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Populating the Handbook on Governance Statistics with Empirical Evidence: Illustrations from the GPS-SHaSA survey modules in Africa

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Populating the Handbook on Governance Statistics with Empirical Evidence:

Illustrations from the GPS-SHaSA survey modules in Africa

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Abstract

The 2030 Agenda and the transition from the MDGs to the SDGs focus on the quality of institutions, governance, peace and security (GPS). This renewed interest drove a pressing need for measurement, monitoring and evaluation in developing countries and rich countries. Such are the aims of SDG16 at global level and Agenda 2063 (Aspirations 3 and 4) in Africa. This working paper describes and analyses eight dimensions of governance drawn from GPS-SHaSA initiative household surveys "Governance, Peace and Security" in nine Sub-Saharan African countries. Those dimensions are: Non-discrimination and equality; Participation in political and public affairs; Openness; Access to and quality of justice; Responsiveness and satisfaction with services; Absence of corruption; Trust in institutions; Safety and security. This document helps populating with empirical evidence the UN Handbook on governance statistics, developed under the auspices of the *Praia Group on Governance Statistics*.

Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Governance, Peace, Security, Indicators, Statistics, Households surveys, Sub-Saharan Africa

JEL codes: A33, C21, D02, D63, D71, D72, D73, D74, H56, K41

Résumé

L'Agenda 2030 et le passage des OMD aux ODD ont attiré l'attention sur la qualité des institutions, la gouvernance, la paix et la sécurité (GPS). Cet intérêt renouvelé a suscité un besoin urgent de mesure, de suivi et d'évaluation tant dans les pays en développement que dans les pays riches. Tels sont les objectifs de l'ODD16 au niveau mondial et de l'Agenda 2063 au niveau africain (Aspirations 3 et 4). Ce document de travail décrit et analyse huit dimensions de la gouvernance dans neuf pays d'Afrique subsaharienne, à partir des enquêtes ménages « Gouvernance, Paix et Sécurité » (initiative GPS-SHaSA). Ces dimensions sont : la non-discrimination et l'égalité ; la participation politique et aux affaires publiques ; le degré d'ouverture du gouvernement ; l'accès à et la qualité de la justice ; la satisfaction vis-à-vis des services publics et le degré de prise en compte des demandes des citoyens ; l'absence de corruption ; la confiance institutionnelle ; la sûreté et la sécurité. Ce document contribue à illustrer par des résultats empiriques le Manuel sur les statistiques de la gouvernance, développé pour le compte de la Division Statistique des Nations Unies par le *Groupe de Praia* en charge des Statistiques de la Gouvernance.

Mots-clefs : Objectifs de Développement Durable (ODD), Gouvernance, Paix, Sécurité, Indicateurs, Statistiques, Enquêtes ménages, Afrique Sub-Saharienne

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The GPS-SHaSA initiative: a short presentation

The 2030 Agenda and transition from the MDGs to the SDGs focused attention on the quality of institutions, governance, and peace and security (GPS). This renewed interest drove a pressing need for measurement, monitoring and evaluation in developing countries and rich countries. Such are the aims of SDG16 at global level and Agenda 2063 (Aspirations 3 and 4) in Africa. This is a relatively new item on the international development agenda, and an area in which Africa is well ahead. Back in 2012, the African Union Commission (AUC) launched an initiative in association with the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) to develop GPS statistics at continental level under its Strategy for the Harmonisation of Statistics in Africa (SHaSA). The challenge was taken up with instruments developed, adopted and tested on the ground in a dozen countries.

The GPS-SHaSA initiative develops, tests and institutionalises measurement instruments. It is designed for use by the continent's National Statistics Offices (NSOs) and is coordinated by the AUC Department of Economic Affairs with institutional support and funding from the UNDP and EU (under the Pan-African Statistics Programme), and scientific assistance from IRD (DIAL) researchers. The GPS-SHaSA initiative informs the Praia Group's methodological think tank in charge of defining international standards for governance statistics worldwide.

A brief presentation of the GPS-SHaSA initiative's methodological bases and explanation of its main principles and strengths is called for first for all players implementing or using these instruments to realise their potential and defend and convey them, and for the consolidation of these principles. This section draws on the abundant literature already produced on the GPS-SHaSA initiative's methodology and challenges (see, for example, Razafindrakoto & Roubaud 2015 & 2018; Orkin *et al.*, 2015; Cling *et al.*, 2016; Laberge *et al.*, 2018), consolidates these studies' findings, and develops the foundations and assets that underpin the initiative.

The GPS-SHASA methodology: sound, suitable bases

The methodology developed for the GPS-SHaSA initiative is based on four instruments:

- Two statistical survey modules (G and P&S), and
- Two administrative data collection instruments (G and P&S).

Governance module added on to official	Peace and Security module added on to
household surveys	official household surveys
Administrative Sources on Governance	Administrative Sources on Peace and Security

Table 1: The GPS-SHaSA initiative's statistical instruments

Complementarity of the instruments

The instruments make for optimal coverage of the major focus areas and the possibility of studying the interactions between these areas. Basically, although "governance" and "peace and security" are different subjects, they are interlinked. For example, it is hard to post good governance performances without peace. Similarly, security has an impact on governance. Administrative data also provide information on institutional procedures, resources and

capacities. Household survey data are more focused on results and directly collect the points of view of the people concerned.

A lightweight, flexible, modular mechanism

Due consideration of data collection/production conditions (constraints) is key to ensuring the mechanism's feasibility, relevance, reliability and sustainability, especially in developing countries. There have been many attempts to set up sophisticated, multi-objective measuring and monitoring systems with huge resources (entailing a major visibility concern for donors), but these endeavours have remained ad-hoc and have never been sustainable. Many mechanisms fail to achieve their goal or do not get past the stage of "one-shot" implementation because they are cumbersome and do not consider conditions on the ground, in particular human resources and material constraints.

Firstly, then, the methodology involving adding on modules to already scheduled official surveys is particularly appropriate. Once the minimum conditions required are in place (sample size, collection of basic sociodemographic variables, inclusion of a minimum base of questions on GPS, etc.; conditions that will be explained later in this document), the country is free to adjust and/or round out their mechanism according to their means and the particular objectives they wish to add.

Secondly, the chosen option for the administrative statistics is to build the capacities of the structures already in place in the administration (rather than creating new parallel institutions that would add to or supplant the institutions already in place). This takes advantage of policymaker and development community momentum (with the growing interest in monitoring and indicators, which took shape in particular with the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063). In this context, the aim is to launch and/or flank processes designed to organise, coordinate and drive units/services that are theoretically already supposed to collect data on the activities for which they are responsible.

The instruments' subject coverage: a comprehensive, multidimensional methodology

Meet the Agenda 2063 monitoring objective in addition to the 2030 Agenda

The GPS-SHaSA instruments were aligned in the design phase (2013-14) with legal instruments governing political relations between African countries, such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the African Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. These instruments consistently cover the focuses of Agenda 2063's aspirations 3 and 4, which largely tie in with the 2030 Agenda's SDG16. The GPS-SHaSA initiative instruments hence propose indicators that cover and synergise the two agendas' targets (see tables 1 and 2 in the appendix).

Beyond governance: Monitoring SDG16 in association with other SDGs

The GPS-SHaSA instruments present the opportunity to put into practice as recommended SDG principle of considering interactions between the different goals. First, in addition to the subjects directly associated with SDG16, some GPS module questions already consider other 2030 Agenda goals (poverty, hunger, education, environment, etc.). Second, as mentioned above, the survey mechanism provides for the possibility to add in additional questions.

Coverage of the multitude of GPS dimensions

One of the strengths of the GPS-SHaSA initiative instruments is their comprehensive approach designed to cover not only a raft of different subject areas, but also their many dimensions (**Figure 1**). The instruments have to be able to cover the different services concerned, a range of scales (local, regional and national), different types of variables (depending on whether they relate to principles, processes or outcomes), the gamut of individual, household and community data, etc.



Figure 1: A multi-dimensional approach

Source: Razafindrakoto et Roubaud (2018a).

The 2030 and 2063 agenda guidelines include tracking an indicator to evaluate progress in a given area. However, this indicator clearly provides information on just one stage, one part of an entire raft of processes. The GPS modules provide the opportunity to broaden the focus (rather than having a zoomed focus, which can never be any more than partial) as a way to understand and identify precisely at which level, at which stage the sources of potential problems and discontent are to be found (**Figure 2**).



Figure 2: Considering all steps in a process

Source: Razafindrakoto et Roubaud (2018a).

