternity: it is in fact justification for marriage: *pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant*. Inversely, for concubines, there is no public commitment to fidelity and so no automatic presumption of paternity: this is why the father and mother had to declare their parental status separately, up until not long ago. The declaration of paternity for the civil records can be done with the registration of birth, or by a separate act before or after the birth (a 2005 ruling did away with the mother's obligation to establish this act; only the unmarried father will now be required to carry out this procedure – an important though seemingly benign, procedure without ritual – which is regrettable). This gesture, which can seem banal, is in fact loaded with a significant symbolism. It gives paternity to the child and enters it into a familial continuity; it makes him or her a citizen with rights and duties which are linked to this status. For unmarried couples, the institutionalization of their family starts with the child's registration in the civil records.

It is by this act that the child enters its lineage, and the importance of the intergenerational link must be highlighted again, as it compensates for the fragility of the conjugal link. The role of grandparents in contemporary Europe is very important (Attias-Donfut and Segalen, 1998).

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Day 5, Friday, July 23

2.4.6. Matrimonial Strategies in the Rural Environment. Another Source for the Study of Familial Change: the Population Census, by Martine Segalen

This presentation discusses the diverse matrimonial forms analyzed in rural societies, and in its second part, looks at the use of another source for analyzing change: counting or taking a census of the population – useful documents for the history of family sociology. For this I will use the field work carried out between 1974 and 1984 in Brittany, in a region called the Bigouden country where the village Saint-Jean Trolimon is found (Segalen, 1985). During the entire XIXth century there were approximately 1,500 inhabitants there, and during my field work, I witnessed the brutal transformation of this agricultural town. In 1970, there were 150 farms; today there are only two. Today it is a residential city whose inhabitants work in the city of Quimper, 18 kms away; there are also many second homes.

Inheritance Strategies and Matrimonial Strategies

This line of study is part of a wide anthropological comparison of societies throughout the world. Jack Goody (2000) notably developed a comparison between Eurasian and African societies.

There is a fundamental difference between non-European societies (but not yet all of them) and rural European societies. In the

former, a lineage collectively appropriates the rights to a space and then develops that space; moreover, the territory is occupied by human groups that are rarely stationary, or full of people. In the old peasantries of Europe, since the XIVth century, demographic pressure kept populations on territories with more or less stable boundaries, which were gradually saturated. Even if the collective property of specific lands (forests, mountain pastures, communal grazing land) is a fact, most of the land that is cultivated, or used for raising livestock is appropriated individually and developed in the restricted realm of the domestic group. While in non-European societies, the reproduction of society is a collective issue – it is the group that must fight (physically, through war if necessary) against another group in order to protect its hunting, gathering or agricultural spaces –, in European societies, the crucial question is that of the reproduction of the individual domestic groups, owners or occupants of well-delineated assets.

Given that domestic groups and farming are solidly linked together, kinship is doubly present at the heart of the village system: it regulates the rights of access to land (and others that follow, within the village community), and the methods of devolution of these assets.

African and Eurasian societies have distinctive modes of devolution of assets. For the former, which are unilinear, the processes of transmission are associated with gender: men inherit from men, women inherit from women. In Europe and in Asia, women inherit from men and vice versa, which can cause the dissemination of property outside of the unilinear filiation group; Jack Goody (1976) called this ensemble "*divergent devolution*".

Although the similarities of inheritance and kinship theories between non-European and peasant societies seems illuminating, there are, nevertheless, limitations to that comparison. European specificity should be considered. Besides the individual appropriation of an asset (as opposed to the collective property of a clan or lineage), it is the great diversity of modes of devolution which characterizes societies and invites attempts at systematization. Thus, we observe that concerning inheritance, there are egalitarian societies and others that are inegalitarian, and it is by studying the transformation of domestic groups over long periods of time that we can understand the internal logic of these systems.

The inegalitarian systems forbid the division of inheritance and it is transmitted from one generation to the next through one child, generally the eldest. The youngest children either stay on as workers in the house or emigrate. For example, we know of younger Basque children who left to make their fortune in Australia or the United States; others joined the army or the clergy.

This heritage is incarnated in the house and a type of characteristic domestic group which includes the parents who are the owners, their oldest son and his wife and children, and possibly other children who remain on the farm as single adults. We call this configuration "stem-family" or "house system". We can find this system in the south of France, northern Spain and Italy, but also in Austria or Germany. In France, in Occitan, we speak of the "oustal" or the "oustau", house which bears a name and is owner of the fields and collective pastures, and owns certain political rights such as a spot in the cemetery.

In this system, from a matrimonial point of view, it is preferable for the heir of the House A to be married to the youngest child in House B, while the heir of House B marries the youngest child in House A: it is therefore a double brother-sister, sister-brother marriage; a dowry is estimated before a notary for each house. In reality, the money never leaves the houses. This system functioned up until the beginning of the XXth century; then the women abandoned the houses and the heirs, preferring to marry a salaried employee in the city where they would have an easier domestic life.

The opposite of this system is the egalitarian model generally present among peasants who are merely farmers and not land owners, and who give an equal part of their assets to each of their children, generally in the form of money. The family model from Brittany incarnates this equality in its pure form. Unlike the domestic groups in the house system, which are rooted in a single place from one generation to the next through the ownership of the land, the peasants in Brittany are generally not owners of their farms, and because of this tend to move several times over the course of their lives, whether evicted by landlords or required to leave in order to find a farm that is big enough to feed their families, which remain large throughout the XIXth century because of the high fertility rate. The residential groups have hardly any symbolic attachment to a place and circulate within micro-regions which constitute culturally homogenous areas. The rules for devolution of assets coincide easily with civil law (unlike the previous system). It is an egalitarian rule that is implemented between all of the children, boys and girls. This should seemingly lead to

the decline of the viability of farms, but in a region dominated by tenancy, egalitarian rule only affects the moveable goods. When the peasants become landowners, they will try to reconcile the two apparently contradictory principles: the necessity to maintain an economically viable farm and the concern for not slighting any of the children.

In practice, the father designates an heir who is not the eldest, but often the youngest, who is responsible for supporting his parents in their old age, obliging the brothers and sisters to sell their inherited part of the land to the heir so that he can reconstitute the farm. Egalitarian peasantry often requires their members to look for non-agricultural resources, or to modify their production system.

I personally carried out a long ethno-historical study to follow the evolution of society in Saint-Jean Trolimon, and besides the field surveys, I worked on the censuses, the civil records data and the acts witnessed by solicitors in order to follow the mode of devolution of assets and the continuity of domestic group, in a deeply egalitarian system.

Concerning marriage, one can observe a marked endogamy within the five towns which make up the southern Bigouden country and the application of the principle of interlinking alliances which is made up of spouses being related on two sides, without being directly related to the same ancestor: they marry a blood relative of an ally or an ally of a blood relative.

This form was extremely frequent thanks to the existence of very large families. Among these relatives, and especially at weddings, circulated all the information on the tenancies

that would be available as well as the young people who were of an age to be married. We notice that wedding rituals included very large bridal parties, sometimes with twenty or so couples, and it was often at a wedding that new unions formed which “interlinked” the couples.

The Census: A Source for the Study of Familial Transformation

In Saint-Jean Trolimon, as I stated above, I used this source in order to follow the evolution of domestic groups, by coupling this information with those of the civil records.

French demographic historians have worked extensively with parish records which were made obligatory by the Villers-Cotterêts ruling of 1539 signed by François I. From these we can establish the fertility, nuptiality, and mortality rates. The English have long had another source (which also exists in France) which is the population census carried out for various reasons: fiscal, military, taxes. The censuses from past centuries are erratic, but they give us a snapshot of the structure and size of households at a certain moment in time. What is interesting is to be able to access census information at regular intervals over a long period of time, to follow the changes in size and composition which occurred within the households.

Before speaking of the use that I made of it in my field of study, I want to point out that these documents were the source of important theoretical debates concerning the evolution of the family. The sociology of the family in the 1950s saw the “modernity” of the family in the industrialization process which, according to the thesis of T. Parsons, created the nuclear family. However, English historians showed, with the support of the

census of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, that the family had been nuclear for a long time already and they reversed the argument, which threatens Parsons’ great thesis.