Survey feasibility and analytical relevance: results already obtained

Measurement of progress with governance has long been met with distrust, reticence and resistance, especially when endeavouring to accurately evaluate developments in areas previously (and still for some) considered to be sensitive. The results already obtained by the pilot countries that have conducted GPS-SHaSA survey modules demonstrate their practicability (with no major difficulties for the NSOs and no respondent reticence or resistance, indeed quite the opposite) and the relevance of the adopted approach: analysis of collected data is definitely informative and helps understand the situation in the countries. In particular, the choice of relevant indicators enables national and international players alike to monitor and evaluate the extent to which the leadership's actions meet the population's expectations (**Figure 3**). Concrete illustrations and lessons learnt from pilot tests can be found in different documents.

Figure 3: Using GPS-SHaSA Statistics to monitor Agenda 2063 (the Africa we want) and SDG 16 indicators on corruption



The statistical approach: an inclusive process from many point of views ("*leaving no-one behind*")

Indicators built based on the population's experiences and points of view

The GPS surveys serve as a mouthpiece for the voice of the people. They provide information on the population's experiences and points of view and are not just based on national or international experts' opinions. Rather than having an indicator designed to aggregate the information and rank the countries, the data collected provide information on the nature of any problems or difficulties and the categories concerned (perpetrators and victims). The information is more detailed and more relevant to policymaking and policy adjustments. More specifically, the instruments target groups (already or potentially) marginalised or excluded.

An instrument that cultivates civic participation

Most importantly, this is an instrument that cultivates participation by the people in the decisionmaking process. Measurement and monitoring are in themselves already a way of achieving SDG16 (**Figure 4**). Where monitoring effectively gives the people a voice with policymakers and provides all stakeholders (policymakers, civil society and the public at large) with information on governance (level of corruption, level of trust, etc.), it delivers on the principles of inclusion, transparency, accountability and participation.

An initiative conducive to national ownership

Ownership by national players is promoted by the mechanism's institutionalisation, as its integration into the national statistical system combines with its design to voice the population's opinions. This is a process conducted by the countries, and not imposed or conducted from the outside. The statistics produced by the National Statistics Offices (NSOs) constitute public goods that citizens, policymakers and researchers alike can use to inform, guide and steer public policies.



Figure 4: Meet the imperative for measurement transparency and participation

Source: Razafindrakoto et Roubaud (2018a).

A bottom-up instrument revision and consolidation process

The different methodology revision and consolidation steps

Following the AUC's launch of the GPS-SHaSA initiative in 2012, the pilot phase developed and tested the instruments. Feedback for the initial technical assessments of the pilot phase was provided by a certain number of documents and discussions following public presentations of the tests.

In concrete terms, revision and consolidation called for consideration of the following elements:

- Instrument assessments: reliability, relevance and utility of the approaches and questions (subject and wording)
- Country-specific contexts and needs
- Statistical data needs for Africa's Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development.

This was the result of a long process involving:

- Input and discussions at public conferences presenting the initiative and its results
- Contributions and feedback from the different focal points representing the partner NSOs that took part in the pilot phase:
 - A first collection of reactions and returns on experience was put together over the 2013-2014 period (Orkin and Roubaud, 2015).
 - The same feedback collection process was conducted to prepare for the AUC-IRD-INSEE workshop on GPS instruments in November 2016.
- A collaborative work space set up with a shared Dropbox from June to November 2017 for everyone to be able to work together on this methodological revision. This initiative launched a "virtual review" of the GPS-SHaSA survey instruments, asking all pilot countries to comment on each of the questions in the two survey modules.
- All input and feedback was rounded up and considered in preparation for the November 2017 methodological revision workshop. The workshop was the last step for the proposal and validation of revisions and consolidation of the different methodological options.



Figure 5: A bottom-up country-driven construction process

Assets for visibility, recognition, consolidation and utilisation

It is worth highlighting the potential of the GPS instruments and their "transformative" capabilities (**Figure 5**) due essentially to a bottom-up development process (not one dictated by the international institutions) and putting into practice the principles of inclusion, participation and ownership by the countries (and their peoples). Steps need to be taken to prevent this process – and the instruments it generates – from being overshadowed and eventually stifled by any kind of standardisation or orders from the developed countries or the international community.

Importance of a training programme

The GPS-SHaSA initiative therefore needs to be flanked by an ambitious training programme for both NSO managers and potential users (policymakers and civil society) to ensure the dissemination and implementation of the methodology in the different countries, guarantee the quality of results, and ensure that they are usable and used by the different players. In this regard, IRD has already provided for a GPS school to be held regularly (once a year) with the possibility of a modular format.

This background paper elaborates on the GPS-SHaSA initiative to illustrate with concrete examples the different dimensions of governance as adopted in the *Handbook on Governance Statistics.* For each of the Handbook thematic chapters, the background paper provides some figures drawn from the first round of GPS-SHaSA surveys, conducted between 2013 and 2016, in nine Sub-Saharan Countries: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Uganda, a fairly representative sample of African diversity.

Source: Razafindrakoto et Roubaud (2018a)

Chapter B-1:

Non-discrimination and equality

Perception and Experience of Discriminations: results from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules in Africa

As stressed in this chapter (*Non-Discrimination and Equality*), non-discrimination is a fundamental standard of international human rights. It is at the core of SDG 16, with a dedicated indicator (16.b). Furthermore the principles of "justice" and "no one left behind" cannot only be achieved if discriminations are at stake.

Measuring discriminations is still a huge challenge. No standard methodology has been adopted yet, and indicator 16.b is still classified as Tier III. The *GPS-SHaSA* initiative in Africa developed a harmonized methodology at the continental level to capture discriminations in their different dimensions (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2015 and 2018a). The *GPS-SHaSA* questionnaire goes beyond indicator 16.b.1 in two respects: on the one hand, by distinguishing ten sources of experienced self-declared discriminations (ethnic, gender, religion, politics, economic, etc.); on the other hand, by measuring the perception of how much discriminations are common in the country, along the same ten dimensions. Here we focus on the aggregate level of experienced discriminations (of any kind), a direct measure of indicator 16.b.1, which we correlate with the perception of discriminations. We provide some illustrative results for the nine countries which conducted the first round of *GPS-SHaSA* survey between 2013 and 2016: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Uganda, a sample fairly representative of African diversity.

The simple descriptive statistics provide interesting and consistent results. First, in the nine countries, the rate of self-declared experienced discrimination (red dot in the **Figure B.1-1**) varies hugely. It ranks from 10 % and 12 % in Burundi and Mali respectively, to a bit more than 40 % in Uganda (41 %) and Malawi (43 %). With 61 %, Cameroon is by far the country where discriminations are the most widespread. Second, as expected, the share of the population who considers that discriminations are "*always*" or "*often*" a concern is much higher (one does not have to be personally victim of discrimination to consider discriminations are important in the country). As an extreme case, in Cape Verde, 33 % have been victim of discrimination during the year anterior to the survey, but 89 % declared discriminations are a huge concern in the country. Furthermore, the correlation between perceived and experienced discriminations is far from perfect. Thus, experience and perception of discriminations are two distinct phenomena worth being investigated. Finally, those who experienced personally some kind of discrimination are systematically more prone to declare that discriminations are of utmost importance. Burundi is emblematic in this respect: while 30 % of the population judge discrimination as a decisive issue to be addressed, they are 90 % when they have been personally affected.





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions are formulated as follows: "In the past 12 months, have you ever been victim of discriminations?" (**right scale**); "People are sometimes discriminated against on various grounds. In this country, do you think there is discrimination?" (**left scale**).

Some relevant variations can be underlined concerning victimization of discrimination by the socio-economic characteristics (**Figure B-1.2**). First, there is no important differences in the incidence of discrimination between male and female, except a slightly higher probability for men of being victimized in Uganda (46 % male vs 37 % female) while the reverse is observed in Cape Verde (30 % vs 36 % respectively). By areas, discriminations seem to be more prevalent in urban areas. It also affects more educated people (except in Malawi). Finally, younger people are in general slightly more impacted, except in Mali where the reverse is true (but the difference are not significant).







Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For the formulation of questions, see Figure B-1.1.

When it comes to the characteristics of the perception of discriminations, the results are globally consistent with the previous results on experience of discriminations (**Figure B-1.3**). Males and females tend to share the same perception about the pervasiveness of discriminations, the former being a bit more sensitive to the phenomenon. Again, excluding Malawi and Cape Verde (where urban and rural areas share the same perceptions), perceptions of discriminations are more acute in urban areas and for the more educated. Madagascar presents the higher gradient: 63 % of urbanites and 73 % of those who attended higher education consider that at least one form of discrimination is wide spread in the country, while "only" 43 % of rural people and 33 % of those who never attended school share this view. This might be linked with the higher incidence of

discriminations in urban areas and among the most educated, but also with a better access to information and awareness. The same holds for younger people who tend also to perceive more discrimination (except in Benin).



Figure B-1.3: Perception of discrimination by socio-economic characteristics

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For the formulation of questions, see Figure B-1.1

To round up this section, we ran some econometric models, country by country and on the pooled sample, to assess the association between experience of discrimination (of all kinds all together) and socio-economic factors. Along gender, no clear pattern is at stake. At the aggregate level, women are less victims of discrimination. Benin, Mali and Uganda, are the only countries in this situation at significant levels. Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar and Malawi show the same pattern but not significantly, meaning there is no significant differences between men and women. The only exception is Cape Verde where males are significantly less affected than females. All things equal, discriminations seem more prevalent in urban areas, except in Malawi where urbanites are more affected. Globally, older people seem to suffer less from discriminations. Here, Mali is at odds with this feature. Finally, the effect of education is non-linear: those with primary and secondary education are the most discriminated, compared to those who did not attend school and, at the same level, those who attend tertiary education.

				Cape	Côte					
	Benin	Burundi	Cameroon	Verde	d'Ivoire	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Uganda	All*
Woman	-0.103 ***	-0.0830	-0.0044	0.265 ***	-0.0431	-0.0738	-0.0005	-0.234 ***	-0.379 **	-0.0715 ***
Rural	-0.0398	-0.414 ***	-0.315 ***	-0.213 **	-0.227 *	-0.470 ***	0.503 ***	0.0914	-0.0086	-0.0662 ***
Age (refere	nce: 18-	24 years o	old)							
[25 - 44]	0.0323	0.184 *	0.155	0.00412	0.0638	0.0218	-0.140 **	0.218 **	-0.273	0.0358 *
[45 - 59]	-0.0272	0.139	-0.122	-0.524 ***	0.136	0.0928	-0.339 ***	0.378 ***	-0.185	-0.0190
60 & +	-0.0277	0.0665	0.167	-0.761 ***	-0.157	-0.242	-0.363 ***	0.285 **	-0.578 **	-0.0650 **
Education	(referen	ce: no sch	ooling)							
Primary	0.0447	0.0574	0.261 **	0.0143	0.112	0.0581	0.185 **	0.108	-	0.0903 ***
Secondary	0.0181	0.0837	0.320 **	-0.0345	0.263 *	0.313 *	0.126	0.150	-	0.104 ***
Tertiary	0.0766	-0.226	0.0152	0.0412	0.259	-0.464	0.0036	0.179	-	0.0418
# obs.	39,938	12,547	4,925	2,397	3,065	7,165	13,941	15,098	1,034	99,763

Table B-1: Socio-economic determinants of discrimination victimization

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimated Models are binary logit. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled model excludes Uganda (no data on education) and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model (because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon). The pooled model includes a country fixed effect.

Chapter B-2:

Participation in political and public affairs

Perception and Experience of participation: results from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules in Africa

As stressed in the introduction of the chapter, participation in political and public affairs is a universal human right and a key component of good governance (cf. Article 25 of the ICCPR, adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee). It is also da key pillar for a vibrant democracy. The Chapter adopted the following working definition: *"Taking part in the conduct of public affairs, including by registering to vote, voting and standing as a candidate in elections; being members of legislative, executive and judicial bodies at all levels of government; accessing positions in the public service; and engaging, individually or as members of political parties and other non-governmental organizations, in political activities such as by publicly expressing political opinions, campaigning, holding peaceful demonstrations or taking part in other forms of collective mobilization".*

The *GPS-SHaSA* module provides a lot of information on political participation. In this section we will focus on only two aspects of participation: classical dimension of political and social participation (including votes, membership in associations and political parties); and other forms of participation (like petitions, strikes and interests in politics). We present some illustrative results for the nine countries which conducted the first round of *GPS-SHaSA* survey between 2013 and 2016: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Uganda, a sample fairly representative of African diversity.

Classical forms of participation (votes and association membership)

The number of citizens who voted in the last presidential election was relatively high (**Figure B-2.1**). It varies from 49 % in Côte d'Ivoire to 83 % and 90 % in Burundi and Malawi. This figure should be taken with caution. They should be compared with official electoral participation, both having shortcomings. On the one hand, survey declaration may be biased due to difference in scope and also because of the potential social desirability bias (in general an upward bias). On the other hand, official results may be reliable because of frauds and political manipulation. Furthermore, electoral participation should be interpreted with caution: positively in democratic regimes, but ambiguous in autocratic regimes, with all the nuances in between.

Participation in association (of any kind, as a leader or a simple member) is less common, but still quite high compared to usual standards. With 41 %, Burundi citizens are the less involved in association. Membership rises to nearly four in five in Malawi (77 %) and Côte d'Ivoire (79 %). Disaggregating by type of associations, membership in local associations and political parties is more limited. The minimum is registered in Malawi and Burundi for local associations (12 % and 13 %), while participation in political parties is at its lowest in Madagascar (6 %), for a maximum of 26 % in Uganda and 23 % in Benin. Here again and for the same reasons, association membership, in particular in political parties, should be interpreted with caution.



Figure B-2.1: Classical forms of participation (vote and associations membership)

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. The questions are formulated as follows: "*Did you vote in the last presidential/general/tripartite elections?*"; "*Are you a member or a leader of* [...]?" **Figures B-2.2** and **B-2.3** present the tabulations of electoral participation and association membership by socio-economic characteristics. Electoral participation does not vary substantially along gender (except in Madagascar and Uganda where women vote slightly less). The gap is more important by area of residence. As expected, rural people participate systematically more than urbanites. In all countries, the differences are limited, with the exception of Cameroon where it amounts for 17 percentage points. Age is an important factor of vote behavior. Youth ([18-24] years) show some kind of disinterest in elections. As an extreme illustration, only 16 % of youth declared they voted in the previous elections compared to around 60 % for older counterparts. In Madagascar the corresponding figures are 40 % vs 80 % and in Uganda 45 % vs 90 %. Possibly an important part is not registered on the electoral lists. On the other hand, the trend is unclear in terms of education. The most educated are more prone to vote in Côte d'Ivoire, while we observed the contrary in Cameroon, and the distribution is flat in other countries.





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For questions formulations: See figure B-2.1.

Socio-economic characteristics of political party members also show consistent results (**Figure B-2.3**). Except in Madagascar where there is no gender difference, men are systematically more prone to be members of political parties than women. Membership in political party increases

with age, but recedes for the oldest (60 years old and over). Rural people are always more engaged in political parties than urbanites. Again, the evidence suggests no straightforward patterns along education level, depending on local circumstances. As regard age groups, young people participate less. Political party membership tends to increase with age up to 60 years old. We observe a certain form of disengagement for older people, but they still keep involved and participate more than youth.











Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For questions formulations: See figure B-2-1.

Other forms of participation

Other less classical forms of participation appear to be less common (**Figure B-2.4**). Indeed, political participation through petitions, strikes or other type of protests (in the year previous to the survey) never exceeds 7 % of the citizens (Benin), with a minimum of 2 % in Côte d'Ivoire. Interest in politics is also limited, although at higher levels. It varies a great deal between countries. Consistently with political participation, Benin citizens are the most interested (45 %)

with Malawi citizen (42 %). Conversely Côte d'Ivoire citizen declare the lowest level of interest (12 %). Interest for politics is also very low in Madagascar (18 %), Mali and Cape Verde (19 %).





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions are formulated as follows: "*Have you taken part in a petition/strike/other type of protest in the last 12 months?*" (Left scale); "*How interested are you in politics?*" (Somewhat + Very – right scale)

By socio-economic characteristics, males and the more educated are systematically more interested in politics than females and the less educated (**Figure B-2.5**). Regarding gender, the gap varies from 7 percentage points (ppts) in Cape Verde to 14 ppts in Burundi. This might reflect the still remaining patriarchal patterns in the political arena. In terms of education level, the gradient is steeper, Madagascar showing the greatest differences. 38 % of those with tertiary education show interest in politics (one of the highest level with Benin - 47 % - and Burundi - 49 %), while the proportion is only 10 % for those who never attended school (the lowest level with Côte d'Ivoire: 10 % too. The age pattern is consistent with other dimensions of political engagement: increasing over years, except for the older group (60 years old and over). Finally, differences between areas of residence are limited, except in Madagascar where urbanites show higher interest (by 10 ppts), while we observe the reverse in Benin and Malawi.



Figure B-2.5: Interest in politics by socio-economic characteristics



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For questions formulation: See figure B-2.4.

In order to disentangle the contribution of each of these four socio-economic factors on the variation of membership in political parties, we estimated econometric models, country by country and a global pooled model with the countries all together (**Table B-2**). Ceteris paribus, women participate less, while rural inhabitants participate more. Globally political membership is at its highest between 25 and 59 years old. Finally, the impact of education varies according to the contexts. Political membership increases with education in Cameroon but decreases in Benin and Malawi. At the global level, the pooled model shows a decreasing trend with education.