Sociologists also thought that in preindustrial societies, the dominant form of the domestic group was the extended family with three generations. However, this is not the case. Research on the structure of domestic groups, under the influence of Peter Laslett and of the *Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure* (1972) has shown that in a vast part of Europe, domestic groups had the identical configuration as those in 1950 and 1960. Industrialization did not “nuclearize” the family because the family had already been nuclear for a long time. Some authors have even put forth the opposite idea, that is to say that it was the existence of a nuclear family that favored the emergence of industrialization. Thus, in the 1970s, demographic historians seized the issue of the census and began studying the size and the structure of domestic groups. From this work emerged the Laslett typology:

- domestic groups “without family structure” which we cannot define as anything other than old friends that share the same household. This category is most often made up of lone individuals;
- “simple” domestic groups which correspond to a household, a contemporary family unit: these are composed of either the father, mother and children, or a widow or widower with children, excluding all other relatives;
- “extended” domestic groups which, in addition to the members of a simple family unit, are composed of ascending, descending or collateral relatives, meaning the father or the mother of the head of the

household, of a grandson, or granddaughter of the head of the household or of his wife, a brother, sister, nephew or grand-nephew. The extension is the addition of a more or less close relative to a central conjugal core, a type of satellite relative;

- "multiple" domestic groups where several related households live together, thus the name "poly-nuclear". Within this category, we introduce a complementary distinction according to who leads the domestic group. If it is the elderly parent couple at the head, the married children couple submits to this authority; this corresponds to the "stem-family" described in regards to the "house system". If there are only households of married brothers and sisters, this is a "frèreche".

To each of these domestic groups may or may not be added household employees, servants, companions, non-related people. One of the criteria of classification is based on who leads the domestic group, which introduces distinctions that are sometimes more formal than real.

- The Case of Saint-Jean Trolimon

Therefore, even as non-landowners, there is the transmission of property on one hand, and on the other hand the familial transmission, transmission of the lease and not the property. (Following the census every five years.)

Young households go through a phase of cohabitation with their parents until they find a tenancy for themselves, and it is often the youngest or second-to-youngest child that inherits the lease when the last of the two parents dies. Marriage and individual homemaking do not coincide for this child.

I proposed the study of a farm over several generations by following the size and form of the household and by following the inter-generational transmissions. One of the tables shows that the farm always needs a fixed number of workers, so that when the children are young, the domestic group includes valets and servants, who disappear when the children are old enough to work on the farm. This study also shows the limitations of the Laslett typology, because according to the census, the form of the domestic group changes; even if the principle is a simple household, because of demographic pressure we see the domestic group taking on extended or complex forms.

The theoretical interest in the study of inheritance systems is finally to show how people think of themselves in a family and what are the family relationships, rivalries or alliances (between the oldest and youngest).

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2.4.7. Filiation and Migration, the Case of the Minangkabau in Sumatra (Indonesia), by Bernard Formoso

What is the dialectical relationship between filiation and migratory practices? Why can a certain filiation method influence or favor large scale migratory movements? How can this filiation method be modified in return by these movements in conjunction with other factors? These are the questions that will be addressed in this session through the particularly well documented example of the Minangkabau. Since I have not done field work myself with the Minangkabau, I will base my discussion on the works of the following ethnologists: Patrick Edward Josselin de Jong (Dutch), Tsuyoshi Kato (Japanese) and Richard J. Chadwick (Australian) (Josselin de Jong, 1980; Kato, 1982; Chadwick, 1991). From a methodological point of view, these three studies are complementary. The oldest is P.E. Josselin de Jong's study, initially presented as a doctoral thesis in 1951. It is exclusively based on second hand documentary sources dating back to the Dutch colonial period. Although dated, this study is useful as it offers precious historical insight to the sociopolitical organization of

the Minangkabau and, when cross-checked with more recent works, it provides keys to the comprehension of the contemporary evolution of this social organization. Also, it analyzes how the Minangkabau social structure was transposed into the migratory context through the example of Negeri Sembilan, a state within the Federation of Malaysia where the Minangkabau migrated en masse between the 16th and 17th centuries. Tsuyoshi Kato's study relies on extensive first-hand data collected from 1972 to 1973 in Minangkabau country as well as in the city of Pekan Baru, an important production center for palm oil in central Sumatra, which is in fact a primary destination for emigrants from this society. Kato's ethnology directly addresses the relationship between filiation methods and migratory phenomena. As such, it will be our principal source of information. Finally, Richard Chadwick carried out his research between 1974 and 1986, in the Koto Anu community, in the heart of *darek*, the historical territory of this population. His ethnology certainly presents a more monographic quality than that of Tsuyoshi Kato, but it is also more detailed concerning the emigrants' strategies.

Before getting into the heart of the subject, it must be pointed out that choosing the Minangkabau in order to illustrate the link between filiation and migration is justified on two levels. First, because the social organization of the Indonesian people is characterized by a strong structural tension between two apparently contradictory ideologies, the nature of which was very well analyzed by P.E. Josselin de Jong (Josselin de Jong, *op. cit.*), but which the Minangkabau were able to reconcile on both the institutional and judicial levels. On one hand,

they form the most important matrilineal society in the world. In this society, social identity, inheritance and ritual responsibilities are passed down the maternal line. On the other hand, their social structure integrates patrilineal principles in certain areas (traces of social categories founded on patrilineality, inheritance of some goods from the father to the son). Moreover, the Minangkabau have followed Islam since the 16th century, which has judicial and ideological regimes strongly influenced by patrilineality. As a result, the combination of matrilineal *adat* (common law) and *charria*, Koranic law, has raised many questions among certain Islamic specialists who thought that this was in principle impossible, and who wrongly thought that the progress of radical Islam in Sumatra would damage the Minangkabau system of matrilineal filiation.

The second reason for choosing this society as an example is that it presents an exceptional rate of emigration. Indeed, out of a population of eight million people estimated in 2010, more than half live outside of the western Sumatra province that is the home of the original Minangkabau people. Nearly 550,000 Minang live in the Indonesian archipelago Riau, in the Strait of Malacca on the Malaysian border; 540,000 live in the Malaysian state, Negeri Sembilan, and approximately three million are in various cities in Indonesia and Malaysia, where they make up influential trading communities. At the beginning of the 1970s, 400,000 Minangkabau lived in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, alone; this represents 10% of the population of the city according to an estimation by T. Kato (Kato, *op. cit.*). Their migratory capacity is legendary in Indonesia. There is a local joke that when the first American astronaut, Neil Armstrong,

landed on the moon in 1969, he found a Minangkabau restaurant already established. Shortly, we will see that according to Kato and then Chadwick, this high rate of migration is an important factor in favor of the matrilineal filiation system's adaptability (Kato, *op. cit.*).

History tells us that migration is a very ancient process for the Minangkabau and that it is one of the most determining practices of their social dynamic. The Minang representational system is edifying in this respect. We are dealing with a society that sees itself in perpetual expansion from the beginning of time. According to legend, the Minangkabau came from the volcano Merapi and when the volcano erupted, they were spread over the neighboring hillsides and valleys (Chadwick, *op.cit.*). This original homeland, called *darek* ("highland above the water"), is composed of three central districts, the *luhaknantigo*, which form the social matrix and the epicenter of the traditional governing system because of their structural complementarities (Josselin de Jong, *op. cit.*). Although this region is among the most fertile in the Indonesian archipelago, it was the source for many waves of emigration because of its overpopulation, its location in a mountain enclave and expansive agricultural practices. This migration was amplified by the matrilineal social structure. This migratory movement was toward the *rantau*, which may mean river bank, river course, or foreign countries depending on the context (Kato, *op. cit.*). In the Minangkabau language, the equivalent of "to emigrate" is *merantau*, which can literally be translated by "*leave your native land in order to, depending on the situation, go toward a river bank, follow the course of the river, or go to a foreign country*". Historically, the oldest migrations consisted of opening up new lands for agriculture in the immediate vicinity

of the three *luha*, by village segmentation. Three *rantau* were thus created, each one as the spatial extension of a *luhak*. Gradually, by using the same method of colonizing frontier regions by village segmentation, the Minangkabau pursued their expansion until they reached the western coast of Sumatra in the 19th century. This type of migration, operating from one proximity to the next in order to gain agricultural land, is called *rantau pasisir* ("migration towards the hillside"). Early on (around the 15th or 16th century and until today, with a noticeable increase after 1930) the Minangkabau added another type of migration called *rantau hilir* ("downstream migration"), this time toward the eastern coast of Sumatra and the Strait of Malacca's commercial zone. This type of migration does not occur in order to clear new land for agriculture, but in order to participate in commerce (historically gold and coffee, then rubber, palm oil and tobacco), crafts and, more recently, employment in the public or private sectors. It consists mainly of men, single or married, who are motivated by opportunities for work elsewhere as well as personal ambition. It is directed toward small or large cities located at small or medium distances from Minangkabau country. This migration has a circular quality. Even if a man is married, his wife and children stay in the village and he maintains regular contact with them. He visits them once or twice per year for major holidays. The geographic mobility is therefore temporary, because once a man has accumulated sufficient savings, he comes back to the village to live.