	Benin	Burundi	Cameroon	Côte	Madagascar	[.] Malawi	Mali	Uganda	All*
				d'Ivoire	9			U	
Woman	-0.338 ***	-0.322 ***	-0.315 ***	-0.523 ***	-0.143	-0.176 ***	-0.680 ***	-0.536 ***	-0.363 ***
Rural	0.035	0.391 ***	0.786 ***	0.063	0.327 **	0.583 ***	0.433 ***	0.245	0.198 ***
Age (refere	nce: 18-	24 years ol	d)						
[25 - 44]	0.011	0.456 ***	0.727 ***	0.075	-0.007	0.220 ***	0.416 ***	0.449 *	0.164 ***
[45 - 59]	-0.098	0.479 ***	1.349 ***	0.411 *	0.210	0.222 **	0.476 ***	0.532 *	0.195 ***
60 & +	-0.328 ***	0.235 *	1.284 ***	0.398	-0.026	-0.065	0.010	0.575 *	-0.042
Education	(referen	ce: no scho	oling)						
Primary	-0.463 ***	-0.053	0.760 ***	0.297	-0.170	0.263 ***	-0.073	-	-0.183 ***
Secondary	-0.377 ***	-0.110	1.020 ***	0.258	-0.312	0.230 **	0.329 ***	-	-0.174 ***
Tertiary	-0.495 ***	0.0405	0.810 ***	-0.059	0.888	-0.026	0.279	-	-0.319 ***
# Obs.	39,938	12,547	4,925	3,065	7,165	13,941	15,098	1,034	97,366

Table B-2: Socio-economic determinants of membership in political parties

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimated Models are binary logit. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled sample excludes Uganda (no data on education) and Cape Verde (the Political Membership has not been collected), and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model (because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon). The pooled model includes a country fixed effect.

Chapter B-3: Openness

Perception of Government Openness: results from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules in Africa

Government Openness is considered as a key dimension of governance, including transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholders participation principles. The working definition of public institutions Openness adopted in this chapter is "*The extent to which public institutions are transparent about their decision and policy making processes, and accountable for making sufficient information available to the media, members of the public and business*". In line with this definition, the chapter distinguishes four dimensions of Openness: access to information, the principle of open data, and freedom of expression (for the media and the people). In this section, we will illustrate Openness through empirical evidences drawn from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules. We provide descriptive statistics about three main issues: government's decisions transparency, freedom of speech and freedom of press. The results are presented for the nine countries which conducted the first round of *GPS-SHaSA* survey between 2013 and 2016: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Uganda, a sample fairly representative of African diversity.

First, here, perceived transparency of government's decisions is captured by the following question: "*How much information is provided by national government to citizens on government decisions?*". **Figure B-3.1** shows that the perceptions are globally low in the nine countries (all balances of opinion are negative) and vary importantly from one to another. According to their citizen, Madagascar and Benin are the less transparent countries with only 6 % and 13 % of the population considering information by the government is very comprehensive or sufficient enough. In Madagascar, the most pessimistic country in this respect, 50 % claim that there were no information released at all (highest rate of all countries). Transparency rate peaks in Uganda and Malawi, both gathering 42 % and 46 % positive opinions (the balances of opinion are respectively -17 points and -6 points). But even in these countries, only 8 % and 7 % consider the information provided by the government is very complete.



Figure B-3.1: Perceived transparency of government's decisions

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. The question is formulated as follows: *"How much information is provided by national government to citizens on government decisions?"* (Left scale); Balance of opinions (Right scale).

The second indicator considered is the perceived freedom of expression measured by the question *"Is freedom of expression respected in this country?"* The assessment in more positive than for information release. But, here again, it varies a great deal between countries (F**igure B-3.2**). Cameroun and Côte d'Ivoire citizen are the most critical, with a negative balance of opinions (-12 points and -4 points). At the other end of the spectrum, the balance of opinions for Burundi and Mali is positive with 36 and 37 points respectively. Globally, except for Cameroun and Côte d'Ivoire, at least half of citizens see their freedom of expression respected, leaving a non-negligible proportion of citizens unsatisfied, and in the expectation of improvements in this aspect.

Figure B-3.2: Perceived freedom of expression



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions are formulated as follows: "*Is freedom of expression respected in this country?*" (*Left scale*); Balance of opinions (**Right scale**).

Note: Answer's modalities were "Yes" (in green) and "No" (in red) for Benin, Madagascar and Burundi.

Perceived freedom of press follows similar patterns (**Figure B-3.3**). Except for Cameroun (balance of opinions of -12 points), at least half of citizens considers freedom of press respected, with a maximum rate in Mali (balances of opinions of 45 points) and Burundi (up to 95 points). Nevertheless, it still leaves great and varying proportions of unsatisfied citizens (around 50% in Cameroun, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Madagascar) who think the media are not free.



Figure B-3.3: Perceived freedom of press/media

The questions are formulated as follows: "Is freedom of the press /media respected in this country? (Are newspapers, radio and tv media free to publish without fear of being shut down?)"; Balance of opinions (**Right scale**).

Note: Answer's modalities are binary ("Yes" in green and "No" in red) for Benin, Madagascar and Burundi.

Respondents' socio-economic characteristics provide interesting and consistent results (**Figure B-3.4**). Globally, those who perceive government's decisions are transparent are more likely to be rural and less educated (except in Côte d'Ivoire where the contrary is true and Cape Verde where there is no differences). It can probably be explained by the fact that more isolated areas and less conscious citizens underestimate the number of government's decisions they should have to know. Additionally, only slight variations are observed concerning gender. Older citizens tend to express more optimistic views about government transparency (except in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda).

Figure B-3.4: Perceived transparency of government's decisions by socio-economic characteristics



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For the formulation of the question, see Figure B-3.1. Modalities "*Often*" and "*Always*)" are aggregated.

A very similar picture is given for the freedom of press and media (**Figure B-3.5**). Rural citizens more often considers the media are "*Often*" or "*Always*", as the least educated. For instance in Madagascar, 59 % of rural citizens declare this principle is respected whereas urbanites are only 41% to think accordingly. An opinion shared by 68 % of those who never attended school compared to only 28 % of those who reached higher education. This might be explained by the higher concentration of media and press in urban areas (so a higher probability to perceive a lack of freedom). It can also be explained by the fact that the more educated might be more sensible to this aspect (media being a vector of information and knowledge). No great differences are observed by sex and age of the respondents (with a few exceptions).



Figure B-3.5: Perceived freedom of press/media by socio-economic characteristics

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For the formulation of the question, see Figure B-3.3. Modalities "*Often*" and "*Always*)" are aggregated.

In order to disentangle the contribution of each of these four socio-economic factors on the perception of government transparency, we estimated econometric models, country by country and a global pooled model with the countries all together (**Table B-3**). The results are as follows. Ceteris paribus, at the aggregate level women tend to be less convinced information provided is sufficient, but this result is only highly significant in Mali and Benin. Rural inhabitants are more positive in this respect than urbanites. However, the coefficients are not significant in four countries out of nine. Neither does have any influence age groups, except and marginally for the most aged in the pooled model. Finally, education level impacts negatively on the probability to consider government information is adequate. Again, the effect is limited to secondary and higher education, and it is not robust in the majority of countries.

	Renin	Burundi	Cameroon	Cane	Côte	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Uganda	A 11*
	Denin	Durunui	cameroon	Verde	d'Ivoire	Madagastai	Marawi	Man	oganua	All
Woman	-0.075 **	0.072	0.077	-0.005	-0.123	-0.067	0.065	-0.209 ***	-0.114	-0.054 ***
Rural	-0.067	0.337 ***	0.353 ***	-0.095	-0.282 **	0.374	0.012	0.458 ***	0.291	0.113 ***
Age (refere	nce: 18-	24 years o	old)							
[25 - 44]	-0.061	-0.021	0.009	0.005	-0.080	0.116	0.038	0.003	0.030	-0.005
[45 - 59]	-0.068	0.052	0.288	0.196	-0.025	0.276	0.031	0.061	-0.253	0.016
60 & +	-0.052	0.141	0.029	0.437 ***	0.018	0.266	0.089	0.002	-0.231	0.064 **
Education	(referen	ice: no sch	ooling)							
Primary	-0.044	-0.058	-0.382 ***	-0.091	-0.118	-0.423 *	0.110 *	-0.080	-	0.000
Secondary	-0.049	-0.239 *	-0.369 **	-0.173	-0.103	-0.238	-0.136 *	0.0452	-	-0.110 ***
Tertiary	-0.067	-0.542 **	-0.144	-0.016	0.060	0.152	-0.174	-0.278	-	-0.122 ***
# obs.	39,938	12,471	4,906	2,344	3,065	7,165	13,936	15,098	1,034	99,487

Table B-3: Socio-economic determinants of perceived transparency of governments' decisions

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

For the formulation of the question, see Figure B-3.1.

Notes: Estimated Models are binary logit. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled sample excludes Uganda (no data on education) and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model (because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon). The pooled model includes a country fixed effect.

Chapter B-4: Access to and quality of justice

Perception and Experience of access to justice: results from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules in Africa Ensuring access to and quality of justice for all is an objective *per se* as well as a driver of social and economic development. It is a component of the rule of law and is at the core of SDG 16 given the UN target 16.3 (*Promote the rule of law at the national and international level, and ensure equal access to justice for all*). It refers to the ability of people to be aware and to enforce their rights. At the same time, it concerns the principle of obtaining efficient and just resolution of justiciable problems, in compliance with human rights standards. This resolution can be operated through impartial formal or informal institutions with appropriate legal support. In order to measure access to justice, different dimensions must be taken into account: the existing structure or resources (the legal framework and justice institutions), the process or how these resources are mobilised and the outcomes (quality, satisfaction). In this section, we will illustrate access to and quality of justice through empirical evidences drawn from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules. We provide descriptive statistics on these three dimensions in the framework of conflict resolution.

Regarding the structural dimension of access to justice, **Figure B-4.1** displays citizens' perception of existing tensions between groups and the perceived existence of a conflict resolution mechanism. First, it appears that perceived tensions are relatively low but non negligible, and vary importantly between countries. Citizens who perceive tensions range from 8% and 9% of the population in Mali and Cape Verde, to 24 % and 30 % in Madagascar and Burundi. Systematically more than 65 % of citizens in each country claim the existence of a conflict resolution mechanism, except for the extreme case of Uganda (6 %), and the less extreme cases of Cape Verde (36 %) and Benin (47 %). These results might probably reflect variations in terms of access to institutions or their actual effectiveness. Moreover, the figure shows that those perceiving tensions are moderately more prone to perceive the existence of conflict regulation mechanisms (except in Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi).





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions were formulated as follows: "These days, is there any tension, conflict or violence between groups in your area?" (right scale); "In your area, is there any means, institutions or persons to help resolve conflicts?" (left scale).

Regarding the process in order to access to justice, Public Security Forces (PSF) are not the most often contacted to solve a conflict. This is a striking result given their official role of law enforcement agency. The only exceptions are Uganda and Cape Verde where respectively 81 % and 95 % of citizens perceive them as the main actors for conflict resolution mechanism. In the other countries, the institutions which are most frequently approached are more "informal". On the one hand, Mali, Cameroon and Malawi give more importance to traditional leaders (51 %; 62 %). On the other hand, Madagascar, Benin and Burundi show greater priority to local comities (61 %; 50 %; 62 %). These results highlight the central role of traditional and community

institutions, with the key role of traditional leaders and/or the decreasing trust in the police and the formal justice. For the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the respective role of formal and informal institutions is relatively more balanced.





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions were formulated as follows: "*Where do people usually go to get help for resolving a conflict?*" *Notes:* ** The database on Uganda only had 58 respondents for this question.

* For Côte d'Ivoire, the interpretation is a bit different because the variable was constructed in a different way compared to the other countries, since the modalities were not initially exclusive. A new variable for « Reported to » had to be created by favoring the "Law enforcement" option. The proportions are therefore decreasing as we move away from "law enforcement".

Regarding outcomes indicators of access to justice, and in particular quality of justice, Figure B-**4.3** sums up the perceived effectiveness of conflict resolution institutions in general (All), for those who only mentioned Public Security Forces (PSF) and for those who only mentioned traditional leaders or local comities (informal). First, in each country, at least 50% of the citizens find conflict resolution institutions effective in general (All). The balance of opinions varies importantly from -2.4 in Benin (not far from Cape Verde), where 42.6% and 5.5% of citizens find them "not really" and "not at all" effective, to +74.5 in Burundi, where those rates were respectively 11% and 2% (closely followed by Madagascar and Mali). Second, perceived effectiveness varies importantly between Public security Forces (PSF) and Traditional leaders or Local comity (informal). Indeed, except in Benin, Informal institutions are systematically seen as more effective compared to PSF. In some cases, the gap is huge (Cameroon, Mali, Madagascar and Côte d'Ivoire) and, in other cases, we notice only a slight difference (Cape Verde, Malawi and Burundi). One possible explanation of this difference could be found in the lack of confidence and performance of formal institutions (probably linked to corruption or discrimination matters). Another explanation could be drawn from cultural values. Indeed, proximity of traditional leaders and the strength of the social pressure in a local comity (for punishing or preventing conflicts) could make them more efficient than more distant institutions, such as the police or a court.

Figure B-4.3: Perceived effectiveness of conflict resolution by institutions



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions were formulated as follows: "How effective is this (mechanism)?"

Note: 1st bar= All citizens (*All*); 2nd bar= citizens who only mentioned Public Security Forces (*PSF*): 3rd bar= citizens who only mentioned traditional leaders or local comities (*Informal*); The balance of opinions display the difference between positive and negative opinions.

Figure B-4.4 discloses views and awareness on the existence of conflict resolution institutions by socio-economic characteristics. Globally, it appears that answers differ depending on the area of residence (rural citizens are more prone to perceive the existence of resolution mechanism, except in Cape Verde), education level (less educated are more numerous to claim its existence, except in Cape Verde, Benin and Cameroun) and the age (slightly more positive answers for older people systematically), but with no differences in terms of gender.





By age

By education



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For questions formulations: See Figure B-4.1.

When looking at respondents' area of residence, it appears that Public Security Forces are usually more solicited by urbanites than rural citizens (**Figure B-4.5**). And in the case of Madagascar and Mali, richer people are more prone to solicit PSF. On the other side, rural citizens tend to more consider traditional and community institutions. These specific institutions (informal) may operate at their best in rural areas, where interpersonal trust is an important parameter and where traditional customs are still leading.

Figure B-4.5: Perceived conflict resolution institutions by area and by income/consumption distribution





In order to shed light on the characteristics of the citizens who share a positive view regarding the quality of justice, we estimated econometric models on the socio-economic determinants of trust in justice institutions, country by country and a global pooled model with the countries all together (**Table B-4**). The results are as follows. Ceteris paribus, at the aggregate level, women tend to be more inclined to claim their trust. But this result is only highly significant in Mali and, in a lesser extent, in Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire. Rural inhabitants are also more positive in this respect than urbanites. The coefficients are not significant only for Cape Verde. The picture is not clear regarding the age groups influence, even if it appears in the pooled model that older people tend to express more their distrust. Finally, education levels impacts negatively on the probability to trust justice institutions. However, this last result does not apply for Malawi and coefficients are not significant for Cape Verde and Mali.

	Benin	Burund i	Cameroo n	Cape Verde	Côte d'Ivoir e	Madagasca r	Mali	Ugand a	Malawi	All*
Woman	-0.0297	0.108 **	0.00305	0.145 *	-0.221 **	0.125 *	0.175 ***	0.123	-0.215	0.0463 ***
Rural	0.194 **	0.595 ***	0.392 ***	0.0770	0.400 ***	0.544 **	$0.471 \\ {}^{***}$	0.443 ***	0.460 *	0.362 ***
Age (reference	e: 18-24	vears old)								
[25 - 44]	-0.110 ***	-0.170 **	0.0431	-0.0159	-0.126	-0.106	0.00747	-0.202	0.165	-0.0893 ***
[45 - 59]	-0.101 **	-0.153	0.225 *	0.420 ***	-0.0938	-0.0462	-0.0699	0.0393	0.199	-0.0739 ***
60 & +	-0.197 ***	0.0529	0.291 *	0.875 ***	-0.244	-0.0996	-0.109	0.332	0.165	-0.0647 **
Education (r	eference:	no schooli	ng)							
Primary	-0.176 ***	-0.0386	-0.141	0.0902	-0.160	-0.138	-0.0899	-	0.721 **	-0.135 ***
Secondary	-0.168 ***	-0.469 ***	-0.305 **	-0.0917	-0.283 *	-0.576 ***	-0.151	-	0.416	-0.333 ***
Tertiary	-0.197 ***	-1.026 ***	-0.0473	0.226	-0.814 ***	-0.837 **	-0.222	-	0.518	-0.306 ***
# obs.	39,938	12,473	4,909	2,346	3,065	7,165	15,098	1,034	788	86,347

Table	B-4 :	Socio-e	conomi	c de	etermi	nants	of tru	st in	iustice	institut	ions
IUDIC	~			v u c		inanco			Jubuce	mourue	10110

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimated Models are ordered logit, except for Burundi and Madagascar where estimated Models are binary logit. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled sample excludes Uganda (no data on education) and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model (because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon). The pooled model includes a country fixed effect.