Finally, a third type of migration, which developed in the 1950s and grew to dominance in the 1970s, is called *merantau cino* ("Chinese style migration"). It is a far

reaching migration, turned towards the cities of Malaysia or other Indonesian islands. It leads to the migration of single men, nuclear family units, or more rarely, extended families. A man will sometimes return in order to marry and then bring his wife to his migratory destination. The occupations pursued are hardly different from those that already characterize circular movements (commerce, crafts, private or public sector employment). However, the emigrants maintain looser, more episodic ties with their homeland. Some end up coming back to the village, but the majority emigrate permanently (Kato, *op. cit.*).

Now that the general framework has been established, we can provide some indication of the migratory structure at a local level through the example of the village of Koto Anu, studied by Richard Chadwick. In this village, more than half of the 5,000 inhabitants lived in the *rantau* in 1975 and the population that stayed behind was predominantly feminine and elderly. Among the emigrants, 8% lived in the *rantau dakek*, meaning in western Sumatra, principally in the provincial capital, Padang; 77% lived in the *rantau hilir*, meaning in other Sumatran villages; finally 15% had emigrated *rantau cino*, to other large cities of the Indonesian archipelago, including Jakarta (5%) (Chadwick, *op. cit.*). Richard Chadwick notes that the dispersal of emigrants is very wide. Women are not totally excluded from the process, but when they do emigrate as single women, they always follow an older, married sister. Often, the sister who follows has a marriage arranged for her with a young Minang in the migratory destination. Consequently, the author notes a close tie between the place of residence of the sisters in the *rantau*. For single boys, migration is less directly affected by the presence of close

family members. Nevertheless, the plan to migrate from their village very often results from an employment opportunity that they heard about from a larger network of emigrant relatives. Because of this, they tend to join networks made up of members of the same lineage already established in the *rantau*, even if, depending on the opportunities, they go on to move a second or third time. From these remarks, R. Chadwick makes three conclusions: 1) men from a matrilineal group are more dispersed in the *rantau* than women; 2) family networks that are reconstituted in migratory destinations have a strong matrilineal character; 3) in the end, the fundamental principles of village social organization, especially the centralization of the social life around a core group of women, tends to be reproduced in the *rantau* (Chadwick, *op. cit.*).

The Minangkabau Social Structure

Before looking at the relationship between matrilineal filiation and migration, I will briefly describe the structure of Minangkabau society. First, Minangkabau country is composed of approximately 500 *nagari*, or village communities, which are largely endogamous and traditionally enjoy great political autonomy. The population of each *nagari* is divided into several matriclans, the *suku* ("quarter"), which are strictly exogamous. Each clan is then divided into sub-clans, the *payuang* ("umbrellas") under which each person is led by an elected chief, the *penghulu*. The members of a sub-clan consider themselves to be closely related, even if most of them are not capable of giving the exact nature of their genealogical ties (Kato, *op. cit.*; Chadwick, *op. cit.*). The sub-clan includes several lineages, which are themselves composed of lineage segments,

the *sabuah paruik* ("one in the same matrix"). This, however, is the most important grouping in the eyes of the Minangkabau, first because it is clearly delineated. Indeed, the nature of kinship ties is crucial in establishing land usage rights; secondly because this group directly influences an individual's social status and the way in which his/her life is led. The members of a lineage segment are traditionally co-residents of one or several long "customary houses" (*rumah adat*). These are headed by a chief, the *mamak rumah* ("eldest of the house"). This chief divides among the members of the *sabuah paruik* the arable land which, with the livestock, ceremonial objects and customary titles make up the patrimony of the group. He protects this property, called *harta pusaka*; he also ensures that customary rights are respected, settles disputes and blesses marriages. Finally, the *sabuah paruik* includes several *samandai*. Each *samandai* is a minimum unit made up of a mother and her children.

According to the Minangkabau *adat*, the father mostly remains outside of his spouse's *samandai*. Although he visits his wife in the evening, he still belongs to his mother's customary house, which he occupies during the day. He has minimal obligations for raising and educating his own children. He is only obligated to offer some gifts for their circumcision and marriage. However, tradition dictates that he provide material support to his sisters' *samandai*, that he work their land and that he acts as *mamak*, maternal uncle, in the education of his *kemanakan*, his uterine nephews (Kato, *op. cit.*). As is the rule in most matrilineal societies, the Minangkabau maternal uncle plays the role of social father.

Through hard work, a man in this society can acquire prestige and even great wealth.

Nevertheless, this personal gain is largely subordinated to the superior interest of the matrilineal filiation group. In this respect, the way in which arable land is acquired and passed on is telling. There are four recognized ways of acquiring a plot of land: (i) by temporary attribution of a plot from the lineage segment's property, (ii) by the "iron hoe", meaning by clearing the land, but the land will then be part of the collective property of the next generation, (iii) by the "golden hoe", meaning by purchasing it, but in this case the land comes back to the lineage segment after two generations; (iv) and finally by pre-inheritance donation, (*hibah*) which comes from Muslim law. In the last case a man's children receive a gift of land from him. But his uterine nephews, indirectly penalized by the transaction, must agree to the donation (Josselin de Jong, *op. cit.*; Kato, *op. cit.*; Chadwick, *op. cit.*).

To conclude on the male condition in this society, it should be pointed out that a man doesn't really have his own home. He is a visitor in his spouse's home without really having his own place in the customary house of his lineage group either. Because of this, from the age of 6-7 years old, he stops sleeping in his mother's home and begins sleeping in the mosque's prayer hall with the other young men from the community. T. Kato thus remarks that the world of Minang men is restricted to the mosque, café, village council hall and rice paddy shelter. The author adds that "*all of these seem transitory and shapeless compared to the solidity and security of the customary house*" (Kato, *op. cit.*). As the Minangkabau man is on the periphery of his community, in perpetual transit from one social setting to the next, he is logically predisposed to be mobile and inclined

to migration. However, the Minangkabau matrilineal system does not submit men alone to a centrifugal dynamic. As Richard Chadwick has shown (Chadwick, *op. cit.*), it can also push women to migrate, if they belong to poor *sabuah paruik* and are victims of an unequal division of rare resources.

Relationship Between Social Structure and Migration

We have just seen that the matrilineal organization of the Minangkabau, by placing men on the periphery of the social system, has greatly contributed to the exceptionally large migratory dynamic observed in this society. Another contributing factor, according to T. Kato, is the expansive agriculture practiced by the Minangkabau since ancient times. Although the agro-ecological conditions of West Sumatra were very favorable to intense agriculture, unlike the Balinese or the Javanese, the Minangkabau preferred geographic expansion as a response to demographic pressure and the risk of destabilization that pressure held for their the social structure. By doing this, explains the author, mobility and migration were fundamental for the survival and vitality of the matrilineal system itself (Kato, *op. cit.*).