Chapter B-5:

System responsiveness and satisfaction with services

Perception of responsiveness: results from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules in Africa

As stressed in this chapter, responsiveness and inclusiveness of policies are two major concerns of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG16). The underlying challenge is to deliver public services that are consistent with citizen needs and aspirations. For the purpose of the handbook, responsiveness is defined as *the degree to which public institutions listen to what people want and act on it i.e. whether public policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and uphold their rights.* As SDG16 prones efficient, inclusive and peaceful institutions, the indicator 16.7.2 is supposed to measure "*the proportion of the population who believes that decision making is inclusive and responsive*". The indicator 16.7.2 allow to assess if institutions are driven by citizens' preferences and if the ordinary citizen has a say in policy formulation and policy making.

The *GPS-SHaSA* module provides a lot of information on responsiveness. In this section we will focus on two of the many questions addressing this issue: "*Do you think that politicians respond to the population's concerns and needs?*" and "*How often do you think the Members of Parliament / Senate listen to people like you?*". The results are cross-tabulated by socio-economic characteristics and institutional trust (see chapter 7). We present some illustrative results for the nine countries which conducted the first round of *GPS-SHaSA* survey between 2013 and 2016: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Uganda, a sample fairly representative of African diversity.

In the nine countries, the majority of citizens are dissatisfied with the politicians' responsiveness to their demands (**Figure B-5.1**). The proportion of citizens who declared that politicians "*never*" or only "*sometimes*" respond to population's needs varies between 90 % and 70 % (except in Burundi where 64 % citizens are satisfied). A potential consequence of this high level of distrust could be a low level of trust in the administration. Effectively, **Figure B-5.1** suggests that the more you are satisfied with politicians' responsiveness, the more likely you are to trust the administration. Burundi and Malawi are an exception in this respect: the trends are reversed or unclear. In Malawi, even if 38 % of citizens said the politicians '*never*' respond to their concerns, they still are 87 % to trust the administration. One possible interpretation of this result is that they put high hopes on future decisions, despite the fact that they are not satisfied with what has been provided so far.



Figure B-5.1: Politicians' Responsiveness to population's needs and Trust in the administration

The questions are formulated as follows: "Do you think that politicians respond to the population's concerns and needs?"; "How much do you trust the administration (in general)? (Completely + somewhat)" Notes: In Benin, answer's modalities were uniquely "Yes" (in green) or "No" (in red). The "Trust" bars represent then the proportion of people who trusts (or not) the administration between those who answered Yes or No in the first question.

Socio-economic characteristics of unsatisfied citizen show that men and women tend to share similar opinions (Figure B-5.2). Age groups do not differ substantially, except at the margins in Madagascar and Cameroon where older citizens are slightly more unsatisfied (and the reverse in Cape Verde and Mali). No great differences are observed between urban and rural areas, except in Madagascar and Mali where rural people tend to express slightly less dissatisfaction. Finally, the more educated are more prone to express negative opinions on politician's responsiveness (except in Burundi with a reverse trend and in Benin where there's no differences). This last observation might find an explanation in their better access to information and their more demanding expectations from politicians.





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations For questions formulations: See figure B-5.1.

Secondary

cape verde

Mali

Malani

Benin

Higher

0%

Burundi Madagascal

No school

coted Indire

Cameroon

Primary

The second question, a better proxy of the NOSAY question, can be declined at the national level (Figure B-5.3) and at the local level (Figure B-5.4). Without going into details, when asking the degree of dissatisfaction with the listening of Members of Parliament and local elected officials, is quite substantial. It is sometimes even higher than when asking about politicians' responsiveness in general. For instance in Burundi, responsiveness gathers 64 % of positive answers for the politicians in general vs 20 % for the members of parliament. Again, trust in the administration varies positively with the degree of listening.

coted woire

25-44

Cameroon

45-59

Verde

Malani

60 and more

Benin

Mali

Cape

Uganda

Burundi

Madagascat

18-24



Figure B-5.3: Members of Parliament's responsiveness (degree of listening) and Trust

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations The questions are formulated as follows: *"How often do you think the Members of Parliament / Senate listen to people like you?"*; *"How much do you trust the Parliament/Senate?* (Completely + somewhat)"



Figure B-5.4: Local elected officials/councilors' responsiveness and Trust

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions are formulated as follows: "*How often do you think local elected officials/councilors listen to people like you?*"; "*How much do you trust the Mayor*? (Completely + somewhat)".

To round up this section on public institutions responsiveness, we estimated econometric models to assess the net contribution of the four socio-economic factors on. The results are as follows. At the aggregate level, men and women share the same opinion about central authorities (national assembly) capacity to listen to the ordinary citizen. This point of view is also shared by all age groups. Urbanites are, ceteris paribus, more critical. Finally, education seems to lower appraisal of government responsiveness. But the effect does not hold for all countries and is not robust, apart to distinguish those who never attended school vs all the others.

				Cano	Côto					
	Benin	Burundi	Cameroon	Verde	d'Ivoire	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Uganda	All*
Woman	-0.045 *	0.116 ***	-0.079	0.088	0.064	0.066	0.078 *	-0.059	0.009	-0.009
Rural	0.039	-0.202 **	0.221 **	-0.159 *	0.042	0.413 ***	0.254 ***	0.287 ***	0.122	0.070 ***
Age (refere	nce: 18-	24 years	old)							
[25 - 44]	-0.057	0.040	-0.055	-0.006	-0.004	0.045	0.005	-0.018	-0.018	-0.021
[45 - 59]	-0.098 **	0.055	0.051	-0.017	0.076	-0.004	-0.046	-0.062	-0.253	-0.026
60 & +	-0.088	-0.021	-0.240	0.183	0.108	0.005	-0.086	0.108	-0.293	-0.012
Education	(referer	nce: no scł	ooling)							
Primary	-0.167 ***	-0.026	-0.133	0.078	-0.033	-0.138	0.143 **	-0.177 ***	-	-0.079 ***
Secondary	-0.092	0.0217	-0.204	0.039	-0.172	-0.049	0.023	-0.106	-	-0.085 ***
Tertiary	-0.101	-0.011	-0.065	0.179	-0.493 **	-0.438 **	-0.139	-0.191	-	-0.093 ***
# obs.	39,938	12,472	4,907	2,346	3,065	7,165	13,935	15,098	1,034	99,490

Table B-5:Socio-economicdeterminantsofMembersofParliament's/SenateResponsiveness (NoSay question)

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimated Models are ordered logit. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled sample excludes Uganda (no data on education) and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model (because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon). The pooled model includes a country fixed effect.

Chapter B-6: Absence of corruption

Perception and Experience of corruption: results from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules in Africa

Today corruption remains a global concern for all the continents and may manifest itself through different forms (bureaucratic corruption or political/legislative corruption). The SDG Target 16.5 (*"Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms"*) explicitly aims at erasing this concern that lasts since a long time. In this section we provided indicators of both experience and perception of corruption. The question *"In the past 12 months, have you had to give money or to offer a gift to a civil servant to influence service or favorable outcome?"* [SDG 16.5.1], available in the GPS-SHaSA surveys, is an indicator of experienced petty corruption. The question *"To what extent do you think that corruption is a concern in this country?"* is an indicator of perception that captures all kind of corruption, including grand corruption and political corruption.

In the nine Sub-Saharan countries, corruption victimization by civil servants varies importantly (**Figure B-6.1**). It goes from 1 % and 3 % in Cape Verde, Burundi and Mali to 17 % and 22 % in Uganda and Cameroon. With 24 % victimized citizens, Côte d'Ivoire is the country which experienced petty corruption the most. Not surprisingly, perception of corruption is higher than experience (one does not have to be victim of corruption to perceive corruption pervasiveness in the country). The lowest level of perception can be found in Benin (55 % of citizens see that corruption is "often" or "always" a problem) and the highest in Madagascar (92 %). However, the correlation between experience and perception of corruption is low, which invites to investigate further those two distinct phenomena. Furthermore, victims of corruption. While it is the case for the majority of the countries under review, in Cape Verde the reverse is true: victims of corruption are less likely to think corruption is an acute problem in the country.





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions formulated as follows: "*To what extent do you think that corruption is a concern in this country?*" (always + often) (**Left scale**); "*In the past 12 months, have you had to give money or to offer a gift to a civil servant to influence service or favorable outcome?*" (**Right scale**) The observations for the latter include only those who declared they had contact with institutions.