According to T. Kato, migrations to the *rantau hilir*, the east coast of Sumatra, did not modify the matrilineal structures at first since the duty of the *mamak* to assist his uterine nephews, *kemanakan*, remained an obligation in this particular migratory context for many centuries. The uncle continued to help his nephews with their education, daily life, emigration plans or marriage (Kato, *op. cit.*). Nevertheless, starting in the 19th century, the strong development of monetary exchanges and individualism along with the growth

of a local market economy with which the Minangkabau traders were directly involved, had significant effects on the ancient communitarian logic and long-standing *mamak/kemanakan* relationships. In this context, *harta pencarian*, individual property, took on a growing importance, while the responsibility for supporting children shifted from the maternal uncle towards the father. More and more fathers referred to the traditional *hibah* clause in order to pass on most of the property they had personally earned to their own children. According to Kato, one possible reason for this shift is that an uncle would have more heirs than a father and this significantly complicates the transfer of a diverse and rare inheritance made up of land, moveable goods and money. The society's legal system made inheritance laws more flexible in 1951 in order to facilitate the succession of property from a father to his children (Kato, *op. cit.*). The decline of the customary house and the increased use of individual houses also contributed to the shifting of balance in favor of the biological father. Since the 1950s, different ethnologists working in Minangkabau country have observed a growing trend of matrilineal core families or couples forming independent households (Josselin de Jong, *op. cit.*; Kato, *op. cit.*; Chadwick, *op. cit.*). According to a partial census carried out by T. Kato in the 1970s, the *rumah adat* accounted for only 9 to 13% of the villages' houses and those that remained were often abandoned for houses occupied by extended families or young couples at the beginning of the cycle (Kato, *op. cit.*). The extended families were not only organized around a core group of women, but also increasingly integrated the husbands who chose to live permanently with their spouses. Gradually, notes Richard Chadwick

(Chadwick, *op. cit.*), the *semenda bertandang* ("visiting husband") became the *semenda menetap* ("husband who stays in his wife's *samandai*") and then the *semenda bebas* ("free husband") who builds a house for his wife and children with the money he brings back from the *rantau*. In these conditions, it is logical that conjugal relationships grew stronger, even more so since divorce and polygamy, which were very frequent until then, came under virulent attack by Muslim reformers in the 1960s. As the couple became more central to the family unit, fathers widely replaced maternal uncles in supporting their children's educational and material needs (Josselin de Jong, *op. cit.*; Kato, *op. cit.*).

These different mutations reveal the nature of the dialectical relationship between the social organization of the Minangkabau and the migratory phenomenon. On one hand, as we have seen, matrilineal filiation in conjunction with expansive agricultural practices led to a very high level of migration in this society; in return, migration motivated by non-agricultural activities amplified and accelerated the effects on local traditions that the monetization of the economy and the increase in individualistic values would normally have. Another factor that has contributed to this amplification is the gradual depletion of available frontier land. Beginning in the 19th century, the Minangkabau were confronted with a lack of land in the *rantau pasisir*. This pressure grew and resulted in less and less agricultural revenue. Thus a process of agricultural decentralization began and gradually grew (Chadwick, *op. cit.*). A growing number of Minangkabau turned away from working the fields and opted for *hilir* and *cino* type emigration. Consequently, revenue from emigration dominated in the second half of

the 20th century, which strengthened the position of emigrants, principally the men, and allowed them to modify the *adat* and social customs to their advantage, moving them from the margins to the center of the family unit.

Should we deduce from all of these changes that the Minangkabau matrilineal system is disappearing? Certain Dutch authors from the colonial era predicted this and imagined that it was inevitable (Schrieke, 1955; Maretin, 1961). However, T. Kato shows that this is not the case. It must first be noted that the method of matrilineal filiation is still the rule and that the reference to membership in a (maternal) clan is always a fundamental element of individual identity. Furthermore, the *harta pusaka*, ancestral property, remains divided between members of a lineage segment and preserves the cooperative character of the matrilineage as before. Even if the expansion of individual property has significantly complicated inheritance methods, this individual property is always dissolved into the collective holdings of a lineage segment after one or two generations, except in the case of *hibab* gifts to children which are still less common. Of course the age of dual residences for men which led them to alternate constantly between their wives' houses and their mothers' is practically finished, but it has been replaced by uxorilocality. Finally, fathers now play a preponderant role in their children's education, but the maternal uncle determines the social status for the children by attributing a customary title and a share of the ancestral property (Kato, *op. cit.*). Therefore, in the end, the social appearance of the Minangkabau has changed, whereas the society's kinship rules, legal structure and status systems have not really evolved.

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Biographies of Teachers

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

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PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Philippe Antoine has been Research Demographer at the IRD since 1975, Research Director since 1989. Professional experience in different countries: Algeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

My research has essentially been focused on the social and demographic transformations in urban environments. Abidjan, Dakar, Bamako, Yaounde, Antananarivo and Lome are places in particular interest in this field. First, I studied the populating dynamic in Abidjan and showed the diversity of demographic evolution according to social categories in this city (1976 to 1982 with the Côte d'Ivoire Department of Statistics). I then studied the intra-urban differences in Pikine (suburb of Dakar), due in part to insufficient infrastructures and the low level of education of the mothers in the poorest neighborhoods (in collaboration with the Department of Statistics, Senegal, 1985-88). The central objective of the multi-discipline study undertaken afterward in Dakar (in collaboration with the IFAN - Dakar University - in 1988-91) consisted of discovering how, in the exacerbating context of the economic crisis, the

conditions and modalities of urban insertion have evolved. With the help of biographical studies, three components of insertion in the city were studied: access to employment, access to housing, the constitution and evolution of households. The comparison of the processes of insertion in Dakar and Bamako showed the fundamental role of employment and education in the evolution of family and residential dynamics (1991-93, in collaboration with IFAN, CERPOD in Bamako and the Department of Demography at Montreal University). At CEPED (1993-99), I initiated a comparative study with several African teams having adopted our biographical approach on urban insertion in Yaounde (IFORD 1996), in Antananarivo (Madio, 1998) and Lome (URD in 1999-2000). Approximately ten theses were produced from these studies, as well as numerous publications. In the Research Group on Biographical Analysis (GRAB), I co-edited two methodology manuals with Eva Lelièvre concerning the biographical studies at INED publishers.

From 2000 to 2007, in Dakar, I led a team (IRD-DIAL, and IFAN) who studied family dynamics and the passage from adolescence to adulthood for different social categories. Crisis leads to the re-composition of socioeconomic categories, generates a restructuring process of the family organization and leads to a redistribution of status and roles between the sexes and generations. The research also addressed the comparative analysis

of interrelations between professional and family life in Dakar and Lomé.

My work, which for a long time was focused on the events that affected entrance into adulthood (first marriage, first job, etc.), has been, since 2008, on the end of adulthood and the transition toward old age. Does an older age for entering adulthood lead to a differed transition to old age in the urban societies of West Africa? I address this question partly by analyzing data in

Senegal and partly by leading a network of African researchers on the subject (network financed by the AUF and the CEPED). I conduct this research at the Research Laboratory on Economic and Social Transformations at Dakar University.

Since 2008, I have been the General Secretary of the l'Association Internationale des Démographes de Langue Française (AIDELF).

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

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1999: D.E.U.G in Vietnamese Language and Civilization, University of Paris VII Denis Diderot.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Senior Lecturer at the École pratique des hautes études, Religious Sciences Department (since September 2007).

Courses:

Master's course "Initiation to the Religions of Southeast Asia: Historiographical and Epistemological Approaches".

Seminar "Religions in Southeast Asia": Socio-historical approaches of the new religious movements in South Việt Nam (XIX-XXth centuries).

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

Pascal Bourdeaux centered his first historical studies on one of the contemporary expressions of religious modernity in South Việt Nam (Hòa Hảo Buddhism) by diving into the beliefs of local Millenarists, studying the cultural environment of the region, emergence and spread of this New Religious Movement as well as the socio-

economic evolution of the western part of the Mekong Delta. The joint study of the religious foundation of belief, the charisma of its founder, the institutionalization of its cult, local expressions of engagement in the world (social, political, military action) attempted to distinguish the crystallization of a contextualized communitarism from a lasting religious sentiment which expresses the desire for social and cultural integration within a modern nation by defining a transversal chronology and a continuum of colonial and post-colonial situations.

The post-doctorate research took two distinct and complementary directions: the pursuit of field work (notably Kiên Giang province) in order to study certain facets (popular beliefs, religious plurality, mobility and migration) of what Sơn Nam calls the "river civilization" when he speaks about the Mekong Delta; the definition of a research mission in Cambodia to study the colonial era sources (National Archives of Cambodia) concerning the Vietnamese presence and the modern phenomena of religious hybridation.

To complement this personal research, he participated in the "Valéase" project (Promotion of Writing in Southeast Asia) in Hồ Chí Minh City, Hà Nội, Phnom Penh and above all participated in the elaboration and the coordination (French part) of the FSP project "Religious Modernity and Đổi Mới: from the Reconfiguration of Buddhist and Christian Landscape in Việt Nam" (École pratique des hautes études-

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Since 2007, Pascal Bourdeaux has created a teaching and research project placing Vietnamese religious phenomena within the larger context of “religions of Southeast Asia”. Besides the pursuit of his socio-historical research on contemporary religiosity of meridional Việt Nam, he is also interested in the comparative study of Millenarism and the New Religious

Movements, as a prolongation of the phenomena of institutionalization and religious regulation while giving a historical depth to the present reconfigurations and by looking for counterpoints to the official vision of the relationships between state and religion. Finally, he also is interested in the history of “religious sciences” considered from and applied to Southeast Asia.

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

2005: Doctorate thesis in Economy, Paris Dauphine University, with honors, candidate for thesis prize and publication.

1983: Admitted as Administrator of l'INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).

1982: Statistician-Economist diploma, Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique (ENSAE), Paris.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Administrator at l'INSEE, Research Director at the Institute of Research for Development, DIAL, Hà Nội (2007-2010). Research program on the economic and social transition in Việt Nam led in partnership with the Institute of Statistical Science.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROJECTS

Generally, my research is articulated around the relationship between the processes of economic development, the repartition of resources (thus the questions of distribution) and public policies. My present work falls within the framework of the research program on the economic and social transition in Việt Nam led by the IRD/DIAL team in this country.

We are pursuing three complementary centers of research:

- analysis of the functioning of the labor market and the characteristics of the role of the informal sector, given that the knowledge in this sector is limited in Việt Nam; notably, we look at the characteristics of this sector and not on the impact on the conditions of the life of the households;
- follow-up and evaluation of the impact of policies, in order to identify the drivers of growth and their distributive characteristics; the impact of the participation of Việt Nam in the World Trade Organization beginning in 2007 is particularly studied in this framework (evaluation *ex-ante* with the help of micro-macro models);
- study of the role and the performance of institutions in the process of transition; one study of the role of the World Bank in Việt Nam and its interaction with public policies of this country is notably underway in this vein.

In compliance with IRD missions, my work consists of three dimensions of research, formation and expertise applied to the study of development policies. This work is carried out in partnership with Vietnamese researchers and consists of the important activity of statistic application in the framework of the General Bureau of Statistics in Việt Nam (Institute of Statistical Science).

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

1998 - Doctorate Thesis in Anthropology, University of Provence (Aix en Provence), under the direction of M. Charles MACDONALD. Title: "Le Messianisme Hmong". Published in 2005 at CNRS Editions, Paris.

1991 - Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies (DEA) in Ethnology and Comparative Sociology, Paris X-Nanterre University, under the direction of Mr. Alexander W. MACDONALD on the endogenous and exogenous political organization of the Hmong in Việt Nam, Laos and Thailand.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Research Associate in Anthropology at CNRS at the Institute of Research on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC Bangkok – CNRS – MAEE). In post in Việt Nam since 2008: Development Anthropology research program in ethnic zones and the study of forms of emergence in civil society in Việt Nam in partnership with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in the Lào Cai province and the Anthropology Department of the Việt Nam National University, Hà Nội. This Franco-Vietnamese research program (2010-2012) is supported by Agence française de développement (AFD Hà Nội-Paris).

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

In the 1990s, my research was principally directed toward the different forms of the traditional Hmong religion (shamanism, rituals), on their political and religious movements (Messianic, Buddhist and Taoist influences), on transnational migrations in Asia, on the social changes through the production of opium and the development of markets in Laos and in Việt Nam.

Since the 2000s, my research has been oriented toward the paths of emergence of the civil society in Việt Nam (a book and collective articles are in progress), on the epistemological study of local knowledge and practices concerning the management of natural environments in the mountains of Việt Nam.

Since 2008, we have launched a research program on Development Anthropology and on social change in ethnic zones. It consists of a section on anthropological research (field study, text analysis, and interpretation methods, and writing social sciences texts). The objective is to be able to associate a deep understanding of the realities of the field (collective studies, long, extensive studies) and the most effective research tools (socio-anthropological approach inspired by the methods of Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan).

My work includes three dimensions: individual and collective research (Franco-Vietnamese) in socio-anthropology; research training (theoretical and practical) through research within the themed

cooperative and collaboration-advisory projects in Vietnamese institutions in the fields of ethnic tourism development, protection of cultural heritage of ethnic groups in North Việt Nam and the integration of local ethnic knowledge of the forests in the management of natural spaces.

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

2010: Ph.D., (ABD) Geography, Toronto University.

2003: M.A., Political Sciences, University of British Columbia, Canada.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Doctorial Candidate, Toronto University.

Consultant: Development and Poverty.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

My research examines the emergence of a global market for Vietnamese bamboo. Using the “commodity chains” and “network” approaches, I work on the evolution of bamboo products on different scales and the reconfiguration of social, economic and political domains of networks of poor producers in Việt Nam. Before these doctoral studies, I worked for development organizations in Việt Nam, Laos and in Canada for ten years. I worked for the University of British Columbia, the Coady International Institute, World University Service of Canada. I was also a consultant for FIDA, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.

Bernard FORMOSO

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

1996, HRD, Peregrination Within Minority Groups, Paris X University - Nanterre, Dir. O. Herrenschmidt.

1984, Doctorate in Social Anthropology, Romani and Sedentary, EHESS.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Professor, Department of Ethnology, Comparative Sociology, Pre-history, and Ethnomusicology, West Paris University – Nanterre La Défense.

Head of Southeast Asia Studies, Ethnology Department, West Paris University.

Member of the Ethnology and Comparative Laboratory (LESC – UMR 7186).

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROJECTS

After having first worked with the sedentary Romani populations in France of which I studied the identity constructions in their relations to non-Romani (1979-1984), I then turned toward Southeast Asia. I studied:

- the development of rural zones in Northeast Thailand and their agrarian dynamic (1984-1997);
- birthright citizenship and the native question in Southeast Asia;
- ethnic minorities in Southwest China and in the north of the Indochinese Peninsula in their relations to the state (1997 to today);
- the Chinese minority and its relations with the host country and native country (1993 to today).
- religious institutions of the Chinese in Southeast Asia.

In regards to thematic orientations and more general theoretical considerations, my research centers principally on the construction of identity and interethnic relations.

Christophe GIRONDE

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christophe.gironde@graduateinstitute.ch

TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

Doctorate in Development Studies,
Graduate Institute of Development Studies
(IUED) / University of Geneva, 2001; thesis
entitled "Rehabilitation and Transformation
of Family Economy in North Việt Nam
- Village Activity Systems and Relation
Networks in the Red River Delta".

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Lecturer / Researcher at the Graduate
Institute of International and Development
Studies (IHEID) of Geneva.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

My research essentially focused on the
processes of transformation of rural
economies and societies. It is involved in the
field of political economy, and is based on
the field research among the populations
and representatives of the local authority.

My work is concentrated on Việt Nam,
based on doctoral research done at
the end of the 1990s. I took a particular
interest in the evolution of the productive
activity system of the populations, in the
social differentiations, in the process of
institutional transition toward a so-called
market economy and in the role of local
authorities in these transformations.

More recently, I had the opportunity to
work as a consultant, on the questions of
population participation in the definition
and implementation of anti-poverty
programs in Việt Nam and in Mali.

Rodolphe DE KONINCK

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International University of Shanghai, Fall 1983.

TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

Since 2002, Canada Chair of Research in Asian Studies and Professor in the Geography Department in Montreal University.
Doctorate (Geography), University of Singapore, 1970.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Since 2002, Canada Chair of Research in Asian Studies and Professor in the Geography Department in Montreal University. Winner of the Innis-Gérin Prize (humanities), Royal Society of Canada, 1999. Winner of the Jacques-Rousseau Prize (interdisciplinary) of the ACFAS, 1998. Winner of Killam Scholarship at the Canada Council for the Arts Council, 1991 and 1992.
Member of the Royal Society of Canada since 1990.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Full Professor at Montreal University since 2002.