Descriptive statistics of respondent's characteristics provide interesting and consistent results. First, males tend to be more victimized by women, and urban people are more prone to experience corruption than rural people (except in Côte d'Ivoire where it is the reverse trend). This might be explained by the fact that men might usually be those who contact the more the administration and that institutions are more concentrated in urban areas (with then a higher probability or being asked to pay bribes). Additionally, usually more educated people are more prone to be a victim (might be linked with area of residence). Finally, younger people are more victimized than older people, except in Benin and Madagascar displaying a reverse trend. This last observation might also be explained by the higher contact with the administration of the younger people and the more educated.



Figure B-6.2: Experience of corruption by socio-economic characteristics

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For questions formulation, see figure B-6.1.

In terms of perception, less heterogeneity is found regarding socio-economic characteristics (**Figure B-6.3**). While corruption victimization differs between gender, the perception are more alike, men being slightly more sensitive to corruption prevalence. Urban dwellers are also more critical of the pervasiveness of corruption than rural people, the gap varying from 11 ppts in Benin to 2 ppts in Mali. Concern about corruption is increasing with age (before 60 years old) and even more pronounced with education. For instance in Benin, where concerns about corruption is at its lowest, 45 % of those without education claim corruption is a real issue versus 65 % for those who attended tertiary education. In Madagascar, where corruption is denounced the most, the respective figures are 92 % vs 95 % respectively. Mali appears as an exception, as concern about corruption is decreasing with education. This unique result should be investigated further.



Sources: GPS-SHaSA, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For questions formulation, see figure B-6-1.

The association between corruption victimization and institutional trust deserve attention. **Figure B-6.4** shows that trust in the administration is higher for victims of corruption. The gap is huge in Malawi: 87 % of the population trust the administration in general, while only 55 % of the victims are in the same situation. In other countries, the gap is much lower suggesting corruption is not the only determinant of institutional trust. However, the evidence is again an invitation to fight against corruption in order to limit its negative impact on institutional trust.

Figure B-6.4: Trust in the administration and experience of corruption



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions are formulated as follows: "How much do you trust the administration (in general)? (Completely + somewhat)" (left scale); "In the past 12 months, have you had to give money or to offer a gift to a civil servant to influence service or favorable outcome?" (Right scale)

To round up this section on corruption, we estimated econometric models to assess the net contribution of the four socio-economic factors. The results are as follows.

Females are significantly less affected than males in most of the countries and in the pooled regression. The only exceptions are Cape Verde, Madagascar and Uganda, where gender doesn't influence victimization of corruption. Moreover, rural dwellers suffer significantly less than their urban counterparts, except in Côte d'Ivoire where rural areas are more victimized. In Benin, Cape Verde and Madagascar, area of residence isn't significant. Plus, age is at play in the pooled regression, with differing signs and significances, country by country. While citizens between 25 and 44 years old are globally more prone to be victim of corruption, those of 60 years old and more are less affected. The role of education is globally unclear. Country by country, the effects of education vary and in the pooled regression they are negative and weakly significant (10%).

	Benin	Burundi	Cameroon	Cape	Côte	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Uganda	All
				Verde	d'Ivoire					
Woman	-0.290 ***	-0.889 ***	-0.408 ***	0.243	-0.948 ***	0.00407	-0.410 ***	-1.163 ***	-0.249	-0.538 ***
Rural	-0.007	-0.881 ***	-0.539 ***	0.282	0.412 ***	0.0290	-0.575 ***	-0.425 **	-0.495 ***	-0.194 ***
Age (refere	nce: 18	-24 years	old)							
[25 - 44]	0.089	0.522 **	0.276 **	-0.032	0.123	0.265	0.176	0.188	0.184	0.172 ***
[45 - 59]	0.052	0.339	0.0081	-0.565	-0.0662	0.306	0.117	0.030	-0.168	0.073
60 & +	0.066	0.284	-0.0834	0.476	-0.728 **	0.369	-0.429	-1.047 ***	-0.297	-0.186 ***
Education	(refere	nce: no scł	100ling)							
Primary	-0.220	0.474 ***	0.0200	0.280	0.0490	0.185	-0.0411	0.224	-	-0.029
Secondary	-0.327 ***	0.00252	0.305 *	0.468	-0.500 ***	0.568 **	0.0977	-0.042	-	-0.017
Tertiary	-0.363 ***	-0.516	0.609 **	1.266	-0.173	0.186	0.429	-0.351	-	-0.094 *
# Obs.	14,719	9,950	4,238	2,230	2,345	4,876	11,820	8,574	1,034	59,204

Table B-6: Socio-economic determinants of Corruption Experie	ence
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Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimated Models are binary logit.. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled sample excludes Uganda (no data on education) and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model

(because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon). The pooled model includes a country fixed effect.

Chapter B-7: Trust in institutions

Trust in institutions:

results from the GPS-SHaSA modules in Africa

As shown in this chapter, Trust in institutions is a key element of the governance nexus, both a cause and a consequence of other governance dimensions. That is why Trust in institutions is one of the variables considered in the GPS-SHaSA questionnaire, harmonized at the continental level (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2015 and 2018a). Less investigated is the association between socio-economic status of the population and institutional trust. Here we will provide some results for the nine countries which conducted the first round of GPS-SHaSA survey between 2013 and 2016: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Uganda, a sample fairly representative of African diversity. We will focus on the public administration in general as results are very consistent when looking at more specific public institutions (police, justice, customs...), considered in the GPS-SHaSA generic module (11 different institutions investigated).

The first analysis of unconditional correlations based on descriptive statistics provides illuminating results. At the aggregate level, trust in public administration varies hugely from 40 % in Cameroon to 87 % in Burundi and Malawi. It is of interest to know if having a concrete experience with services changes the appreciation one has and the corresponding trust. Globally the answer is no, as illustrated in **Figure B-7.1**. In all countries, the level of institutional trust is independent of whether one has been in contact or not with the administration. Incidentally, it is worth noting the rate of contact with public services varies hugely from a low 31 % in Benin to a huge 96 % in Malawi.





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. **Questions formulated as follows:** *"How much do you trust the administration (in general)?* (Completely + somewhat)".

The GPS-SHaSA module offers the possibility to disaggregate the results by a rich set of socioeconomics characteristics. The empirical evidence suggests highly robust patterns, which hold whatever the country and the level of confidence. First, contrary to expectations, there is no difference between men and women in trust towards administration (**Figure B-7.2**, top left panel). Second, variation according to age brackets is very limited, and most of the time nonsignificant, Cape Verde being the only country where age seems to matter bottom left panel). If any, older people tend to be more trustful. Third, by area, urbanites appear systematically more distrustful in their administration than their rural counterparts, although the gap varies substantially, from 17 and 12 percentage points (ppts) in Mali and Cote d'Ivoire to insignificant differences in Burundi and Malawi; the two latter countries being by far the most trustful. Fourth, education levels (which can also be considered as an economic status proxy) show the steepest gradient. Trust in administration is at its lowest for those who attended university and at its highest for those who never went to school. The gap may be huge, as far as 20 ppts in Madagascar and Cote d'Ivoire. One natural element of interpretation is that citizen with higher social status (urban, educated, wealthy) are more prone to express critical views, potentially as a skill developed at school and also due to a better access to information.





In order to disentangle the contribution of each of these four socio-economic factors on the variation of institutional trust, we estimated econometric models, country by country and a global pooled model with all the countries together (**Table B-7**). Ceteris paribus, gender is in general non-significant or non-robust. The only case they are, the signs are opposite: being a woman reduces trust in Côte d'Ivoire, while the reverse is observed in Mali. Rural inhabitants are more trustful. The impact of age on institutional trust varies according to the contexts. Finally, education has a robust negative impact on trust.

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. **Questions formulated as follows:** *"How much do you trust the administration (in general)?* (Completely + somewhat)".