Assistant, Associate, Full Professor, Laval University, 1970 - 75; 1975 - 80; 1980 - 2002
Professor, St Leo's College, Fort Portal, Uganda, 1962 - 63.

Guest Professor

National University of Singapore, January to June 1997.
EHESS, Paris (Director of Associated Studies), Spring 1988.
University of Geneva, Spring 1987.

Television Teaching

Le monde à la carte, broadcast from 1990 to 2006 on Canal Savoir, Télé Québec and TV5 Monde.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Guest Researcher

Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, June to October 2007.
Center for the Study of Tropical Geography, Bordeaux, Spring 1991.
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Summers of 1990, 92, 93.
Universities Sjah Kuala, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, Summers of 1972, 73, 74, 75.
Centre for Policy Research, Univ. Sains Malaysia, summers of 1972, 73, 74, 75, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87.

Direction or co-direction of funded research projects: 28 since 1970, including:

3rd) Technical Progress and Social Progress of the Peasantry in Malaysia and in Indonesia.
- Center for International Development Research (1972 à 1977).
21st and 22nd) The Forest Challenge in Vietnam (I and II).
Center for International Development Research (1994-96 and 1997-2001).
23rd) The Southeast Asian Agricultural Development Model: advantages and vulnerabilities in a crisis.
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (2000-2004).

27th) The Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia.

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (2005-2011).

28th) Agricultural Expansion, Deforestation, Biocarburants, Global Market: Borneo at the Heart of the Torment.

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (2008-2011).

Danielle LABBÉ

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

2004: Master's in Architectural Science, Laval University, Quebec.

2001: Bachelor's in Architecture, Joint Diploma Laval University (Quebec) and University of Civil Engineering in Hà Nội.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Doctorate in Urbanism at the School of Community and Regional Planning at British Columbia University, Vancouver (Canada). Associate researcher on the project "Urbanization Processes at Work: Mobility and Local Development in Hà Nội", at the Institut National de Recherche Scientifique du Québec – Urbanization, Culture and Society (INRS) and the Environment and Sustainable Development Research Institute at the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences. Consultant in urban design (Việt Nam) and protection of building and landscape heritage (Montreal).

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

My research presently involves the processes of urbanization and transformation of space and human activities on the periphery of the Southeast Asian cities in general and in Việt Nam in particular. For my thesis, I study the socio-spatial transformations that have taken place in a village situated in the immediate vicinity of Hà Nội since the colonial period. Over the last ten years, my research has been on the preservation of building heritage and on the transformations of housing in the central quarters of Hà Nội.

Emmanuel PANNIER

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

2006-2010: Doctorate Thesis in Anthropology, Provence University – Aix-Marseille 1.

2008: Diploma in Vietnamese from the Continuing Education Center for Languages at the Polytechnical Institute in Hà Nội.

2005: DESS (Master's Degree) "Development Anthropology" Option: Local and Sectorial Dimensions of Development Actions in Urban and Rural Environments, Institute for the Study of Economic and Social Development (IEDES) in Paris I University - Panthéon Sorbonne.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

- Doctorate in 4th year of thesis in Anthropology at the Institute for Research on Southeast Asia (IRSEA – CNRS – Marseille).
- Associate researcher in Research and Development project financed by AFD entitled "Socio-anthropological Study of Development Projects in Vietnam". Cooperation between the Anthropology Department of the National University of Hà Nội, the Department of Culture, Sport and Tourism of the Lào Cai province, the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC-Bangkok) and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva).

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

My research in Việt Nam started in 2005 with an applied development study for an IRD project entitled "Transfers of Fertility, Water Management and Integrated Approach of Modeling Agricultural Ecosystems in Hill and Small Mountain Zones in Southeast Asia". It involved studying the social and cultural peasant dynamics linked to the use of agricultural land in a Mường community in the Hòa Bình province.

My studies then turned to academic research for my thesis work and for the FSP2S project, "Social Networks in North Việt Nam" (IRSEA – Sociology Institute – VASS) in 2006.

My general research centered on forms, functions and the evolution of social links in the rural environment in north of Việt Nam in contemporary times. The objective was to identify the principles and mechanisms that create social cohesion as it is defined and redefined in the Vietnamese villages in the north of Việt Nam.

My work revolves around three central complementary research themes:

- contemporary manifestations of the non-commercial circulation system (gift and reciprocating gifts, ritual or symbolic exchanges or non-commercial exchanges). It involves measuring the role that these social transfers play in the edification, the

- reinforcement and the manifestation of interpersonal social links.
- the modalities of construction and the functions of social networks in rural areas through the study of informal groups and the sociability practices. This focuses on the concrete modalities of the expression of social links.
- the evolution of regulation systems in the local society. Through an approach which aims at identifying the continuities and the ruptures of present-day social reconfigurations, this analysis aims to show the variability of norms and principles that favor social cohesion at a local level in a context of global socioeconomic transformations.

PHẠM Văn Cự

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

Post-Doctorate 1991-1992 at CARTEL,
Sherbrooke University, Quebec, Canada.

Ph.D. in Geomorphology and
Paleogeography, Việt Nam Academy of
Social Sciences.

DESS GDTA and Paris VI University, 1989.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

1. Coordinator of the project "Information
Systems of the Red River Delta", in
cooperation with CARTEL, Sherbrooke
University, Quebec, Canada, 1993-1997.

2. Coordinator of the project "Red River
Observatory", cooperation between the
VTGEO and REGARDS, CNRS Bordeaux,
France, 1993-2001.

3. SIG and Remote Sensing Consultant for
the project "Reforestation in Vietnam", ADB,
1998-1999.

4. Project Coordinator for "Rice Monitoring
in Mekong Delta Using Radarsat System",
cooperation with Radarsat International,
Canada Center for Remote Sensing, Canada,
1999-2000.

5. Project Coordinator for the project
"Geomatics Applied in the Environment
and to the GEOMENSA Health", cooperation
between the Natural Sciences University
and the Medical University of Hà Nội and
Sherbrooke University, Quebec, Canada,
1999-2005.

6. Deputy Director of the Remote Sensing
Program of the CNST, 1999-2002, head of
Radar sector.

7. In charge of the Environment section
of the CNST cooperation in Việt Nam and
CNRS France, 1999-2002.

8. External evaluator of the CIDA (Canadian
International Development Agency) for
the project "Water and Soil Conservation",
cooperation between the Thài Nguyên
University, Geotechnical Institute of Việt
Nam and the Saskachwan University,
Sakatoon, Canada 1998.

9. Independent evaluator of the GTZ for
the project, Catchment Management in
Mekong Basin in Laos, 1999.

10. Member of the Scientific Council of
the City of Hà Nội since 1997, Applied
Geosciences Sector.

Courses:

1. Senior teacher in remote sensing training
and SIG applied to geography at the
Natural Sciences University in Hà Nội
since 1990.

2. Associate Professor in the Geography
Department at the Natural Sciences
University in Hà Nội since 1997.

3. Associate Professor of the CARTEL (Centre
for Research and Applications in Remote
Sensing) Sherbrooke University, Quebec,
Canada since 1997.

4. Co-director of master's, DEA and theses, at
Sherbrooke University and University Louis
Pasteur I in Strasbourg.

5. Guest Professor at Toulouse University, Le
Mirail, 2004, 2005, 2006.

6. Classes and Conferences Given:

- a. Detection and Analysis of Changes in Surfaces.
- b. Physical Indicators and the Extraction of Information from Optical Images.
- c. Multi-scaled Approach Applied to Remote Sensing.
- d. Spatial Modeling of Water Erosion of the Ground.
- e. Geomatics and Sustainable Development.
- f. Geomatics Applied to Urban Development.

Mireille RAZAFINDRAKOTO

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TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

2010: Certification for Direction of Research, Paris-Dauphine University.

1996: Doctorate in Economic Sciences, École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris (EHESS). Très honorable avec les félicitations du jury (*Summa cum laude*).

1991: Statistician Economist Engineer, diploma from the ENSAE-CESD, Paris (École nationale de la statistique et de l'Administration économique, Centre européen de formation des statisticiens économistes des pays en développement) *Valedictorian*.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Research Manager 1st Class, Institute for Development Research (IRD), Research, DIAL (Development, Institutions and Long Term Analysis) Unit.

Posted in Việt Nam, at the General Statistical Office (GSO), since July 2006. Responsible for the implementation of the DIAL research program in Việt Nam.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

My present work particularly focuses on: the links between well-being and the living conditions of households, inequalities and governance; job satisfaction; corruption and poverty as well as the evaluation of the impact of public policies. The research on Việt Nam concerns a program on the "issues and constraints of the economic transition since Đổi Mới". It is carried out according to three complementary axes:

1- The role of the informal sector on the labor market and its impact on the living conditions of households. Starting from the analysis of the characteristics of this sector, we try to find out in what way it contributes to the improvement of the standard of living and to the reduction of inequality. What are the specificities of the informal sector which should be taken into account in public policy?;

2- Follow-up and evaluation of the impact of public policies, in particular in distributive terms. On the one hand, it involves the analysis of the influence of the commercial opening up of Việt Nam, notably the social consequences of Việt Nam joining the WTO (*ex ante* approach by resorting to micro-macro models). On the other hand, the objective is to measure the efficiency of the political battle with poverty which is taking place in the mountain regions where ethnic minorities live (*ex post* evaluation: analysis of causalities, specific methods for evaluating impact);

3- The role and the performance of institutions in the transition process. This involves exploring the links between governance (role and functioning mode of public institutions), the value system of the society, the economic dynamic and

the living conditions of the population. The analyses are on, among others, the multiple dimensions of poverty (subjective well-being, employment conditions, social participation and exclusion, conditions for access to public services, etc.).

François ROUBAUD

Email: roubaud@dia.pr.fr

TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

1991: Doctorate in Economy. Paris XI University – Nanterre. Très honorable avec les félicitations du jury (*Summa cum laude*), candidate for thesis prize and publication.

1986: Diploma of statistician-economist, École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique (ENSAE), Paris.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Research Director, Institute for Development Research (IRD), DIAL (Development, Institutions and Long Term Analysis) Unit.

Posted in Việt Nam, General Statistics Office (OGS-ISS), in September 2006 (Research Program on the Economic and Social Transition in Việt Nam).

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

As a development economist, my work follows two lines of research:

Statistical: survey methodology, data processing:

- development of mixed survey methods (households/enterprises) and creator of 1-2-3 surveys for statistical measuring and analysis of the informal sector (projects in Africa, Latin America, and in Asia);
- development of modules "Multiple Dimensions of Poverty", "Governance" and "Democracy" (projects in Africa and in Latin America);
- support for national statistics institutes in the implementation and analysis of survey results.

Economic:

- functioning of labor market, informal sector, urban dynamics and the impact on living conditions;
- links between governance, democracy, new dimensions of poverty and process of economic development;
- analysis of public policies in developing countries: structural adjustment programs, anti-poverty strategies, follow-up and evaluation of impact.

Martine SEGALEN

Email: msegalen@u-paris10.fr

TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

1984: State Thesis, "Fifteen Generations of Bas Bretons. Marriage, Kinship and Society in South Bigouden Country, 1720-1980", Paris V-René Descartes, under the direction of Jean Cuisenier.

1970: Thesis in Sociology, 3rd cycle, "The Choice of Spouse in a Community in Eure", Paris V, under the direction of Alain Girard.

1960 Diploma from the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, Economic and Private Finance section.

Professional Career at the CNRS

The entire career was at the Center for French Ethnology, laboratory associated with the National Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions (1972-1998).

January 1986 - February 1996: Director of the Center for French Ethnology.

University Career

- October 1, 1995 - September 30, 1998: Professor in the Sociology department at Paris X University - Nanterre, on loan from the CNRS.
- DESS Director "Cultural Consultant. Cultural Project and Social Environment" since 1996, became Master 2 pro "Conducting Cultural Projects - Public's Knowledge".
- January 2000 - January 2002: Elected member of the Administration Council.
- May 1999 - May 2003: Elected Director of the Sociology department, Paris X University-Nanterre.

- February 3, 2003 - December 2005: First vice-president of the Paris X University-Nanterre, in charge of the Administration Council.
- Researcher at IPRAUS - Institut parisien de recherches architecture, urbanistique et sociétés (Segment of UMR 7136).
- From September 1, 2006: Director of the review, *Ethnologie française*, a review of the UMS from the Maison de l'Archéologie et de l'Ethnologie de Nanterre-Paris X.
- Presently, member of LASCO (Laboratoire d'analyses socio-anthropologiques du contemporain) at West Paris University Nanterre La Défense.

FIELD OF RESEARCH

As the list of publications below shows, the work was primarily on most of the fields relative to the family, in an inter-disciplinary perspective, associating sociology, ethnology and history: couple, family, marriage, rituals, intergenerational relations, kinship have all been addressed over time, in rural, industrial and contemporary society. The research also addresses the question of heritage, and its promotion in museums.

Ongoing Research:

- participation in a collective international survey, by the CNAV on two generations of immigrant families from sub-Saharan Africa in France (family transitions and transformations).
- ego genealogy essay: choice of spouse and kinship in a double context of migration.

Olivier TESSIER

Email: otessier2002@yahoo.fr

TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

Doctor of Anthropology, University of Aix-Marseille I, 1995-2003, "The native country is a sweet star fruit". Social anchors and spatial mobility: essay on the local social space in the north of Vietnam. Academy of Aix-Marseille, Provence University (Aix-Marseille I), Anthropology department, Arts and Humanities section, December 2003, 658 p. + 150 p. of annexes.

Engineer in Agronomic Techniques in Warm Regions, Specialization: Social Water Management, National Center for Agronomic Studies of Warm Regions (CNEARC), Montpellier, 1991-1993.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

After being trained as a tropical agronomy engineer and four years of experience as the head of development programs (Burkina Faso, Haïti), I started a doctorate in Anthropology (Aix-Marseille University) in 1995 for which the field work was in the north of Việt Nam (Phú Thọ province). During my thesis, which was presented in 2003, I decided to show that the rural space *kinh* (or *việt*), generally perceived and described as an aggregation of villages which are total and exclusive units, takes on another aspect when it is considered from the angle of exchanges, of the dynamic of constitution and transformation of social and political spaces. Instead of the legendary attachment of peasants to their land, the reality is more complex and abundant, that of a mobile population

which moves easily in order to follow opportunities.

Co-editor of the work *Le village en question* which ends a multi-disciplinary research program led jointly by the EFEO center in Hà Nội and the Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences from 1996 to 2000, I coordinated, at the same time as my own research activities, two scientific cooperation programs (1999-2004) for Louvain Catholic University in the mountain provinces of Sơn La and Hòa Bình. During the same period, I participated in different expert missions for international organizations (European Union, World Bank). Finally, from January 2005 to September 2006, I directed the FSP project, "Research Support on Economic and Social Transition Issues in Vietnam" financed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry and implemented by the EFEO center in Hà Nội.

For my work at the EFEO as lecturer (September 2006), I pursued my research on the central question of the evolution of relations "state – peasant collectivities" during the XIXth and XXth centuries by looking at them from the angle of water and hydraulic management, the omnipresence of which organized the countryside and permeated human culture. In practical terms, it is necessary to examine the social, political and economic conditions of the implementation of large scale hydraulics in the deltas of the Red and Mekong Rivers, to envision the possibilities of control on the land and man offered by such coverage of space, to take an interest in the techniques of construction that have gradually led to a

remodeling of the territory, to analyze the modalities of water supply implemented by the peasant collectivity on the one hand, and by the state through its specialized corporations, veritable technical services, on the other.

Bruno THIBERT

Email: bruno.thibert@umontreal.ca

TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

2004: Specialized Superior Study Diploma, Geographic Information Systems, Université du Québec, Montréal.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

Researcher and Deputy Director of Canada Research Chair in Asian Studies at the Université de Montréal since 2004. Coordinator of the project, The challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia – ChATSEA; 2005-2011, subsidized by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada in the context of its Major Collaborative Research Initiatives.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

The agrarian transition probably represents the most important process at the source of the social changes of the last three centuries. In the wealthiest countries of the North, this transformation is practically finished while it is still ongoing in the developing countries of the South.

We define agrarian transition as the transformation of societies made up essentially of rural populations that are dependent on agricultural production and organized according to rural structures, into principally urban, industrial populations that strictly adhere to market laws.