	Benin	Burundi	Cameroon	Cape	Côte	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Uganda	All*
				Verde	d'Ivoire	U			C	
Woman	-0.017	0.052	-0.022	-0.041	-0.161 *	0.038	-0.094	0.139 ***	0.124	0.0201
Rural	0.152 *	0.494 ***	0.472 ***	0.262 ***	0.513 ***	0.310	0.428 ***	0.611 ***	0.564 ***	0.348 ***
Age (refere	ence: 18	-24 years	old)							
[25 - 44]	-0.138 ***	-0.217 **	0.023	-0.017	-0.285 **	-0.003	0.016	0.059	0.088	-0.0887 ***
[45 - 59]	-0.143 ***	-0.235 **	0.289 **	0.426 ***	-0.215	0.048	-0.184	-0.042	0.264	-0.0513 **
60 & +	-0.159 ***	-0.0507	0.109	0.575 ***	-0.098	0.021	-0.488 **	-0.085	0.123	-0.0360
Education	(refere	nce: no scł	nooling)							
Primary	-0.201 ***	-0.188 **	-0.279 **	-0.204	-0.01	-0.177	-0.229	-0.040	-	-0.149 ***
Secondary	-0.148 **	-0.672 ***	-0.189	-0.463 **	-0.108	-0.441 ***	-0.425 ***	-0.147	-	-0.299 ***
Tertiary	-0.208 ***	-0.906 ***	-0.213	0.122	-0.782 ***	-0.625 **	-0.595 ***	-0137	-	-0.319 ***
# Obs.	39,938	12,475	4,910	2,347	3,065	7,165	3,236	15,098	1,034	85,561

Table B-7: Socio-econo	mic determinants	of Institutional Trust
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Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimated Models are ordered logit, except for Burundi and Madagascar binary logit. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled sample excludes Uganda (no data on education) and Malawi (the Trust question has only been asked for those in contact with the administration. The pooled model includes a country fixed effect, and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model (because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon).

To push further the analysis of trust correlates, we investigate the link between institutional trust and discriminations and corruption experience (**Figure B-7.3**). As expected, in general discriminated people are more prone to distrust public institutions. However, the correlation is weak. In Burundi, Mali and Malawi there is no significant differences between discriminated and non-discrimination people. Other factors should more important to shape trust level. The same holds with corruption. For eight out of nine countries, victims of corruption distrust more their general administration than those who did not suffer from corruption. The impact is stronger than for discriminations. For instance, Benin registers the maximum decrease in trust due to discrimination (-22 ppts). The gap reaches -32 ppts for corruption in Malawi.

Figure B-7.3: Trust in the administration by discrimination and corruption status



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Questions formulated as follows: "How much do you trust the administration (in general)? (Completely + somewhat)" **(Left scale)**; "Have you ever been victim of discrimination for this reason [...]?" (At least one reason: ethnicity, language/dialect, religion, regional origins...)" **(Right scale)**.

Chapter B-8: Safety and security

Perception and Experience of crime, safety and security: results from the *GPS-SHaSA* modules in Africa

As stressed in this chapter, safety and security is a fundamental standard of international human rights. It is also a precondition of good governance and economic and social development. Safety and security is at the core of SDGs, with numerous dedicated indicators, mainly SDG 16, but also SDGs 5 and 11. Measuring safety and security is still a huge challenge. In their great majority, indicators are still classified as Tiers II (conceptually clear, availability of internationally established methodology and standards, but data not regularly produced by countries).

The *GPS-SHaSA* initiative in Africa developed a harmonized methodology at the continental level to capture crime, safety and security in their different dimensions (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2015 and 2018). With nearly one hundred specific questions, the *GPS-SHaSA* questionnaire goes beyond SDGs indicators in various respects: by addressing both criminal (except homicide) violence and political violence; by measuring both perception and experience of safety and security; by detailing sub-dimensions to go beyond aggregate indicators. Here we focus on two key SDG 16 indicators: 16.1.3 (*Proportion of population subjected to (a) physical violence, (b) psychological violence and (c) sexual violence*) and 16.1.4 (*Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live*). We provide some illustrative results for the nine countries which conducted the first round of GPS-SHaSA survey between 2013 and 2016: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali and Uganda, a sample fairly representative of African diversity.

The simple descriptive statistics provide interesting and consistent results. First, in the nine countries, the rate of self-declared experience of crime (red dot in the **Figure B-8.1**) varies hugely. It ranks from 6 % and 9 % in Mali and Madagascar respectively, to 25 % in Burundi, 27 % in Malawi and 29 % in Cameroon. Second, as expected, the share of the population who does not feel safe ("*always*" or "*often*") when walking in their neighborhood is much higher (one does not have to be personally victim of discrimination to consider discriminations are important in the country). As an extreme case, in Burundi, 25 % have been victim of crime during the year prior to the survey, while 87 % declared they feel insecure. Furthermore, the correlation between crime and feeling of insecurity is far from perfect, demonstrating these are two distinct phenomena worth being investigated. Finally, those who experienced personally some kind of crime are systematically more prone to declare that they feel insecure. Benin is emblematic in this respect: while 52 % of the population declare they feel unsafe when walking alone around the area they live, they are 77 % when they have been personally victim of crime.





Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

The questions are formulated as follows: "How safe do you feel in the following situation? [...]: Walking alone in your area during daytime or at night"? (Left scale) Over the past 12 months, did the following happen to you? [...]: Physical assault, Sexual harassment, Rape or attempted rape, Theft at home, Theft at home, Theft outside home, Personal goods destruction. (Right scale)

The *GPS-SHaSA* data can be cross tabulated with a rich set of socio-economic characteristics. This advantage is of utmost relevance to assess the *no one left behind* principle. **Figure B-8.2** presents indicator 16.1.3 by sex, area of residence, age groups and education levels. Without commenting the results in details, some general patterns can be underlined. In all countries, victims of crime are more often male and urbanite. In both cases, the gaps are limited (with a maximum of 4 ppts across gender, and 3 ppts by areas), except in Uganda and Cameroon where urbanites are much often victims of violence. The gap rises up to 9 ppts in Cameroon and 13 ppts in Uganda. Younger people are systematically more at risk, as (in general) the less educated.







Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For the formulation of questions, see Figure B-8.1.

Turning to indicator 16.1.4 (safely walking in her neighborhood), the results are quite different, confirming that experiences and perceptions are two different dimensions of safety and security deserving being measured and investigated (exploring the interactions). Consistent with crime patterns, the feeling of insecurity is more widespread in urban areas and among youth (**Figure B-8.3**). However, female and educated people feel more insecure while they experience less acts of violence.



Figure B-8.3: Fear of walking alone (SDI 16.1.4) by socio-economic characteristics



Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations. For the formulation of questions, see Figure B-8.1.

To round up this section on safety and security, we estimated econometric models to assess the net contribution of the four socio-economic factors on crime victimization (all forms together, except homicides). The results are as follows. In all countries, men are, ceteris paribus, more often directly targeted. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant in four of them (Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda). Crime is generally more prevalent in urban areas. Again the coefficients are not significant in four countries (Benin, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Madagascar). Globally, young people are more often victim of violence. The effect is highly robust in Benin and Uganda, where victimization decreases steeply with age. The same pattern is at stake, although less significant, in all other countries, except in Burundi where crime victimization is at its highest between 25 and 59 years old. Finally no clear feature seems playing with education. In Benin, education protects from crime victimization: the coefficients are increasing constantly and significant. At the reverse, in Cameroon crime affects the more educated. The pooled model suggests that only higher education protects from crime. All in all, the association between crime victimization and education are not robust nor does it show any clear pattern, appearing to be context dependent.

	Benin	Burundi	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Côte d'Ivoire	Madagascar	Mali	Uganda	All*
Woman	-0.150 ***	-0.0888 **	-0.127	-0.141	0.0979	-0.266 **	-0.275 ***	-0.174	-0.140 ***
Rural	0.0353	0.0323	-0.337 ***	-0.334 ***	-0.135	-0.197	-0.300 *	-0.542 **	-0.0678 ***
Age (referer	nce: 18-2	24 years ol	d)						
[25 - 44]	-0.139 **	0.291 ***	-0.0466	-0.111	-0.153	0.00812	-0.0981	-0.439 **	-0.0355
[45 - 59]	-0.195 **	0.295 ***	-0.131	-0.402 *	-0.364	-0.100	-0.0396	-0.644 **	-0.0591 *
60 & +	-0.331 ***	0.0564	-0.164	-0.781 **	-1.151 ***	-0.437 **	-0.170	-0.839 ***	-0.244 ***
Education (referenc	ce: no scho	oling)						
Primary	-0.266 **	0.256 ***	0.170	0.0960	0.0324	0.270	0.0256	-	-0.0237
Secondary	-0.348 ***	0.157	0.294 **	0.222	0.219	0.226	0.0419	-	-0.00870
Tertiary	-0.230 **	-0.357	0.346 *	-0.0845	-0.560 *	0.435	-0.150	-	-0.110 **
# obs.	39,936	12,547	4,898	2,397	3,065	7,164	15,098	1,017	85,674

Table B-8: Socio-economic determinants of crime victimization

Sources: GPS-SHaSA modules, 2013-2016, NSOs; authors' calculations.

Notes: Estimated Models are binary logit. *: 10 %; **: 5 %; ***: 1 %. The pooled sample excludes Uganda and Malawi and has slightly greater observations than the sum of each country's model (because of missing or null values in weight variables for Burundi and Cameroon). The pooled model includes a country fixed effect.

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