Six central processes that are unique to this dynamic have been identified. They provide the framework for the project: (i) agricultural

intensification and territorial expansion; (ii) growing integration of production in the market economy and commercial networks; (iii) acceleration of urbanization and industrialization processes; (iv) increase in mobility of populations within the country and internationally; (v) intensification of legislation as a tool of power in the private sector, governments and supranational organizations formalize agricultural production and ensure the accumulation of control of the mechanisms of exchange; (vi) environmental transformations and the mutations of the relationships between societies and nature which shows the impact of new forms of human activity as well as the new mode of attributing value to resources.

The research team assembled for this project includes 25 researchers who come mostly from the fields of economic, cultural and environmental geography, but also from other disciplines such as history, sociology, anthropology, economics, women's studies and urban studies. Bringing together three generations of researchers, the team is composed of members from 17 different universities and research centers: nine in Canada (U. de Montréal, McGill U., York U., U. of Toronto, U. of British Columbia, UQAM, U. Laval, Wilfrid Laurier U. and U. of Waterloo), five in Southeast Asia (U. of Việt Nam Hà Nội, Chiang Mai U., U. of the Phillipines Diliman, U. Gadjah Mada, U. Malaysia Sabah and National U. of Singapore), two in Europe (U. of Durham and U. Michel de Montaigne), and one in

Australia (U. of Sydney). Concerning the academic production, the project will produce 65 graduate student theses.

Nicolas ZUFFEREY

Email: nico.zufferey@unige.ch

TITLES AND DIPLOMAS

1992: Doctorate Thesis in Sinology at University of Geneva, Faculty of Arts: Wang Chong (27-97?): Knowledge, Politics and Truth in Ancient China.

1985: Master of Arts in Philosophy and Sinology.

PRESENT PROFESSIONAL POSTING

- (since 2002) Professor, Chinese Studies Unit, Faculty of Arts, University of Geneva.
- (since 2002) Head of Chinese Studies Unit
- Vice-director of multi-discipline Master of Asian Studies.
- (from 2005 to 2008) Vice-dean of the Faculty of Arts.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

My principal research subject is Confucianism, which I address from diverse perspectives:

- from an intellectual history perspective, principally Confucianism during the Han dynasty, 206 B.C. - 220 A.D. (studies and translation of the intellectual, Wang Chong, 27-29 A.D.).
- from a contemporary perspective (renewal of Confucianism in the 20th century, Confucianism and human rights, Confucianism and Asian values, Confucianism and democracy in RPC).
- from a literary and cultural perspective, notably in contemporary literature, principally martial arts novels (Jin Yong, etc.).

I have also taken an interest in the status of the woman in ancient China (gender studies); I am participating in a research project on China-Japan-Korea intellectual representations.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACDI	<i>Agence canadienne pour le développement international</i>
AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>
AGED	<i>Allocation de garde d'enfant à domicile</i>
AIDELF	<i>Association internationale des démographes de langue française</i>
AMP	<i>Assistance médicale à la procréation</i>
APE	<i>Allocation parentale d'éducation</i>
API	<i>Allocation de parent isolé</i>
ASSV	<i>Académie des Sciences Sociales du Viêt Nam</i>
AUF	<i>Agence universitaire de la Francophonie</i>
CARTEL	<i>Centre d'applications et de recherches en télédétection</i>
CEFURDS	<i>Centre de recherche sur le développement et l'urbanisation</i>
CEPED	<i>Centre français sur la population et le développement</i>
CERPOD	<i>Centre d'études et de recherche sur la population pour le développement</i>
CHATSEA	<i>Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia</i>
CNAV	<i>Caisse nationale d'assurance vieillesse</i>
CNEARC	<i>Centre national d'études agronomiques des régions chaudes</i>
CNRS	<i>Centre national de la recherche scientifique</i>
DIAL	<i>Développement, institutions et analyse de long terme</i>
EFEQ	<i>École française d'Extrême-Orient</i>
EHES	<i>École des hautes études en sciences sociales</i>
ENSAE	<i>École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique</i>
EPHE	<i>École pratique des hautes études</i>
FELDA	<i>Federal Land Authority</i>
FIDA	<i>Fonds international de développement agricole</i>
FSP2S	<i>Fonds de solidarité prioritaire en sciences sociales</i>
GRAB	<i>Groupe de recherche sur l'analyse biographique</i>
GRET	<i>Groupe de recherches et d'échanges technologiques</i>
GSO	<i>General Statistical Office</i>
IDH	<i>Indice de développement humain</i>
IEDES	<i>Institut d'études du développement économique et social</i>
IFAN	<i>Institut fondamental d'Afrique noire</i>
IFORD	<i>Institut de formation et de recherche démographiques</i>
IHEID	<i>Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement</i>
IHTP	<i>Institut d'histoire du temps présent</i>
INED	<i>Institut national d'études démographiques</i>
INSEE	<i>Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques</i>
IPRAUS	<i>Institut parisien de recherche : architecture, urbanistique et sociétés</i>
IRASEC	<i>Institut de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine</i>

IRD	<i>Institut de recherche pour le développement</i>
IRPA	<i>Institut régional du patrimoine</i>
IRSEA	<i>Institut de recherche sur le sud-est asiatique</i>
ISF	<i>Indice synthétique de fécondité</i>
IUED	<i>Institut universitaire d'études du développement</i>
IUP	<i>Institut universitaire professionnalisé</i>
IVG	<i>Interruption volontaire de grossesse</i>
JTD	<i>Journées de Tam Đảo</i>
LARTES	<i>Laboratoire de recherche sur les transformations économiques et sociales</i>
LASCO	<i>Laboratoire d'analyses socioanthropologiques du contemporain</i>
LASDEL	<i>laboratoire d'études et de recherches sur les dynamiques sociales et le développement local</i>
LESC	<i>Laboratoire d'ethnologie et de sociologie comparative</i>
LFS	<i>Labor Force Survey</i>
MAEE	<i>Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes</i>
MLF	<i>Mouvement de libération des femmes</i>
MOLISA	<i>Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (Viêt Nam)</i>
OGM	<i>Organisme génétiquement modifié</i>
OGS	<i>Office général des statistiques du Viêt Nam</i>
OMC	<i>Organisation mondiale du commerce</i>
PACS	<i>Pacte civil de solidarité</i>
PAJE	<i>Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant</i>
SIG	<i>Système d'information géographique</i>
UMR	<i>Unité mixte de recherche</i>
USAID	<i>United States Agency for International Development</i>
USTH	<i>Université des sciences et technologies de Hà Nội</i>

What is AFD ?

AFD, *Agence Française de Développement*, is a public development finance institution that has worked to fight poverty and support economic growth in developing countries and the French Overseas Communities for 70 years. AFD executes the French government's development aid policies.

Through offices in more than fifty countries and nine French Overseas Communities, AFD provides financing and support for projects that improve people's living conditions, promote economic growth and protect the planet: schooling, maternal healthcare, help for farmers and small business owners, clean water supply, tropical forest preservation, and fighting climate change, among other concerns.

In 2010, AFD approved more than €6.8 billion for financing aid activities in developing countries and the French Overseas Communities. The funds will help 13 million children go to school, improve drinking water access for 33 million people and provide €428 million in microloans benefiting more than 700,000 people. Energy efficiency projects financed by AFD in 2010 will save nearly 5 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually.

www.afd.fr

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From Global to Local: Methodological, Cross-cutting and Critical Approaches

The Việt Nam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), Nantes University, École française d'Extrême-Orient (ÉFEO) and Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) have decided to hold a social sciences summer university called "Tam Đảo Summer School Week" as part of a partnership agreement for the period 2010-2013. The objectives of this partnership are to develop multidisciplinary training of an excellent standard, to create a policy discussion platform and to attract a large academic and non-academic audience from the entire Southeast Asian region.

This book is a verbatim transcription of the plenary sessions and workshop presentations and debates on the issues surrounding transition, held from July 16 to 24, 2010 in Hà Nội and in the hill station of Tam Đảo. The concept of transition was studied in various situations according to four principal themes: *i*) agrarian transition, *ii*) economic transition through both quantitative and qualitative analyses, *iii*) field study methods in social anthropology of development, *iv*) demographic transition and familial transformation.

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